Technical or Political? An Exploration of the Work of Officials in the Committees of the European Parliament

Abstract

In conjunction with the gradual empowerment of the European Parliament, interest in its internal politics and in particular its committee system has increased considerably. While much has been learned about the influence of parliamentarians, little is known of the role of their unelected supporters. Although the literature indicates that officials are involved in the policy process, it remains open to question whether their work is fundamentally technical or of relevance to public policy. In a first step towards closing this gap in the literature, this paper explores the role of officials working in the secretariats of European Parliament committees. Although officials are involved in both secretarial and political work, their role is constrained by their position in the parliamentary hierarchy. This supports a cautious understanding of the autonomy and influence of bureaucracy in the Parliament and in the European Union's main institutions.

Keywords:

• European Parliament
• parliamentary committees
• administrative governance

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to all interviewees from the European Parliament for sharing their time and information, and to three anonymous reviewers and the editor of this Journal for their helpful comments.

Notes

Several detailed accounts of the evolution of the European Parliament are available elsewhere (e.g. Westlake 1994, 1998, Corbett et al. 2003, 2007, Judge and Earnshaw 2008).

For a more comprehensive review of the internal organisation and politics of the EP please refer to Westlake (1994), Corbett et al. (2007), and Judge and Earnshaw (2008). Broader reviews of the literature on the EP are, for instance, offered by Hix et al. (2003, 2007), Burns (2006, pp. 230–233), or Judge and Earnshaw (2008).

For a more critical view of the impact of recent trends on the committee system, see Yordanova (2010).

A comprehensive description of the committee system of the EP can be found in Corbett et al. (2007: 126–155; see also Judge and Earnshaw 2008).

For further information on the organisation of the parliamentary secretariat, see Corbett et al. (2007, pp. 191–203) and Neunreither (2006). In total, the secretariat employs over 2100 officials in the highest staff category (although the work of about 1500 is mainly devoted to translation and interpretation) (cf. Corbett et al. 2007, pp. 192–194).

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the legislative workload of INTA will increase (Maurer 2008).

On the importance of parliamentary reports and rapporteurs, see Benedetto (2005), Hausemer (2006) and the citations in the introduction.

For instance, about 300 officials of the highest staff category work in the secretariats of the political groups (Corbett et al. 2007, pp. 192–194).

While the EPP-ED and the PES were the largest groups in the Parliament when research for this paper was carried out, the newly elected parliament witnessed the formation of the EPP and the S&D as the two largest groups. While membership overlaps with the previous groups, there are some prominent changes including the withdrawal of the British Conservatives from the EPP-ED. (EPP-ED – European People's Party-European Democrats; EPP – European People's Party; PES – Party of European Socialists; S&D – Socialists & Democrats).

The chairman presides over the committee and formally this position is not meant to be exploited for party political purposes. This does not mean that chairmen are apolitical as the distribution of chairs among parliamentarians is strongly transcended by party politics and various contributions point to the influence of committee chairs in legislative negotiations (e.g. Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, pp. 339–340; Neuhold 2001, pp. 5–6).

One should note, however, that the role of personal staff and of group advisers can also be curtailed by the rapporteur who may decide to limit their involvement (cf. Neunreither 2006, pp. 50–51).

As one reviewer correctly pointed out, the cooperation of officials with Eurosceptic parliamentarians may be more problematic. Although the ‘integrationist zeal’ (Judge and Earnshaw 2008, p. 167) of officials has moderated over time, most will still feel uncomfortable with drafting a Eurosceptic (or even EP-sceptic) report.