https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2977-4985
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ABSTRACT
The AKP came to power in Turkey in 2002 after a devastating economic crisis and has since become a hegemonic party. Despite its neoliberal policies, its votes mostly come from the poorer echelons of the society. This article analyses the AKP as a prime example of ‘neoliberal populism' and argues that the AKP's social policies are the material sources of its neoliberal populism. There are, however, important contradictions in AKP’s social policies. First, they have mostly benefited informal sector workers, but have decreased the benefits of formal employees. Second, some of the social policies are programmatic and universal, but others are particularistic and clientelistic. Third, although social programmes and spending increased, the labour policies of AKP have decreased the power and conditions of labour. These social policy contradictions help AKP target the poor unorganized sections of the society, gain and maintain popularity among them and weaken opposition to its neoliberalism and authoritarianism.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Yonca Özdemir is an assistant professor at the Political Science and International Relations Program of the Middle East Technical University, Northern Cyprus Campus. She holds a PhD from University of Pittsburgh. She specializes in international and comparative political economy. Her research examines politics of economic reform, development policy, economic globalization, and most recently the links between neoliberalism and populism. Her works include both cross-national studies and also case studies of Turkey, Cyprus and some Latin American countries.
ORCID
Yonca Özdemir http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2977-4985
Notes
1 Yet, as will be mentioned in the Conclusion section, finally the AKP has started to lose votes in 2019 due to growing economic crisis.
2 Naim (Citation1994) calls these new set of policies ‘the second generation Washington Consensus’, while Rodrik (Citation2002, Citation2006) refers them as ‘Augmented Washington Consensus’.
3 After AKP consolidated its power in 2011, Erdoğan became more dominant in the party and AKP’s populism became more personalized under the cult of Erdoğan (Lancaster, Citation2014; Yilmaz & Bashirov, Citation2018). Thus, it would not be wrong to conflate AKP with Erdoğan.
4 Sinan Aygün, ‘Türkiye Dönüm Noktasında’ [Turkey at a Crossroads], Zaman (Aug. 15 2002).
5 However, one should not forget that that same period was a period of high growth for almost all economies as 2003–2007 was the global economic boom period.
6 One exception to this trend is the Kurdish electorates who are usually the poorest in Turkey but shifted their support away from AKP towards the Kurdish party especially from 2015 onwards (KONDA, Citation2015).
7 There was Pension Chest (Emekli Sandığı) for civil servants, Bağkur for the self–employed, and Social Insurance Institution (SSK) for the employees in private enterprises. The benefits of these three institutions varied greatly with Emekli Sandığı with the best benefits and SSK the worst.
8 Buğra and Candaş (Citation2011) call this an ‘eclectic social security regime’ as it combines some traditional welfare state policies with some new neoliberal policies, such as CCTs and private charity.
9 As a result of these changes the health expenditures skyrocketed in Turkey. See Eder (Citation2010) and Yıldırım and Yıldırım (Citation2011).
10 The data union density data are taken from the OECD statistics (https://stats.oecd.org/).
11 Bianet, 9 January 2019 (http://bianet.org/bianet/emek/204304–akp–doneminde–engellenen–milli–guvenligi–bozucu–grevler).
12 Data are taken from ILO web site at http://www.ilo.org/global/statistics–and–databases/lang––en/index.htm on August 22, 2017.
13 See Health and Safety Labour Watch/Turkey web site (http://www.guvenlicalisma.org/).
14 For instance, by 2008 about 400,000 households were assisted by the Ankara municipality, which was controlled by the AKP (Köse & Bahçe, Citation2009).
15 The most common way for the AKP municipalities to raise charity funds was to favour pro–AKP businessmen in the public bids and in privatization of publicly owned companies in exchange for donations to their charity funds.
16 As stated in a New York Times article, ‘The corruption inquiry has targeted the ministers’ sons, a major construction tycoon with links to Erdoğan and municipal workers, and it centres in part on allegations that officials received bribes in exchange for ignoring zoning rules and approving contentious development projects’ (Arango, Citation2013, par. 8.). The scandal was revealed thanks to the power struggle between the two political Islamist groups, the Gülen movement and AKP (Taş, Citation2018).
17 Later in 2011, SYDGM was placed under the Ministry of Family and Social Policy.
18 Considering that most of this assistance was handed to the women in the households (70%, according to the Turkish Family and Social Assistance Ministry), one can easily understand why AKP is quite popular among housewives.
19 Numbers are calculated from the Turkish Statistical Institute’s social protection statistics.
20 The best known example is when washing machines and dishwashers were distributed in Tunceli just before the local elections in 2009. Yet, it is also widely observed that coal and food assistance increases especially before the elections. Also, the number of Greencard holders peaked to 14,541,791 just before elections in 2007. See Çelik (Citation2010).
21 In 2007, Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), a giant NGO for social assistance, was accused for conducting illegal activities in Germany and its administrators took prison sentences in Germany. The Turkish branch’s court case started in February 2008 but all defendants got acquitted in 2015. Other best known examples are İnsani Yardım Vakfı (Humanitarian Aid Foundation), Kimse Yok Mu, and Can Suyu Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği.
22 According to the 2013 official statistics, poverty rate in Turkey is 22.4%. This rate is calculated by taking poverty threshold as 60% of the median income in Turkey (http://www.tuik.gov.tr/basinOdasi/haberler/2014_61_20141021.pdf).
23 Data are taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute’s social protection statistics.
24 Data are taken from World Bank, Poverty and Equity Database (http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/home/).
25 In the 31 March 2019 local elections, AKP lost the municipalities of three main metropolitan cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) to the opposition (Sancak, Citation2019).
26 The data on deteriorating political and civil liberties in Turkey can be accessed at Freedom House’s webpage, https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey.