![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This article seeks to explain the combined political effects of international sanctions against Iran and Tehran's domestic responses on the power structure of the targeted regime. It contends that although sanctions have contributed to elite infighting in Iran, they have not weakened the targeted regime. The Iranian leadership's modified reading of the imposed sanctions from targeted United Nations, US and European Union (EU) nonproliferation sanctions as an opportunity to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities to the perception of comprehensive and coordinated US and EU sanctions as regime change efforts marked a critical juncture. Tehran's adjusted responses to these sanctions, shaped by the interplay between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, affected Iran's balance of power to the detriment of the outgoing president and his faction. This impact sheds a light on the workings of a targeted hybrid regime under intensive sanction pressure.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Oliver Borszik completed his master's degree in Islamic Studies and German Language and Literature Studies at the University of Hamburg and then completed his doctoral degree in Islamic Studies at the Asia-Africa-Institute, University of Hamburg. Oliver Borszik is an Associated Research Fellow at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Middle East Studies. He was a Lecturer at the Department of Islamic Studies, University of Hamburg and also was a Visiting Researcher at the German Federal Foreign Office in the Department 311 (Iran, Iraq, Arab Peninsula, Gulf Cooperation Council). He also gained his Ph.D. scholarship at Evangelisches Studienwerk Villigst.
Notes
1 I would like to thank André Bank, Christian von Soest and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) research team Religion, Conflict and Politics for their invaluable comments and suggestions. This paper is a product of the research project ‘Ineffective Sanctions? External Sanctions and the Persistence of Autocratic Regimes’, funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention in March 2014.
2 The interviews were conducted during the author's research stay in Iran in October and November 2013.
3 Interview with Fouad Izadi, Political Advisor to the Former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Chief Nuclear Negotiator, Said Jalili, and Associate Professor at the Institute of North American Studies at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, 2 November 2013.
4 For an overview of the US, UN, and EU sanctions imposed on Iran from 2006 to 2013 see International Crisis Group (Citation2013, pp. 54–57).
5 In addition, the P5+1 came into being. It consisted of the five UNSC veto powers – China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US – plus Germany. In order to influence Iran's nuclear decision-making process, the P5+1 pursued a dual-track approach that oscillated between engaging Iranian officials in negotiations and supporting sanctions.
6 Full text of Doctor Mahmud Ahmadinejad's lecture at the UN General Assembly, 17 September 2005, online: <http://www.president.ir/fa/2393/> (last accessed 27 May 2015). This and all other Farsi-language excerpts translated by the author.
7 Meet the West's worst nightmare, in: The Guardian, 15 January 2006, online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/15/iran.jasonburke> (last accessed 21 April 2015).
8 Interview with Daniel Bernbeck, Executive Director of the German–Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Tehran, on 4 November 2013 in Tehran.
9 Khamenei, address to a gathering of pilgrims and neighbours at the shrine of Imam Reza, 21 March 2007, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3378> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
10 UNSC resolution 1737, online: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1737(2006)> (last accessed 27 May 2015). The resolution mainly called upon the international community to prevent the supply of nuclear-related assistance to Iran, to impose travel bans and asset freezes on Iranian persons and entities involved in the nuclear and missile programmes, and to prevent Iranian students from studying abroad in disciplines relevant to nuclear expertise. Reiterating the IAEA's concerns regarding the expansion of Iranian proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, the UNSC also adopted resolutions 1747 in March 2007, 1803 in March 2008, and 1929 in June 2010.
11 The IFSA sanctions package forced any non-US parties to endorse the US blacklisting of Iranian banks and refrain from any dual use technology transfer to Iran. Thus, it essentially punished any financial, commercial, or technical assistance to Iranian persons and entities associated with proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of WMD delivery systems (International Crisis Group Citation2013, pp. 8–9). The act also included the financial and political support of prodemocracy forces in Iran. It was passed in September 2006, online: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/pl109_293.pdf> (last accessed 30 April 2015).
12 Der Spiegel Interview with Iran's Chief Nuclear Negotiator: ‘We Welcome New Sanctions', in: Der Spiegel, 30 September 2009, online: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,652104,00.html> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
13 The EU measures prohibited any assistance to the nuclear programme and extended the travel bans and asset freezes stipulated by the UNSC (Bassiri Tabrizi & Hanau Santini, Citation2012, p. 2; Portela, Citation2014, pp. 19–20)
14 Interview with Mohammad Marandi, Dean of the Faculty of World Studies and Associate Professor at the Institute of North American and European Studies at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, 2 November 2013. Interview with Fouad Izadi.
15 Interview with Daniel Bernbeck.
16 Khamenei, speech during a meeting of the people of Shiraz, 30 April 2008, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3427> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
17 Khamenei, address during the ceremony marking the seventeenth anniversary of Imam Khomeini's death, 4 June 2006, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3341> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
18 Interviews with Mohammad Marandi and Fouad Izadi.
19 Interview with Daniel Bernbeck. During the period from 2005/2006 to 2011/2012, Tehran generated 531 billion USD in oil revenues, accounting for approximately 75% of the total export income (Torkan & Farnam Citation2012, pp. 9–10). This sum significantly exceeded the 141 billion USD earned during Ayatollah Rafsanjani's presidency, and the 157 billion USD earned during Mohammad Khatami's presidency. The reliability of these data is unclear because the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) has not clarified whether they have been adjusted for inflation.
20 Interview with Daniel Bernbeck.
21 Barack Obama offers Iran ‘new beginning' with video message, in: The Guardian, 20 March 2009, online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/20/barack-obama-video-iran> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
22 Khamenei, address to a gathering of pilgrims and neighbours at the shrine of Imam Reza, 21 March 2009, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=6082> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
23 Khamenei, speech during a gathering of people from Mazandaran, 26 January 2010, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=8678> (last accessed 30 April 2015).
24 Russia and China had opposed any further UN sanctions against Iran.
25 The act was adopted in July 2010 by US Congress, included enhanced sanctions against non-US entities that were still involved in economic and financial interactions with Iranian banks and companies and provided the backbone to freezing Iran out of the global economy. CISADA, online: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/hr2194.pdf> (last accessed 27 April 2015).
26 The EU Foreign Affairs Council imposed an almost comprehensive sanctions package including a trade ban as well as banking restrictions that affected Iran's energy, financial, military, transportation, and insurance sectors. EU Council Decision of 26 July 2010, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:195:0039:0073:EN:PDF> (last accessed 27 April 2015).
27 Under CISADA, subsequent US executive orders, and the EU Council Decision in April 2011, Washington and Brussels imposed travel bans on, blocked the property of, and restricted the financial transactions of Iranian individuals responsible for human rights abuses and jurisdiction against demonstrators, journalists, human rights defenders, and students affiliated with the Green Movement.
28 Khamenei, address at the shrine of Imam Reza, 21 March 2011, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=11804> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
29 Khamenei, speech during a gathering of people from Mazandaran, 26 January 2010, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=8678> (last accessed 30 April 2015).
30 Parliament: Mussavi and Karrubi are counter-revolutionaries, in: Kayhan, 3 March 2011.
31 Khamenei, answer of the supreme leader of the Islamic revolution on the president's request, 3 July 2006, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=1401> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
32 Interview with Daniel Bernbeck.
33 Within the framework of the consecutively passed US Congress National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which was signed by Obama in December 2011, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCPA), and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA), Washington planned to curtail Iran's oil revenues by prohibiting any foreign banks from performing transactions with the CBI, which received the country's oil receipts to a great extent. NDAA, online: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr1enr.pdf>; IFCPA, online: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4310enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4310enr.pdf>; ITRSHRA, online: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/hr_1905_pl_112_158.pdf> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
34 Given Iran's sustained progress at uranium enrichment to the level of 20%, Germany and the other leading EU states, UK, and France, considered broadening their restrictive measures and gradually adopted a ‘discouragement strategy’ vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic (Interview with Daniel Bernbeck). In January 2012, the EU Foreign Affairs Council decided to impose an embargo on Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products, which took effect in July 2012 and was accompanied by, among other things, an insurance ban for oil shipments and a freeze on the CBI's assets. Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:019:0022:0030:EN:PDF> (last accessed 27 May 2015). In March of that year, the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide International Financial Transfers (SWIFT) excluded Iranian banks from its network and, thereby, effectively prevented any foreign transactions with them through this network (International Crisis Group Citation2013, pp. 13–14).
35 Khamenei, address at a meeting of junior scientific elites, 5 October 2011, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=17466> (last accessed 7 May 2015).
36 Ahmadinejad, speech at a meeting of regime officials with the supreme leader, 24 July 2012, online: <http://www.president.ir/fa/41587/printable> (last accessed 7 May 2015).
37 Khamenei, address at the shrine of Imam Reza, 21 March 2013, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=22233> (last accessed 7 May 2015).
38 During the course of international sanctions, the programme expanded significantly. Whereas in 2005 fewer than 300 centrifuges for uranium enrichment were in place, at the end of Ahmadinejad's presidency this number amounted to roughly 19,000. The stockpile of low enriched uranium for manufacturing fuel rods for the nuclear power station in Bushehr expanded from 800 kilograms in 2008 to more than 8000 kilograms in 2013. In addition, Iran had produced more than 100 kilograms of medium enriched uranium by that time.
39 Khamenei, Friday prayer in Tehran, 3 February 2012, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=18923> (last accessed 6 May 2015).
40 Khamenei als Bewunderer von Ahmadinejad, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 August 2008, online: <http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/khamenei-als-bewunderer-von-ahmadinejad-1.815756> (last accessed 18 May 2015).
41 Telhami, Arab Public Opinion Poll, 5 August 2010, online: <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/8/05-arab-opinion-poll-telhami/0805_arab-ic_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf> (last accessed 19 May 2015).
42 Motahari: The deviant current is a faction that has a special way of thinking, in: Fars News Agency, 2 October 2012, online: <http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910710001020> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
43 Motahari: The government is responsible for the situation of the economy, in: Tabnak, 5 October 2012, online: <http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/276737> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
44 Khamenei, address during a meeting of citizens in Azerbaijan, 16 February 2013, online: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=22042> (last accessed 27 May 2015).
45 Interview with Hesamoddin Ashna.