Iran’s soft power in the Middle East via the promotion of the Persian language

ABSTRACT

This article explores the language-related instruments Tehran uses to pursue its soft power goals in the Middle East. The article first defines soft power and the role of language in its promotion, and then summarises Iran’s overall Persian-language strategies across the region. The main part of the article uses a rich array of primary source material in Persian to focus specifically on Tehran’s efforts to use the Persian language as a soft power resource in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. The article demonstrates that over the last decade, Iran has increasingly engaged in strategies to enhance its soft power reach in these countries through the development of Persian language programmes. It argues that Iran at times uses the promotion of the Persian language to further other soft power goals, such as the development of its key foreign policy platforms and the spread of Shiism based on the context.

KEYWORDS:

• Iran
• soft power
• Middle East
• Iraq
• Lebanon
• Syria
• Persian language

During the past two decades, Iran has gained a prominent position in the Middle East, with the expansion of its influence particularly notable in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Iran’s influence in Iraq gradually increased following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In Syria, Iran’s influence increased in 2011, with the Islamic Republic becoming a major player in the Syrian conflict. In Lebanon, Iran has exercised significant influence, especially through its key regional ally Hezbollah. Iran has not only helped Hezbollah to increase its military capabilities, but also supported Lebanese Shias affiliated with Hezbollah through various humanitarian projects.

There is now a considerable body of literature about Iran’s soft power in its neighbouring countries, and the different strategies used by the Islamic Republic to increase its soft power have received scholarly attention. Jones and Newlee (2019) explore various strategies, including the use of media channels, that Iran has employed to exercise its soft power influence across the globe. Wastnidge (2015) investigates how Tehran seeks to project its cultural reach at the international level. Jenkins (2016) explores how bonyad (charitable trust) organisations established by Iran in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Syria contribute to Iranian soft power. Iran’s soft power in Iraq (Watkins, 2020) and Syria (Akbar, 2021), countries outside the Middle East including Afghanistan and Pakistan (Ahmed et al., 2021), as well as the Caucuses (Valiyev, 2017) has also been explored in the literature. Despite the existence of a vast body of literature concerning Iran’s soft power, there is no comprehensive study concerning how Iran uses the Persian language, one of its most significant cultural resources, to further its soft power; this aspect of Iranian soft power tends to be mentioned only in passing.¹

To address this lacuna, this article explores how Tehran promotes its soft power influence in the Middle East using the Persian language. I will confine this exploration to three countries—namely Lebanon, Syria and Iraq—and the timeline to the past decade. These three countries have been selected because Iranian influence in these countries is considerable, as I will address later. The main question that this article seeks to address is: What resources and instruments has Iran used to project its soft power through the promotion of the Persian language in these countries? In terms of methodology, I will draw on data gathered through thematic content analysis of a rich array of primary source materials in Persian. This includes online sources such as publications by official Iranian news agencies, academic analyses and political speeches delivered by Iranian policymakers. The article demonstrates that Iran has invested significantly over the past decade in a vast range of measures, including establishing links with existing local schools and universities as well as setting up new institutions and foundations, in order to promote the Persian language in the aforementioned countries. The article contributes to wider scholarly discussion about Iran’s soft power influence in the region and the mechanisms used by Tehran to further its soft power reach.

The article has four sections. The first part defines soft power and the importance of language in its promotion. This is then followed by a brief explanation of Iran’s overall soft power strategies to promote the Persian language across the region. The third part provides a brief explanation of Iranian influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Drawing on primary source material in Persian, the fourth part of this article, which constitutes its main part, explores Tehran’s use of the Persian language as a soft power resource in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria.

Soft power

The American political scientist Joseph Nye is known as the progenitor of the discourse of soft power. Nye (2004, p. 7) defines soft power as the ability to attract, persuade, and co-opt people, as opposed to hard power which tends to rely more on ‘coercion or inducement’. Therefore, soft power ‘occurs when a country gets other countries to want what it wants’ without the use of measures such as military intervention or economic sanctions (Nye, 1990a, p. 166). Indeed, while ‘resources associated with hard power include tangibles such as force and money’, the resources that are associated with soft power include ‘factors such as institutions, ideas, values, culture, and the perceived legitimacy of policies’ (Nye, 2011, p. 21). Indeed, as Nye (2004, p. 7) states, ‘If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place – in short, if my behaviour is determined by an observable but intangible attraction – soft power is at work’.

When speaking about soft power, it is important to consider the potentially high price of using hard power in the post-Cold War context. Nye (1990b, p. 188) himself noted this issue, and argued that given the increased cost of using military force against another country, especially in the era of nuclear weapons proliferation, the influence of one country over another should be exercised through soft power which is less expensive as well as ‘less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible’. Nye extended his theory in the context of War on Terror, arguing that the US should not exercise its hard power at the expense of losing its soft power. He criticised US’s heavy reliance on hard power means during George W. Bush's administration, stating that capturing the hearts and minds of the people of the target states can be achieved not through hard power measures such as military intervention, but soft power influence (Nye, 2004, p. 1). Nye did not argue that the US should avoid using its hard power capabilities, but rather that it should not exercise its hard power at the expense of losing its soft power potential. Here, Nye refers to ‘smart power’, which he considers to be a combination of soft and hard power: ‘America’s success will depend upon our developing a deeper understanding of the role of soft power and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy. That will be smart power’ (Nye, 2004, p. 147).

Despite the differences between hard and soft power, the two forms of power can be linked together. In his most recent work, Nye notes that some resources that are commonly associated with hard power can at times produce soft power. For example, in 2004, US naval ships’ provision of tsunami relief to Indonesia became a source of American soft power since it increased the attractiveness of the US in the eyes of Indonesians (Nye, 2021).² Economic resources can also produce hard and soft power simultaneously; prominent examples include the Marshall Plan in 1948 and China’s Belt and Road Initiative today (Nye, 2021). Providing economic relief programmes with the aim of capturing the hearts and minds of people—or a certain group of people—in a target country is another relevant example (see Akbar, 2021).

Soft power capabilities draw on three key sources: culture, political values, and foreign policies. Each source can increase a country’s attraction and has the potential to generate respect and admiration in the target country. According to Nye, ‘In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organisation or country expresses in its culture’ (Nye, 2004, p. 8). Indeed, the cultural values of a country are significant resources that can be deployed in the service of soft power goals. According to Nye, given that soft power ‘is the ability to attract’, its resources are those ‘that produce such attraction’, and these could be an attractive culture (Nye, 2004, p. 6). When a country seeks to exert influence on another, its attractive cultural norms can help it to capture the hearts and minds of the other’s population. Nye argues that cultural values are important resources for policymaking and thus it is crucial for governments to create situations where their cultural norms can be displayed. This is because culture is communicated through human interaction. Cultural influence can be achieved by various means such as student exchange programmes, granting scholarships to foreign students, convening seminars and conferences and even broadcasting programmes through media channels (Nye, 2004, p. 109).³ For example, Nye argues that students who study in the US and subsequently return to their home country are valuable sources of American soft power (Nye, 2005). In addition to university exchange programmes, other government-funded projects such as training programmes aimed at mid-career professionals are also shown to play an important role in the generation of positive attitudes toward a country (Miller, 2006, p. 26).

As stated, according to Nye, attraction is a key element of soft power. Other scholars agree with him about attraction and soft power, but question Nye’s positioning of attraction in opposition to hard power means. Mattern (2005) argues that attraction, a key element of soft power, can be, and often is, coercive and thus claims that ‘soft power should not be understood in juxtaposition to hard power but as a continuation of it by different means’ (p. 583). Indeed, attraction is often socio-linguistically constructed through what Mattern (2005, p. 586) refers to as ‘representational force’ – ‘a form of power that operates through the structure of a speaker’s narrative representation of “reality”’. If attraction rests upon coercion, a sharp distinction between hard and soft power becomes unsustainable, meaning that, in Mattern’s words, ‘soft power is not so soft after all’ (p. 587).

In articulating his own approach to soft power, Nye states that it is important to consider the reception of soft power – i.e. whether the soft power being exercised by a country is effectively influencing the people of the target countries: ‘What the target thinks is particularly important, and the targets matter as much as the agents’ (Nye, 2011, p. 84). However, throughout his works, as other scholars (Miskimmon et al., 2013) have also noted, Nye does not explore or propose methodologies to ascertain the extent to which a given state’s attempts to exercise soft power translate into soft power influence. The recent literature on soft power has focused on the importance of the reception of soft power, and how it can be measured. Indeed, although measuring soft power relies on mostly qualitative data sources, various methods such as polls, surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews, Q-methodology and media content analysis can be applied to gauge how successful countries have been in promulgating their soft power (Pamment, 2014; Roselle et al., 2014).

There is now a considerable body of literature on how language, an important element of culture, can be used as a key source of soft power and how policymakers over the world use it to pursue a range of political objectives (see for example Mkhoyan, 2017; Mustajoki et al., 2020). Nye himself notes that there is a direct link between language and soft power. For example, he argues that Japan’s weakness in languages made it difficult for the country to exercise its soft power. Although Japan seeks to alleviate this weakness through the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme, Japanese is not widely spoken in the world and Japanese people’s foreign language skills rank among the lowest in Asia—factors which prevent Japan from extending its soft power (Nye, 2004, p. 97, 110). Pashayeva (2018) focuses on the communicative and cultural potential that a language can carry, in turn enabling a country to enhance its soft power influence. Indeed, language is a powerful asset and tool with strong potential to increase a country’s appeal in the eyes of language learners—a potential which, as will be discussed, Iran has sought to realise. This can be conducted, for example, ‘through preparing and selection of teaching materials and providing a comprehensive insight into the culture and values of the country and its people’ (Yudina & Seliverstova, 2019).

There are numerous examples from all over the world demonstrating how language can be used as a means to promote soft power. China has used its language to increase its worldwide soft power reach. In 2006, a National People’s Congress (NPC) deputy, Hu Youqing, referred to this goal directly, stating that the promotion of Chinese ‘can help build up our national strength and should be taken as a way to develop our country’s soft power’ (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 67). In line with this policy, the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Education states that ‘[It] is of strategic significance to popularise the Chinese language and culture throughout the world, to enhance the friendship and mutual understanding as well as the economic and cultural cooperation and exchanges between China and other countries around the world’ (Yudina & Seliverstova, 2019). The establishment of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese government from 2004, which aim to promote Chinese language and culture in various parts of the world, is a significant part of this policy, and has been considered an important source of Chinese soft power and an element of the ‘foreign mission of the People’s Republic of China’ (Repnikova, 2022, p. 1). Confucius Institutes offer large-scale training programmes for the promotion of the Chinese language. They either work in collaboration with foreign universities and educational institutions in host countries, or establish independent Chinese-language classes. They support Chinese language courses in primary and secondary schools in host countries and also cooperate with the international Chinese Bridge language competition (Gil, 2017, pp. 8–9). The latter competition, whose primary rounds are held in host countries while the final rounds are held in China, is reported to have encouraged a large number of people to learn the language (Gil, 2017, p. 11).

The present article focuses on the linguistic aspect of soft power, exploring how and to what extent Iran uses the promotion of the Persian language. It focuses in particular on three countries of the Middle East in which, as will be explained, Iran exercises significant influence. Following Edward Wastnidge (2015, p. 366), my approach to soft power in this article is oriented around ‘top-down’ initiatives, i.e. the condition ‘whereby the state has control over the aspects of soft power that it wants to project and harness’, and thus does not consider ‘grassroots cultural exchange through non-state actors’. In other words, in the present article I focus only on how the Iranian government and government–associated organisations have engaged in or funded projects that contribute to the development of the Persian language.

Iranian soft power through the promotion of the Persian language

Iranian soft power includes a variety of elements. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, Iran has pursued an anti-American and anti-Israeli policy. In line with these key aspects of its foreign policy, Tehran’s soft power approaches have been, to a significant degree, oriented around defending the rights of Muslims and Palestinians (Mozaffari, 2013, p. 198). For example, through its patronage of various Shia groups in Pakistan, Iran has achieved success in its use of soft power resources, especially its anti-America message, to gain influence over them (Vatanka, 2015, p. 244). Another aspect of Iranian soft power, employed especially following the Iranian revolution of 1979, comprises its government’s efforts to spread Shiism. This has been conducted through the promotion of Shia religious ceremonies such as the Ashura ceremony (see for example ABNA, 2014). In countries in which Shias comprise the majority, Tehran uses existing cultural links to increase its presence and influence; in the case of Iraq, Iran wields particular influence in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala.

At times, Iran’s soft power reach has extended to the humanitarian sphere. For example, following the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, in line with its policy of capturing the hearts and minds of Shia Lebanese, Iran invested heavily in South Lebanon, offering various social services including free healthcare for the families of soldiers killed (Saikal, 2019, p. 159). The Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC) is one key Iranian organisation whose objective is oriented around distributing welfare funding in countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (Saikal, 2019, p. 160). The IKRC also collaborates with government and non-government charitable organisations in up to 40 countries (Mehrnews, 2014). In addition to its humanitarian activities, Tehran has invested significantly in the educational sector of various countries to enhance its image. Iran establishes collaborations with other countries’ universities, often with the aid of the local Iranian embassy, hosts students through exchange programmes and facilitates Iran-based study through the granting of scholarships.⁴ To give an example in the context of Syria, in late 2007, a joint Iranian-Syrian university was established in the Latakia region, which offered various postgraduate level courses (von Maltzahn, 2013, pp. 168–169). The pattern of Iranian investment in the educational sector in Syria continued during the 2010s, and increased in the late 2010s and early 2020s when the Syrian conflict diminished (Akbar, 2021).

Tehran has also attempted to spread Iranian cultural values throughout the Middle East and other regions, including in the Middle East, Central and South Asia (see Clark, 2012; Wastnidge, 2014) as well as the South Caucasus (see Mozaffari & Akbar, 2022; Valiyev, 2017). Iran’s effort to promulgate its national language is part of this policy. There are a number of organisations based in Iran which engage in the promotion of the Persian language outside the country. The Sa’adi Foundation (bonyad-e sa’adi) is one of the key Iranian institutions which has declared the expansion of knowledge of Persian beyond the borders of Iran to be its chief mission. The Foundation is estimated to have more than 80 cultural representatives in various countries (Rezaie-mehr & Vafaei, 2020-21, p. 84). Another organisation, the Islamic Culture and Communication Organisation (ICCO), which is affiliated with the Ministry of Culture, identifies the status of Persian language and literature at different universities over the world as well as holding conferences and seminars pertinent to the Persian language. It also publishes books, articles and pamphlets related to Persian study in multiple languages, targeting Persian learners outside Iran (Rezaie-mehr & Vafaei, 2020-21, p. 83). In addition to these organisations, the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology also shares responsibility for expanding familiarity with Persian outside Iran (Rezaie-mehr & Vafaei, 2020-21, p. 83). Those affiliated with these organisations often identify the importance of the promotion of language in other countries as a key element of soft power and cultural diplomacy strategy. For example, the deputy of international affairs at the Sa’adi Foundation stated in 2016:

It is now four decades since the entire world came to the conclusion that formal diplomacy is no longer as effective as it once was, and [countries] have turned to public and cultural diplomacy. Obviously, language teaching is one of the important elements of cultural diplomacy. The countries that invest in this area do not do it secretly, and officially declare their [activities] concerning the promotion of [their] language and culture (Mehrnews, 2016).

The importance of the promotion of the Persian language outside Iran, especially in countries in which Iran exercises significant influence, has been emphasised by Iranian policymakers. Amir Abdollahiyan, Iran’s current foreign minister, stated once at a meeting with the head of the Sa’adi Foundation that his ministry is willing to provide the foundation with all necessary assistance to expand its international Persian-language programme further (Mehrnews, 2021). Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has also stressed the importance of the promotion of the Persian language outside Iran. Khamenei has met with Iranian cultural advisors several times, emphasising the importance of spreading the Persian language in the countries they work. For example, in one such meeting on 2 March 2010, he stated, ‘Spreading Persian language and literature [outside Iran] is one of the main responsibilities of cultural advisors’. They should fulfil this task, Khamenei explained, by establishing close connections with Persian-language chairs and university departments in which Persian-language courses are offered (IBNA, 2010).

Iran has used a variety of means to promote the Persian language beyond its borders. According to the deputy of international affairs at the Sa’adi Foundation, in the same way that two foreign languages, i.e. English and Arabic, are taught in Iranian high schools, one of Iran’s strategies to promote the Persian language has been to make Persian a second language of choice for high school students in different countries in the region (Mehrnews, 2016). He stated, ‘We have engaged in formal negotiations with the ministries of education of different countries and with the heads of many schools who have the authority to choose [second or third] languages [for students]’. He added that the Sa’adi Foundation has sought to increase the number of Persian-language learners in countries where Persian as a second language is already taught at high schools, and to add it to the list of second language offerings in countries where it is not currently available (Mehrnews, 2016). Further, Iran has promoted the Persian language at various foreign universities. In universities where Persian language and literature are taught and master’s and PhD students engage in these areas of research, Iran has advertised such courses in an effort to boost student numbers. Iranian cultural centres play a significant role in the promotion of Persian by holding classes for those interested in learning the language. According to the deputy of international affairs of the Sa’adi Foundation, such public classes have been established in 60 countries, and that the number of students is roughly 40,000 in total. To increase the number of participants, Iran has advertised its programmes through various public forums such as internet websites (Mehrnews, 2016).

Another strategy employed by Tehran to promote the language is the deployment of linguists and scholars in the field from Iran to other countries to train local teachers. Some of these scholars remain in the target country, engage in the development of Persian teaching courses or teach the courses themselves. According to one estimate, in the past four decades, Iran’s Ministry of Science, Research and Technology has sent more than 260 Persian literature and language experts to different countries for the purpose of teaching (Rezaie-mehr & Vafaei, 2020-21, p. 83). On occasion, Tehran funds foreigners who attend Persian-language classes and graduate with high marks to travel to Iran to attend complimentary courses. In the years prior to 2015, as the deputy of international affairs of the Sa’adi Foundation confirmed, his institute alone brought roughly 70 people per year to Iran to teach them Persian; this number is envisaged to increase to 300 students each year (Rezaie-mehr & Vafaei, 2020-21, p. 83).

Iranian influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria

All three countries whose Iranian influence is explored in this article, i.e. Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, are important for Tehran from a strategic angle. Lebanon’s geographical position, especially its position next to Israel—Iran’s main regional rival—makes this country significant to Iran. Iranian influence in Lebanon is primarily exercised through Hezbollah. The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon in 1982 provided Iran with a timely opportunity to invest further in its anti-Israeli policy by sponsoring the establishment of Hezbollah (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003, p. 299). Since then, Iran has viewed Hezbollah a ‘strategic asset’ (Terrill, 2015, p. 227). Tehran’s arming of Hezbollah not only gave it the capacity to retaliate against Israel if Iran were attacked by Tel Aviv, but also allowed Tehran to use Hezbollah’s power as a deterrent against any Israeli attack on Iranian territory. As of June 2013, Israeli security officials estimated that Hezbollah possessed between 60,000 and 80,000 rockets and missiles (Terrill, 2015, p. 227). Iran’s influence in Lebanon is not only limited to the military arena, but has also extended to the social and humanitarian spheres through the initiation of various activities in south Beirut—which has a significant Shia population and is home to many Hezbollah supporters.

In Iraq, Iran has exercised influence since the 2003 American invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. One significant reason driving Iran to increase its influence in Iraq was that Iran viewed the presence of the US forces in Iraq with great anxiety, considering them a threat to its own security. Iranian policymakers worried that if the United States were to accomplish its mission in Iraq, Iran could be the next target (Kamrava, 2008). Further, Iraq became one of the few countries through which Tehran could circumvent sanctions to an extent—especially after the increase of tensions between Iran and the West concerning the former’s nuclear programme (Saikal, 2019, p. 162). Iranian influence in Iraq during the post-Saddam era has included a combination of soft and hard power measures to minimise the threat of America to Iran’s security. To this end, Iran has supported an increased number of Iranian pilgrims to visit Shia shrines in Karbala and Najaf, extended its links with Shia communities, invested significantly in Iraq’s two major religious cities—Najaf and Karbala, and strengthened its formal diplomatic and economic ties with the Iraqi government (Barzegar, 2010).

Syria has been one of the Tehran’s key allies in the region. After the Iranian revolution, both countries have pursued anti-American and anti-Israeli policies and cooperated with each other in terms of supporting Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups. With the American invasion of Iraq and the establishment of US forces on the borders of both countries, the strategic cooperation between the two countries significantly increased. This relationship culminated in the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war (Ahmadian & Mohseni, 2019, p. 349). When the Arab Spring uprisings reached Syria, Tehran assisted the Assad regime to defend itself against rebels and then against the Islamic State (IS). The Syrian rebels were supported and equipped by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey as well as by the United States and its Western allies. There are a number of reasons why Tehran lent its strong support to Assad during the civil war. First, Syria is an important actor in the Iran–US conflict, and the survival of Assad’s government in Syria provides Tehran with a better opportunity to resist the US. Second, from a strategic viewpoint, Syria is the Middle East’s gate to the western Mediterranean. Third, Syria is Iran’s key ally against Israel and part of ‘the axis of resistance’. Indeed, Syria has functioned as the main transit route for Iranian weapons and equipment to Hezbollah. These factors make it crucial for Tehran to maintain its influence in Syria, including through its soft power reach.

The remainder of this article explores one significant element of Iranian soft power, namely the promotion of the Persian language and the measures through which Iran has been able to develop the language in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria.

Promotion of the Persian language in Lebanon

Iranian efforts to promote the Persian language in Lebanon have been increasing in the past decade through a variety of strategies. In 2010, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon and the Iranian cultural advisor in Beirut met with Lebanon’s minister of higher education to emphasise the importance of Persian-language teaching in the country. The Lebanese minister agreed to instigate the teaching of a Persian language and literature course at the undergraduate level at the Lebanese University, and also promised that Persian would become an option for second language study in government schools. He assured the Iranian ambassador and cultural advisor that preparations to establish the undergraduate course in Persian language and literature at the Lebanese University would be conducted with the cooperation of the Iranian cultural centre in Beirut (Asr-e Iran, 2011). The plan to offer Persian as a second language option for Lebanese high school students has been implemented, with Iran’s cultural advisor in Lebanon Abbas Khamehyar recently indicating that students can choose between French and Persian for their second language studies (SNN, 2021).

During the past decade, Iran has expanded Persian-language teaching in Lebanon at both government and non-government universities. A professor of Persian studies in Lebanon, Dallal Abbas, stated in an interview that with the aid of Iran, Persian-language courses are offered at several Lebanese universities (IBNA, 2019). Abbas continued that the Iranian government has always supported and continues to support the teaching of Persian in Lebanon. In addition to the Lebanese University where an official chair of Persian language teaching exists, other universities such as the University of St. Joseph and the American University of Beirut have also established Persian-language teaching courses during the past ten years. Some of these universities, especially the Lebanese University, have collaborated closely with Iranian universities. According to one report, as of March 2021, 60 students were studying Persian at the Lebanese University in both undergraduate and postgraduate degrees (IRIB, 2021). Further, the Iranian university of al-Mustafa, which has a branch in Lebanon, also offers Persian-language courses as well as courses on Shia theology.

Iran has also managed to expand Persian-language teaching in non-government Lebanese schools. Here, Hezbollah has played a significant role. For example, al-Bayan School in southern Beirut, affiliated with Hezbollah, was one of the first schools to add the Persian language to its curriculum. This school announced in 2013 that the school curriculum would include Persian from the following year (Tasnim News, 2013). More significant than al-Bayan school are the al-Mahdi schools which are closely connected to Hezbollah and teach Persian to students as a second language. According to one report released in 2019, Persian is being taught in all of Lebanon’s 15 al-Mahdi schools (IBNA, 2019). Al-Mahdi schools work closely with the Iranian embassy and the Iranian cultural centre in Beirut to organise a Persian-language olympiad, which is composed of several rounds of competition. In the inaugural year of the competition in 2012, secondary students at al-Mahdi schools participated in the first round on 11 May. The second round was held the following week in the form of a 90-minute written test taken by the top 100 students in the presence of the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon at the Iranian cultural advisor’s headquarters in Beirut (Hawzah News, 2012). Al-Mahdi schools continued to run the Persian-language olympiad throughout the 2010s and often granted prizes and awards to the winners including a trip to Iran—a reward which encouraged more students to learn the language. The Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, the Iranian cultural advisor and representatives from Hezbollah often attend the prize-giving ceremonies of these Olympiads (IRNA, 2015a). For example, at the 2015 olympiad’s closing ceremony, the report of which is found on the Iranian government-affiliated website IRNA, the director general of the al-Mahdi school organisation thanked the embassy and cultural advisor of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Beirut ‘for their continuous efforts and interest in the expansion of Persian language and literature’. He also expressed his gratitude for Iran’s continuous training of Persian-language teachers in Lebanon (IRNA, 2015a).

What is also important is that Iran often uses such ceremonies to not only further its official foreign policy agenda, including its anti-Israel stance, but also to capture Lebanese hearts and minds. At the same 2015 ceremony mentioned above, the Iranian ambassador to Beirut stated that the ‘Zionist regime is a common enemy of the nations of Iran, Lebanon and Palestine’, adding ‘I emphasise that the message of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Lebanese nation … is a message of love and friendship’ (IRNA, 2015a). Such statements are consistent with Joseph Nye’s theory that when a country seeks to exert influence on another, cultural resources can help it to capture the hearts and minds of the other’s population. In addition, Iran links two other key sources of soft power, i.e. its political values and foreign policies, to a key aspect of its culture, i.e. the promotion of the Persian language, meaning that this latter element or the events related to it are being used, as Nye theorised, to highlight the key values associated with its politics.

Also noteworthy is Hezbollah’s significant role in familiarising the Lebanese population with books published in Iran on matters such as religion, politics and culture. The institutions working closely with Hezbollah often translate these books from Persian to Arabic. In a 2017 interview with the Iranian state-affiliated news agency Tasnim, Mohammad Mehdi Shariatmadar, the Iranian cultural advisor in Beirut, stated that Hezbollah had established a number of institutions in Lebanon which work closely with Iran:

Various institutions have been established by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Their presence in Iran is very strong and they attend many cultural events. They are present in Mashhad, Qom, Tehran, etc., and they have detailed knowledge of what occurs in Iran and choose appropriate books for publication … This relationship [between Iran and such institutions] becomes stronger every day, and of course the [Iranian] cultural advisor plays a significant role too … . In one of the institutions [established by Hezbollah], translation from Persian to Arabic is undertaken (ICRO, 2017a).

Again, what is important to note is that many of these books, written originally in Persian and then translated into Arabic with the assistance of Hezbollah, are oriented around topics such as religion, the Iran-Iraq War, as well as what Iran refers to as ‘the culture of resistance’ (ICRO, 2017a). The ideas of key Iranian policymakers including Ayatollah Khamenei have also been translated either by Hezbollah-affiliated publishers or others. As the Iranian cultural advisor in Beirut confirms, the books translated from Persian into Arabic include ‘A 250-Year-Old Man’ (Ensan-e 250 saleh), which is a collection of Ayatollah Khamenei’s political statements (ICRO, 2017a). This demonstrates another aspect of Iranian soft power efforts to promote its key political ideology through language-related activities such as translating books.

In one of its latest efforts to expand Persian-language teaching in Lebanon, Iran established the first branch of the Persian-language teaching centre Baha al-Din Ameli Education, Research and Studies Centre in August 2021. Attendees at the inauguration ceremony of this institute in Baalbek included Iran’s cultural advisor in Lebanon Abbas Khamehyar, the president of al-Mustafa University in Lebanon and Syria, and the head of Hezbollah in the al-Baqaa area (ANA Press, 2021). Khamehyar emphasised the importance of the Persian language at the ceremony: ‘The Persian language has great capabilities that have made it one of the richest languages in the world … Understanding Islamic culture is not possible without some familiarity with Persian’ (IRNA, 2021). The presence of a representative from Hezbollah again demonstrates Iran’s efforts to increase its soft power reach in Lebanon through Hezbollah. While expressing satisfaction with the opening of the first branch of the Persian-language teaching centre in Baalbek, Hezbollah’s representative, Hussein al-Nemr, said: ‘We will support all the activities and actions of this centre and we will not withhold any assistance in this regard’ (IRNA, 2021). It is important to note that Iranian efforts to establish Persian-language centres in Lebanon, including the Baha al-Din Ameli centre, aims to create a more positive image of Iran among local people, which is another feature of soft-power theories. As the head of the Baha al-Din Ameli centre stated at the inauguration ceremony of the institute, ‘One of the goals of setting up a Persian-language centre is not only to teach this language in a specialised way, but also to provide our language learners with a deep understanding of … the great Iranian civilisation’ (IRNA, 2021).

Promotion of the Persian language in Iraq

Like in the case of Lebanon, Iran has established independent cultural centres and also collaborated closely with Iraqi universities to expand Persian-language teaching in Iraq. One key function of the Iranian cultural centres in Iraq is to teach the Persian language at three levels: elementary, intermediate and advanced (ISNA, 2021). They collaborate closely with the long-established Persian teaching institutions of the University of Tehran and Ferdowsi University in Mashhad, and some of the Persian-language programmes taught at these centres are developed by Iranian linguists at these universities (ISNA, 2021). One key Iranian centre in Iraq is the Qalam Institute, which is a Persian-teaching institute. According to its website, the institute uses ‘skilled and experienced personnel in the field of language . . . in accordance with international standards of language teaching’. The website claims that ‘the institute is one of the most important and preeminent centres for teaching and translating the Persian language in Baghdad and Iraq’, and that ‘the Persian language is taught in groups, and in private and semi-private classes to university students as well as others interested in learning the language’ (Qalam Institute n.d.). In addition to holding Persian-language classes at the institute itself, Qalam collaborates closely with Iraqi universities and convenes Persian-language courses for students studying in the fields of language, literature, theology and politics at Iraqi universities. For example, in September 2021, a Persian course developed by the Qalam Institute was offered to university students in the language department of the University of Baghdad (Qalam Center, 2021).

The cultural centres of the Islamic Republic have played a key role in the development of Persian-language courses and the holding of classes. The head of the academic branch of Iran’s cultural centre in Iraq stated in an interview in 2020 that his staff collaborate closely with the Sa’adi Foundation, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad and Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran to develop Persian-language courses (Sa’adi Foundation, 2020a). As of November 2020, the advisor continued, the Iranian cultural centre had enabled more than ten groups of students to complete its Persian-learning programme and was currently offering classes to more than twelve groups (Sa’adi Foundation, 2020a). The cultural centres of the Islamic Republic in Iraq also host Persian-language exams. These exams test elementary, intermediate and advanced students, and take place both midterm and at the end of term. Persian-language exams under the banner of AMFA (an established Persian language proficiency test) are sometimes held at the Qalam Institute in the presence of Sa’adi Foundation representatives and the Iranian cultural advisor in Iraq (Sa’adi Foundation, 2019a).

In recent years, Iran has significantly expanded its Persian-language courses in Iraqi cities outside the main urban centres. With the assistance of the cultural centre of the Islamic Republic in Iraq, a Persian-language centre was established in Karbala in January 2019 (Parliamentary Library of Iran, 2019). In September the same year, Iran declared the inauguration of a new Persian-language course in Nasiriya, the capital city of Dhi Qar province in southern Iraq (Sa’adi Foundation, 2019b). In Najaf, Persian-language teaching flourishes to a greater extent than in many other Iraqi cities due to the substantial presence of Iranian clerics there and the cultural exchange that exists between the two key centres of Shia Islam, i.e. Qom in Iran and Najaf in Iraq. Iran has continued to facilitate Persian classes in Najaf during the past few years, and some of these classes are held inside religious centres (International Center for Teaching Persian to non-Persians, 2017a).

As in the case of Lebanon, Tehran’s efforts to develop its national language in Iraq are also linked to the development of its key political values. For example, those who participate in Persian classes often attend ceremonies in which key features of Iranian foreign policies are promoted. On one occasion, students of the Iranian cultural centre attended a ceremony in which the Iranian cultural advisor and a representative of the Sa’adi Foundation attended; during the ceremony, Iranian officials delivered speeches with anti-America messages and condemned US sanctions against Iran (Sa’adi Foundation, 2020b). As previously explained, based on soft-power theories, establishing educational or cultural centres is an important way of communicating a country’s norms, values and ideas, including political ones, and it is through this process that a country strengthens its soft power. Ceremonies such as that described above demonstrate how Tehran uses its Persian-language classes to share its political values with language learners.

With the assistance of its cultural centres, Tehran has continuously trained local Persian-language instructors and lecturers in Iraq. This has often been conducted in two ways: either by sending Iranian instructors to Iraq to train Iraqi teachers directly, or by supporting trainee teachers to attend training courses held in Iran (Tasnim News, 2016). It is important to note that in the latter case, in addition to their training courses, attendees are also taken to visit attractions of particular interest. On one occasion, instructors who were supported to undertake training courses in Iran visited the National Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defence—which organises a variety of programmes related to the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war known in Iran as the sacred defence. Later, the trainees participated in a ceremony organised by the Iranian embassy in Iraq, and were given certificates and prizes (Tasnim News, 2016). The presence of Iraqi trainee teachers in Iran, particularly in places with high political significance, is again reminiscent of the Iranian attempt to promote its political values among local instructors—a process which assists Tehran to further its soft power reach in Iraq. This is in line with the theory of soft power discussed already, in particular the idea that people who study (or receive training), or are exposed to certain cultural places in another country, are likely to return home with a more positive view of the country they visited; these people have the potential to build or enhance the soft power reach of the host country (Atkinson, 2010, p. 3).

In order to expand the Persian language in Iraq, Iran has used other methods which have not been employed in Lebanon. Key among these approaches is the publication of several online magazines. The Sa’adi Foundation, the Iranian cultural advisor in Iraq and the Qalam Institute cooperated to produce the first online Persian teaching magazine in Iraq, called Mina. The stated aims of Mina are to engender greater motivation among Iraqi students of all levels to learn Persian (IBNA, 2021). The magazine is available freely online and three issues have been published so far. Here, we can see how Tehran links its Persian-language teaching content with its political ideology. For example, in the third issue, pictures of General Qasem Suleimani, former commander of the Qods Force, together with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces commander assassinated alongside Suleimani, are displayed throughout the magazine (MINA, 2021). The editor of the magazine, who is the cultural advisor of the Islamic Republic in Iraq, states in the beginning of the third issue that ‘our dear martyr Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis … said that the language of Islam is Arabic and the language of revolution and resistance is Persian’ (MINA, 2021).

Other efforts by Tehran to promote the Persian language in Iraq are also noteworthy. Tehran regularly donates Persian-language textbooks to Iraqi universities. In December 2020, for example, all the textbooks required by students of Persian language and literature at Wasit University in eastern Iraq were provided by Iran. The libraries of other Iraqi universities, such as Baghdad, Kufa and Sulaimani universities, regularly receive books related to the field of Persian language and literature from Iranian cultural centres in Iraq (Sa’adi Foundation, 2020c). Further, Tehran often sends representatives to international book fairs held in different cities of Iraq and sets up special pavilions in which Persian books, including textbooks for Persian-language students, are displayed. In 2021, Iran sent representatives to two such international book fairs in Iraq, one in Baghdad and one in Sulemaniyeh (Sa’adi Foundation, 2021a).

During the past few years, Tehran has also increased its online Persian-language teaching courses. In 2019, before the rise of Covid-19, the Iranian cultural advisor in Baghdad met with Persian-language teachers and instructors at the Iranian cultural centre’s premises in Iraq. The cultural advisor stressed the need to deliver Persian-language teaching in a virtual format. He then stated that he would ensure that the plan to expand Persian-language teaching courses through virtual methods would be implemented and would soon come to fruition through the assistance of one of the teachers at the centre (Sa’adi Foundation, 2019c). With the rise of Covid-19, this plan was accelerated and the Iranian cultural centre in Iraq began to convene some online classes. For example, in December 2020, the head of the centre stated that two online Persian-teaching classes had been launched for elementary and advanced students respectively (Mehrnews, 2020). Iran has also increased its efforts to promote the Persian language in Iraq through online conferences. In March 2021, Iran’s cultural advisor in Iraq declared that his office would convene the first international webinar in the field of Persian-language teaching with the assistance of the Qalam Institute (Islamic Republic of Iran’s Cultural Centre in Baghdad, 2021).

Promotion of the Persian language in Syria

Before the outbreak of civil war in Syria, Iran had already expanded its Persian-language teaching programmes through close collaboration with Syrian universities. Courses related to Persian language had been mainly taught in three Syrian universities: Damascus University, Aleppo University, and the Ba’ath University in Homs province. In addition, Iran’s Ministry of Science, Research and Technology was sending four Iranian instructors every year to teach in these universities before the war broke out. It is reported that the cultural section of the Embassy of Iran in Syria, in cooperation with the Organisation of Islamic Culture and Communication, had sent more than 1,200 books to the Persian language libraries of these universities (ISNA, 2015).

The civil war in Syria was a significant obstacle to Iran’s efforts to expand the Persian language in that country. Iran’s cultural advisor in Syria stated in an interview on 21 February 2018 that ‘at the beginning of the [Syrian] crisis, the instructors deployed from Iran who taught [Persian] there all returned. Because there are only a few local teachers, this has had a negative effect on the teaching process’ (Khabarban, 2018). Despite the fact that the expansion of Persian slowed during the civil war, Tehran continued some of its efforts in this regard. The Persian-teaching centre affiliated with the cultural centre of the Islamic Republic in Damascus stated on 1 May 2014 that it would offer new Persian courses at three levels: elementary, intermediate and advanced (Hawza News, 2014). In November 2015, Iran declared that it would assist the development of Persian-language courses at Homs University (IRNA, 2015b).

From mid-2017 onwards, when the Syrian conflict seemed to be lessening, Iran expanded its Persian-language programme in Syria. In December 2017, Ferdowsi University in Mashhad, by agreement with the Iranian cultural advisor in Syria, began to provide Persian-language course development training. In particular, fifteen instructors from universities in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia received both face-to-face and online training and several books relevant to modern Persian-language teaching were sent to the Iranian cultural centre in Syria (International Centre for Teaching Persian, 2017b). In January 2020, the Iranian education minister Mohsen Hajimirzaei travelled to Syria. He stressed the importance of incorporating Persian-language study into the educational system of Syria, stating that the language was permitted to be taught in high schools in Syria as an optional language (IRNA, 2020). On 17 November 2020, the head of the Sa’adi Foundation Gholam Ali Haddad Adel named a new cultural advisor, Hamidreza Esmati, to serve in Syria. In the ceremony introducing him, Haddad stressed the need for him to pay significant attention to the promotion of Persian in Syria, and also stated that Persian-language teaching should be undertaken in accordance with the latest educational methods (IBNA, 2020). In one of its most recent efforts to promote the Persian language in Syria, Iran established a new Persian-language course in 2021 at the cultural advisory commission of the Islamic Republic in Syria (Sa’adi Foundation, 2021b). Iran currently supports the development of the Persian language in Syria through dispatching Iranian instructors to Syria and training local teachers.

Persian-language courses are also taught in other venues aside from universities and Iranian cultural centres in Syria. In August 2018, in order to further expand Persian-language classes in Syria, the cultural advisor of the Islamic Republic in Damascus instigated Persian-language programmes at the Mohseniyeh and Hashemieh schools in Damascus (LISNA, 2018). Also, Persian-language courses are taught in religious centres such as hussainiyas and hawzas which operate under the supervision of Iran and independently from Syrian ministries (Syrian Observatory, 2019). Persian classes are also convened in Syria by a branch of al-Mustafa International University in the Zainabiya region of Damascus and in the official branch of the Office of Iran’s Supreme Leader in Syria (LISNA, 2018). Holding Persian-language classes in religious centres such as hussainiyas and hawzas, as explained above, is of particular significance. Twelver Shiism, the most dominant Shia sect in the world including in Iran, does not have strong roots in Syria, as it does in Iraq and South Lebanon where Hezbollah’s presence is strong. Indeed, although the Alawite sect dominant in Syria originated from the Shia tradition, it differs theologically from Twelver Shiism (see Winter, 2016, pp. 3–6). Therefore, in the absence of a strong Twelver Shia base in Syria, Tehran uses the opportunity of Persian teaching to enhance the rise of Twelver Shiism.

One of the Syrian cities in which Iran has been expanding Persian-language classes is Latakia. The city’s al-Rasoul al-Azam (Great Prophet) complex, whose establishment was sponsored by Iran, has been active as a main sponsor of spreading Shia Islam and has hosted numerous Persian-language courses (see Alrifai, 2021). During these courses, often developed with the cooperation of the Iranian cultural centre in the city, students are encouraged to learn the language well and, as an incentive to attract as many students as possible, often promised funding to travel to Iran to participate in free courses there (ICRO, 2017b). Teaching methods include face-to-face teaching as well as the provision of CDs for home practice (ICRO, 2017b). The Iranian cultural centre in Latakia itself also convenes language teaching. It occasionally holds events, hosting Persian-language students and local teachers on significant cultural days in the Iranian calendar such as Nowruz and Yalda Night (Sa’adi Foundation, 2021c). Iran has further expanded its Persian-language programme in Latakia by deepening its connections with Latakia’s Tishreen University, which is Syria’s third-largest university. Students are now able to take Persian studies as a major at the university. In a recent meeting between Alireza Fadavi, cultural advisor and head of Iran’s cultural advisory centre in Latakia, and Bassam Hassan, president of Tishreen University, Fadavi emphasised the importance of the promotion of Persian-language courses at the University of Tishreen, promising that the cultural centre in Latakia would offer any necessary assistance and take any action needed to develop Persian language and literature at the university (Tasnim News, 2021). Tehran’s efforts to enhance Iranian culture in Latakia, including promoting Persian as well as certain cultural festivals such as Nowruz and Yalda Night, as stated above, should be understood in light of the strategic importance of the city for Iran. Indeed, Iran has heavily invested in Latakia, particularly in the management of the port of Latakia (Akbar, 2021). As in the cases of Lebanon and Iraq, Persian-language classes in Syria, in general, and in Latakia, in particular, are used by Tehran to create a positive image of Iran and to capture the hearts and minds of language learners—an important part of a country’s soft power strategy. In this sense, during the inauguration of a Persian-language teaching course in Latakia in 2018, one of the course instructors noted in his speech that Iran was ‘a great country with a long history of civilisation’, encouraging students to make themselves familiar with ‘Iran’s great culture and civilisation’ (Sa’adi Foundation, 2018).

Iranian presence in the governorate of Deir Ez-Zor is also strong. In this governorate, the city of Abu Kamal has witnessed many Iranian activities during the past few years. In particular, four centres of Persian-language teaching are reported to function in Abu Kamal alone (North Press Agency, 2021). One of the centres closely affiliated with Iran in the city of Abu Kamal is reported to have around four-hundred students who study both Shia Islam and the Persian language (North Press Agency, 2021). In the same way as in Latakia, therefore, Persian is used as a tool of Iranian soft power in Deir Ez-Zor through which Iran seeks to spread Shiism. Critics have argued that Iranian activities in cultural centres in Deir Ez-Zor are at times viewed with suspicion by local Syrian residents, with some activists stating that Iran seeks to ‘impose its ideological culture’ on the region (al-Ahmad, 2019). Recently, as the Syrian Human Rights Observer noted, Iran has expanded its efforts to promote the Persian language among children in this governorate. In September 2020, the Iranian cultural centre in al-Mayadin, located in Deir Ez-Zor, inaugurated free Persian courses for children. In June 2021, the Iranian cultural centre opened another free Persian-language course for children in the same town. In order to encourage more participants to take the courses, the cultural centre offered a prize of one million Syrian pounds to students who achieved excellent results in the Persian-language test at the end of the course (Levant News, 2021).

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that over the last decade, Iran has increasingly engaged in efforts to enhance its soft power in countries in the Middle East, such as Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, through the development of its Persian-language programmes. As argued, Iran has systematically employed two key measures to promote the Persian language: 1) establishing connections with formal educational centres such as schools and universities in host countries, most prominently with the assistance of Iranian cultural centres, the Sa’adi Foundation and the cultural advisory sections of Iranian embassies; 2) offering independent Persian-language courses through Iranian cultural centres or established branches of Persian-language teaching centres. Further, as argued, Iran has used a variety of methods to promote the Persian language, ranging from face-to-face teaching to online courses and the provision of CDs for students’ home practice. The Iranian strategy to promote its language bears some resemblance to that conducted by other countries and institutions such as the Confucius Institutes. For example, Tehran has trained some local instructors inside Iran through training courses, and also dispatches some instructors directly from Iran. Another similarity, which features in Iran’s strategy as well as the language programmes of the Confucius Institutes, is that they sponsor language competitions and olympiads, which act as powerful tools to encourage students to actively engage in language classes and enhance their language expertise.

Despite these similarities, the Iranian investment in promoting its national language beyond its borders seems to be much less significant than the Chinese investment in the Confucius Institutes. While there is no clear-cut data demonstrating how much Iran spends on such activities, the amount fails to meet the expectations even of institutions such as Sa’adi Foundation. The head of this Foundation has lamented the insufficiency of the budget dedicated to the promotion of Persian on several occasions (Mehrnews, 2016). One Iranian study argued that despite the fact that Iran has sent many cultural advisors and Persian-language experts to different countries, their number remains low and they do not have sufficient capacity to promote the language on a large scale (Rezaie-mehr & Vafaei, 2020-21, p. 85). The head of the Sa’adi Foundation, Haddad Adel, once stated that the budget dedicated to the promotion of Persian is low (Mehrnews, 2016). Indeed, one overall challenge for Iran is that the cost of convening free Persian courses and seminars in a face-to-face format has become high due to the financial constraints facing Iran. In Haddad Adel’s words, ‘the cost of holding a Persian-language class overseas is very high and given the high rate of [foreign] currency … our work becomes difficult’ (Mehrnews, 2016). Despite these limitations, Iranian efforts to promote its national language in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon have been successful to varying degrees. For example, it is reported that the Iranian decision to open free language courses for children in Deir Ez-Zor and offer a cash prize to the top students has achieved successful results, attracting tens of students (Asharq al-Awsat, 2021). Iran’s Persian-language programmes are also reported to have absorbed many local students during the past few years in Iraq and Lebanon (ISNA, 2021).⁵

Another conclusion drawn from Iran’s Persian-related activities in the region is that Iran has pursued a number of objectives through the promotion of its national language internationally. The first objective is capturing the hearts and minds of language learners in target countries and creating a more positive image of Iran. This is evident, as demonstrated, in instructors’ and cultural advisors’ speeches and their focus on how Persian-teaching courses create ‘love and friendship’ among nations. They also often emphasise the ‘rich’ values that the Persian language conveys, opening the door for learners to become familiar with Iran’s history and ancient civilisation. This is in line with soft-power theories, in particular those stating that an individual is likely to look more favourably on another country after becoming familiar with its language, in turn engendering affinity (see for example Szostek, 2017). Therefore, the Iranian approach to the promotion of soft power is fundamentally linked to capturing the hearts and minds of people and to promoting the prestige of Iran in the target countries considered in this study.

Tehran’s Persian-language courses are at times used to spread Iran’s religious and political ideology. For example, as argued, anti-American and anti-Israeli messages and stances are sometimes incorporated into the ceremonies held for Persian-language students and local instructors. From a comparative perspective, while Persian-language classes and courses in Iraq and Syria do not necessarily include teachings related to Shia Islam, in Syria, especially in Latakia and Deir Ez-Zor, language and religious teachings often go hand in hand. Indeed, as demonstrated, given that Twelver Shiism is not widely practiced in Syria, religious centres affiliated with Iran such as hussainiyas and hawzas often offer courses both in Persian language and Shia theology. Overall, Tehran’s Persian-language efforts go hand in hand with other elements of its soft power strategy, namely, its emphasis on fundamental aspects of its foreign policy and its national religion, Shia Islam. In sum, this cultural activity of Tehran has the potential to prolong Iranian presence in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, helping Tehran retain its significant influence in these countries.

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Ali Akbar

Dr. Ali Akbar is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Melbourne where he received his PhD in Islamic Studies. He also works as a part-time research fellow at the University of Deakin. He is an expert in the fields of Islamic studies with a focus on contemporary Islamic thought and Middle Eastern politics as well as Iranian politics. He is the author of Contemporary Perspectives on Revelation and Qur’anic Hermeneutics (Edinburgh University Press, 2020) and Contemporary Approaches to the Qur’an and Its Interpretation in Iran (co-authored with Abdullah Saeed, Routledge, 2020). He has also published extensively in journals including Iranian Studies, Culture and Religion, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, British Journal of Middle East Studies, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Mediterranean Politics, Third Word Quarterly and Political Theology.

Notes

1 Jones and Newlee briefly explains how the ICRO promotes Persian language and literature (see Jones & Newlee, 2019; see also Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2020, pp. 101–2); Zalayat briefly mentions Iran’s promotion of the Persian language in Syria (Zalayat, 2019).

2 See also Nye’s idea about developing a balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy, or what he referred to as ‘smart power’ (Nye, 2004a: 147; see also Nye, 2009).

3 The term ‘soft power’ is also associated with ‘cultural diplomacy’. According to Waller (2009, p. 74), cultural diplomacy is a type of public diplomacy that includes the ‘exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding’.

4 As is discussed following in relation to Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, this is often the pattern Tehran has pursued in the promotion of the Persian language in different countries.

5 Further research in this area, such as via methods like focus group interviews in the target countries and monitoring local Arabic media and magazines, can reveal the extent to which Iranian efforts to increase its soft power through the promotion of the Persian language have been successful.