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ABSTRACT
Certain repeated moral narratives support justifications for humanitarian interventions, and simultaneously inform perspectives of ‘the figure of the refugee’. How does ‘the humanitarian’ appear in these narratives? How are the characters of ‘the refugee’ and ‘the humanitarian’ constructed in relation to one another? How does their interlinkage potentially affect refugees’ agency to act, within a neo-liberal and universalist trope of geo-political expansion? In this article, I respond to these questions and describe a theatricality of humanitarian action. I do so by drawing on experiences as a theatre-maker working in a refugee resettlement programme in Thailand, in 2007–2008.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Matthew Yoxall is a theatre-maker, training consultant and academic researcher. Originally from the UK, he has lived in Southeast Asia since 2003. During this time he has worked predominantly on issues pertaining to forced migration. He has a PhD in Theatre Studies from the National University of Singapore.
Notes
1 Though officially renamed Myanmar in 1989 by the then ruling military junta, many opposition politicians and groups used the previous name, Burma, as a mode of resistance. The name Myanmar is now more commonly used, after steps towards greater democracy since 2010. However, I maintain the double usage here to tether this article to the period of specific and intense change in refugees’ lives that I attend to forthwith. West Thailand: I avoid the common usage and reifying of the term ‘Thai–Burma border’. I find the use of ‘border’ too rigid as a construct to describe such a diverse geo-cultural landscape, which is teeming with cultural diversity and fluid rhythms of social relations. Karen people traverse this area daily and without necessarily being documented as doing so. I use the phrase ‘borderlands of West Thailand’ specifically, because I am dealing with the refugee scenario as it pertains to the ramifications of being inside state territory marked as belonging to Thailand. Thus, the Royal Thai Government’s laws and policies pertaining to ‘refugees’ specifically shape the context dealt with here.
2 The term ‘ethnic nationalities’ is used by many minority groups in Burma/Myanmar as they identify as distinct nations. Based on its historical usages, this term is also tightly connected to discourses on national unity and equality. When Burma gained independence from British colonial rule, the Panglong Agreement was signed in 1947 between the Burmese interim government and major ethnic nationalities. The agreement was orchestrated by General Aung San, the country’s legendary figure of independence (and father of Aung San Suu Kyi). The agreement would provide the ethnic nationalities with autonomy and rights to self-determination. Shortly after the signing of the agreement, Aung San was assassinated. The country fell into political chaos, which was eventually followed by a coup. The terms of the Panglong Agreement were never met. The issues surrounding ethnic identity and self-determination continued to be at the heart of six decades of civil war (see Smith Citation1999), and thus are foundational as to why there are so many refugees from Burma/Myanmar living in West Thailand. As the term ‘ethnic nationalities’ is indexed to the time of the Panglong Agreement, it thus remains a key referent in debates about equality and minority politics in Burma/Myanmar. With a geographical location that has precipitated human confluence, and a history complicated by colonialism, Burma/Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Southeast Asia. Approximately one-third of the population are not Bamar (Burmese).
3 As predicted by various critics, given events over recent years, and as reported by the UN, ethnic cleansing is taking place. The Rohingya have suffered increasing disenfranchisement for some decades, violence from the Tatmadaw (Burmese military), and concurrently been the target of rising radical nationalist Buddhist fundamentalism, too, with a serious spike in 2012, which has continued and contributed to their ongoing displacement. The latest exodus of Rohingya refugees started after a disproportionate response by the Tatmadaw after militants from ARSA – Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army – attacked police and military outposts, in August 2017. ARSA was branded a terrorist group by the Myanmar government, which has led to the Rohingya being yet further excluded from everyday life. The conditions Rohingya people live under on the Bangladeshi border are notorious. The sudden international ‘newsworthiness’ regarding the Rohingya’s situation, and the rapidly increased loss of face Myanmar has encountered in the global media as a result, seems uncomfortably tethered to subsequent increases in the perpetration of military violence. Certainly, much reporting on the Rohingya’s plight focuses on the humanitarian crises very effectively, while mainly side-stepping the complicated historical, colonial, projects of nationalist decolonisation, and political and socio-economic realities that also underpins its continuation. The (once) iconic humanitarian image of Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has been submerged beneath a negative, and righteous, backlash of international media attention, as she has stayed tight lipped about the Rohingya calamity, thus seemingly complicit, while attempting to manage an uneasy relationship with the Tatmadaw and political power nationally, addressing attitudes that she is a lackey to the ‘International Community’. For an accessible overview of the Rohingya situation, as of October 2017, see Jones (Citation2017).
4 In the Mekong Sub-region, this war is often referred to as the American War.
5 Burma/Myanmar had already been identified as a potential threat to the US shortly after 9/11. The Patriot Act, or Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, introduced in October 2001, tightened US immigration procedures significantly while enabling increases in global surveillance and ‘counter-terrorism’ activities. A number of the ethnic nationalities military groups in Burma/Myanmar appeared on a list of potential ‘terrorists’. These groups, in the most part, were actually ‘revolutionaries’ who had been fighting the Burmese military regime for independence over the previous decades. Many refugees were open about their affiliations with these groups during resettlement interviews. Many of the men had been soldiers. They were later informed by letter, that their applications had been ‘deferred’. They were unable to resettle until revisions were made to US security policies.
6 Ironically, I was able to watch Rambo in my hotel room in Yangon, in July 2012. Though banned on DVD and in cinemas, the film was being aired on Chinese cable television in Burma/Myanmar, uncensored.
7 International Community: a nebulous and obfuscating term, which Anne Orford has argued is the reimaging of what was once more specifically referred to as the UN Security Council. Through its breadth of scope and lack of clarity, the term International Community is suggestive of far greater inclusivity and consensus than the actual hierarchies of geo-political power it constitutes (Orford Citation1999).
8 The UNHCR suggests that any refugee situation, which continues for upwards of five years and involves more than 25,000 people from the same country of origin, be designated as ‘protracted’.
9 In performance terms, these are often hybrid works that mix local cultural motifs and styles, sometimes with input from a local or overseas artist, and with a remit to express ideas about identity and self-determination, for example. Inside the camps, NGOs do mainly didactic issue-based dramas with their staff or student groups. Traditional dances appear at special events, and collectively once a year during World Refugee Day on June 20th of each year. This is a rare and perhaps the only opportunity to see so many of these dances performed at the same outside Burma/Myanmar.
10 Third Country: a refugee’s country of origin being the first country; the country of flight or country where asylum is being sought being the second. The country of resettlement therefore is the ‘third country’. In the case of the resettlement of people from West Thailand, the third country was predominantly the USA, with Australia and Canada also accepting Karen refugees to some significant degree. In 2007, America was accepting more refugees for resettlement than all the other countries in the world combined.
11 The UNHCR’s Three Durable Solutions are voluntary repatriation; local integration; or resettlement to a third country in situations where it is not possible for a person to return home or remain in their host country (UNCHR Citation2017).
12 See figures from: The Border Consortium (Citation2007). The Border Consortium (TBC) provides material support to refugees; food rations, housing, fuel and other basic supplies. As a consortium, they coordinate with the large number of refugee community-based, local, international and inter-governmental organisations, which provide assistance in the refugee camps.
13 The eight other refugee camps are spread along Thailand’s western borderlands. At the time, they had populations ranging from approximately 3000–20,000 people (The Border Consortium Citation2007).
14 This was due to resistance to resettlement in Nepal by ethnic Nepalese refugees ejected from Bhutan and administrative delays in providing exit visas for Iraqi refugees in the Middle East, for example.
15 Notably, the RTG has not signed the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, nor its 1967 Protocol. Places commonly called ‘refugee camps’ by the people who reside in them and assistance providers working in them are termed ‘Temporary Shelters’ by the RTG. Signboards stating this are to be found at the camps’ main entrances. POC – People of Concern – is used by the RTG in place of the similarly loaded term ‘refugee’.
16 These were the major international organisations charged with convening the resettlement programme in this case. Contracts are up for tender however, and a variety of different INGOs may end up working together with the UNHCR and relevant government departments of the country offering resettlement.
17 I learned this shortly after my arrival and came as a significant surprise given how much time I had ordinarily spent on consultation, research and development of projects in the past and with the same organisation.
18 Cultural Orientation (CO) indicates the process of becoming oriented towards another culture. Workshops were provided for people pre-departure. A set of ‘14 Units’ were incorporated over a five-day period – a standardised collection of facts, with a focus on corresponding skills and attitudes to help support initial immersion into life in the USA. I worked with a CO team to make content potentially accessible and meaningful for participants through using drama and theatre techniques to enable opportunities for experiential learning. A significant portion of this overall content was focused on cultural adaptation and strategies for dealing with culture shock, for example.
19 These decisions included issues pertaining to language use in a multi-lingual environment, and the performance aesthetics we adopted so as to be relevant and meaningful to different refugee audiences. We arrived at a stylistic which employed some diluted use of forum theatre techniques, housed in a relatively comedic form of Karen folk drama. Practical negotiations for rehearsal space, design and costume provision had to also be arranged, and pre-performance activities for crowds of 1000–1500 spectators at times. These pre-performance activities included performances of traditional dances and music by different ethnic groups, supported by a variety of community-based organisations in the camps. Although the plays were performed in the dominant Skaw Karen dialect, used by the majority of people in the three camps that hosted the performances, having as many different groups perform their dances as possible went some way to demonstrating that resettlement was affecting and therefore included, everyone.
20 The need to attend to the psycho-emotional parameters of peoples’ resettlement experiences became more apparent as time went on, particularly regarding the interlacing of a collective of phenomenon that later seemed to bind together and became loosely referred to, by some INGO staff, as ‘resettlement anxiety’.
21 To make the theatre project more sustainable, at the outset I requested members of the company be people who were not planning to resettle. This enabled us to build the skills of the company and ensure that there was consistency in the ways characters were developed. It also meant that the company contained people who had diverse ideas and opinions about resettlement. On starting the theatre project, only one of the actors openly stated her plan to resettle. By the end of the play series, four actors had decided to leave, while three remained undecided. Eventually, one more actor resettled to Australia and another to the USA. One member of the original cast still lives in Mae La camp.
22 Through the distribution of Video CDs of the shows in the camps, the profile of the actors rose to a point that they achieved a certain kind of temporary celebrity. Some audience members also commented that they thought the actors were refugees who had already resettled to America and had returned to tell their story. This indicated that theatre had done its work, in demonstrating an agency to affect interpretations that went way beyond the company’s expectations. The actors were addressing rumours on stage, while simultaneously becoming the subject of them in the camps.
23 I have already attended to this topic elsewhere, of the theatre-maker as a ‘humanitarian worker’ and broker of knowledge and power in relation to this resettlement theatre project, and specifically in regards to the paradigm of Community Cultural Development (see Yoxall Citation2015).
24 This included working on a programme to prevent and respond to violence against women in the camps. This later dovetailed with a correlating project to provide refugees with access to legal assistance.
25 I have ordinarily lived in North Thailand since 2004, intermittently leaving for consultancy work and PhD study.
26 Conversation, Chiang Mai, North Thailand, March 2013.
27 The TBC (Citation2016) Annual Report (January to December) states that the camp populations still amount to 100,000 people, based on their verified caseload. As of 2014, TBC also reported that approximately 100,000 people had resettled since 2004. Based on the 150,000 people who lived in the camps in 2007, this means there have been around 50,000 new arrivals. Their leave to remain in Thailand and legal status is precarious. After an intervention by the RTG, the UNHCR stopped making any new official refugee registrations, at the end of 2005. For a filmed introduction to Karen refugees’ reflections on repatriation see Nothing about us without us (Citation2012) directed by Timothy Syrota.