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ABSTRACT
The EU and the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states have been engaged in milieu-shaping in their shared Arab Mediterranean neighbourhood. This article argues that this engagement has taken place in a disconnected way rather than in a coordinated fashion. The majority of GCC countries have been guided by neo-realist considerations with a focus on short- and mid-term gains and occasional recourse to hard power. In contrast, the EU, through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), has long tried to circumvent geopolitics by focusing on long-term normative milieu-shaping, drawing on a mix of normative soft power tools. However, since the 2015 ENP review, this ambition is no longer central to EU foreign policy considerations. Instead, EU milieu-shaping goals are increasingly underpinned by neo-realist-inspired security concerns. Thus, an interest-based convergence between the EU and GCC countries is emerging in so far as also the EU is regarding its neighbourhood increasingly less through the prism of normative objectives. Yet, as will be demonstrated, and despite the EU's growing awareness for the necessity of cooperating with other powers in addressing an unstable neighbourhood, this convergence is unlikely to generate a shift from mutual neglect to systematic collaboration between the parties in their shared neighbourhood.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Tobias Schumacher is chairholder of the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair at the College of Europe Natolin (Warsaw, Poland). He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Lisbon University Institute (CEI-IUL).
Notes
3 GCC member states have been hosting approximately 2–3 million Syrians since the beginning of the conflict. As their refugee relocation efforts are not processed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, this assistance is often ignored and Syrians finding refuge in the Gulf are, therefore, not categorised as ‘refugees’.
4 See the annual Regional Humanitarian Funding Updates published by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
5 This was visible when Oman hosted Syria's foreign minister Walid Moallem on 2 April 2015 to discuss a potential ending of the conflict. See Oman's diplomatic bridge to Syria, Citation17 August Citation2015.
6 See Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and a divided Gulf, Citation11 July Citation2017.
7 See UAE signs $4.9 billion aid package to Egypt, Citation26 October Citation2013. See Saudi Arabia comes to the rescue of the Egyptian economy, Citation25 April Citation2016. See also UAE allocates $4 bn. in assistance to Egypt (Citation2016, April Citation23). The National. Citation23 April Citation2016.
8 See Kuwait informs UN of assistance being delivered to Libyan ‘brothers’, Citation23 May Citation2011. Qatar was instrumental in the NATO-led campaign against Libya by exerting diplomatic pressure through the Arab League and the GCC. Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the then head of the Libyan National Transition Council (NTC), acknowledged that the NTC's success was owed to Qatar, which allegedly supported the Libyan opposition in 2013 with US$2 billion.
9 According to a recent report of a UN panel of experts, the UAE are still supplying weapons to the anti-Islamist Libyan National Army and to the city state of Zintan. See Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011).
10 See Arab Nations strike in Libya, surprising U.S., Citation25 August Citation2014.
11 Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995 and its work programme.
12 In July 2016, the EU offered Jordan such a relaxation of rules. It applies for ten years, covers goods in 52 chapters of the Harmonised System and corresponds with the rules that are usually granted to Least Developed Countries.
14 See The Gulf Co-operation Council. A Club Fit for Kings, Citation19 May Citation2011.
15 See Morocco Aims for GCC Trade as European Picture Looks Cloudy, Citation28 October Citation2011.
16 See MAEC, ‘Le Maroc aspire à “un partenariat institutionnel avancé” avec les pays du CCG et place l’Afrique au centre de sa politique extérieure’, 2 November 2011.
17 See Gulf States Approve $5 Billion Aid to Morocco, Jordan, Citation20 December Citation2011.
18 See Jordan pivots to Saudi Arabia, Citation21 April Citation2016.
19 See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/qatar-diplomatic-crisis-latest-updates-170605105550769.html.
20 See Oman, 18 September Citation2016.