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ABSTRACT
The participatory innovations of the last few decades, particularly in Latin America, seem to suggest that the establishment of more participatory democracies is possible. However, limitations have characterized important participatory experiences. While the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan attempts to promote popular participation have produced both positive and negative effects, some of these participatory experiences’ limitations are useful to highlight more general problems and contradictions that seem to be inherently associated with the establishment of participatory democracy in poorly functioning liberal democracies and in exclusionary and unequal societies. This analysis suggests that, paradoxically, the establishment of effective and inclusive participatory institutions may be less feasible where participatory mechanisms appear, at first glance, as most needed and promising.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Any mistakes or omissions are mine.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Claudio Balderacchi completed his PhD in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. He then served as an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Florida Center for Latin American Studies.
Notes
1. It should be noted that, according to Barber (Citation1984/2003, p. 263), the institutions he proposes should not be introduced individually but, rather, through a comprehensive reform. For an attempt to place Latin American countries on a similar continuum and for an analysis of the balance between participation and representation in a number of Latin American countries, see Cameron and Sharpe (Citation2012, pp. 241–245).
2. On the limited impact of local participatory initiatives in Brazil, see Pogrebinschi and Samuels (Citation2014, pp. 317–318).
3. Author's translation of ‘una sociedad democrática, participativa y protagónica, multiétnica y pluricultural’. Retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/vigente.html.
4. Author's translation of ‘participativa, representativa y comunitaria’. Retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html.
5. Ecuador's constitution retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html.
6. I pursue these objectives in the aforementioned Balderacchi (Citation2015).
7. In line with some of the weaknesses of liberal democracy reviewed by Peruzzotti and Selee (Citation2009, pp. 2–3), liberal democratic institutions can be viewed as strong and effective when elections are complemented by a clear separation of powers and a system of checks and balances largely able to impartially and effectively enforce the rule of law.
8. More drastically, in his analysis of the left in Latin America, Panizza (Citation2005, p. 730) observes that leftist forces should recognize that ‘new forms of political participation can only be built on the foundations of strong representative institutions’.
9. Wolff (Citation2013, p. 38) himself recognizes the question of judicial independence from popular control as a significant source of controversy in the debate on liberal and post-liberal models of democracy.
10. In particular, Bay-Meyer (Citation2013, p. 421) raises concerns over ‘restrictions in the distribution of public goods and social services’.