Democratic states and authoritarian firewalls: America as a black knight in the uprising in Bahrain

Abstract

Although history is replete with democracies supporting autocracies, democratic black knights have not been approached in a systematic manner. This article examines American rhetoric and policy towards the 2011 uprising and subsequent crackdown in Bahrain in order to further our understanding of how and why democratic states act to reinforce authoritarian firewalls. It finds that the USA was instrumental in providing diplomatic and political cover to the Bahraini government and ensuring that the regime paid no substantive costs for its counter-democracy actions. This case suggests that democratic states may be more effective at providing normative support for non-democratic regimes than their authoritarian counterparts and that democracies may have more in common with autocracies when choosing to act as a black knight than initially thought. Avenues for future research are identified.

Keywords:

• authoritarian persistence
• black knights
• Bahrain
• Arab Uprisings
• US foreign policy

Notes

1. Black knights may also seek to undermine recent democracies in order to reverse democratic trends or advance other interests (Ambrosio 2009, pp. 131–158).

2. The Obama administration's refusal to support the failed, 2009 Green Revolution in Iran is another such example. However, it is a weaker comparison to the present case since it was less a case of active support for a state with which the USA had close relations than a failure to actively support the opposition against a regime with which it has troubled relations.

Another exception was the George H.W. Bush administration's willingness to continue to back Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union after the January 1991 crackdown in Lithuania. However, this is an even more difficult comparison since the Lithuanian movement was at the same time both pro-democracy and pro-secession and, since the Second World War, the USA has generally opposed secession on principle.

3. For a fuller background on the protests, see Dickinson (2012), Friedman (2012), Mitchel (2012), and Zunes (2013).

4. This preceded the Obama administration, as evidenced by American diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks (Landler 2011).

5. Not all of her statements were positive, though her criticisms were mild and in line with her ‘half-full’ comment.

6. See statements by Crowley ('State Department Daily Press Briefing’ 2011), Clinton ('Secretary Clinton's interview on ABC's’ 2011), and US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice in Birch (2011).

7. See statements by Clinton (‘Libyan bloodshed’ 2011, ‘Special Press Briefing’ 2011) and Mullen (‘Mullen reaffirms’ 2011).

8. This was especially true for the non-indigenous members of the security forces whose citizenship may be called into question should the al-Khalifa family fall from power.

9. See statements by Obama (‘Bahrainis protest’ 2011) and Clinton ('Secretary of State Hillary’ 2011).

10. Although the presence of the American naval base was not a target of the protestors, there were legitimate fears that the Fifth Fleet's basing rights would be in danger under a Shiite-led government.