Spreading a norm-based policy? Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy in international media

ABSTRACT

Since 2014, Sweden has pursued the world's first Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP). However, the effectiveness of its policy promotion depends on how Sweden's efforts to spread this norm-based policy are perceived and evaluated by other states. We argue that a policy promotion effort has to be perceived as legitimate, coherent and salient by target populations in order to be effective. We investigate the extent to which it is the case in national newspapers of 17 countries, representing world and regional powers. We demonstrate that most coverage of the FFP is rather modest, notably in non-Western countries. Further, we argue that the coverage of Sweden's FFP in foreign media is influenced by three challenges: (1) an absence of a universal definition of FFP; (2) a clash between ideals of FFP and Swedish “traditional” security and commercial interests; (3) an uneasy relationship between the concept of feminism and media in many countries.

KEYWORDS:

• External perceptions
• feminist foreign policy
• media analysis
• norms
• Sweden

Introduction

In 2014, Sweden declared its intention to henceforth pursue a ‘Feminist Foreign Policy’ (FFP). This initiative can be read as an intensification of Sweden’s long-standing ambition to fight for gender equality, not only in Sweden but also world-wide. Sweden has for many years been an active champion of women’s rights and gender equality (Bergqvist & Jungar, 2000), but the FFP arguably takes a radical step from the ‘broadly consensual orientation of gender mainstreaming toward more controversial politics’ (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 323) and has been characterised as ‘a normative reorientation of foreign policy’ (ibid). While the policy rests on existing norms, as expressed i.a. in international conventions, the FFP constitutes a novel and enhanced normative approach, as ‘the feminist foreign policy entails applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout foreign policy’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 9, emphasis added).

The focal points of the FFP are to promote equal rights and freedom from sexual violence, sexual and reproductive health and rights, women’s participation in politics and peace processes, and equal allocation of resources between women and men. The new feminist policy well illustrates the Swedish government’s ambition, with roots in its ‘active foreign policy’ of the 1960s (see Brommesson, 2018), to be a policy entrepreneur, an actor dedicated to the spread of its cherished norms, expressed in terms of a new, innovative policy (cf. Ingebritsen, 2002).

Policy entrepreneurs can normally expect to encounter resistance, and especially so if the policy they pursue is an ideational construct that has not yet attracted support from influential Others. Though a few other states, like Canada (Government of Canada, 2017), France (Government of France, 2019), Mexico (Government of Mexico, 2020), and Spain (Government of Spain, 2020) have introduced feminist thinking into their external policies, the concept of a feminist foreign policy can be considered radical; it is at least unfamiliar and untested. Alongside progressive politics and advances in gender equality around the world, there are also forces working in the opposite direction, with anti-feminist sentiments and opposition to ‘gender ideology’, not least in populist or far-right movements and parties (Agius et al., 2021). Promoting this type of policy poses a challenge where the policy entrepreneur has to carefully assess the chances for policy spread and what strategies that are needed to reach this goal.

In this article, we explore the preconditions for policy promotion effectiveness. To do this, we employ an approach focusing on external perceptions (Chaban & Elgström, 2021a; Elgström & Chaban, 2015). How significant Others perceive and interpret a novel policy initiative is, we submit, crucial for assessing its potential emulation. We argue that, at a minimum, a policy promotion effort has to be perceived as legitimate, coherent and salient by target populations to have a chance to survive and gain ground. In the empirical section, we investigate the extent to which the Swedish FFP is perceived to fulfil these criteria in 17 countries that are of significance for Swedish policy entrepreneurship. This is done by analysing FFP coverage in 34 major national newspapers, which we consider critical intervening actors for international norm diffusion. Is the FFP a salient topic in these newspapers (covering the time period 2014–2019) and is the Swedish initiative seen as legitimate and coherent?

Our results demonstrate that the coverage of Sweden’s FFP is rather modest, notably in non-Western countries. Sometimes newspapers discuss feminist foreign policy without naming it as such. Even when feminist foreign policy is named, there is often no extensive elaboration on what it means and how it works. Most coverage of feminist foreign policy is centred around diplomatic conflicts and personas of politicians, rather around the content of the policy itself. We argue that the coverage of Sweden’s FFP in foreign media is influenced by three challenges that stem from the norm-based nature of this policy: (1) an absence of a universal definition of feminist foreign policy; (2) a clash between ideals of feminist foreign policy and Swedish ‘traditional’ security and commercial interests; (3) an uneasy relationship between the concept of feminism (the so-called ‘f-word’) and mass media in many countries. These challenges, we argue, shape the perceived legitimacy, coherence, and salience of Sweden’s FFP in international newspapers. The present article thus contributes to recent debates on the FFP by focusing on how international media characterise Sweden’s feminist foreign policy.

We continue the article by motivating our focus on external perceptions, by exploring and detailing key preconditions for policy promotion effectiveness and by introducing three key challenges to a FFP. In the following methodology section, we operationalise our central concepts and explain our choice of target countries and newspapers. Thereafter follows a comparison of perceived salience, legitimacy, and coherence in Western and non-Western¹ newspapers. We finalise the article with a discussion of the challenges facing Swedish policy entrepreneurship and by presenting some policy recommendations.

A focus on external perceptions

Perceptions are part of the ‘psychological milieu’ of political actors, in other words, they are about how actors see the world (Jervis, 1976, p. 13). Perceptions can be conceptualised as mental pictures consisting of our cumulated experience-based knowledge about the surrounding world as well as beliefs about appropriate behaviour (Vertzberger, 1990, pp. 114–27). They often have an affective component, and hence one can expect a consistent set of affective responses to cognitive images (Cottam, 1992, pp. 13–14). We argue that political actors have identifiable world-views, where perceptions of self and relevant ‘Others’ are key ingredients, and they use these perceptions as a basis for making judgements and deciding on strategies. According to Jervis (1976, p. 28), ‘it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others’. Perceptions of self, others and of the situation they are facing therefore assist elites as well as the general public in interpreting and understanding the complex reality and help them to structure, but may also distort, what they see.

We argue that an analysis of outsiders’ views of Sweden’s FFP is essential because it (a) contributes to our understanding of Sweden’s self-identification and the roles it plays in international politics, and, more importantly in this context, (b) provides an insight into how external perceptions influence what impact Sweden policies have on external actors. What effect Swedish policies have is influenced by their perceived salience, legitimacy and coherence. It is difficult to gain influence if Sweden’s ideas are not noticed and discussed. It is improbable that Sweden wins support for a feminist policy if outsiders do not perceive its ideas as legitimate. Perceived incoherence between words and deeds may create obstacles for Sweden’s effectiveness as policy entrepreneur.

Preconditions for policy promotion effectiveness

While there exists a well-developed literature on norm protagonists and their strategic considerations, and on processes of norm spread (Davies & True, 2017; Florini, 1996; Ingebritsen, 2002; Rushton, 2008; Towns, 2010; Zwingel, 2012), less attention has been paid to the obstacles and resistance norm-permeated novel policy initiatives may encounter and to the conditions that should apply to make entrepreneurship more likely (cf. Aggestam & True, 2020). Target states’ reactions to a new policy might range between acceptance, hesitation, indifference, and rejection (Björkdahl & Elgström, 2015).

This means that policy entrepreneurs confront a very difficult task. This is especially the case if the new policy has yet to receive the support from ‘significant Others’ (Neumann, 1996)² and is far from reaching a tipping-point where a critical mass of states stands behind the policy (cf. Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). At this stage, policy entrepreneurs can expect resistance (cf. Björkdahl & Elgström, 2015): In countries where the new policy is perceived to compete with prevalent norms and go against other cherished values, potential policy targets can be expected to oppose efforts of policy spread.

The FFP is an example of a norm enhancement initiative (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019), where Sweden is trying to advance the depth and scope of previously existing gender equality norms. The core norm of the FFP is that all aspects of foreign policy should be informed by gender equality values. Its focal points emphasise that women and men should have equal rights, that more women should be involved in peace processes, that women should enjoy sexual and reproductive rights and that resources should be equally allocated between women and men. The norm enhancing actor ‘challenges predominant normative frames by introducing novel normative ideas and constructs’ (Ibid, p. 3) and its policy promotion initiatives are thus likely to be considered controversial and to encounter resistance. This obviously creates a challenge for Sweden as policy entrepreneur.

At a minimum, we argue, a number of preconditions have to be fulfilled if a new policy is to have any chance at all to sow seeds that may lead to future acceptance. Following arguments from the literatures on political communication and foreign policy (Ekengren & Brommesson, 2017; Elgström & Chaban, 2015; Entman, 2004; Joshi & O’Dell, 2017), we submit that attempts to spread a norm-based policy need to be perceived as legitimate, coherent and salient by their target audiences in order to prove potentially effective. The higher the degree of perceived legitimacy, coherence and salience that is associated with a novel norm-based policy, the higher the chance that it will prove competitive.

Salience refers to the importance and centrality attributed to a specific issue. Following Entman’s argument in his theory of framing (2004), we suggest three elements of frames – defined as ways of characterising and highlighting some facets of a certain event or policy, ‘so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution’ (Entman, 2004, p. 5) – that work to increase or decrease the impact of a political communication: visibility, local cultural resonance and emotive charge. Information about a policy initiative has to reach political elites as well as general public, so they become aware of its existence and implications. Messages that are centrally located in a communication and that fit with local culture and existing values are more likely to be listened to. A communication with positive emotional associations increases the receptivity among its audience. According to Chaban and Elgström (2021b, p. 5), issues ‘endowed with higher visibility and emotive profiles, while addressing priorities defined by local discourses, involving local key actors and resonating with historically informed socio-cultural norms and values will project a message of higher salience for the consumers of political communication’. By conceptualising salience through these three characteristics we can get a firm empirical basis for understanding to what extent the FFP is considered a significant and potentially useful policy in the respective countries under study.

Moving on to legitimacy as one of the preconditions for norm-based policy promotion, we focus on its subjective, relational quality, which is defined by other actor’s perceptions. It can be seen as a source of ‘soft power’: the greater legitimacy an actor is perceived to have, the easier it will be to persuade others to follow one’s policy recommendations (Nye, 2007, p. 177). In this article we focus on normative legitimacy, which refers to whether the norm-based policy an actor pursues, or is associated with, is regarded as ‘right’, just and appropriate (cf. Suchman, 1995, p. 574). This is particularly relevant for the case of the Swedish FFP, which carries the word ‘feminism’ in it and can be perceived as controversial. It should be added that legitimacy may be attached not only to the policy as such, but also to the actor espousing the policy, Sweden. Those who generally perceive Sweden as a progressive role model may transfer this positive image to its feminist policy, increasing its legitimacy. Conversely, those who associate Sweden with Western liberal values and the history of using these for ‘civilising missions’ may come to see the FFP as illegitimate.

The third precondition for norm-based policy promotion norm enhancement is coherence. Coherence refers to consistency in pursuing a policy, and is divided into three different aspects (Mayer, 2013): Horizontal coherence is coherence between different government actors (for example, the foreign minister and the defence minister) or across different foreign policy sectors (such as trade, aid and defence). Chronological coherence implies coherence over time, of actors or actions, in pursuing the FFP. Implementation coherence, finally, is understood as coherence between what an actor says and does (or between words and deeds), as well as a consistent execution of policy across addresses (regions, states) and contexts. We argue that if Sweden’s FFP is perceived as incoherent in all the above-mentioned aspects, the newly emerged policy will have difficulty in gaining support.

In this article, we analyse representations in major national newspapers to explore the perceived legitimacy, coherence and salience of the FFP.³ Information about new policy initiatives reach political elites, and consequently general public, in many different ways; through official channels (primarily diplomatic communications), mass media and social media, to name some of them. Major newspapers can ‘play a significant […] role in legitimising the messages and power’ of norm-based policies ‘in diffusing their ideas to states and their public’ (Joshi & O’Dell, 2017, p. 346). As stated by Zhang: ‘This is a mediated world. People rely on the news media for information, particularly information on a foreign country, and it is the news media that construct the world for people, both for public and elites’ (2010, p. 235) Media’s framing of incoming ideas helps to define and evaluate a policy initiative and suggests positive and negative aspects of it (cf. Entman, 2004, pp. 5–6). Media can frame messages via political and media logics (Meyer, 2002). Political logic implies that media engage in a serious discussion of foreign policy content; media logic means that that media have a tendency to focus on sensational and personalised aspects of foreign policy. Each logic can influence the perceived legitimacy, coherence and salience of foreign policies in positive and negative ways. Hence, media serves as an important compliment to diplomatic communication. Against this background, it seems reasonable and fruitful to investigate mass media in Sweden’s ‘significant Others’ to learn more about existing preconditions for FFP policy promotion.

Key challenges to a feminist foreign policy

By focusing on representations of Sweden’s FFP in international media, we situate ourselves within and contribute to academic literature in constructivist International Relations (IR), particularly external perceptions theory (Chaban & Elgström, 2021a; Elgström & Chaban, 2015) and feminist theory (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019). Our research also aligns with other important approaches to foreign policy analysis: role theory, with its preoccupation with the interplay between self-conceptions and outsiders’ role prescriptions (Aggestam, 2021; Elgström & Smith, 2006) and image theory, with its focus on external actors’ perceived capabilities, intentions and cultural status (for an overview, see Herrmann, 2013). There is also a place for perceptions in Realist theories. Morgenthau (1948) and Bull (1977) considered ‘reputation’ and ‘recognition’ as key components of power. The ‘reality of power’ was argued to be inseparable from the reception and interpretation of that power by external actors.

Certain academic works were front-runners in initiating an early debate about a feminist foreign policy, whether in general (Alwan & Weldon, 2017) or by focusing on Sweden (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016) and Canada (Vucetic, 2017) in particular. The number of publications on feminist foreign policy have then surged (Ridge et al., 2019; Robinson, 2019; Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019; Thompson & Clement, 2019), creating a lively discussion on the nature, promises and problems of a feminist foreign policy.

Most publications on feminist foreign policy try to define this phenomenon and some discuss the challenges it faces due to its norm-based and radical nature. Three key challenges emerge from a perusal of relevant literature: an absence of a universal definition of feminist foreign policy (Ridge et al., 2019; Thompson & Clement, 2019), a clash between ideals of the policy with realities on the ground (Robinson, 2019; Vucetic, 2017), and sharply conflicting attitudes towards the concept of feminism itself (Baxter, 2018; Lind & Salo, 2002). We elaborate on each of these challenges below.

Absence of a universal feminist foreign policy definition

Thompson and Clement suggest that ‘[g]overnments may not be embracing the mantle of feminist foreign policy because there is no universal definition’ (2019, p. 77). The absence of a universal definition relates to the fact that there are several concepts in use, including ‘feminist foreign policy’ (in Sweden, Mexico, and Spain), ‘feminist international assistance policy’ (in Canada), and ‘feminist diplomacy’ (in France). They all include the word ‘feminist’, but use it in relation to different foreign policy sectors. When the Swedish FFP is concerned, it becomes unclear what policy sectors it covers and how these sectors relate to the concept of feminism. One of the reasons behind the lack of clarity is an absence of an ‘overarching mechanism to monitor the implementation of the policy's goals, objectives and activities’ (Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 82). The most comprehensive assessment that exists today is ‘Handbook: Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy’ from August 23, 2018 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018). It includes activities that started before 2014 and projects with other countries involved. The unclear demarcation between what activities count as feminist foreign policy and which time periods qualify for feminist foreign policy poses a challenge for the international media reporting on the Swedish new policy.

We argue that a lack of a universal definition and a unified approach to feminist foreign policy can influence the perceived salience of the Swedish new policy in international newspapers. International media might not discuss Sweden’s FFP achievements extensively simply because of a lack of clarity. A lack of clarity can contribute to a possible confusion and reluctance by ‘significant Others’, who might potentially be interested in a feminist foreign policy, to follow suit.

A clash between feminist foreign policy’s ideals and ‘traditional’ security and commercial interests

To compensate for a lack of a universal definition of feminist foreign policy, Thompson and Clement offer an ‘umbrella’ definition of this phenomenon. They argue that feminist foreign policy is

[t]he policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states and movements in a manner that prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups … and seeks … to disrupt male-dominated power structures across all of its levers of influence (aid, trade, defence, and diplomacy), informed by the voices of feminist activists, groups and movements. (2019, p. 78)

Covering all areas of international relations – from peace and security, trade and development assistance, to diplomacy – implies that feminist foreign policy differs from the policy of advocating women’s rights (Ridge et al., 2019, p. 1) because it ‘sees gender equality as both a priority objective and a tool to advance other foreign policy priorities’ (Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 81). This definition fits the ambitions of the Swedish FFP (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018). Such a broad and almost all-inclusive definition puts pressure on policy coherence – whether across all foreign policy sectors where it is implemented or across all government officials responsible for its delivery. International media are most likely to challenge policy coherence by presenting a tension between a perceived ‘national interest’ and the feminist foreign policy. Ridge and colleagues define a national interest as ‘a specific representation of “national security” as well as practices that support robust domestic economic growth, often through promotion of trade connections for domestic industry’ (Ridge et al., 2019, p. 2). International media can question policy coherence by giving examples of the ideals of feminist foreign policy clashing with the ‘realities’ of trade, defence, and diplomacy on the ground.

A conflicting relationship between the concept of feminism and the media

For years, feminism has been a ‘taboo’ topic in media reporting in many countries and remains so in many conservative newspapers around the world. Even when media report about feminism, their portrayal is usually negative because of the perceived animosity feminists have towards men, their difference from ‘ordinary’ women, and their threat to family values (Baxter, 2018). When feminism is covered, it is usually made sensational, aimed at dividing rather than uniting, and at demonising rather than supporting (Lind & Salo, 2002). This is still relevant for conservative and right-leaning media in the Western countries, as well as mainstream media in non-Western countries, such as BRICS, Japan, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, among others.

Reporting about successes of foreign feminism might be viewed as ‘threatening’ to a country’s sovereignty because of a potential disruption of the local gender regimes. As Ridge and colleagues argue, ‘[s]upporting women’s human rights can mean challenging the “national sovereignty” of other nations that argue their domestic cultures permit some abuses of women’s rights’ (Ridge et al., 2019, p. 3). Another study has established that officials from East European EU member states reported that their governments – and public opinion – were sceptical to the Swedish FFP, as they saw it as ‘too radical’ and contrary to the basic values of their own countries (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019). All this indicates that a possible lack of international media reporting on, or a critical stance towards, Sweden’s FFP can stem from the fact that it has the ‘f-word’ in its title.

We argue that different attitudes towards the concept of feminism can affect the perceived legitimacy of feminist foreign policy. If international newspapers hold negative views about feminism, they are more likely to perceive Sweden’s FFP as illegitimate, and vice versa.

Sweden’s FFP is based on Western liberal feminism, which stands for women’s rights, representation in public life and redistribution of resources (Alwan & Weldon, 2017). It can be interpreted as illegitimate by the proponents of postcolonial feminism who argue that Western liberal feminists disregard the structural inequalities that exist between women in the West and the ‘Rest’ of the world caused by colonialism and globalisation (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018).

To summarise, we contend that the perceived legitimacy, coherence, and salience of Swedish FFP in major newspapers of ‘significant Others’ can be influenced by a lack of clarity on what a feminist foreign policy is (affecting salience), by a contradiction between feminist foreign policy’s ideals and traditional ‘national interests’ (affecting coherence), and by the attitudes towards the concept of feminism in the media (affecting legitimacy).

Methodology

This research is based on quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Krippendorff, 2013) of newspaper articles from 17 states,⁴ major world or regional Western and non-Western powers. The selection of states includes (a) members of G-7 (Group of Seven); (b) members of BRICS; (c) regional powers affected by Sweden's FFP (i.e. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey); (d) Australia (as a promoter of certain areas of FFP).⁵

For each state, we selected two newspapers, covering divisions of left-right, government-opposition, or state-independent, where possible. We included newspapers in English, German, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Italian, and Russian. For newspapers from Japan, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and India, we used media outlets in English (Table 1). In most cases, we accessed and collected the articles by both the newspaper’s website and NexisUni. We chose leading national newspapers with broad coverage, but due to difficulties of access to some newspapers, it was not always the two papers with the broadest coverage.⁶

Table 1. Selected newspapers and articles per country.

Country (=articles)	Newspapers (=articles)	Country (=articles)	Newspapers (=articles)
USA (=16)	The New York Times (=5) The Washington Post (=11)	Canada (=8)	The Globe & Mail (=2) National Post (=6)
Australia (=6)	The Sydney Morning Herald (=6) The Australian (=0)	France (=11)	The Monde (=8) Le Figaro (=3)
Japan (=0)	The Asahi Shimbun, in English (=0) Sankei Shimbun, in English (=0)	Germany (=8)	Berliner Zeitung (=2) Die Welt (=6)
South Africa (=2)	Mail & Guardian (=2) The Sunday Times (=0)	Italy (=16)	La Reppublica (=11) Il Giornale (=5)
India (=3)	The Hindu (=3) The New Indian Express (=0)	Russia (=0)	Rossiyskaya Gazeta (=0) Novaya Gazeta (=0)
China (=1)	China Daily, in English (=1) Hong Kong Free Press, in English (=0)	Brazil (=1)	Folha de São Paulo (=0) O Estado de S. Paulo (=1)
Israel (=16)	The Times of Israel, in English (=7) The Jerusalem Post, in English (=9)	Turkey (=13)	Hürriyet Daily News, in English (=7) Daily Sabah, in English (6=)
Iran (=3)	Financial Tribune, in English (2) Tehran Times, in English (=1)	Saudi Arabia (=10)	Saudi Gazette, in English (=1) Arab News, in English (=9)
UK (=21)	The Guardian (=16) The Telegraph (=5)	–	–
17 Countries (7 Western, 10 non-Western) 135 Articles (72 in liberal newspapers, 63 articles in conservative newspapers)

We collected articles using keywords such as ‘(Sweden, Swedish) feminist foreign policy’, ‘feminist policy’, ‘feminist government’, ‘feminist diplomacy’, as well as ‘Margot Wallstrom’, ‘Isabella Lovin’, ‘Ann Linde’, and ‘Asa Regner’. The time period covered starts in September 2014, when the FFP was introduced, and ends on 31 December 2019.

Initially, we created deductive codes based on the theoretical approaches to external perceptions theory and feminist theory, as presented in the theory section. Inductive codes were then developed on the basis of patterns in the data that did not fit any predetermined theoretical concepts (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). In order to ensure inter-coder reliability (Krippendorff, 2013), the authors continuously discussed and evaluated the codes at the early stages of the work. Once the codes and the codebook were fully established, we double-coded 19.3% (26 articles) of the material, where we agreed on 95% of the cases.

The selected articles were initially sorted into frequently discussed themes where the FFP appeared (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Table A1, Appendix I). The first theme was identified as diplomatic conflicts or crises between Sweden and countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, USA, and EU institutions, with individual involvement of Swedish politicians. These conflicts were termed ‘personified events’ framed via media logic. The second theme included the extent to which the voice of the Swedish government was given attention vis-à-vis the voice of the national government or experts framed via political logic. The third theme focused on national politics of the country of the newspaper and domestic politics of Sweden framed via either media or political logics. These three themes served as a basis for studying theoretical concepts – i.e. salience, legitimacy, and coherence – in Western and non-Western newspapers.

We operationalise the theoretical concepts in the following way: Salience consists of three aspects: visibility, local cultural resonance (local hook) and emotive charge. Visibility includes the number of articles addressing the FFP per country, degree of attention to the FFP per article (i.e. briefly mentioned in one sentence, discussed in several sentences or paragraphs, the whole article about the FFP, with/without photographs and/or illustrations), and how the FFP is referred to in each article (i.e. directly or indirectly). Local hook is when a connection is made between the FFP – or a clearly related FFP area – and a local context, such as a policy or an event, in the country of the newspaper. A high degree of emotive charge exists if positive or negative feelings are expressed towards the FFP.

We operationalise legitimacy by scrutinising the attitudes expressed in the newspaper articles towards the FFP and, more broadly, towards the concept of Western liberal feminism. When articles reveal negative and/or critical attitudes towards Western liberal feminism or towards substantive elements of gender politics, we code the article as demonstrating a low degree of perceived normative legitimacy, and vice versa. Finally, coherence consists of three elements: horizontal, chronological and implementation coherence. These were defined and operationalised in our theory section.

What follows is an analysis of the perceived salience, legitimacy, and coherence of the FFP in Western vis-à-vis non-Western newspapers.

Analysis

Is the FFP a salient topic in international newspapers?

There are differences in covering the FFP between newspapers from Western and non-Western countries, which impacted the FFP’s salience. Western newspapers (86 articles) (in USA, UK, Canada, Australia, Italy, France, and Germany) (1) reported about the FFP in relation to international events; (2) gave space to the voice of the Swedish government through publications and interviews; (3) connected the FFP to the local context of their own countries and to Swedish domestic politics. In comparison, non-Western newspapers (49 articles) in the BRICS, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Japan primarily: (1) reported about the FFP in relation to local events; (2) gave attention to the voice of their national government and experts; (3) were more prone not to cover the FFP. These differences are elaborated below.

Western newspapers

Commenting upon international events was the most common way the Western media made Sweden’s FFP visible in their newspapers (53.5% of coverage in Western newspapers). These events involved Swedish relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, USA, and EU institutions. They were personified (and visualised in photos) through the former Swedish Trade Minister Ann Linde wearing a veil during her visit to Iran in 2017 (7.0% of coverage in Western newspapers), the Swedish Minister for Environment and Climate Isabella Lövin posting an all-female photo when signing a climate law to counter the US president Donald Trump’s all-male picture in 2017 (19.8%), the former Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström criticising women’s rights in Saudi Arabia in 2015 (17.4%) and child sex abuses in Turkey in 2016 (3.5%), and two former Swedish ministers – Foreign Minister Margot Wallström and Equality Minister Åsa Regner – condemning sexual harassment at the EU institutions in 2017 (4.7%). For example:

In February last year, a week after Donald Trump had signed an anti-abortion executive order surrounded by seven men, Isabella Lövin posted a photograph of herself on Twitter signing a climate change bill alongside seven other women. Sweden’s then deputy prime minister remained enigmatic as the picture went viral and she was asked whether she had been “trolling” the US president. “It is up to the observer to interpret the photo,” she was quoted as saying. “We are a feminist government, which shows in this photo.” The image made headlines around the world and, nearly two years on, is still what Lövin is best known for internationally. (The Guardian, 24 November 2018)

Being pro-active in a public sphere, the Swedish female politicians succeeded in getting international media attention to the FFP (46 articles in Western press). However, being reported as a part of personified events, often connected to controversial diplomatic conflicts, the FFP became more a sensational than a substantial topic of discussion (cf. Brommesson & Ekengren 2017). Though it may be argued that the focus on personas and conflicts raised the level of emotive charge, thereby increasing the perceived salience of the FFP, it also took the focus away from any efforts to create a better understanding of the policy and to clarify its meaning (cf. Thompson & Clement, 2019).

The second way to make the FFP visible in Western media was to give space to the voice of the Swedish government through publications and interviews (nine articles in Western press). The representatives of the Swedish government published articles in Western newspapers under their own names (e.g. Margot Wallström wrote for The Guardian) and gave interviews (e.g. La Reppubblica and New York Times interviewed Margot Wallström). Active participation of the members of the Swedish government in Western press helped to popularise the Swedish definition of FFP.

Western media also discussed the FFP in relation to political careers of Swedish female politicians and their contribution to national and international politics (i.e. La Reppubblica wrote about Margot Wallström after her retirement). Furthermore, the publication of the Handbook of Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy (2018) got covered by two French newspapers – Le Monde and Le Figaro. Compared to the visibility of the FFP as a sensationalised and personified event, reporting on the FFP through the voice of the Swedish government offered an opportunity to elaborate on the FFP as a concept and its application.

Finally, Western media made Sweden’s FFP visible by discussing it in relation to the local context of the country where the newspaper was based (8.1% of coverage in Western newspapers) or of Sweden itself (15.1%). Reporting about the FFP in relation to the local context (23.3%) was less visible than discussing the FFP in regard to events (53.5%), but more visible than covering the FFP through the voice of the Swedish government (10.5%). It can be argued that the relevance of Sweden’s FFP to the domestic politics of a particular country (i.e. its local hook) might have increased the perceived salience of the FFP (22 articles in Western press). For example, the Canadian National Post was vocal about Canada’s own feminist international assistance policy, and discussed Sweden’s FFP in relation to the country’s arms trade deals with Saudi Arabia:

What’s happening in Sweden is directly relevant to Canada’s own feminist foreign policy and the Liberal government’s upcoming statement on that policy expected to be released this year. For one, Canada’s record of military exports is similar to Sweden’s in several respects, including from the hypocrisy perspective. Ottawa’s recent arms deal scandals with Saudi Arabia and the Philippines underscore this point rather vividly. (National Post, 9 April 2018)

Western newspapers also discussed the FFP in relation to the local context of Sweden itself (13 articles in Western press): the #metoo campaign in Sweden (i.e. sexual harassment at the Swedish Academy and other cultural institutions), Swedish politics since 2014 (i.e. comparison of Margot Wallström’s politics to Olof Palme’s), 2018 elections in Sweden (i.e. the rise of the Sweden Democrats), and gender equality in Sweden (i.e. gender neutral practices). For example:

Attention, we are not talking about Hollywood. The case that shakes public opinion is a Swedish story. It is the first news of the day on radio, TV, newspapers and websites in the first power of the Great North, the state which first theorized and implemented a “feminist foreign policy” with the current government. Since Wednesday evening, 456 alleged victims have denounced what they had suffered for years using the hashtag #metoo … (La Reppubblica, 17 November 2017)

Bringing attention to the FFP, when addressing Swedish domestic politics, has arguably increased the perceived salience of the FFP. At the same time, being mentioned only briefly, the FFP might have not made a substantial impact on perceptions of potential audiences.

Non-Western newspapers

Non-Western media were keener on covering the FFP in relation to their local events (which have become international events in Western newspapers), all related to diplomatic conflicts with Sweden (45.0% coverage in non-Western newspapers). Newspapers in both Turkey (46.2% of coverage in Turkish newspapers) and Saudi Arabia (60.0% of coverage in Saudi Arabian newspapers) published mostly about how the Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström was wrong in her critique of women’s rights (in Saudi Arabia) and child sex (in Turkey). For example:

Wallstrom is also wrong about developments in terms of women empowerment in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has rejected any marginalization of women in this country … King Salman believes in the right of women to have the best education and employment opportunities. They now have an equal share of scholarships and training, while adhering to the fundamentals of our religion and values. In this regard, Saudi Arabia does not need lecturing from the Swedish minister. (Arab News, 19 March 2015a)

Israeli newspapers, however, brought up some international events, such as Margot Wallström’s cancelled speech at the meeting of the Arab League and Sweden’s relation to Iran, in addition to Sweden’s troubled relationship with Israel (local event) after its recognition of Palestine. International events were also linked to local events:

It’s hard to take someone like Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom seriously. She claims to have a “feminist foreign policy” while veiling herself in Tehran and continually condemning Israel, which has a better record on gender equality than anywhere else in the region and was recently ranked one of the world’s top 20 countries for working women. (Jerusalem Post, 27 November 2018)

The focus on conflicts where the reporting country perceived itself as unfairly attacked probably created strong feelings and a high level of emotive charge, thus increasing the salience of the reportage. At the same time, the sensational and personified reporting diverted attention from the FFP’s substance.

While Western newspapers most of the times referred directly to the acts of Sweden’s feminist foreign policy, using terms such as ‘feminist foreign policy’, ‘feminist government’, ‘feminist diplomacy’, or ‘ethical feminism’ (68 articles in Western newspapers), the non-Western newspapers – Israel constituting the exception – avoided the use of these terms (29 articles in non-Western press). Rather, they used concepts such as ‘women’s rights’, ‘women’s empowerment’, ‘women’s participation’, ‘child rights’ and so on. One possible explanation to the avoidance of naming feminist foreign policy to what it stands for is that the word ‘feminism’ is more accepted and normalised in the West, but less so in non-Western contexts. Another possible explanation is that the concept ‘feminist foreign policy’ is unknown and unclear outside the Western world, and hence, is not used in media coverage of gender issues. It can be argued that not naming the FFP impacted its visibility and hence might have decreased its salience.

Furthermore, FFP reporting in non-Western newspapers took place by giving voice to national governmental officials and experts, who opposed Margot Wallström’s stand. These officials and experts were primarily male and pictures of them accompanied media reporting (seven articles in non-Western press). Visualising national rather than Swedish elites in a gendered manner negatively impacted the FFP’s visibility and might have damaged its salience. The Turkish press, however, made an interview with Margot Wallström, hence giving the Swedish government a chance to clarify its critique of Turkish child sex laws:

Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister Margot Wallström told the Hürriyet Daily News in a written interview on Aug. 22 that she welcomed Turkey’s move to prepare a new law on sentences in cases of sexual abuse against children, following the diplomatic spat between Sweden and Turkey ignited by the top Turkish court’s decision to annul a legal article on the issue. (Hürriyet Daily News, 23 August 2016)

Compared to Turkish and Saudi Arabian newspapers, there was almost no reporting on the FFP in the BRICS media (seven articles overall). This can be explained by the fact that they did not have diplomatic conflicts with Sweden on gender issues. Similarly, BRICS media were not interested in international events in the same way as Western media. One possible explanation to this disinterest is again related to a lack of appeal of feminism to the political elites and audiences of these countries. Another possible explanation is that the media in these countries are less familiar with the concept ‘feminist foreign policy’ and hence do not report on it.

While Western and non-Western newspapers differed in their ways of making (or not) the Swedish FFP salient, there was one pattern in common: the FFP seemed to be mentioned in relation to almost all foreign policy activities of the Swedish government since 2014, without clarifying how these activities were related to gender issues. The FFP could be mentioned in relation to the recognition of Palestine or of Western Sahara, or a military confrontation with Russia, etc: ‘Sweden says it will pursue a feminist foreign policy to counter macho Russian aggression … even if no one really knows what that means’ (Washington Post, 12 August 2014). This means that the international media reproduced an already existing lack of clarity about the FFP definition (Ridge et al., 2019; Thompson & Clement, 2019), rather than trying to minimise audience confusion.

Is the Swedish initiative seen as legitimate?

There were also differences in whether Western and non-Western newspapers portrayed the FFP as legitimate. Western newspapers: (1) mostly viewed the FFP as legitimate; (2) only a few articles in center-right newspapers questioned the legitimacy of the FFP through perceiving Sweden’s gender policies at home as too radical. Non-Western newspapers: (1) mostly questioned the FFP’s legitimacy, understanding it as an imposition of Western values and interference into internal affairs of non-Western countries; (2) in some cases also critiqued Western liberal feminism.

Western newspapers

Whether reported in relation to personified events, through the voice of the Swedish government, or in a local context, the FFP was presented as legitimate. There was neither a questioning of the relationship between feminism and foreign policy, nor of the word ‘feminism’ itself. Rather, feminism was equated with ethics and morality. The FFP’s legitimacy was thus rarely questioned in Western newspapers, but when it was, media reported about it in relation to the Swedish domestic politics (3.5% of coverage in Western newspapers). Here, gender neutral practices at home ‘raised eyebrows’ of certain Western newspapers to the center-right (e.g. Italian Il Giornale and Canadian National Post). It was not so much the FFP per se but gender equality at home that was questioned.

Non-Western newspapers

Non-Western newspapers were less keen to use the word ‘feminist’ when talking about Sweden’s foreign policy, but more eager to question the legitimacy of Sweden’s approach in relation to gender issues. Provocative remarks of Margot Wallström were attacked as an interference in internal affairs and misunderstanding of the local culture (12 articles in non-Western press). The strong negative attitudes found in most articles indicate, in our view, that Sweden’s policy is considered illegitimate. One of the titles of the article in the Turkish newspaper read: ‘Child abuse accusation symptom of the West’s anti-Turkish bias’ (Daily Sabah, 18 August 2016). Another article’s title went even further and falsely accused Sweden of a high rape rate at home: ‘Istanbul airport ad warns travellers of Sweden’s high rape rate’ (Daily Sabah, 19 August 2016). Similarly, the article titles in Saudi Arabian newspapers were ‘Saudi Arabia right to reject interference in its affairs’ (Arab News, 20 March 2015c), ‘Behind Sweden’s tirade is a hidden Western agenda to tarnish Islam’ (Arab News, 19 March 2015b), and so on. Saudi Arabian newspapers also questioned Margot Wallström’s legitimacy as a Foreign Minister: ‘And why is Wallstrom taking up women’s rights and the law in Saudi Arabia? The job of a foreign minister is to foster good relations with other countries and enhance and develop them with other countries regardless of the cultural or political differences’ (Arab News, 20 March 2015c).

Israel differed from the other non-Western countries in actually using the concept of ‘feminist foreign policy’ in the articles. Liberal feminism was not criticised as such, but Sweden’s application of FFP was questioned with the argument that Sweden is constantly criticising Israel, but less so the violations of women’s rights in other countries in the region:

[I]n your extreme efforts to be a moral influence in the world, you over-identify with those you see as the underdog, no matter how immoral they are. (Jerusalem Post, 22 January 2016)

Is the Swedish FFP seen as coherent?

FFP (in)coherence was primarily discussed in Western newspapers in relation to an alleged clash between the FFP’s ideals and ‘traditional’ security and commercial interests. As non-Western newspapers did not seem to be seriously interested in the Swedish FFP and did not call it by its name, the discussion of the FFP coherence was primarily related to Sweden standing firm behind its critique of these countries’ gender issues.

Western newspapers

Western newspapers mostly stressed horizontal (in)coherence between Swedish governmental actors (14 articles). Among personified events, Ann Linde wearing a veil in Iran triggered a portrayal of the FFP as incoherent (horizontal incoherence); Margot Wallström’s critique of Saudi Arabia’s treatment of women was perceived as coherent, but her inability to stop selling arms to a violent regime as incoherent (implementation incoherence); Isabella Lövin posting an all-female photo and Margot Wallström with Åsa Regner condemning sexual harassment at the EU institutions were both presented as coherent (horizontal coherence). For example (incl. chronological incoherence):

More iconoclastic, Foreign Minister Margot Wallström has announced that she wants to lead a “feminist diplomacy”. On the agenda: advocacy for women’s rights and their role in conflict resolution and peace processes. Four years later, her record is mixed. Her colleague, the trade minister, has been criticized for wearing the veil during a trip to Iran, and for her government not to have restricted arms exports. (Le Monde, 2 March 2018)

When reporting about the FFP in relation to domestic politics in Western newspapers, the FFP was presented as coherent if (1) the media celebrated Swedish gender equality at home and FFP was presented as an extension of it; (2) the media supported the FFP and encouraged this policy in their own countries. For example:

Gender-neutral snow clearing with fewer injuries, since pedestrians are more likely than motorists to be injured in icy weather. That’s just one example of what can happen when officials consider the impact of everyday policies on women. Sweden is the leader in this regard, and not just when it comes to snow-clearing. The country has a feminist foreign policy, and each year its budget is analysed by the Swedish Women’s Lobby to see how resources are divided – and whether the government is living up to its promises on gender equality. (The Guardian, 5 December 2017)

On the contrary, the FFP was portrayed as incoherent in Western media in relation to domestic politics if (1) the media were skeptical about Swedish gender equality at home and this skepticism was extended to the FFP; (2) the media criticised the FFP and discouraged this policy in their own countries. For example: ‘Even though female voters are more likely than men to vote for left-of-centre parties, left-of-centre parties are strangely bad at promoting women. Labour has never elected a female leader. Sweden – with its recently much lauded “feminist government” – has never elected a female leader’ (The Telegraph, 3 March 2017).

Non-Western newspapers

Non-Western newspapers were less interested in comparing the FFP to Swedish domestic gender policies or evaluating it in relation to horizontal, chronological, or implementation coherence. Rather, non-Western media interpreted Swedish FFP as coherent because of Sweden not backing down on its ideological stands, e.g. ‘Swedish Foreign Minister Wallström stands by controversial Turkey sex abuse tweets’ (Hürriyet Daily News, 18 August 2016), or because Sweden could influence domestic policy in other countries through critique, e.g. ‘Sweden welcomes Turkey’s move to increase sentences for children’s sexual abuse’ (Hürriyet Daily News, 23 August 2016). This focus was more visible in Turkish, Brazilian, and South African than in Saudi Arabian, Iranian, and Israeli newspapers. Again, Israel constituted the exception among the non-Western countries, portraying Sweden’s FFP as incoherent in several articles, both in relation to horizontal and implementation incoherence (the latter questioning Sweden’s domestic policies). Several articles brought up how Sweden turns a blind eye to violence towards Palestinian women.

Conclusion

Our analysis demonstrates that Sweden’s FFP is facing all the three key challenges that we introduced in our theory section. The focus – in both Western and non-Western newspapers – on dramatic diplomatic conflicts and individual policy-makers means that the substance of the FFP has received little attention. The lime-light has been placed on a small number of rather superficial aspects of the FFP (e.g. wearing a veil or not) while the multi-faceted nature of the policy has not been explored. The few examples of publications where Swedish politicians have been able to present the FFP in their own words cannot balance the impact of this ‘sensational’ reportage. Furthermore, media’s emphasis on cases of perceived incoherence between proclaimed feminist ideals and material self-interests (e.g. selling weapons to regimes that oppress women) has served to question the legitimacy of the FFP. Finally, the lack of understanding of what ‘feminism’ stands for, and the widespread skepticism towards the ‘f-word’ in many, primarily but not only, non-Western countries create a major challenge to any effort to promote the FFP in contexts where governments are not already positively inclined towards feminist values.

All in all, our findings indicate that the Swedish government is facing an up-hill battle in its role as an entrepreneur for a Feminist Foreign Policy. The salience, not least in terms of visibility, of the FFP is limited in international newspapers, notably in non-Western countries. The negative effects of the lack of attention given to the FFP is aggravated by the media’s tendency to focus on sensation, rather than substance, as shown above. When international media do seriously report about the FFP, they link the policy to a local event in the country of the newspaper (local hook), usually a controversial issue. When coherence is discussed, it is frequently in negative terms, with references to either horizontal incoherence in Sweden’s foreign policy or to allegedly too radical aspects of domestic gender policies. And while the legitimacy of pursuing the FFP is not really questioned in most Western newspapers, most news outlets in the non-Western world profess negative attitudes towards the FFP and argue for the illegitimacy of liberal feminist policies in their domestic contexts.

Our analysis invites the following conclusions. First, a highly personified presentation of the FFP makes it dependent on the popularity of Swedish female leadership. This creates a risk of the FFP becoming volatile: When famous political personas leave the stage (e.g. Margot Wallström who retired in September 2019), there is a risk that reporting about the FFP discontinues.

Second, the local context of Swedish gender equality at home, if reported favourably by international press (particularly in Western countries), can become a ‘business card’ of its FFP abroad. This implies that rather than being a matter of interest on its own right, the FFP is heavily dependent on the backbones and chronological coherence of the Swedish gender policy that has been developing for years. As such, gender norm promotion that worked well in the past might also work for FFP promotion in the present. Rather than emphasising the novelty and uniqueness of the FFP, it might be beneficial grounding the FFP in the good, old, and tested Swedish domestic gender policy promotion, especially so as the concept of feminism is still questioned in many parts of the world.

Third, when Swedish domestic gender policy is promoted abroad (particularly to non-Western countries), it might be worth considering targeted adjustments of the FFP to organically fit into the local context of the states with different culture and religion. A strong liberal foundation of Sweden’s FFP might distance potential audiences and allies due to an exclusion of other life experiences and local versions of feminism, whether Muslim, postcolonial, or other. The other presently existing feminist foreign policies are also heavily based on Western liberal feminism, although Mexico adds a considerable amount of intersectional feminism and has an outspoken goal to promote FFP in the Latin American region (Zhukova, Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2021). In order to further feminist foreign policies and their goals in different parts of the world, sensitivity to context is a key challenge. A serious postcolonial critique still remains at the level of local grassroots, academics, and activists, but does not enter the realm of the mainstream public sphere, whether in the Western or non-Western world. This makes it difficult for a constructive critique of Western liberal feminism to take place. One policy recommendation could be to craft feminist foreign policies in collaboration with local people whose lives these policies affect. Inviting local researchers, activists, and community members to have a say in FFP could contribute to a world based on mutual understanding and recognition.

As our analysis has focused on world and regional powers, further research is needed to investigate (1) how states that have already introduced feminist thinking into their foreign policies (e.g. Canada, France, Mexico and Spain) or have just announced to do so (e.g. Luxembourg) relate to the Swedish FFP and (2) how smaller developing states in different geographical regions perceive the Swedish innovation. Understanding external perceptions of Sweden’s FFP around the globe will give us a better sense of its potentialities and challenges on the ground.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond [grant number P19-0712:1]; Riksbankens Jubileumsfond [grant number P19-0712:1].

Notes on contributors

Malena Rosén Sundström

Malena Rosén Sundström is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. She has published on EU negotiations, Swedish political parties, Swedish EU politics and Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy. She is PI in a research project on Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy.

Ekatherina Zhukova

Ekatherina Zhukova is researcher in Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. She has published on humanitarianism and development, for example on the role of gender in humanitarian projects to disaster survivors. She has also published on disasters and crisis. Zhukova is co-PI on the research project mentioned above.

Ole Elgström

Ole Elgström is Professor emeritus of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. He has published on Sweden's foreign policy, on internal and international negotiations involving the EU, and notably on external perceptions of the EU and its foreign policy roles, in a large number of journals.

Notes

1 We are aware that the Western/non-Western classification is relatively crude. Since there are similar problems with other classifications, such as the Global North and the Global South, we have however settled for this option.

2 ‘Significant Others’ include world and regional powers, both Western and non-Western, who are in a capacity to influence the direction of one’s foreign policy.

3 We acknowledge the key role that government actors play in interpreting and evaluating external actors’ foreign policies. However, the kind of nuanced and often sensitive information we are looking for here is rarely to be found in government statements or other official material. We argue that analysing newspaper perceptions is an excellent alternative, while bearing in mind that elite interviews may provide other types of findings.

4 We opted for traditional media rather than social media, as it would have been impractical to collect data on social media in a systematic and comparable manner for 17 states since 2014.

5 Australia has a ‘foreign policy gender strategy’ since 2016. Mexico and Spain had not initiated their FFPs at the time period covered.

6 Difficulties to access here refers to the fact that the newspapers in question were neither available in NexisUni, nor online without subscription. Washington Post was accessed through Thomson Reuters Westlaw.

I

Table A1. How FFP appears in newspapers per country.

News- papers per state	In personified events with Swedish female politicians abroad												In Swedish official voice		In domestic politics				Other
	Wallström recognises Palestine		Linde & veiled female colleagues visiting Iran		Lövin posts an all-female photo against US President		Wallström criticises women’s rights in Saudi Arabia		Wallström criticises child sex rights in Turkey		Wallström/ Regner support #MeToo in EU		Wallström/ Lövin, etc. give interviews/ write articles		Other events in Swedish domestic politics		Other events in foreign domestic politics		Other		Total articles (Table 1)*
	Distribution of articles per state
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
TOTAL	5	3.7	8	5.9	20	14.8	25	18.5	9	6.7	5	3.7	13	9.6	15	11.1	11	8.1	3	2.2	135	100
Western	1	1.2	6	7.0	17	19.8	15	17.4	3	3.5	4	4.7	9	10.5	13	15.1	7	8.1	3	3.5	86	100
USA	-	-	1	6.3	3	18.8	2	12.5	-	-	-	-	1	6.3	2	12.5	-	-	-	-	16	100
UK	1	4.8	-	-	5	23.8	8	38.1	-	-	-	-	4	19.0			2	9.5			21	100
Australia	-	-	1	16.7	2	33.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	16.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	100
Canada	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	25.0	1	12.5	1	12.5	-	-	1	12.5	3	38.0			8	100
France	-	-	1	9.0	2	18.2	2	18.2	-	-	-	-			2	18.2	1	9.0	3	27.3	11	100
Italy	-	-	2	12.5	3	18.8	-	-	2	12.5	2	12.5	3	18.8	6	37.5	-	-	-	-	16	100
Germany	-	-	1	12.5	2	25.0	1	12.5	-	-	1	12.5	-	-	2	25.0	1	12.5	-	-	8	100
Non-Western	4	8.2	2	4.1	3	6.1	10	20.4	6	12.2	1	2.0	4	8.2	2	4.1	4	8.2	-	-	49	100
BRICS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2		-	-	2		-	-	7	100
Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	100	-	-	1	100
Russia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	3	100
China	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	50.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	100
Other non-Western	4	9.5	2	4.8	3	7.1	10	23.8	6	14.3	1	2.4	2	4.8	2	4.8	2	4.8	-	-	42	100
Saudia Arabia	1	10	-	-	2	20	6	60	-	-	-	-	1	10	1	10	1	10	-	-	10	100
Israel	3	18.8	1	6.3	-	-	1	6.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	100
Turkey	-	-	-	-	1	7.7	2	15.4	6	46.2	1	7.7	1	-	1	7.7	1	7.7	-	-	13	100
Iran	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	100
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

*As same article could be coded for several thematic categories, the total number of articles is taken from Table 1.