Why it matters to keep asking why legislatures matter

ABSTRACT

Legislative scholars are very good at explaining and analysing what legislatures do and how they do it. But the why question – why legislatures do what they do and why they matter – is often taken for granted or not raised at all. Our objective in this paper is to focus attention back onto the ‘why’ question and to explore the grounds upon which legislative scholars, and others, might be encouraged to reconsider this basic question. In seeking to coax a reconsideration of the importance of legislatures, we direct attention towards processes of legitimation and why legislatures are invested in such processes across the world in the modern era. If, as we argue, an answer to the question of why legislatures matter is to be grounded in processes of legitimation, then deficiencies in those processes or the questionability of those processes also expose the contingent nature of such an answer.

KEYWORDS:

• Legitimation
• legislatures
• linkage
• accountability
• symbolism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

* References in these notes can be found in supplemental material.

1 For an overview and critique of these approaches see Obler (1981).

2 Manifestly many innovative and sophisticated threads of legislative scholarship and analysis have been pursued in recent decades, including, notably, historical institutionalist, feminist, anthropological, interpretivist, and performative approaches (see respectively, e.g., Kelso 2009; Celis and Childs 2020; Crewe 2015; Geddes 2020; Rai & Spary, 2019; for comprehensive overviews of advances in legislative analysis see Martin et al., 2014; Benoît & Rozenberg, 2020). Nonetheless, these approaches have provided, in essence, new perspectives with which to answer ‘what’ ‘and ‘how’ questions.

3 Packenham uses the term function in the sense of ‘consequences’; insofar as the actions of legislatures have consequences for political systems. And it this meaning that he believes has universal application. He distinguishes this meaning from ‘functional requisites’ as a listing of functions that legislatures are assumed to perform.

4 See, e.g., Beetham, 2013; Knight & Schwartzberg, 2019; Rosanvallon, 2011.

5 For example, Golder and Ferland (2018:, p. 213) openly ascribe a holistic, ‘stagist’ view of representation, where ‘representation occurs in stages. Citizen preferences are translated into votes, votes are translated into legislative seats, legislative seats are translated into governments, and government proposals are translated into policies’. In part, the emphasis upon particular stages reflects the differential costs of data analysis: with studies to examine congruence and responsiveness in relation to electoral, party, or executive institutions able to draw upon readily available cross-national data, relative cost-effective survey analysis, and the use of standardised comparative methodologies (see e.g. Dalton, 2017:614; Golder & Ferland, 2018, pp. 219–228); whereas legislative institutions pose more of an empirical challenge (see Golder & Ferland, 2018, p. 224; Hanretty et al., 2017, pp. 237–238; 241–243).

6 On electoral system effects (see e.g.: Childs & Lovenduski, 2013; Franceshet et al., 2012; Hughes et al., 2017; Krook, 2018; Kubo & Lee, 2017; Matland & Studlar, 1996; McAllister & Studlar, 2002; Reher, 2018: Ruedin, 2010; Stockemer, 2018; Taylor-Robinson, 2014; Urbatsch, 2016). On party effects see (e.g.: Archenti & Tula, 2017; Childs & Kittilson, 2016; Culhane & Olchawski, 2018; Franceschet et al., 2012; Kostadinova & Mikulska, 2017; Lawless, 2015; Lovenduski, 2005; Stockemer, 2018; Webb & Childs, 2012).

7 Some have focused upon issue specialisation and its effects (see Atkinson & Windett, 2019, p. 770; Lawless, 2015, p. 359; Pearson & Dancey, 2012, p. 496; Taylor-Robinson, 2014, p. 253; Volden et al., 2018, p. 692; Barnes & Jones 2018, p. 132; Bauer, 2012, pp. 375–378; Clayton et al., 2018, p. 25; Minta, 2009, p. 210; Piscopo, 2014, p. 15; Wallace, 2014, p. 925; Wilson, 2010, pp. 1057–1059; Yoon, 2011, pp. 89–90; Zetterberg, 2018, p. 205). Others have examined policy congruence, (see Bowen & Clark, 2014, p. 697; Clayton et al., 2018, p. 15,25; Dingler et al., 2019, pp. 311–312; Dolan, 1998, p. 90; Griffin et al., 2012, p. 41; Hänni, 2017, p. 121; Kroeber, 2018, p. 912; Wängerud, 2009, pp. 62–63; Whitby & Kraus, 2001, pp. 566–571).

8 Although controversial, the diffusion of reserved seat quotas (a subset of legislative quotas) – to secure gender and minority representation – have, in the words of Hughes (2018:, p. 114), ‘led to real and significant transformations in some countries, literally changing the faces of political power’. Some 27 legislatures, mainly in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, along with China, use reserved seat quotas to set a threshold of seats to be occupied by women (IDEA, 2020). Some 28 countries use ethnic reserved seat quotas in their main legislative chambers to assure minority representation. Such guarantees of minority group representation in deeply fissured multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religion societies have proved to be of significance in precluding secession or civil war, or as formal recognition of the cultural and ethnic diversity claims of identity-based social movements (Htun, 2004, p. 440).

9 See Cox, 2008; Cox & McCubbins, 2011; Hix & Noury, 2016; Huber, 1992; Jenkins & Munroe, 2016; Koss, 2015, p. 2018; Muller & Sieberer, 2014; Rasch, 2014.

10 Executive hierarchies are evident, most particularly in cabinet and ministerial positions in parliamentary systems (see, in the case of the UK, Flinders, 2002, p. 30; Hailsham, 1978, p. 22; Judge, 1993, p. 143; Kelso, 2009, p. 19; Shugart, 2008, p. 353). Legislative leadership hierarchies are structured around institutional positions such as presiding officers, speakers, presidents, and committee chairs (see Blackburn & Kennon, 2003, p. 203; Loewenberg, 2011, p. 63; McKay & Johnson, 2010, p. 44; Green, 2010, p. 12; Oleszek et al., 2015, p. 22). Party hierarchies are headed by, for example, party caucus chairs, party whips, party fraction leaders (for Europe see, e.g., Blumenau, 2016, p. 13–18; de Vet and Wauters, 2016, p. 3; see also Heidar & Koole, 2000; Schuler & Malesky, 2014, pp. 374–376; for the US see, e.g., Curry & Lee, 2019:47; DiSalvo, 2014, p. 166; Davidson et al., 2018, p. 141).

11 In the case of women, see (e.g. in the UK, Crewe, 2015; Childs, 2016; Lovenduski, 2012; in India, Rai, 2010; Johnson & Rai, 2014; Rai & Spary, 2019; in South Africa, Hasson, 2010; in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bauer & Britton, 2006; in Argentina, Franceshet & Piscopo, 2008; in Belgium, Celis & Wauters, 2010; and more broadly see Armitage et al., 2012, pp. 329-–333; O’Brien & Piscopo, 2019, pp. 61–62).

12 For overviews of some of the complexities see (e.g. Devine et al., 2020; Judge, 2014, pp. 35–46; Martini & Quaranta, 2020, pp. 23–51; Schnaudt, 2019, pp. 21–71; Warren, 2019, pp. 75–94).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Judge

David Judge is Emeritus Professor of Politics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK. His main research interests include representative democracy, the UK parliament, and the European Parliament.

Cristina Leston-Bandeira

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds, Leeds, UK. She is the Co-Director of the Centre for Democratic Engagement, and has research interests in parliaments and public engagement, petitioning processes, and comparative legislatures.