National parliaments’ resilience under the Euro-zone and the Covid-19 crises: continuity and discontinuity in the Euro-national scrutiny

ABSTRACT

Among the epochal crises experienced by the EU in the last 15 years, the Euro-zone and the Covid-19 stand out for their impact on the Euro-national economic and financial governance structure, which challenges the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches and raises major concerns for the role of national parliaments. This contribution aims to analyse how national parliaments have reacted to these challenges in order to identify elements of continuity or discontinuity. After considering the contextual entry conditions met by parliaments in the two outbreaks, the article analyses the scrutiny procedures and practices developed in the European Semester and in the post-Covid recovery framework. The assessment witnesses the resilience of national parliaments’ scrutiny vis-à-vis major changes in the Euro-national governance structures. It confirms an adaptive capacity outside of any real ‘learning curve’ between the two outbreaks, but with potential innovations on the ground of the ex post scrutiny.

KEYWORDS:

• National parliaments
• EU affairs scrutiny
• Euro-national governance
• Euro-zone crisis
• pandemic

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 of 19 May 2020, adopted as a non-legislative procedure by the Council.

2 Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020, adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure.

3 Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021, adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure in accordance with the Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 of 14 December 2020, adopted as a non-legislative procedure by the Council.

4 Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020, unanimously adopted by the Council after consultation with the European Parliament.

5 Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020, adopted by the Council after consent of the European Parliament. See also the rule of law conditionality mechanism, adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure by the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of 16 December 2020.

6 See the AGS 2021 adopted by the Council on 6 November 2020, 12631/20 and the Conclusions of the Council on the Alert Mechanism Report of the Commission, SWD (2020) 275 final.

7 This is the circuit based on the activation of European mechanisms, including the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) and the Political dialogue.

8 Four 'frugal' countries (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) opposed the EU Stimulus Plan during the European Council of 17 and 18 July 2021.

9 See the Eurogroup agreement of 9 April 2020 on the activation of the emergency package financed under the ESM, then ratified by the ESM Board of Governors on 15 May 2020.

10 Preamble 1 and Articles 3.1, 14.3 Reg. (EU) 472/2013; Art 11.2 Reg. (EU) 473/2013.

11 Articles 3.8, 3.9, 7.11, 14.5 Reg (EU) 472/2013 and Article 7.3 Reg (EU) 473/2013 on the possibility for national parliaments to consult the Commission on draft budgetary plans.

12 Articles 3.4 and 7.4 of Reg. (EC) 1466/1997, as amended by Reg. (EU) 1175/2011 and Premise no. 16.

13 See European Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni’s intervention under the LXV COSAC Meeting on 31 May–1 June 2021 and the European Parliament Resolution of 10 June 2021, 2021/2738 (RSP).

14 Data reported for both stages are referred to 2018 practices, which show continuity with early trends recorded in 2013, thus confirming their overall reliability.

15 21 parliaments/houses discussed the proposal COM (2020) 408 fin, only 13 of them concluded the procedure. In the case of the proposal COM (2018) 325 fin, the scrutiny was started in 25 parliaments/houses and concluded in 12.

16 14 parliaments/houses discussed the proposal COM (2020) 139 fin, but only 8 assemblies concluded the process. 9 parliaments/houses discussed the proposal COM (2018) 322 fin, 8 concluded the process.

17 Letter of the Minister of Finance 35466, No. 3 of 20 May 2020, which was followed by the presentation of a variation to the 2020 budget.

18 See the Report of 1 June 2021 of the Finance Committee of the House of Representatives.

19 Sitting No 593 of 19 May 2021 (https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2021/PK0593/) and Sitting No 631 of 27 May 2021 (https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2021/PK0631/).

20 Finland is not formally part of the 'four frugal countries' group, but held critical positions in the negotiations. See the Declaration of 8 May 2020, the Declaration adopted on 12 June 2020 and the Final Statement of 16 July 2020.

21 The Houses of the Oireachtas Publication analyses the outcomes of the questionnaire submitted to national parliaments by the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD).

22 The Italian Parliament is among the few assemblies that intervened in three subsequent stages: the ex post scrutiny of the guidelines for drafting the RRP; the ex post scrutiny of the draft plan; the ex ante scrutiny of the final plan.

23 Art. 1, para. 2–7 Law 29 July 2021, no. 108; art. 9-bis Decree-Law 6 November 2021, no. 152 and art- 43 Law 23 December 2021, no. 238.

24 See the Resolution voted on 15 March 2022 by the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies (8-00154).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elena Griglio

Elena Griglio is Senior Parliamentary Official of the Italian Senate, she teaches Legislative Drafting and Comparative Public Law at the Department of Political Sciences of the LUISS University of Rome. She has been a Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute - School of Transnational Governance. She recently authored the monograph ‘Parliamentary oversight of the executives. Tools and procedures in Europe’, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2020.