https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0496-5163
ABSTRACT
The Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA) set up in March 2019 is the result of an unprecedented collaboration between the parliaments of the two most powerful member states of the European Union (EU). While this bi-parliamentary assembly has received some attention by political think tanks, we know very little about its potential transformative effect on bilateral executive accountability as well as on the accountability and the salience of EU economic governance in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on an extensive document analysis and on semi-structured interviews with FGPA members and staff, we show that to a large extent the FGPA has become a forum of transnational accountability that cuts across the traditional domestic and EU channels of executive oversight. Our findings also reveal that the pandemic has increased the FGPA’s oversight activity and allowed for the (re-)emergence of EMU matters on the shared parliamentary and executive agenda.
Introduction
The extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic that challenged governance systems around the world have resulted in the marginalisation of parliamentary actors vis-a-vis the executives who assumed a predominant role in responding to the crisis (Griglio, Citation2020; Uhlmann, Citation2020). Some scholars and analysts observed that the pandemic has weakened parliamentary oversight, scrutiny and policy-making capacities (Bolleyer & Salát, Citation2021; Dias Pinheiro & Fromage, Citation2020), while others even feared legislatures to become casualties of the situation (Bar-Siman-Tov, Citation2020). Other studies found that although legislatures have not been on the frontlines of action, they have been indeed actively involved in the pandemic response and oversight of the executive (Ginsburg & Versteeg, Citation2020) thus proving their adaptive capacity in difficult times (Rozenberg, Citation2020). While day-to-day executive accountability was severely strained, legislatures sought alternative ways to keep track of the situation, for example by setting up special inquiry committees (e.g. France, Belgium, UK), or by resorting to inter-parliamentary cooperation (Inter-Parliamentary Union, Citation2020). In EU studies, the latter alternative, however, enjoys a mixed record as a potential remedy to the weaknesses of democratic accountability. While some authors have viewed the so called Inter-Parliamentary Conferences (IPCs) as a ‘weapon of the weak’ vis-à-vis the executive actors (Crum & Fossum, Citation2013) or an added value in strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs (Wouters & Raube, Citation2012), others have been less optimistic (e.g. Borońska-Hryniewiecka, Citation2021; Fromage, Citation2016; Kinski, Citation2021; see also Bartolucci & Lupo, Citation2022).
This article contributes to the discussion about the nature of inter-parliamentary cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic by focusing on the activity of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA). The FGPA, established in March 2019, is currently the only bilateral parliamentary assembly in the EUFootnote1 and consists of 100 members, 50 from the French Assemblée Nationale and 50 from the German Bundestag largely reflecting the political balance of power in the two national parliaments.Footnote2 The structure of the FGPA includes a Board, which plays an important steering and agenda-setting role, a plenary and five Working Groups devoted to concrete policy areas/sectors.Footnote3 The primary competences of the bilateral assembly are ensuring the application of the Elysée Treaty from 1963 and of the Treaty of Aachen signed in 2019, including the implementation and evaluation of bilateral projects, following the Franco-German Council of Ministers (FGCM), monitoring international and European affairs of common interest and making proposals on any matter concerning Franco-German relations.
Since 2003, the FGCM brings together French and German cabinet ministers once or twice a year to discuss a broad range of policy topics, bilateral initiatives and common positions on EU priorities.
There are at least three reasons for undertaking research on the FGPA. First, it is a relatively new inter-parliamentary body (set up on March 25, 2019)Footnote4 with formal oversight competence which has not received adequate, theoretically-driven scholarly attention to date (but cf. policy papers: Demesmay & Seidendorf, Citation2021; Nguyen & Heimbach, Citation2020). Second, although the major part of the FGPA’s operation has taken place in the context of the pandemic, its workings have not stalled but in fact intensified. Third, since the assembly is the result of a collaboration between the parliaments of the two largest EU Member States who often set the tone for the strategic orientations of the Union, it is likely that the FGPA’s activities might have important repercussions in a broader EU context.
Against this background, the objective of this article is to account for the potential transformative effects of the FGPA in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. The three research questions we attempt to answer are: (1) What has the impact of the FGPA on executive accountability in Franco-German relations been?, (2) In what ways has the pandemic affected this unfolding inter-parliamentary cooperation?, and (3) How do the accountability relationships within the FGPA play out in the sphere of EMU governance? A closer look at the latter is justified not only by the strategically important and sensitive nature of EMU-related decision-making for both countries. It also allows us to illustrate in how far the pandemic has shifted the FGPA’s focus beyond bilateral cooperation to the initially marginalised questions of EU economic governance.
We draw on original data from interviews and an analysis of parliamentary documents and activities. Between June and October 2021, we conducted ten semi-structured interviews with FGPA members as well as parliamentary and administrative staff of both chambers.Footnote5 This mixed institutional and actor-oriented approach allowed us to delve deeper into the workings of the FGPA enriching its official set-up and objectives with real-life developments. The period of analysis covers the assembly’s activity since its creation until the German parliamentary elections in September 2021.
Our findings show that the FGPA constitutes a novel form of inter-parliamentary accountability-enhancing forum contributing to a new type of transnational accountability in the EU governance context. They also reveal that contrary to what might have been expected, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased this forum’s leverage in holding the executives to account as well as in political agenda setting. Finally, we also find that the pandemic has influenced the positions of German MPs, particularly in the CDU/CSU, with respect to important EU economic and fiscal policy issues. Overall, through the FGPA, the two parliaments are frontrunners in parliamentarizing bilateral relations and finally catching-up with the executives.
This article is structured as follows: The first section situates the FGPA in the analytical perspective of transnational accountability. The second evaluates various institutional and operational aspects of the FGPA against the criteria of an oversight forum and transnational accountability platform. The third section accounts for the impact of the pandemic on the Franco-German inter-parliamentary dynamics. The article finishes with the discussion of the findings and sets out avenues for further research.
From traditional to transnational accountability: towards a framework for analysis
At its core, accountability refers to the communicative exchange between an agent and an audience. The former is (publicly) answerable to the latter who may impose sanctions in case of misconduct (Auel, Citation2007; Bovens et al., Citation2014). In both the domestic and international political realm, we can essentially distinguish two types of accountability mechanisms: one based on delegation or ownership, and another based on participation or affectedness (Bovens et al., Citation2014; Koenig-Archibugi, Citation2010). The former oftentimes refers to mandatory and vertical, formal accountability relations to those principals for whom a task is performed (Strøm, Citation2000) and is usually reserved to the executive-legislative relationship within a democratic political system (whether in a national or EU context). The latter rather manifests in (quasi-)voluntary and horizontal, political accountability to those who are affected by a task the agents perform (Bovens et al., Citation2014; Koenig-Archibugi, Citation2010). It might interconnect various state and non-state actors cutting across the levels of governance and jurisdictions.
Such increasingly complex accountability relationships tend to prevail in the EU multi-level system of governance. Due to the differentiation of policy-making modes and multiplicity of actors participating in policy-bargains, we do not only observe a higher level of information asymmetries between governments and parliaments, but also what has been termed ‘peer accountability’ (Papadopoulos, Citation2014, Citation2021), ‘interdependence accountability’ (Scott, Citation2000) or ‘transnational accountability’ (Macdonald, Citation2014). Formal, traditional government accountability is supplemented by an extended accountability towards negotiation partners, and other members of the multi-level governance network that transcends national borders. According to Macdonald (Citation2014), such transnational accountability practices do not only serve the classic functions of accountability, namely monitoring government conduct and maintaining the legitimacy of governance processes. They can ultimately become ‘an entry point and a vehicle for contesting and transforming core constitutive features of the governance system’ (p. 432). Put differently, they may contribute to subtle shifts in the way things are done, simultaneously cross-cutting borders and established accountability practices. Moreover, because these supplementary forms of accountability cut across established principal-agent relationships, they may also have a transformative effect on ‘routine practice or established patterns of behaviour’ (Macdonald, Citation2014, p. 432).
Scholars have identified transnational parliamentary assemblies (TPAs) as forums that could potentially foster such transformative modes of accountability (Giesen & Malang, Citation2022; Kraft-Kasack, Citation2008). EU scholars associate similar functions with IPCs, however, their empirical evaluations have not been too optimistic so far (e.g. Borońska-Hryniewiecka, Citation2021; Fromage, Citation2016; Kinski, Citation2021) pointing to a range of weaknesses including lack of formal powers and transparency, diverging actors’ preferences as to their scope and functions, or to the missing links to domestic parliamentary procedures. In this context, Cooper (Citation2019) distinguishes two, to some extent competing, types of IPCs. The ‘dual scrutiny’ type assumes a clear division of labour between national parliaments and the European Parliament (EP) when it comes to accountability. National parliaments separately hold their respective governments to account, as does the EP with the European institutions. In this logic, IPCs can only be discussion forums for exchange of information and best practices. In case of the ‘joint scrutiny’ type, IPCs become a common oversight body in which EP and national parliaments exercise scrutiny of EU level institutions together. Against this background, the FGPA can be classified not only as a forum of classic, formal accountability of one’s own government, but also of joint political accountability based on affectedness. The two roles defined by Cooper, i.e. parliamentary discussion forum and joint scrutiny platform, are performed in parallel.
The FGPA as a transnational accountability forum
On the one hand, as a transnational parliamentary assembly, the FGPA differs significantly from multilateral IPCs in the EU in that it is bilateral and does not include the EP. On the other hand, it also differs significantly from ‘usual’ bilateral parliamentary cooperation, which tends to be weakly institutionalised and informally organised (e.g. parliamentary friendship groups) (Giesen & Malang, Citation2022). The FGPA shares with IPCs their more formal organisation and stronger institutionalisation. Hence, we use the analytical framework created by Cooper in relation to IPCs as a benchmark to gauge the FGPA’s accountability potential in the EU context. When evaluated against the six attributes of IPCs (Cooper, Citation2019), the FGPA satisfies almost all of the conditions of an ‘oversight body’:
democratic legitimacy that does not replace but complements that of the two national parliaments,
autonomous legal status including own Rules of Procedure,
permanence and institutional continuity (as opposed to ad hoc nature)
public forum in which MPs engage directly in questions and debate not only with representatives of their own executives (but also with representatives of the EU),
mandate to make political statements addressed to the governments (but not to the EU)
ability to take collective decisions (of non-binding nature), including through formal voting procedures.
As will be shown below, the constitutive features of FGPA are conducive to new forms of transnational accountability that cut across the existing dual chains of executive accountability in general and regarding EU governance in particular.
Competences and party dynamics
While delivering his introductory remarks before the joint audition of Angela Merkel and Jean Castex in June 2021, the President of the Assemblée Nationale, Richard Ferrand underlined that the FGPA ‘is a body of cooperation and control’.Footnote6 Our interviewees also reiterated that oversight and control of government cooperation is the FGPA’s main function besides agenda-setting and signalling of shared policy priorities as well as representation and communication of shared interests (G-I1-I5). The controlling competence over the Franco-German Council of Ministers (FGCM) deserves special attention because it constitutes a novel accountability element in the Franco-German relationship. In this respect, the Franco-German Agreement from March 2019 foresees that the respective governments are supposed to provide exhaustive and early information, as well as to report regularly on the progress of the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Council. Indirectly, this provision has paved the way to the strengthening of transnational accountability practices between the two legislatures and their respective governments and might have potential transformative effects on the domestic legislative-executive relationship especially in France (see below).
Prior to the German federal election of September 2021, the partisan composition of the FGPA facilitated a broad transnational consensus, and to some extent cut across the existing government-opposition dynamics. Our interviewees pointed to the importance of national and transnational coalitions (G-I2; F-I1) including government and opposition parties, e.g. La République en Marche (LREM) and Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem) with the German Greens (G-I2), or the cooperation between La France insoumise and Die Linke (cf. Nguyen & Heimbach, Citation2020, p. 3).Footnote7 Similarly, a cross-party, consensus-oriented mode of proceedings was also observed within the German and French delegations (G-I1; F-I3). The EU dimension of the FGPA is reflected in the fact that half of its members come from European affairs and foreign affairs committees as well as that four out of the five existing working groups are oriented towards EU priorities (see Online Appendix A.2.3).
New practices & behavioural changes
According to Macdonald (Citation2014, p. 433), the transformative mode of transnational accountability does not only change the institutional dimension, but also shifts key actors’ practices, habits, routines and norms. In this sense, while the FGPA has no formal mandate to invite members of the respective governments, let alone representatives of EU institutions, to joint hearings, such practices have been regular so far. Between March 2019 and September 2021, the FGPA organised ten public hearings and auditions of executive actors of the national and EU level, including four secretaries of state, twelve ministers from France and Germany, the French prime minister and German chancellor, as well as the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) (see ). There was also a closed meeting with the First Vice President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans in the Working Group on the Green Deal. The transformative effect of such activity could be observed especially with regard to the meeting with Christine Lagarde who – as the President of the ECB – is not formally accountable to national parliaments but to the EP. Yet, after the initial reluctance to accept the invitation, the change of name from hearing to discussion convinced Madame Lagarde to meet with the MPs (F-I5; G-I4). This may signal an additional transformative effect of the FGPA, namely the Bundestag’s consent to the ECB President’s appearance. The German parliament had previously been opposed to the idea to endow the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (SECG IPC) with oversight capacity arguing that EMU governance is the EP’s prerogative (cf. Cooper, Citation2016 and generally on this Conference: Lupo and Bartolucci, in this issue). It remains to be seen whether such practices will be durable, but there has been no ‘fear of contact’ to EU representatives so far (G-I4).
Table 1. Overview of FGPA hearings (with ministers, heads of government, state secretaries)a.
Another observation with regard to the FGPA’s accountability leverage is that the emerging transnational oversight practices seem to work despite the differences in formal strength of the two parliamentary chambers. While the Assemblée Nationale has comparatively weak scrutiny rights vis-à-vis its own government (especially in EU affairs) than the Bundestag (Auel et al., Citation2015), the two delegations seem to have found a way around it by using slightly different wording in their common decisions and resolutions. While the German MPs ‘call upon/demand’ the governments to undertake certain action, the French ‘invite’ the governments to do the same. Due to the weaker formal standing of the Assemblée Nationale compared to the Bundestag in EU affairs, the provision on monitoring the FGCM is likely to have a stronger transformative effect on the French executive-legislative accountability relationship. Contrary to the German case – the French government to date has had no practice of reporting to the Assemblée on the FGCM meetings. As recalled by several interviewees (F-I1; F-I2; F-I5), it was a common practice that French MPs would receive the necessary feedback and documents after FGCM meetings not from the French executive but from their German counterparts (sometimes even small opposition parties like Die Linke). The new joint oversight of the FGCM and the explicit expectation of prompt executive reporting might change this and foster transnational accountability as the ‘normal’ procedure (Demesmay & Seidendorf, Citation2021). This would require certain change in the French political culture (F-I4).
The way hearings within the FGPA are conducted also illustrates the transnational nature of the Franco-German accountability relationship. Apart from sporadic addressing of their own national ministers, MPs often articulate direct questions to both ministers simultaneously or use a cross-questioning technique whereby French MPs address the German executive and the other way round. MPs also ask questions they have drafted jointly with an MP from the other parliament. Some MPs are bilingual or fluent in the other language, and simultaneous translation at each meeting facilitates creating a transnational discussion space.
Link with domestic parliamentary procedures
In her analysis of the SECG IPC, Borońska-Hryniewiecka (Citation2021) observes the missing link between activities of the conference and domestic parliamentary procedures of oversight and scrutiny. In the case of the FGPA, this connection is present and evolving. The forum can adopt its own decisions on setting up working groups or its rules of procedure for example, and propose joint resolutions to the two parliaments. The joint resolutions are not legally binding and the parliamentary chambers deal with them according to their own procedures. In the Bundestag, they can be forwarded to a committee or to the Parliamentary President, and may become motions which parliament can debate and vote on (G-I5). In the Assemblée Nationale, the majority of the FGPA’s resolutions are not passed on the plenary for reasons of document overload (F-I5). Yet, one resolution was indeed submitted to the plenary, marking an important step in the accountability relationship between the Assemblée and the government. The resolutionFootnote8 invited
the Government to develop monitoring tools to provide Parliament and citizens with extensive information on the implementation of the Aachen Treaty and in particular on Franco-German priority projects, as well as on the budgetary resources allocated to each of these projects.
Another resolutionFootnote10 drafted within the FGPA’s Working Group on Disruptive Innovations and Artificial Intelligence, despite not being presented to the plenary, led to an increased oversight activity in this policy sector. It was the first case when the working group submitted its resolution to the respective executives (interview F-I2). Within a few months of its adoption, the resolution resulted in the FGPA’s joint hearing of Cédric O, French Secretary of State for Digital Transition and Electronic Communications and Anja Karliczek, German Minister for Education and Research.Footnote11 The meeting did not only focus on bilateral cooperation in this sector, but addressed the EU-wide Artificial Intelligence ecosystem and innovation strategy driving forward the process towards the European Innovation Union.Footnote12
It is important to observe that while the working groups consist of FGPA members, they also regularly invite other MPs from different parliamentary committees and non-parliamentary experts. This allows for issues and practices to spill over from the FGPA to the respective parliaments and vice-versa (cf. Demesmay & Seidendorf, Citation2021). Finally, there is a visible high-level support by the two Parliamentary Presidents as well. This creates the strategic link to the day-to-day workings of parliaments even without the FGPA’s possessing formally binding instruments. Ultimately, as one German interviewee observed, Franco-German cooperation in the FGPA does not only ‘diffuse’ into the two parliaments separately, but spills over to intensified cooperation at multiple levels, be it in the transport committees on the Berlin-Paris railroad project or within COSAC (G-I4).
The impact of COVID: increased oversight activity and re-emergence of EMU matters
Addressing the question about the impact of COVID on the inter-parliamentary dynamics, our research findings point to two general effects: an enhancement of the overall FGPA’s oversight leverage vis-a-vis the executive actors and a shifting focus to the previously marginalised questions of EMU governance.
Regarding the first aspect, instead of reduced activity of the FGPA, we have seen an increase in the number of its meetings beyond the formal bi-annual ones. Since the outbreak of the health crisis until October 2021, the FGPA conducted three additional hearings of strategic executive actors devoted to the pandemic response (see ). On 28 May 2020, the MPs heard the two ministers of interior, Christophe Castaner and Horst Seehofer, on the measures taken to combat the crisis, in particular border controls. The FGPA debated these initiatives including their consequences on a European scale. On 17 June 2020, the FGPA conducted a video hearing of the two finance ministers, Bruno Le Maire and Olaf Scholz, on the financial measures introduced at EU level, in particular the Franco-German Initiative for European Recovery presented by the President of the Republic and the Federal Chancellor as well as the European Commission’s ‘Next Generation EU’ plan. The audition of the President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde, took place on 22 September 2020. On the same day, the two health ministers were also heard by the FGPA discussing the need to strengthen European cooperation in health governance. Finally, on 28 June 2021, the FGPA organised an additional – third plenary meeting devoted to the hearing of the Prime Minister of the French Republic, Jean Castex, and the then German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. Apart from questions related to various aspects of the COVID-19 response, MPs inquired about issues such as climate change, EU external relations or the rule of law crisis in some EU Member States.Footnote13
The outbreak of the pandemic also resulted in the (re-)emergence of EMU-related topics on the FGPA’s agenda. The issue of EMU reform re-appeared on the forum’s table through the backdoor via questions surrounding the shared economic consequences of the pandemic (e.g. G-I1, 2, 4) despite previous marginalisation. The pandemic also influenced the positions of German MPs, particularly in the CDU/CSU, with respect to shared borrowing in the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)/Next Generation EU,Footnote14 and guarantees within the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE).Footnote15 Whether these remain temporary emergency measures or become more permanent remains contested among German parties (G-I1, G-I2, G-I4).
In the Joint Resolution from January 2018, the two parliaments called upon their governments to work together towards the development and stabilisation of the EMU (art. 23). Yet, the Franco-German parliamentary agreement from 25 March 2019 setting up the FGPA did not include monitoring of EU economic governance as one of its competences. Consequently, out of the five Working Groups created within the FGPA none was exclusively devoted to economic or fiscal matters. Moreover, while the 2018 Joint Resolution envisioned joint Franco-German preparatory meetings before EU level IPCs such as the IPC SECG with a view to reciprocal consultation and joint initiatives, no such coordination has taken place so far (F-I2; F-I5; G-I2; G-I4).
There are at least two reasons why EMU governance was sidelined. First, while EMU reform ranks high on the agenda of both countries, their positions often differ substantively. France endorses more fiscal transfers leading the camp of Southern EU member states, while at the same time postulating closer fiscal integration at EU level. In contrast Germany leads the fiscal discipline coalition including Northern countries (Lehner & Wasserfallen, Citation2019) expressing scepticism towards the idea of greater fiscal integration. Taking into account these differences, in the initial stages of cooperation, the FGPA decided to focus on less contentious issues of common interest that would produce early success stories (G-I5). Second, the question of (inter)parliamentary oversight of EU economic governance has long been a source of disagreement between the Assemblée Nationale and the Bundestag. The process of setting up the IPC SECG illustrates this very well. While the French proposed that the IPC should exercise an oversight function with respect to EU economic and fiscal policy, the Germans envisaged it as a mere discussion forum, possibly enabling national parliaments to scrutinise one another’s economic and budgetary plans while leaving the EU’s economic accountability to the EP (cf. Cooper, Citation2016). Such divergence of views could also affect the final decision about the scope of the FGPA’s influence over EU economic governance.
Our interviews confirm this reasoning to some extent. The French President of the FGPA Bureau, Christophe Arend (LREM) admitted that the initial idea to include EU economic governance into the list of the FGPA’s competences was too ambitious and had to be renegotiated during further stages, also pointing out that EMU governance is the EP’s prerogative (F-I5). Administrative staff from the French EAC secretariat attending FGPA’s meetings also recalled that there was a strong preference among FGPA members to focus on cross-border issues that might yield satisfactory results rather than on ‘more controversial’ EU-level developments (F-I1; F-I2, F-I3).
The German respondents shared most of these views, and added that the FGPA can only be a stepping-stone to solving longstanding controversies between the two governments, albeit an important one (G-I1, & G-I2, G-I3, G-I4, G-I5). One staff member observed that with the two ‘controversial’ Working Groups on ‘Foreign and Defence Policy’ and the ‘European Green Deal’, there was enough on the table even without EU economic governance (G-I2). Here, German and French interviewees pointed to the Working Group on ‘Harmonization of French and German Business and Insolvency Law’ stressing that the FGPA wants to first focus on tangible matters that are essential to bilateral economic cooperation to later address EU-wide issues (FI-3, GI-1, GI-3).
The official turning point for EMU re-emergence was 6 April 2020, when the two FGPA Presidents, Wolfgang Schäuble and Richard Ferrand, issued their joint declaration ‘Supporting Solidarity in Europe with Trust and Patience’Footnote16 which was simultaneously published in Le FigaroFootnote17 and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.Footnote18 They argued for a flexible mobilisation and expansion of all available instruments including the EU budget and its multiannual financial framework (MFF), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to remedy the unfolding economic crisis. More interestingly, despite the well-known Franco-German differences with regard to the evaluation of the Maastricht criteria, they both advocated for the temporary suspension of national and European debt rules and urged that Europe should also think about new steps towards more solidarity and fiscal integration. They further stressed that the two parliaments can contribute to ‘clearing up misunderstandings and moving forward jointly’ in this respect. In a sign of synergy – on the same day – the two Presidents of the FGPA’s Bureau, Christophe Arend and Andreas Jung published the declaration entitled ‘Together against the Coronavirus’ in which they specified precise conditions for the financial support to be generated at the EU level from the ESM, the EIB as well as the SURE instrument.Footnote19 In another joint declaration ‘Germany and France – Jointly towards a New Dynamics in the Corona-Crisis’ on 26 May 2020, FGPA Presidents Ferrand and Schäuble expressed their support for the Macron-Merkel initiative on economic recovery in the EU of 18 May 2020 and formulated a series of expectations towards their governments in this regard.Footnote20 As confirmed by our interviewees, the Presidents of the FGPA Bureau, Arend and Jung, were continuously involved in the preparation of that governmental initiative, while parliamentary exchange was ‘of the utmost intensity’ in the FGPA on how money can be spent in shared investment projects (F-I5; G-I2). In the abovementioned special meeting of the FGPA on 17 June 2020, the hearing of finance ministers, Bruno Le Maire and Olaf Scholz, focused on the Franco-German proposition that led to the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility. The historical significance of accepting joint borrowing in the EU for future spending to mitigate the economic consequences of the pandemic was discussed including the volume of the recovery fund, the ratio of grants and loans as well as its time horizon and permanency. Finally, the discussion with Christine Lagarde on 21 September 2020 revolved around the political role of the ECB and visions for EU economic governance beyond immediate crisis management. Schäuble underlined that ‘[t]he monetary union is not sustainable in the long run without a political equivalent’.Footnote21
On 22 September 2020, the FGPA put forward its first resolution related to the EMU to the two parliaments entitled ‘Giving Franco-German impulses to the economic and monetary union – Strengthening Europe together’. Already in the first passages of the document the MPs observed that the Covid-19 pandemic was ‘a new stress test for Europe and therefore also for the EMU’. In this respect, the MPs called upon the two governments to continue their efforts undertaken during the previous crises ‘to ensure European economic stability’ through, among others, the completion of the Banking Union and Capital Markets Union, the establishment of the financial transaction tax as well as the development of sustainable and green finance. They also urged the governments to work on a rapid adoption of the European recovery plan (Next Generation EU) legislative package and to continue the debates on the new EU budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness with a view to creating an independent permanent fiscal capacity for the euro area. MPs also called upon the German government to undertake reflection, during its EU Council presidency, on the creation of a permanent unemployment insurance designed to reinforce the economic stability of the Eurozone, with a view to be implemented during the French EU Council presidency in 2022. It will be interesting to see how the German government in place since December 2021, an SPD (Social Democratic Party), Greens, FDP (Free Democratic Party) coalition, is going to pursue this initiative.
In 2021, matters of EU economic and fiscal governance were an important element of the strategically significant FGPA hearing of the then prime minister of France and chancellor of Germany, Jean Castex and Angela Merkel, on 28 June 2021. Five out of fifteen questions referred to the EMU, e.g. to the Franco-German differences with regard to modification of the Maastricht (convergence) criteria (MoDem), to the risk of debt mutualisation, and fiscal discipline rules (AfD), to the role of the ECB in managing the crisis (Die Linke), and to the EU investment plans (LREM). They came from both sides of the spectrum as well as various political parties.
In total, since the outbreak of the pandemic in early 2020 until the summer 2021, EMU oriented topics appeared on the agenda of the FGPA seven times, which marked an evident qualitative and quantitative change with respect to the preceding period of its operation. It remains to be seen whether the topic will continue to occupy the forum’s agenda in a similar way in the future.
Conclusions
The aim of this article was to account for the potential transformative effects of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. With regard to the first research question, we show that the FGPA has not only increased executive oversight in Franco-German relations, but is also conducive to new forms of transnational accountability cutting across the levels of governance and involving EU actors. While the FGPA has no formal mandate to invite members of the respective governments, let alone representatives of EU institutions, to joint hearings, such practices have been de facto regular so far. FGPA MPs have engaged directly in cross-questioning and debates not only with representatives of their own executives, but also with representatives of EU institutions, as the cases of Madame Lagarde and Mr Timmermans have illustrated. In this sense, the forum’s dynamics have induced a certain transformative effect on the established practices and patterns of behaviour within the bilateral and EU accountability architecture. On the one hand, the analysed legislative-executive relationships are voluntary and lack sanctioning mechanisms, and therefore may be seen as an ‘incomplete version’ of transnational accountability. On the other hand, the sheer number of hearings as well as the fact that they have taken place despite the differences in formal strength of both parliaments, make these developments quite impressive. What is more, this type of transnational accountability, albeit voluntary, can be qualified as ‘substantive’ rather than just ‘procedural’ because governmental actors justify the ‘substantive worth of the policy decision itself’ rather than the process through which it came about (Dawson & Maricut-Akbik, Citation2021, p. 2). It appears that the forum has the ambition to provide an additional accountability dimension in the field of joint transposition of EU directives but it remains to be seen whether this active cooperation stays after the crisis is over. Our findings also reveal that while the FGPA lacks formal influence on parliamentary decision-making, let alone mandating executive positions, its resolutions have certain agenda-setting effects for the executives and, in some cases, lead to important next steps such as joint government hearings on a particular topic of common concern.
Regarding the second research question, contrary to what might have been expected given the general impact of COVID-19 on the scrutiny capacity of national parliaments, the pandemic was a catalyst for the FGPA’s oversight activities. In particular, the extraordinary circumstances have enhanced the joint, political type of accountability based on affectedness whereby both the French and the German governments found it appropriate, if not indispensable, to explain their immediate crisis management and more long-term plans in front of a transnational parliamentary forum. Such motivation was most likely also shared by Christine Lagarde who, despite not being formally accountable to national MPs, agreed to appear in front of two of them to explain the political role of the ECB and its vision beyond immediate crisis management. Even though the ECB has met with national MPs more often since the Eurozone crisis, such high-level public engagement is still remarkable. In parallel, the pandemic has caused a re-emergence of issues related to EMU governance, effectively marginalised at the stage of FGPA institutionalisation. The topics of economic recovery and solidarity emerged on the shared agenda. Interestingly, the pandemic has influenced the positions of German MPs, particularly in the CDU/CSU with respect to some highly contested EMU policy solutions such as shared borrowing and unemployment guarantees. Whether these are temporary emergency measures or become more permanent remains contested.
Last but not least, our research shows that the FGPA has the ambition to go beyond the bilateral dimension and influence the EU-wide debate on particular policy solutions such as digitalisation, green economy or the EMU more specifically. In this vein, its most recent plenary meeting, held in February 2022, was devoted to the debate on the future of Europe auditioning the French EU affairs minister, and the German state secretary for EU affairs. This confirms that this transnational inter-parliamentary forum is likely to become a catalyst for new EU-policy proposals and initiatives, especially in the context of the recommendations produced by the Conference on the Future of Europe enjoying strong endorsement from both Member States.
Overall, the case of FGPA points to a new potential for national parliaments to exercise political accountability within the EU multi-level system of governance. Future research could investigate to what extent such a bilateral format is colliding or cohering with existing multilateral IPCs, and whether it is a steppingstone or a stumbling block to broader transnational parliamentary cooperation within the EU. Scholars could also explore how such a model compares to existing multilateral parliamentary fora such as the Baltic Assembly, the Visegrad parliaments’ cooperation or the recently initiated Montecitorio format.Footnote22 Ideally, such comparative studies would allow identifying scope conditions for the emergence of transnational accountability beyond bilateral interparliamentary relations. Finally, we could analyse in how far such transnational parliamentary assemblies foster transnational parliamentary representation (Kinski & Crum, Citation2020) and dense legislative communities (Giesen & Malang, Citation2022).
Supplemental Material
Download MS Word (94.8 KB)Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka (dr. habil) is Adjunct Professor at the Institute of Political Science and a lecturer at the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Wrocław. She is also a Visiting Fellow at the Centre européen de sociologie et de science politique (CESSP) of Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
Lucy Kinski
Lucy Kinski is postdoc at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg, Austria. Her research focuses on parliaments and representation in the European Union. Her latest book is European Representation in EU National Parliaments (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).
Notes
1 The British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body was created in 1990, includes regional MPs since 2001, and since 2008 it is the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly (BIPA) (http://www.britishirish.org/).
2 Since the reform of the rules of procedure, there are also 30 substitute members for each parliament. For details, see Online Appendix A2.1.
3 See Online Appendix A2.1.
5 For more information on the interviews, see Online Appendix A.1.
7 See Online Appendix A.2.2 for more details on partisan composition.
9 Point 14 of the above-mentioned Resolution.
10 ‘Emerging from the crisis through innovation on the way to the European Innovation Union’ adopted earlier by the FGPA (22 January 2021), https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/content/download/326052/3180393/version/1/file/PV.2021.2+IR+IA.pdf.
11 The audition took place on 19 May 2021.
16 https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2020/kw15-schaeuble-ferrand-690250; https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/690266/437cb0f23d9da525a8d121ba0df89e75/kw15_schaeuble_ferrand_erklaerung-data.pdf.
21 https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/818012/68f1e5c7d61e9756b2acab7c27120b92/20200922_protokoll-data.pdf, pp. 20–21.
22 Similar to the Weimar triangle with Poland, the new Montecitorio format brings together the European Affairs Committees of France, Germany and Italy (https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/871194/2ecf68e68f169094adda3d209f874db0/arbeit_19wp-data.pdf).
References
- Auel, K. (2007). Democratic accountability and national parliaments: Redefining the impact of parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs. European Law Journal, 13(4), 487–504. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00380.x
- Auel, K., Rozenberg, O., & Tacea, A. (2015). Fighting back? And, if so, how? Measuring parliamentary strength and activity in EU affairs. In C. Hefftler, C. Neuhold, O. Rozenberg, & J. Smith (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of national parliaments and the European Union (pp. 60–93). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, I. (2020). Covid-19 meets politics: The novel coronavirus as a novel challenge for legislatures. The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 8(1–2), 11–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2020.1800250
- Bartolucci, L, & Lupo, N. (2022). National opposition parties within the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU. The Journal of Legislative Studies.
- Bolleyer, N., & Salát, O. (2021). Parliaments in times of crisis: COVID-19, populism and executive dominance. West European Politics, 44(5–6), 1103–1128. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1930733
- Borońska-Hryniewiecka, K. (2021). Accountability revisited: Parliamentary perspectives on the inter-parliamentary conference on stability, economic coordination, and governance. Politics and Governance, 9(3), 145–154. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4142
- Bovens, M., Goodin, R. E., & Schillemans, T. (2014). Public accountability. In M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin, & T. Schillemans (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 1–20). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.013.0012
- Cooper, I. (2016). Chapter 13. The interparliamentary conference on stability, economic coordination and governance in the European Union (the ‘Article 13 Conference’). In N. Lupo & C. Fasone (Eds.), Interparliamentary cooperation in the composite European Constitution (pp. 247–268). Hart Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781782257004
- Cooper, I. (2019). The inter-parliamentary conferences of the European Union: Discussion forums or oversight bodies? In K. Raube, M. Müftüler-Baç, & J. Wouters (Eds.), Parliamentary cooperation and diplomacy in EU external relations (pp. 139–157). Elgaronline.
- Crum, B., & Fossum, J. E. (Eds.). (2013). Practices of interparliamentary coordination in international politics: The European Union and beyond. ECPR Press.
- Dawson, M., & Maricut-Akbik, A. (2021). Accountability in the EU’s para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union. Regulation & Governance, online first, rego.12442. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12442
- Demesmay, C., & Seidendorf, S. (2021). Die Deutsch-Französische Parlamentarische Versammlung – ein Schritt zur Europäisierung der Parlamente? Integration, 44(2), 97–114. https://doi.org/10.5771/0720-5120-2021-2-97
- Dias Pinheiro, B., & Fromage, D. (2020). Parliamentary oversight of the EU economic recovery plan – lessons learned and which way forward? In D. Utrilla & A. Shabbir (Eds.), EU law in times of pandemic. The EU’s legal response to COVID-19 (pp. 102–116). EU Law Live Press.
- Fromage, D. (2016). European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Involvement: Some shortcomings of the Article 13 conference and a solution. 1. https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/6jhdkroj8l8c596hft7pgrdp99/resources/2016-fromage-european-economic-governance-and-parliamentary-involvement.pdf
- Giesen, M., & Malang, R. (2022). Legislative communities. Conceptualising and mapping international parliamentary relations. Journal of International Relations and Development, online first. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-021-00251-x
- Ginsburg, T., & Versteeg, M. (2020). Binding the unbound executive: Checks and balances in times of pandemic. SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3608974
- Griglio, E. (2020). Parliamentary oversight under the Covid-19 emergency: Striving against executive dominance. The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 8(1–2), 49–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2020.1789935
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2020). Multilateralism and Inter-parliamentary cooperation strengthened during pandemic. https://www.ipu.org/news/press-releases/2020-04/multilateralism-and-inter-parliamentary-cooperation-strengthened-during-pandemic
- Kinski, L. (2021). What role for national parliaments in EU governance? A view by members of parliament. Journal of European Integration, 43(6), 717–738. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1817000
- Kinski, L., & Crum, B. (2020). Transnational representation in EU national parliaments: Concept, case study, research agenda. Political Studies, 68(2), 370–388. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719848565
- Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2010). Accountability in transnational relations: How distinctive is it? West European Politics, 33(5), 1142–1164. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.486142
- Kraft-Kasack, C. (2008). Transnational parliamentary assemblies: A remedy for the democratic deficit of international governance? West European Politics, 31(3), 534–557. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380801939818
- Lehner, T., & Wasserfallen, F. (2019). Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone. European Union Politics, 20(1), 45–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116518814338
- Macdonald, K. (2014). The meaning and purposes of transnational accountability. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 73(4), 426–436. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12107
- Nguyen, T., & Heimbach, H. (2020). Time to unlock the potential of bi-parliamentarism. The Franco-German model. Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre. https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/time-to-unlock-the-potential-of-bi-parliamentarism-the-franco-german-model
- Papadopoulos, Y. (2014). Accountability and multi-level governance. In M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin, & T. Schillemans (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 273–288). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.013.0021
- Papadopoulos, Y. (2021). Political accountability in EU multi-level governance: The glass half-full. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps). https://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2021/political-accountability-in-eu-multi-level-governance-the-glass-half-full/
- Rozenberg, O. (2020). Post Pandemic Legislatures. Is real democracy possible with virtual parliaments? https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02934718
- Scott, C. (2000). Accountability in the regulatory state. Journal of Law and Society, 27(1), 38–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6478.00146
- Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 261–290. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007064803327
- Uhlmann, F. (2020). Concentration of powers in the federal executive: The application of emergency powers in Switzerland. Verfassungsblog. https://verfassungsblog.de/concentration-of-powers-in-the-federal-executive-the-application-of-emergency-powers-in-switzerland/
- Wouters, J., & Raube, K. (2012). Seeking CSDP accountability through interparliamentary scrutiny. The International Spectator, 47(4), 149–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.733219