Accountability, analysis and avoidance: how PMO data impacts on Westminster

ABSTRACT

Parliamentary Monitoring Organisations [PMOs] seek to make legislators more accountable and reduce the potential moral hazards of delegation. This study of the UK finds that PMOs do reduce such hazards and make for greater ‘informatory’ accountability from MPs and Peers. The primary effect is on the House of Commons, and on individual MPs, where information seeking is most frequently local. The exact impact is variable, and depends on whether a Member is in government or opposition, how long they have served and, more subtly, whether they are male or female. The impact of PMOs is uneven, and can provoke resistance and gaming or fuel political conflict.

KEYWORDS:

• PMOs
• legislatures
• Westminster
• accountability
• data

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the staff in Birkbeck Politics Department, especially Professor Dermot Hodson and Professor Deborah Mabbett, for their feedback. I’d also like to thank the PSA Parliament and Legislatures group for their constructive comments and thoughts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by The Leverhulme Trust [grant number RPG 2019-124].

Notes on contributors

Ben Worthy

Ben Worthy is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London.

Stefani Langehennig

Stefani Langehennig is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Business.