The Islamic State, Shia religious clerics and the mobilisation of Shia militias in Iraq and Syria

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the Islamic State’s (IS) attacks on Shia communities and their holy sites across Iraq and Syria and explores the responses of key Shia religious and political leaders. It demonstrates how these Shia elites utilised sophisticated mobilisation frames to admonish their followers to take up arms against the IS. To do so, these Shia elites drew on Shia religious symbols and historical events that emphasise Shia suffering at the hands of Sunni forces and highlighted the urgent need to protect Shia communities and their holy sites. The article also demonstrates how these mobilisation frames were malleable in the hands of different Shia elites and were instrumentalized to advance both national (defend the country) and transnational goals (defend Shia Islam). The article concludes by noting that this study of the complex motives underpinning Shia mobilisation has implications beyond the case of contemporary Iraq and Syria.

KEYWORDS:

• Islamic State
• Shia clerics
• Shia militias
• Iraq
• Syria

Introduction

The Arab Spring mobilised large numbers of young people across much of the Middle East and North Africa who sought to remove their autocratic leaders from power. Although the Arab Spring initially had a secular tone, the black flag of the khilafah (caliphate) began to emerge frequently in protests across the region, including Syria, in late 2011 (Staffell & Awan, 2016, p. 6). From early 2012, salafi-jihadi terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra (The Support Front, JAN) and the Islamic State (IS) actively engaged in military campaigns in Syria to bring down the Assad regime, capturing the city of Raqqa in March 2013. By mid-2014, the IS had also conquered cities in neighbouring Iraq and declared the formation of a new Islamic Caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its leader. Across Iraq and Syria, the IS conducted mass genocidal pogroms, including the slaughter, enslavement and forced exodus of thousands of innocent civilians (Hashim, 2018; Isakhan, 2015; Kilcullen, 2016). Aside from their attacks on the Mosul Museum and ancient sites such as Palmyra and Hatra, the IS actively targeted the religious sites of minority communities such as Shia mosques and shrines, Christian churches and Yezidi temples.

This article focuses specifically on the IS attacks on Shia communities and their holy sites across Iraq and Syria and explores the responses of key Shia clerics and militia leaders. There is already a significant body of literature examining several aspects of the Shia fight against the IS across Iraq and Syria, including: the decisive role these Shia non-state actors played in defeating the IS in several key battles (Cigar, 2015); the persecution of Sunni Arab civilians by several Shia militias (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Nelson, 2015); the threat they pose to the prospects of peace and stability in Iraq and Syria as well as to regional security (Lecorps, 2017; O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017; Smyth, 2015); and the extent to which they are backed by Iran to advance its own geopolitical interests in the region (Akbarzadeh, 2015; Lob, 2021; Ostovar, 2016). To date, however, far less attention has been paid to the mobilisation frames developed and deployed by key Shia religious and political elites to mobilise their constituents to fight against the IS.

To address this lacuna, this article advances the study of Shia actors in seven significant ways. First, it begins by situating the discussion within the existing literature on how religious, national and transnational frames can be used to mobilise social movements, drawing specifically on other Shia state and non-state actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah (Party of God). This lays the conceptual framework for the analysis, furthering the understanding that religious doctrine does not constitute the entire ideation driving Islamist movements and that other significant and pragmatic motives such as national or transnational agendas must also be considered. Second, the article proceeds to detail the threat that the IS posed to the Shias in Iraq and Syria, cataloguing the scale and significance of IS attacks on Shia communities and their holy sites. This includes an analysis of key propaganda produced by the IS and released via outlets such as Dabiq and Al-Hayat. Third, the article documents the responses of key Shia clergymen to the IS threat. While much has been written about the fatwa (religious edict) issued by Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani (al-Qarawee, 2019; Anzalone, 2016), little attention has been paid to the pronouncements of other prominent Shia religious leaders. This article therefore analyses primary materials produced by various Shia clerics in response to the rise of the IS, including those from key seminaries in both Iraq and Iran. Fourth, the article further demonstrates the ways in which these fatwas provided the backdrop of religious legitimacy to the (re-)emergence of several Shia militias via an analysis of the statements made by key militia leaders. By examining a wide range of primary source material produced by militant groups which have rarely been covered in the English-language scholarship to date (Isakhan, 2020; Isakhan & Akbar, 2022), this article also furthers existing studies of Shia non-state actors in the region. Fifth, in conducting this analysis the article also demonstrates how these Shia clerics and militia leaders drew on a rich catalogue of Shia religious symbols and historical events that emphasise Shia suffering at the hands of Sunni elites to recruit and mobilise Shia men to fight the IS. To date, the issue of Shia religious and historical motifs being used by Shia leaders to mobilise their support base is mentioned only in passing or only in relation to one specific country (Anzalone, 2013; Ostovar, 2016; Smyth, 2015). Sixth, this article joins other recent scholarship to focus specifically on the ways in which Shia clerics and militia leaders built on this religious and historical mythology to further highlight the urgent need to protect not just Shia communities but also significant Shia holy sites across Iraq and Syria via a mobilisation frame identified as the ‘shrine protection narrative’ (Isakhan, 2020). Finally, the article also examines how these mobilisation frames were malleable in the hands of different Shia elites, some of whom instrumentalized them to advance domestic agendas and others to further geopolitical objectives. While existing scholarly works of Shia mobilisation give a few insights as to factors beyond religion that contributed to the mobilisation of Shia militants against the IS (Constable, 2018; Ostovar, 2016, p. 219), this article focuses on the complex ways in which different Shia elites used religious and historical mythology as well as shrine protection to advance both national (defend the country) and transnational (defend Shia Islam) goals. The article concludes by noting that this study of the complex motives underpinning Shia mobilisation has implications for the study of social movements beyond the case of contemporary Iraq and Syria.

Religious, national and transnational motives of Shia mobilisation

In the literature on social movements, religion is often considered a key element in mobilising the faithful, transforming them into a political force. Religion can be harnessed by political elites to achieve their agenda and objectives given that it legitimises certain behaviours and creates a unified set of social and moral values (Fox, 2002; Smith, 1996). As Tarrow (1998, p. 112) notes, religion ‘provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that can be accessed and appropriated by movement leaders’. Religion therefore ‘drapes a powerful sacred canopy over the sometimes banal, sometimes brutal work involved in political mobilization’ (Wald et al., 2005, p. 132). This article recognises the importance of religion in mobilising people, exploring the religious motifs utilised by Shia religious clerics in their fatwas and the extent to which this galvanised Shia militants in their fight against the IS. At the same time, however, this article also acknowledges that religion is insufficient on its own to justify such mass political mobilisation. As Goodwin and Jasper (1999, p. 36) argue, an ‘extraordinarily large number of processes and events, political and otherwise, potentially influence movement mobilisation, and they do so in historically complex combinations and sequences.’

As a result, the literature on Islamist movements has developed to include drivers beyond religion, such as exploring broader narratives of economic hardship as well as national and transnational sentiments. For example, studies of factors contributing to suicide attacks by members of the Palestinian political and militant group known as Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement or Hamas) have shown that, beyond religion, economic factors play a critical role – including a significant reward or payment that the family of such attackers is supposed to receive after their death (Hafez, 2006; Moghadam, 2003). Others have demonstrated how key Islamist political actors, such as Morocco’s Hizb al-Adalah wa-Tanmiya (Party of Justice and Development) or Adl wal-Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality), have to strike a delicate balance between the complexities of national politics, geopolitics and their transnational supporters (or detractors) in shaping their strategic policy decisions (Casani & El Asri, 2021; Tome-Alonso, 2021).

In the Shia context, Iran’s first Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini relied on both religious and national narratives in the lead up to, during and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. While Iran’s hardline clerics routinely emphasise Islamic over national identity as the authentic source of Iranian identity (Saleh & Worrall, 2015, pp. 86–87), a close reading of Khomeini’s speeches reveal an emphasis on broader Iranian national identity such as via his use of the terms ‘our land’ or ‘our country’ (Munson, 2003, pp. 42–43). Further, upon the establishment of new political institutions following the revolution, Khomeini emphasised that they had a dual nature: Islamic and national. This is the case with the state-run organisation Reconstruction Jihad (Jahad-e Sazandegi), which played not only a key role in rural development projects but also in spreading both revolutionary and religious values throughout the Iranian countryside. As Lob (2022, p. 140) argues, many members of the Reconstruction Jihad ‘joined the organisation due to a nationalistic desire to serve and rebuild their country’. During the establishment and development of the organisation, Khomeini emphasised both national and religious elements to promote cohesion and solidarity between the group’s members, and to maximise recruitment and mobilisation (Lob, 2020, pp. 42–43). This is a case demonstrating that ‘religion, particularly when combined with altruism and nationalism, can be a force for recruitment, mobilisation, cohesiveness, and commitment’ (Lob, 2022, p. 134).

Another example of the combination of religious and national rhetoric underpinning the actions of key Shia religio-political movements comes from the powerful Lebanon-based political party, Hezbollah which also has its own militia units. Despite its staunchly pro-Islamic, and especially pro-Shia discourse, Hezbollah’s leaders have routinely emphasised the importance of nationalism in their speeches and statements. In an interview with Egypt’s al-Ahram newspaper in February 2000, leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that one key aim of Hezbollah is oriented around protecting ‘Lebanon’s infrastructure and population’, stating that his organisation aims to secure ‘Lebanon’s national interest’ (Noe, 2007, p. 216). Nasrallah (2015) has also declared several times that despite his organisation’s ties and close friendship with Iran, these do not undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty. Paterson and MacQueen (2021, p. 98) argue that Hezbollah’s ideology is strongly framed ‘in the context of territorial and national claims’. It is within this context that when the organisation refers to its conflict with Israel, its leaders speak of ‘violations of Lebanese territorial, air and naval sovereignty’ (Paterson & MacQueen, 2021, p. 98). Hezbollah’s political functions, including its participation in state elections, further demonstrates the group’s commitment to domestic politics (Hamdar, 2019).

However, while significant Shia actors such as Iran or Hezbollah may utilise national sentiment to advance their cause at home, they also often seek to influence Shia communities abroad and thus to shape geopolitical trends across the region. For centuries, prominent Shia clerics from the key seminaries of Iran and Iraq have maintained close ties to the Shia faithful across the world. Many such clerics are regarded as Marja al-Taqlid (Sources of Emulation) meaning that they rank as the most learned juridical authorities of the global Shia community. Their rulings on religious, social and political matters are closely followed and carefully adhered to by their followers. These religious scholars and their respective seminaries also maintain powerful transnational political influence and charity-based networks that help maintain their authority and credibility across national borders (Corboz, 2015). Other Shia actors have instrumentalised such transnational influence to shape politics abroad and the geopolitics of the region. For example, across key Persian Gulf states with Sunni regimes governing significant Shia populations such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, several Shia movements have emerged in recent decades that are directly inspired by (or directly supported by) various powerful Iranian or Iraqi Shia networks. This has led to some upheaval in which local Shia populations, have taken transnational inspiration to focus on national issues, such as becoming fierce opponents of the Saudi monarchy (Louer, 2008; Matthiesen, 2015). In the case of the Shia-majority Azerbaijan, Iran has utilised the soft power of education, culture and religion in an attempt to develop a stronger Shia identity among several domestic Shia groups (Jodicke, 2017; Mozaffari & Akbar, 2022).

Building on this important body of work, this article seeks to examine the ways in which the rhetoric espoused by key Shia religious and political elites in response to the mass devastation unleashed by the IS across Iraq and Syria was instrumentalized along both national and transnational axes. It analyses the statements made by key Shia leaders and how these galvanised and mobilised Shia fighters in their war against the IS. As a crucial backdrop to this discussion, the following two sections document the threat posed by the IS to Shia communities and their holy sites across Iraq and Syria.

The Islamic state’s hostility towards Shias

The IS represents an extreme expression of anti-Shia polemics which views Shiism as a heretical religious innovation. The split between the Shia and Sunni sects dates back to the days following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE when a debate emerged over who should lead the ummah (Islamic community). The majority, who would come to be the Sunni sect, accepted the authority of the Prophet’s companion Abu Bakr. However, a minority that became the Shia sect argued that their new leader ought to be a blood relative of the Prophet, in particular Ali ibn Abu Talib, who had also married the Prophet’s youngest daughter, Fatima. In Shiism, Ali is recognised as the first Imam and his descendants are highly revered as the legitimate legatees of the Prophet’s authority and the true leaders of the ummah. Supporters of Ali therefore contested the rule of an Umayyad caliph who had seised power in 661, instead backing Ali’s son Husayn ibn Ali as their leader. However, Husayn and his followers were defeated by forces loyal to the Umayyad leader Yazid ibn Mu‘awiyyah at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. Husayn was beheaded and many of his family and companions were slaughtered, including his brother, Abu Abbas ibn Ali. Other members of Husayn’s family, such as his sister Zaynab and his daughter Ruqayya, were taken prisoner by Yazid’s forces. Shias commemorate the Battle of Karbala at the annual Ashura procession, which includes public self-flagellations and re-enactments of the battle.

However, throughout Islam’s long history, some Sunni scholars have denounced the followers of the Shia faith as apostates who have deviated from the core beliefs of Islam. Extreme examples include polemical Sunni religious scholars such as the thirteenth century’s Ibn Taymiyya and the eighteenth century’s Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, both of whom condemned the core beliefs and practices of the Shia.¹ Today, radical salafi-jihadi groups such as the IS have re-appropriated this legacy. For the IS, the Shia ‘are more the enemy than the west … [The IS] is different in its degree of anti-Shia rhetoric and action than almost all other salafi-jihadi groups that may view the Shia as wrong, but not necessarily apostate’ (Steed, 2016, p. 138). Unlike al-Qaeda which ‘considers Shia Muslims to be apostates but sees their killing to be too extreme … and detrimental to the broader jihadist project’ (Kendall, 2016, p. 102), the IS sees it as an obligation to eradicate Shias. Evidence of this anti-Shia sentiment can be found throughout the vast trove of propaganda materials produced by the IS. For example, in a 4-minute video released by the IS in 2017, the Shias are referred to as ‘deviants,’ ‘heretics’ and ‘the innovators of religion’ who ‘have disbelieved in the creator’ (Al-Hayat, 2017b). Another clip places the Shias on an equal footing with apostates, using the term rafidah, a derogatory word for Shia meaning ‘rejecter of the truth’: ‘Neither the rawafid nor the apostates can stand up against you [members of the IS] … Allah will support you … how could He not support you, given that you worship Him alone, whereas they disbelieve and associate partners with Him?’ (Al-Hayat, 2017a).

Similar anti-Shia polemics appear in the official magazine of the IS, Dabiq. Drawing extensively on the writings of figures like Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab, issue 13 of Dabiq is specifically dedicated to condemning Shia beliefs. Shia Muslims are referred to as people who worship the dead and conduct other ‘forms of kufr [faithlessness] and shirk [idolatry]’ (The Rafidah, 2016, p. 12). The Shias are accused of aiming to eradicate Islam; they ‘hate Islam just as the Jews hate Christianity. They did not enter Islam longing for Allah or fearing Him, rather out of spite for the people of Islam and so as to inflict harm upon them’ (The Rafidah, 2016, p. 33). Finally, the article calls for open confrontation with the Shia: ‘[They] are mushrik [idolaters] apostates who must be killed wherever they are to be found, until no rafidi walks on the face of earth’ (The Rafidah, 2016, p. 45).

These were not empty threats. When the IS conquered Shia towns and villages in Iraq and Syria, they slaughtered hundreds of civilians and many more were forced to flee. According to one report, in mid-June 2014, in the Shia Turkmen town of Amerli in Iraq, the IS executed more than 600 Shias in the local prison (UNAMI/OHCHR, 2015). Later the same month, the IS conquered the Shia Turkmen town of Tal Afar where they forced roughly 90% of the population, some 125,000 people, to flee for their lives (Human Rights Watch, 2014a). The IS also went to some effort to document their active persecution of Shia communities. In one video entitled ‘Strike Their Necks’ and released in March 2015, eight Shia detainees are beheaded by IS militants. The film shows a speech by an IS fighter who religiously justifies the battle against the Shias, and refers to them as ‘the defiled’ (Al-Hayat, 2015).

The IS destruction of Shia shrines and mosques

The hostility of the IS towards the Shias was not limited to violence against Shia people. Drawing further on the works of scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab, the IS also consider Shia shrines and mosques objects of shirk and they therefore destroyed many such sites across Iraq and Syria. Visiting (ziyara) the shrines of the Shia Imams as well as the tombs of their relatives, descendants and disciples is a practice that has been important throughout Shia history. At these shrines, which are spread across Iran, Iraq, Syria and further afield, Shia pilgrims are thought to receive spiritual blessings (baraka). As noted by Nakash (1995, p. 162), shrines represent ‘a magnet attracting believers to the worship of God.’ In this way, Shia shrines can be considered transnational spaces that have long hosted Shia pilgrims from various parts of the world. This means, for example, in the same way that Iraqi Shias visit shrines located in the Iraqi cities of Karbala, Najaf and Samara, it is usual for non-Iraqi pilgrims from countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon and Afghanistan to be present alongside them. Shrines are often surrounded by concomitant businesses and communities that serve thousands of religious tourists, providing various services such as food and accommodation (Szanto, 2012). This is another reason why terrorist groups like the IS frequently target Shia mosques and shrines, because such acts are not only a symbolic attack on Shia sacred sites, but also because they often inflict a high death toll and devastate local communities.

In Iraq, the targeting of Shia mosques and shrines escalated after the onset of the 2003 war and the dramatic spike in sectarian bloodshed it unleashed. Most notoriously, in February 2006 and June 2007, Al-Qaeda in Iraq – the predecessor of the IS – bombed the al-Askari mosque in Samarra (Isakhan, 2013). From 2014, the IS continued this strategy of attacking sacred Shia sites, dutifully recording the destruction in their many propaganda outlets. For example, the second issue of Dabiq includes images of the complete obliteration of a number of Shia mosques in the predominantly Shia Iraqi city of Tal Afar (A Photo Report, 2014). The series of attacks conducted by the IS in 2014 included the desecration of a mosques and shrines dedicated to significant figures in Shia history, such as Abbas, Ali’s brother, Aqeel, and the sixth Shia Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq (Human Rights Watch, 2014b; Danti et al., 2015, pp. 54–84). In March 2015, the IS destroyed four religious sites in the Shia Shabak village of Manarat where they toppled minarets before using explosives and bulldozers to reduce mosques and shrines to rubble (UNAMI/OHCHR, 2015). In July 2016, the IS orchestrated a suicide attack on the mausoleum of the brother of the 10th and 11th Shia Imams, Muhammad ibn Ali al-Hadi, in the Iraqi Shia majority town of Balad, scorching the gates and killing at least 40 Shia pilgrims who were worshipping there at the time (Chulov, 2016).

In Syria, attacks on Shia sites began from 2012. The grave of Hujr ibn Adi, one of the companions of both the Prophet Muhammad and Ali, was desecrated in 2013 (An-Nahar, 2013; Asalamyahussain, 2013). The following year witnessed the destruction of the shrines of other companions of the Prophet and supporters of Ali, such as the mosque of Ammar Yasir and Uwais ibn al-Qarni in Raqqa (An-Nahar, 2013; Asalamyahussain, 2013). However, the most notorious attacks on Shia holy sites in Syria are the repeated assaults on the Sayyida Zaynab mosque and shrine in southern Damascus by Sunni Islamists. One such attack, conducted by the IS in 2016, led to the destruction of buildings and shops near the mausoleum and the death of 120 civilians (Danti et al., 2016a; see also Arnous, 2017; Danti et al., 2016b).

The fatwas of Shia clerics

In response to the climate of heightened insecurity triggered by the IS attacks on Shia communities and their sacred sites, a number of prominent Shia clerics issued fatwas that obliged their followers to stanch the IS incursion. These fatwas came from various clerics, ranging from those who are regarded as voices of moderation to hardliners, as well as from those inside Iraq and Syria and those further afield. Perhaps the most seminal example is that of Grand Ayatollah Sistani who is widely regarded as Iraq’s most senior Shia clergyman and a moderate who has largely refrained from involvement in political affairs. However, at critical moments he has played a decisive role in post-2003 Iraqi politics, such as advocating Iraqi participation in elections and calling for restraint during upsurges in sectarian violence (al-Qarawee, 2019). Immediately after the IS seised Mosul and began to march southwards, Sistani issued a fatwa announcing a jihad (holy war) against the IS.² He called for a mass Shia mobilisation, arguing that: ‘It is the legal and national responsibility of whoever can hold a weapon to take up arms to defend the country, the citizens and the holy sites.’ Sistani declared the fight against the IS a ‘sacred defense’ and stated, ‘Whoever of you sacrifices himself to defend his country and his family and their honour will be a martyr’ (al-Sistani, 2014). With the Shia Arab population being the majority in Iraq, Sistani’s fatwa played a decisive role in mobilising Shia militias to fight against the IS by drawing on a potent mixture of key religious themes (‘sacred defense’, ‘martyr’), Iraqi national identity (‘national responsibility’, ‘defend the country’) and the shrine protection narrative (‘defend … the holy sites’).

Other influential Shia clerics in Iraq supported Sistani’s fatwa and issued their own proclamations that emphasised both religious and national sentiments as well as the shrine protection narrative. For example, Ayatollah Ishaq al-Fayyadh stated: ‘I call on all believers to respond to Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa to defend the sacred [sites] and drive out the terrorists’ (al-Fayyadh, 2014). In endorsing Sistani’s fatwa, al-Fayyadh also stressed that its key imperative was to mobilise the Shia to fight in defense of the Iraqi nation and should not be used to legitimize sectarian violence, stating: ‘Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa to take up arms has been issued for the purpose of defending Iraq’ (al-Fayyadh, 2014). Another example is Grand Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi who, much like Sistani and Fayyadh, proclaimed that it is a religious, national and moral duty to launch a ‘defensive jihad’ to defend the country and its holy shrines from the IS (al-Najafi, 2015). Beyond this, clerics such as Najafi also drew on the rich and emotive history of Shia persecution at the hands of Sunni groups to justify the war against the IS and to mobilise their Shia constituents. As just one example, Najafi explicitly referred to the Battle of Karbala in a public prayer, calling for God to grant the contemporary Shias killed in the war against the IS places of honour in the afterlife alongside those martyred in the early days of Islam, like Husayn and his followers in Karbala (al-Najafi, 2015).

However, it is important to note that before Sistani and other Shia religious leaders issued the above fatwas against the IS in Iraq, other clerics had already released their own decrees urging the faithful to take up arms to defend Shia holy sites and communities in Syria. Due to the fact that Shiism is a minority religion in Syria, these fatwas were issued predominantly by non-Syrian clerics and are therefore couched less in terms of national interests (defending the country) and more in border transnational and pan-Shia terms (defending Shia Islam). For example, Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri responded to the escalating conflict in Syria by connecting shrine protection to transnational Shia religious sentiments. In 2013, he stated that it was a religious obligation for Shias to fight in Syria in order to defend not only Shia shrines and communities, but the religion of Islam as a whole. For him, the civil war in Syria represented a battle to defend Islam itself:

This issue [the battle in Syria] is not only related to Syria, nor solely concerned with the protection of the shrines of Zaynab and Ruqiyya. Rather, it is related to the united front of disbelief, which has attacked the fundamental principles of Islam. And defense of the principles of Islam is obligatory (Haeri in Serat News, 2013).

When it comes to Iranian clerics, while Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei has not issued an official fatwa asking Shias to participate in the conflicts in either Iraq or Syria, he has consistently praised the ‘defenders of the shrines’ in reference to the many Iran-backed Shia militias who have fought in both conflicts (Khamenei, 2021). Another Iranian cleric, Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, who is known as a hard-liner with close government ties, has been far more explicit, drawing on the shrine protection narrative, the theme of martyrdom and historical events such as the Battle of Karbala to admonish Shias to fight against the IS. What is most interesting for our purposes, however, is the ways Iranian clerics such as Makarem Shirazi couch their rhetoric less in national (defending the country) and more in transnational and pan-Shia religious terms (defending Shia Islam). As just one example, a 2014 fatwa released by Makarem Shirazi states: ‘I explicitly announce that defending the sacred sites is obligatory for all followers of Ahl al-Bayt [People of the House; in Shia Islam this refers to the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad via Ali and Fatima] … The martyrs will join the martyrs of Karbala’ (Shiraze, 2014).

The mobilisation of Shia militias

By drawing on a mixture of religious, historical, national and transnational narratives, the fatwas released by various Shia religious elites effectively galvanised much of the Shia population and led to the mass recruitment and mobilisation of Shia men across Iraq and Syria. This provided a backdrop of religious legitimacy to the scores of Shia militias that were (re-)formed virtually overnight and the tens of thousands of men who enlisted before being hastily armed, trained and sent to the frontlines (Anzalone, 2016; Smyth, 2014). As will be demonstrated below, these militias utilised the various fatwas of key Shia religious authorities not only to justify their actions in religious and historical terms, but also to further various national and transnational goals.

In Iraq, the mobilisation of Shia fighters to defend their communities and holy sites had begun prior to the rise of the IS. The al-Askari mosque bombings of 2006 and 2007 triggered the rise and strengthening of several Shia militias and also legitimised foreign Shia militants to enter Iraq (Fishman, 2016, p. 211). As one example, the Iraqi militia known as Badr – which had been created in 1982 and was supported by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – became more prominent in Iraqi politics following the escalation in sectarian violence from 2006. By 2010, Badr were thought to have around 2,000 fighters in Baghdad alone, as well as units dedicated to various specialised tasks such as governance, communications, security and the recruitment and training of various militiamen across several Shia-majority cities of Iraq (Fishman, 2016, pp. 211–212).

Following the IS conquest of Mosul in 2014 and in direct response to Sistani’s fatwa, Iraqi militias such as Badr and some 60 others banded together to form al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Units, or PMU).³ By analyzing the media and statements produced and distributed by these different militias, we can see that many of them derived their legitimacy directly from the fatwas issued by different Shia clerics, especially Sistani. They also drew heavily upon a rich catalogue of Shia symbols to argue that their central goals were to protect Shia communities and their holy sites and to defend Iraq’s national sovereignty from the threat of the IS.

One example is the Shia Turkmen Brigades (Hashd al-Turkmani) who made up Brigade 16 of the PMU. Throughout their online materials, the Turkmen Brigades articulated that the key motives driving their fight against the IS was the suffering of Shia people, the threat posed by the IS to key Shia holy sites as well as the country more generally, and the need to observe the fatwas of Shia clerics. Perhaps the clearest indication of this comes from the various evocative songs written and performed by popular vocalists to inspire and mobilise the Turkmen Brigades. Such songs – which take the form of a nasheed (religious chant or song) – utilise a colloquial style to fuse historical grievances, religious rhetoric and contemporary politics into a coherent call to arms. One such nasheed demonstrates the myriad factors driving their fight against the IS, including the importance of Sistani’s fatwa, as well as the significance of the shrine protection narrative. It recounts:

We are the Turkmen [of Iraq] and we are followers of ahl al-bayt … We follow Ali’s path … The fatwas of the grand marja [Sistani] is the cure for all of our pains … Iraq must live in peace and happiness … When Sayyid Sistani orders us, we obey. We will defeat and destroy the IS. We take our honor and courage from you, Abul Fadl [Father of Virtue]! We believe in the fatwas of our religious authorities, and we defend our holy sites (Jairli, 2016).

Another nasheed produced by the Turkmen Brigades outlines their religious motivations to fight and, in a similar fashion to the statements made by several senior Shia clerics, they made references to the seminal Shia historical figures who were killed at the Battle of Karbala. The lyrics state: ‘We fight our enemies. Our martyrs are similar to the martyrs of Karbala. Our people are supporters of Husayn in their hearts and minds. We give the oath of allegiance to the ahl al-bayt through our blood’ (Turkmen Brigades, 2016). Another video produced in July 2016 includes footage of a series of military parades held by the Turkmen Brigades inside the city of Karbala. When the narrator asks a Shia Turkmen commander why Karbala was chosen as the venue of the military parade, he responds: ‘[We] chose Karbala to encourage other Shias to join us and get involved in the fight against the IS’ (Ghanat Karbala, 2016). It is important to note that beyond historical references to Shia suffering at Karbala, militias like the Turkmen Brigades were also motivated by the integrity of both the national sovereignty and their faith in their fight against the IS. For example, in another video documenting the Turkmen Brigades’ preparations before heading to the frontline in the Iraqi town of Taza Khurmatu, one of the militiamen states: ‘We are not fighting on a sectarian basis. We are fighting for our honor, country and our religion’ (AFP, 2014).

Similar examples can be found in the media produced by the Shia Shabak militia known as Liwa al-Shabak (Shabak Brigades) and sometimes referred to as the Quwat Sahl Ninawa (Nineveh Plains Forces, NPF). As with the Turkmen militia, the Shabak Brigades were also amalgamated into the PMUs, serving as the 30th Brigade. In terms of their allegiances to Sistani and his fatwa, one video produced by the Shabak Brigades includes footage of Shabak fighters carrying weapons while chanting: ‘Our people are with you Sistani. We all respect you and you are our leader. We are ready to sacrifice our life and blood’ (Quwat Sahl Ninawa, 2015). Another film uploaded onto YouTube shows armed members of the Shabak Brigades chanting: ‘Sistani is like a crown on our heads. Your wish is our command … The entire nation is with you … We love you Sayyid’ (Nineveh Plains Forces, 2016). The Shabak Brigades also made several references to the need to protect Shia shrines as a key mobilisation frame. For example, many images released by the group feature portraits of fighters superimposed over images of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine and other Shia holy sites (Quwat Sahl Ninawa, 2015). Towards the end of one video produced by the group, the narrator states: ‘Nobody can harm [the shrines of] Imam Husayn and nobody can harm Imam Ali. Our religious authorities protect the holy shrines’ (Nineveh Plains Forces, 2015a). The Shabak Brigades also drew heavily upon the symbols of the Shia tradition in their fight against the IS. One of their videos shows a number of Shabak fighters listening to a speech by one of their leaders who invokes many of the key historical symbols and figures of Shiism. For example, he draws explicit links between the contemporary fight against the IS and historic events such as the Battle of Karbala: ‘O children of Yazid! Listen to me. I warn you. We are Ali’s followers. We are Shias of Ali. I swear to God, we will fight you. We will kill you’ (Nineveh Plains Forces, 2015a).

In addition to the religious and historical motifs found throughout the materials produced by the Shabak Brigades, there are also frequent references to the importance of defending Iraq and its sovereignty. A video released by Quwat Sahl Ninawa in June 2015 documents the rigorous military training undertaken by the Shabak Brigades. Dubbed over the footage, a singer recites a nasheed which draws not only on key Shia religious motifs but also on national sentiment to mobilise the militia to fight against the IS. He sings:

O’ IS, we warn you. We are Shabaki and this is our country. We are Shias. You should quickly leave our land. We warn you of our heroes. We are full of ability and honor. We defend our land and our borders. We are the Shabak Brigade. We will quickly take our lands back. We are the followers of Ali, and we never give up. When an oppressor tries to kill us, we fight back. Today, we all stand up and fight with honor (Nineveh Plains Forces, 2015b).

Much like their militia counterparts in Iraq, Shia militias fighting in Syria drew on religious sentiments and key historical events and figures revered by Shia Muslims to legitimize their fight against the IS. One of the major Shia militias in Syria was the Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas (al-Abbas Brigades, LAFA), which takes its name from Husayn’s brother who was martyred at the Battle of Karbala, Abbas. Founded in 2012, LAFA announced its central purpose to be the defense of Shia sacred sites. As its leader, Abu Ajeeb, declared, ‘LAFA was founded only to protect the holy shrines which they [Sunni militants] have targeted or attacked already, like the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab’ (Ajeeb, 2013). In this sense, the threat to Syria’s Shia shrines, particularly the Sayyida Zaynab shrine, and the need to protect these sites has often been reflected in the pictures and posters produced by LAFA. In some of these posters, Shia militiamen are identified as the representatives or the descendants of the ahl al-bayt and the guardians of Zaynab’s shrine (Ibn Siqilli, 2013, Figure 7). In other posters, fighters are shown next to popular Shia slogans such as ‘Labayk ya Zaynab’ (We are at your service, O Zaynab) and ‘We sacrifice our souls [for] you, O Zaynab’ (Ibn Siqilli, 2013, Figures 8, 21–22, 31–33). One picture produced by LAFA, which shows the dome of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine in the background, includes the slogan: ‘We write our love for Abbas with our blood, and with our martyrdom we exhibit our defense of Zaynab, upon her be peace’ (Ibn Siqilli, 2013, Figure 26/B).

However, the rhetoric of LAFA and other Shia militias in Syria can be differentiated from those in Iraq by an important distinction. As we have seen, in Iraq several militias such as those formed by Shia Turkmen and Shabak fighters, drew their legitimacy from the fatwas of Sistani and other clerics who argued that fighting against the IS was part of a national obligation, framing their participation in the conflict in terms of a domestic crisis. In Syria, however, the Shia militias emphasised the transnational dimension of Shiism and that the religious obligation to protect Shia communities and their holy sites transcended national boundaries. Here, protecting key Shia sacred sites was argued to be less of a responsibility to one's homeland (as was the case in Iraq) and more of a religious duty for all Shia Muslims regardless of their national identity. In this way, Shia militias such as LAFA were able to call upon thousands of Shia faithful from across Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and elsewhere to come to Syria and fight to protect Shia interests. This strategy proved remarkably successful with some reports estimating that LAFA attracted some 10,000 volunteers from outside Syria within its first 12 months alone (Mahmood & Chulov, 2013).

Another example of the power of this transnational and pan-Shia mobilisation frame is the critical role it played in mobilising members of the Shia Afghan community who travelled from Afghanistan to Syria, at times via Iran and under the direct patronage of the state.⁴ In 2013, these Afghan militants formed the Liwa Fatemiyun (Fatima Brigades), whose name is drawn from Fatima, the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter and Ali’s wife. Since 2013, Iranian state-affiliated media outlets have produced a number of clips depicting the training of the Fatima Brigades and their deployment into Syria. As these clips show, the Fatima Brigades justified their fight in Syria along familiar religious and historical lines. For example, in one video a commander of the Fatima Brigades speaks about the importance of shrine protection, considering it a key reason motivating Afghans to fight in Syria: ‘The Afghans come to Syria to defend their beliefs … They have left their family for an exalted goal [which is] to defend our holy shrines’ (IRIB, 2017). One Afghan militiaman interviewed in the same video refers explicitly to the Battle of Karbala, stating: ‘If we were alive at the time of the Battle of Karbala, Husayn would never have been alone … We have come to Syria to say Zaynab you are no longer alone … We will fight until our last drop of blood to defend the path of the ahl al-bayt’ (IRIB, 2017). Another documentary shows the pilgrimage of Afghan militants to the site of Ruqayyah mosque, where their commander states:

O Ruqayyah! We will never leave you alone. We, the Fatemiyun, have come here to defend the holy shrine and show our devotion to the ahl al-bayt. It is an honor for us to be martyred on the path of the ahl al-bayt. Zaynab was arrested in this city. We have come here to say, O Zaynab! We give you our oath of allegiance, and we will never leave you alone, and we will defend your holy site until our last drop of blood (Bachehaye Ghalam, 2017).

Another video released by Iranian state-affiliated media outlets reveals how the Fatima Brigades also drew on broader transnational themes to call for the followers of Shiism to defend their communities, their holy sites and their religion, thus helping to justify the entry of Shia Afghans into the complex conflict in Syria. The video begins with a general description of the key motives driving Shia militants such as the Fatima Brigades in Syria: ‘[Sunni extremists] aimed to eradicate the Shia sites and symbols. They aimed to destroy the shrine of Zaynab … but real Muslims from various parts of the Muslim world joined their Shia brothers in Syria to fight jihadist groups’ (Bachehaye Ghalam, 2016). Further indication of the transnational motives underpinning the role played by a Shia Afghan militia in Syria is the extent to which the group is beholden to Iran. Here, the Fatima Brigades looked to their patrons within Iran’s religious establishment for support, guidance and legitimacy. For example, several of the videos produced by the Fatima Brigades make reference to Ayatollah Khamenei who is even seen meeting with members of the militia and their families on several occasions where he praises their efforts and recognises their sacrifices in the Syrian conflict (Khamenei, 2021).

Conclusion

The IS conquest of significant territory across both Iraq and Syria posed a distinct challenge to the Shia populations of the region. Via an analysis of key propaganda produced by the IS, this article has documented how their anti-Shia polemics underpinned horrific violence against Shia communities and holy sites. Such violence and destruction triggered a virulent response from key Shia non-state actors across the region, dramatically escalating the sectarian nature of the conflict. This article has utilised a conceptual framework that details the intersection between religious, historical, national and transnational motives driving various forms of Shia mobilisation, documenting earlier examples from Iran and Lebanon. From here, the article has analyzed the fatwas issued by prominent Shia clerics from the key seminaries of both Iran and Iraq in response to the IS incursion. This was followed by an analysis of several primary sources produced by an array of Shia militias ranging from those fighting on behalf of Shia ethnic minorities in Iraq to Shia Afghan militiamen fighting in Syria. This included documenting the pronouncements made by key Shia militia leaders, the YouTube videos these groups released that detail their ideology and actions, and the evocative nasheeds recanted by popular singers.

The analysis reveals how the fatwas of key Shia clerics mobilised the Shia faithful to join the militias and take up arms against the IS. This not only saw tens of thousands of men enlist virtually overnight, it also legitimised the actions of powerful foreign and domestic Shia militias who (re-)formed to fight the IS. In doing so, Shia elites drew on a complex and emotive cache of Shia religious doctrine and historical mythologies, emphasising seminal moments of Shia suffering such as at the Battle of Karbala. Further, Shia elites implored their followers to rise up to protect the key symbols of their faith – such as the shrines dedicated to these martyrs and other important historical figures – via a mobilisation from referred to as the ‘shrine protection narrative’. However, it is important to note that these complex mobilisation frames were instrumentalized by a wide array of Shia actors to advance differing political goals. In this way, Shia elites can be seen to have used religious and historical motifs to further domestic agendas or geopolitical ambitions. For example, Iraq-based Shia clerics and militias framed the fight against the IS not only in terms of religious but also national duty, a call to arms to defend the sovereignty of Iraq from the IS incursion (defend the country). Conversely, when it came to the conflict in Syria, Shia elites from outside the country couched their rhetoric in border transnational and pan-Shia terms that urged their followers to defend Shia communities and holy sites regardless of national borders (defend Shia Islam).

This therefore has implications beyond the case study of the mobilisation of Shia actors in contemporary Iraq and Syria. While existing studies of Islamist actors have documented how certain frames, such as religion, mobilise movements towards political violence, the emphasis on religion alone can obfuscate the role that other related frames and narratives play at critical junctures to mobilise certain movements towards specific outcomes. Future studies of social movement mobilisation in conflict therefore ought to consider the complex intersection between an array of mobilisation frames as diverse as religion, histories of persecution, shrine protection and both national and transnational imperatives, and the roles they can play in galvanising people and exacerbating conflict.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ali Akbar

Dr. Ali Akbar is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Melbourne where he received his PhD in Islamic Studies. He also works as a part-time research fellow at the University of Deakin. He is an expert in the fields of Islamic studies with a focus on contemporary Islamic thought and Middle Eastern politics as well as Iranian politics. He is the author of Contemporary Perspectives on Revelation and Qur’anic Hermeneutics (Edinburgh University Press, 2020) and Contemporary Approaches to the Qur’an and Its Interpretation in Iran (co-authored with Abdullah Saeed, Routledge, 2020). He has also published extensively in journals including Iranian Studies, Culture and Religion, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, British Journal of Middle East Studies, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Mediterranean Politics, Third Word Quarterly and Political Theology.

Benjamin Isakhan

Benjamin Isakhan is Professor of International Politics and Founding Director of Polis, a research network for Politics and International Relations in the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University, Australia. He is also an Adjunct Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Humanities at the University of Johannesburg.

Notes

1 For example, Ibn Taymiyya considered the practice of attending the shrines of fallen martyrs an act of shirk (Beránek & Ťupek, 2018, pp. 44–45).

2 It is not surprising that these Shia clerics invoked the concept of jihad to justify and legitimize the fight against the IS. This has been a recurring theme in Islamic history and utilised by various Islamist movements to advance different political agendas (Cook, 2005; Bonner, 2006).

3 It is important to acknowledge that many of the Iraq-based Shia militias that formed the PMUs, including Badr, have close ties to the Iranian state. However, as has been demonstrated in the case of Hezbollah, such militias can maintain strong transnational links while also adhering to a platform underpinned by a national agenda. Hence, Iraqi militias vary in both their loyalty to Iran and in the extent to which they wish to defend Iraq and its sovereignty.

4 There are reports that Iran facilitates the deployment of Shia Afghan fighters to Syria (Constable, 2018). In exchange for fighting against radical Sunni forces, the IS in particular, Iran is reported to have granted residency to the Afghan Shia fighters and their families and paid them a monthly stipend.