Game of deals: bargaining behaviour of the European parliament in the Brexit process

ABSTRACT

The article provides an in-depth analysis of the various bargaining strategies that the European Parliament (EP) used to leverage its influence over the negotiations of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. More specifically, it focuses on five bargaining self-empowerment strategies (obstructing, moving first, issue-linking, allying with other actors, and mobilising public opinion), elucidating if, how and to what extent the EP was using these strategies vis-à-vis the Brexit process. Conceptually, the article rests on the theory of bargaining-based rational institutionalism. The analysis covers almost a five year period, from the announcement of the in/out referendum results on 24 June 2016 until 27 April 2021 when the EP consented to the conclusion of the TCA. The data used for the analysis come from a number of sources, including 17 original interviews and email communications with MEPs.

KEYWORDS:

• European parliament
• Brexit
• Withdrawal Agreement
• Trade and Cooperation Agreement
• bargaining strategies
• rational institutionalism

Introduction

The article explores various bargaining strategies that the European Parliament (EP) used to leverage its influence over the contentious Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and TCA (Trade and Cooperation Agreement) negotiations. The European Parliament gave its consent to the WA, which set the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 29 January 2020. The TCA, which is a free trade agreement governing the relationship between the EU and the UK after Brexit (and which for the EP was ‘the most unusual Free Trade Agreement the European Union has ever concluded’ [Banks, 2021]), was signed on 30 December 2020. It applied provisionally from the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021 and formally entered into force on 1 May 2021, after the ratification processes on both sides were completed. The EP approved the agreement on 28 April 2022.

Despite various adverse conditions (such as the lack of any formal decision-making authority during the negotiating stages, the executive-dominated nature of the negotiations, and the sidelining of the EP during certain stages of negotiations), the EP’s engagement in both negotiations enhanced its own profile and extended beyond its veto power, thus shaping the reality of Brexit and continuing ‘a longer trend in establishing itself as a force to be reckoned with in EU external relations’ (Larik, 2021). This raises an intriguing and empirically highly relevant question: how exactly did the EP managed to do that? A key argument foregrounded in this article is that it was due to strategic use of bargaining strategies that the EP managed to leverage its influence upon the Brexit negotiations.

The EP’s engagement in the Brexit negotiations is a compelling focus for academic attention. Brexit is a critical juncture (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) and an unprecedented event in the process of European integration, raising a number of questions about the EU’ functioning as well as its future (Brack & Costa, 2018). Impinging on a host of politically highly salient and interconnected issues, the negotiations of both agreements were massively complex, sensitive and emotional, with unusually high stakes (Martill and Steiger 2021). As Cullen succinctly points out, ‘The results and how they were reached will be analysed and debated by negotiation students for years to come’ (Cullen, 2016).

Against this background, the article aims at to provide an in-depth analysis of the various bargaining strategies the EP employed to provide input and oversight of the WA and TCA negotiations. Grounded in a comprehensive comparison, the study also searches for patterns of both continuity and change between the two sets of negotiations. Conceptually, the paper is based on the theory of bargaining-based rational institutionalism. Uniquely, the analysis covers almost a five year period, with the timeframe stretching from the announcement of the in/out referendum results on 24 June 2016¹ until 27 April 2021 when the EP consented to the conclusion of the TCA. The data for this study derive from analysis of a wide range of official documents, including EP resolutions, official documentation, media interventions, letters, MEPs’ public pronouncements, speeches (please see Appendix I for the full list) and 17 original elite interviews and email communications with MEPs. The interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis from January 2018 to July 2022 (for more details, please see the list provided at the end of this article²).

The article starts with a contextual section that sketches the contours of the EP’s general performance during the two sets of negotiations and reflects on the article’s contribution to scholarship. The subsequent part attends to the bargaining-based rational institutionalism which provides the theoretical bedrock of the paper and addresses the analytical framework. The empirical part then reflects on how the EP pursued bargaining strategies during WA and TCA negotiations and, finally, the concluding section summarises the major arguments.

EP engagement in Brexit and contribution to scholarship

When taken in aggregate, Brexit was high on the EP’s agenda, both for the ‘old’ Parliament (2014–2019) and the ‘new’ one (since 2019). Yet, the context was not always favourable for its involvement. During the WA negotiations, the EP’s role was very limited. The legal basis for its engagement in the Withdrawal Agreement was laid down in Article 50 (TEU), according to which EP consent is required before the agreement could enter into force. After the EP’s attempts to sit at the negotiating table failed (Gostyńska-Jakubowska, 2017, p. 5), its formal role was limited to giving its assent to an agreement that had been already negotiated at the consent stage of the whole process. Informally, however, the EP developed into a ‘quasi negotiator’ (Bressanelli et al., 2019, p. 359) and ‘an important interlocutor’ that co-shaped negotiations (Meissner and Schoeller 2019: 1087; cf. Peers & Harvey, 2017, p. 830) and was active already in the negotiation phase of the withdrawal process (Bressanelli et al., 2019; Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019).

By contrast, the legal setting for the EP’s engagement in the TCA negotiations was more favourable, providing for an enhanced ability of the EP to exercise its oversight authority. The EU concluded the TCA the basis of Article 217(TFEU), used for Association agreements (AAs) with third countries. Article 218 stipulates that such agreements receive the assent of the European Parliament and are then unanimously approved by the Council of the EU. Crucially, in order to avoid the unpredictability of a long ratification procedure by 27 member states, which is typical for mixed agreements, the European Commission and the Council chose to conclude the TCA as an ‘EU-only’ AA, thus granting the EP the very special position of being the only non-UK legislature to scrutinise the deal (Eckes & Leino-Sandberg, 2022; Van der Loo & Chamon, 2021). This more favourable legal setting notwithstanding, the EP was sidelined more during the TCA negotiations (Bressanelli et al., 2021; Von der Burchard, 2021; also Interview #11). What is more, the organisational model, which differed from the one adopted for the WA, proved to be more constraining (for an informed overview of the Brexit-related organisational models within the EP, see especially Bressanelli et al., 2019, 2021) and ‘created significant obstacles for the EP to influence the negotiations’ (Bressanelli et al., 2021, p. 24). Despite these limitations, however, the EP ‘emerged as an even more empowered institution’ and ‘managed to enhance its own profile in the process of ratifying the TCA’ (Larik, 2021), having obtained inter alia extra capacity to scrutinise the TCA. It is against this background that the article explores the bargaining strategies during the negotiations.

By inquiring into the concrete bargaining repertoire employed by the EP during both sets of negotiations, the article presents novel empirical results that builds upon, extends and updates earlier findings within several strands of literature. First of all, it makes an original contribution to the scholarly understanding of the EP’s Brexit-related performance. This issue has attracted scholarly attention, albeit with different focuses and varying degrees of empirical depth. Most of the accounts deal with the Article 50 negotiations. Bressanelli et al. (2019) centre their analysis on the EP’s organisational adaptation, its institutional involvement and influence in the key negotiation dossiers. Brusenbauch Meislová (2019) considers the EP’s role in Brexit within four specific dimensions: constitutional, procedural, party-political, and national-interest. In her recent work she draws upon the conceptualisation of actorness of Kaunert, Léonard and MacKenzie and assesses the EP’s role in the withdrawal negotiations in terms of the six variables of capacity, legitimacy, initiative, autonomy, cohesion, and recognition (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2021). Closa (2020), by contrast, looks at the EP’s empowerment in Brexit from the perspectives of commitment to democratic values and the strategic use of procedures to increase the EP’s own powers. Crucially, though, works that deal with the EP in the context of both the WA and TCA negotiations are still missing. The only exception is the work by Bressanelli et al. (2021) which focuses mostly on the various impacts, both direct and indirect, of the Brexit process on the EP. The authors cover the negotiations until the completion of the ninth round of negotiations (29 September – 2 October 2020), which means that they could not address the latter moves of the EP. Yet, it was those developments that were defining for (re)assessing its role in the TCA negotiations. Valuable and rich in detail as these accounts are, they do not tell the whole story and leave a gap in the existing scholarship that this article aims to fill.

In addition, the article provides empirical richness to the burgeoning literatures on the more general yet pertinent matter of the EP’s post-Lisbon self-empowerment (Closa Montero et al., 2021; Fromage & Markakis, 2022; Richardson, 2012; Shackleton, 2017), its performance in EU crises (see, for instance, Roger, Otjes and van der Veer 2017 and Warren 2018 on the EP and the financial/eurozone crisis), and various international negotiations (Larsén, 2017; Ripoll Servent, 2014; Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017), as well as the role within the inter-institutional dynamics (Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2018; Fasone, 2022; Schoeller & Héritier, 2019).

Theoretical and analytical framework: bargaining-based rational institutionalism

Theory-wise, the article is grounded in bargaining-based rational institutionalism. The fundamental insight of this theory is that actors interact in a given institutional context, seeking to ‘maximize their institutional power in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes’ (Héritier et al., 2019, p. 9). Yet, actors are ‘boundedly rational and do not have perfect information because they face cognitive limits to and transaction costs of information collection’ (Héritier et al., 2019, p. 9). It is because of these cognitive limits, transaction costs and the high diversity of actors involved in the design of the rules that formal institutional rules are conceived of as incomplete contracts which are subject to renegotiation. Actors often exploit these various ambiguities in order to achieve an institutional change in their own favour, which may then produce informal institutional rules (Farrell & Héritier, 2007; Héritier et al., 2019, pp. 10–11).

The paper applies these lines of theorising to the WA and TCA negotiations, drawing specifically on Meissner and Schoeller (2019) who, based on refined propositions of inter-institutional bargaining theory, identify a repertoire of five key strategies that the EP might use to influence decision-making. These are (1) obstructing, (2) moving first, (3) issue-linking, (4) allying with other actors, and (5) mobilising public opinion. Employment of these self-empowerment bargaining strategies sheds light on how the EP might increase its institutional powers as such, with Meissner and Schoeller concentrating their research on two policy areas of economic governance and trade policy. Yet, there are at least four reasons, closely interlinked and jointly at work, why this framework for understanding institutional strategies offers a particularly convenient prism through which to examine the EP’s performance in the Brexit negotiations, too.

Firstly, the WA and TCA negotiations do qualify as a multi-level bargaining process (Jensen & Kelstrup, 2019; Martill & Steiger, 2018), with the deals themselves being the bargaining outcome. Secondly, both sets of negotiations might be perceived as an incomplete contract, particularly in the sense of the many elements of vagueness and ambiguity that they involved (Craig, 2017; Peers & Harvey, 2017, pp. 830–832). Indeed, both negotiations were characterised by a high degree of complexity, uncertainty, risk and incomplete information (Jensen & Kelstrup, 2019, p. 31). Thirdly, as discussed in further detail below, in the context of Brexit the EP is an actor with limited formal institutional rights. Fourthly, although not exhaustive (cf. Héritier et al., 2019), these bargaining strategies are versatile and complex enough to allow for a systematic, nuanced and context-sensitive analysis of the EP’s multifaceted engagement during the whole process of the Brexit negotiations.

While Table 1 details operationalisation of the strategies based on Meissner and Schoeller (2019: 1077), in what follows, the article applies this typology to a new area of inquiry, looking at whether and how such strategies were employed by the EP during the Brexit negotiations. Importantly, the inquiry’s primary ambition is not to explain the effects of the bargaining strategies used by the EP. Rather, it is explorative in character, seeking to shed light on how the EP leveraged its influence during the negotiations by utilising different bargaining strategies.

Table 1. Operationalisation of bargaining strategies.

Bargaining strategy of
obstructing		• delaying approval until the EP gets what it wants • blocking a decision completely if concerns remain unaddressed or unsatisfactorily addressed
moving first		• engaging in direct, unilateral contact with negotiating partner in order to get a first-mover advantage
issue linking	within an arena	• alliances with actors that enjoy formal rights in the given decision-making context - linking requests to support for a policy issue
	across arenas	- tying demands to outcome in another arena
alliance building	with other EU institutions	• building alliances with other EU institutions
	with individual member states	• building alliances with individual member states
mobilising the public		• cooperation with the media or NGOs

Empirical assessment: the European parliament’s bargaining strategies compared

In this section, the article documents if and how the EP applied the bargaining strategies identified above and how this differed between the two sets of negotiations. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that despite treating these strategies separately for reasons of analytical clarity, I do recognise their strong inter-connection and co-constitutiveness.

Strategy of obstructing

The hard-bargaining strategy of obstructing proved effective during both sets of negotiations. Significant continuity existed in the sense that during both negotiations the EP skilfully availed of the fact that it had to consent to a final deal at the end of both negotiation processes. Establishing a direct link between acceptance of its own demands and approval, the EP consistently signalled its determination to use all the powers available to reinforce its bargaining position. Even though it was very unlikely to use the nuclear option, and although in general loud public veto threats are rather unusual (as it may confuse other actors as to when and why the EP actually means them [Hart, 2020]), the EP was active in making such threats, both directly and indirectly. The documentary evidence also shows that it used all its resolutions on Brexit, as well as numerous public pronouncements, to spotlight its veto power potential implied in the need for consent.

What principally differentiates the two negotiations was the fact that while during the WA negotiations, the EP only threatened to apply this strategy, during the TCA negotiations it actually did apply it. A pertinent illustration of the threats was, for instance, the last-minute objections raised by the EP, which warned it might reject the WA as late as 18 December 2019 – that is, one day before the first reading of the EU Withdrawal Agreement Bill in the British House of Commons. It substantiated its concerns with the UK’s Home Office settlement scheme for EU nationals, proclaiming that: ‘Everyone presumes the European parliament will give automatically its consent to the withdrawal agreement. Not if the remaining problems with the citizens’ rights are not solved first’ (Stone and Kentish, 2019). In its September 2019 resolution, the EP threatened to torpedo any deal without a backstop (European Parliament, 2019d; refer online Appendix I).

Yet, it was only during the TCA negotiations that the EP put this strategy into full effect. The assembly repeatedly delayed its ratification of the time-sensitive TCA, in marked contrast to the other key actors of the ratification process (Larik, 2021). The EP did not allow itself to be pressured by the externally imposed time constraint to rubber stamp the agreement by the end of 2020. In the words of Larik (2021), ‘it is remarkable that the EP resisted being dragged along in the rush of late 2020 and 2021’ (a view expressed very similarly in Interview #17). By blocking the ratification, the EP effectively became the only parliament to actually scrutinise the deal in detail, and thus distinguished itself as a crucial legitimating actor. Such strategic exploitation of time enabled the EP to gain more manoeuvring space for communicating its concerns, which aligns with the previous research that highlights the impact of the urgency of the EP’s decision-making (Fasone, 2022; Schoeller & Héritier, 2019). At first, the EP justified the delay by the need for thorough scrutiny of the deal (after having emphasised throughout the TCA negotiation process that there would have to be sufficient time for it to be able to grant its consent). At later stages, the EP refused to ratify the agreement in light of alleged violations by the UK of the Northern Ireland Protocol (Larik, 2021). As a result, even though in the original version of the TCA the provisional application was scheduled to end on 28 February 2021, due to the EP’s sustained push it ended only on 31 April 2021.

What also emerges powerfully from the comparison is the shift in the EP’s attitudinal approach towards the UK. While during the WA negotiations the EP came to be viewed as the most conciliatory and accessible EU institution (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019, pp. 241–242; Gostyńska-Jakubowska, 2017, p. 5; McTague & Herszenhorn, 2018; similarly also Interviews #9, #17), the TCA talks were characterised by a clear hardening of the tone towards the UK, with the EP treating the UK with much more caution than it did during the WA talks, foregrounding the impression that the UK could no longer be trusted (similarly also Usherwood, 2021, p. 117). As one interviewee stated: ‘we had to work together to cushion demands of the British government that were sometimes exaggerated to the point of absurdity’ (Interview #17).

Strategy of moving first

Another distinctive trait of the negotiations was the deployment of the first-mover strategy, with the EP trying to effectively become something of an agenda-setter and input-provider. In the words of one interviewee: ‘Although the European Parliament did not have a formal role in the Brexit and post-Brexit negotiations, we have been very active throughout, proposing concrete measures, highlighting the concerns of citizens and businesses and exerting political pressure towards the European Commission’ (Interview #17). A salient tool that enabled the EP to offer political guidance and substantive comments on the negotiations and contents of the deals in a consistent manner was its resolutions. Despite the resolutions being ‘largely symbolic’ with no legally binding force (Archick, 2014, p. 16), they constitute essential normative and political governance tools at the EP’s disposal (Hart, 2020) whose value rests not only in their influence on the other EU institutions, but in ‘the political signals it transmits to certain constituencies in the European public’ (Hart, 2020, p. 351). The EP abandoned its usual practice of issuing resolutions at the end of the negotiation process (Hart, 2020) and adopted them while the negotiations were still ongoing, despite their fluidity and thus with a higher potential for a mistake. This enabled the EP to inform or/and restrict other decision makers early on in the process and to present itself as quick, well-prepared and informed (Interviews #11).

It was especially during the TCA talks that the EP tried hard(er) to create the impression of being the first mover, as evidenced by the following statement by David McAllister, Chair of the UK Coordination Group, which strategically highlights the sequence of events: ‘I welcome the fact that the European Commission has transmitted to the United Kingdom a draft agreement on a new partnership with the European Union that is closely aligned with the European Parliament’s recommendations in its resolution adopted in February’ (European Parliament 2020i; refer online Appendix I).

As detailed in Appendix II, altogether twelve resolutions on Brexit were passed: ten non-legislative and two legislative. The broad intergroup consensus across the assembly for all of the resolutions was a strong negotiating element, adding massively to their importance and reinforcing the credibility of the EP as a negotiating actor. The assembly itself was constantly reminding all the negotiating parties and the public of the importance of its own resolutions, routinely identifying the priorities and requests laid down in them as ‘red lines’. Apart from the resolutions, the EP also communicated its positions via various statements by the Brexit Steering Group/UK Coordination Group whenever it felt that Brexit-related developments merited a comment.

Symbolic of this strategy was an attitude of assertiveness vis-à-vis other actors in the negotiation process and the lack of restraint in accentuating different policy preferences. As one interviewee put it, ‘As a Parliament, we wanted the agreements around our ‘divorce’ to be balanced, and we were not afraid to speak up when the discussion went in the wrong direction’ (Interview #17). One such example during the WA negotiations was the EP’s proposition that Article 50 might be revoked (European Parliament 2017b; refer online Appendix I). Here, the assembly moved away noticeably from the position of other EU institutions and caused extensive consternation at the Commission (Boffey, 2017; Payne, 2017). During the TCA negotiations, EP was determined to demand more time for its ratification of the deal. As a result, despite the high level of Brexit-related policy convergence among the EU institutions (Barnier, 2021; De Rynck, 2023), neither set of negotiations was devoid of certain disagreements and differences of opinion over Brexit. The pronouncement by the former EP President, Martin Schulz, that the European Council President had not yet understood that in Brexit the EP was not an obstacle but a partner (Macdonald & Guarascio, 2016) serves as a case in point, and so does the EP’s criticism of the European Commission and the Council for insufficient involvement during the TCA negotiations (Larik, 2021).

To further advance its preferences, the EP also habitually engaged in direct, unilateral contact with the UK as the negotiating partner, but did so only during the WA negotiations. Notable in this respect were, for instance, open letters to David Davis, the British Secretary of State for Exiting the EU (in January and March 2018), and Amber Rudd and Sajid Javid, the Secretaries of State for the Home Department (in April and July 2018), as well as David Davis’ hearings before MEPs at plenary sessions.

Strategy of issues-linking

While the empirical mapping of the EP’s engagement during the WA negotiations found instances of only the issue-linking strategy within the arena, in the TCA negotiations the EP expanded this strategy to across-arena linking, too. Starting with the within-arena linking, during both negotiations, the EP made its consent to the treaties, which are enormously wide-ranging, conditional upon its preferences for only a limited number of issues being taken into consideration. The issues that the EP recognised as essential for its approval of the WA amounted to citizens’ rights, the Northern Irish border, and particularly the protection of British citizens’ rights in the EU, which the EP prioritised more vehemently than any other EU institution or EU27 member state (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019, 2021; also Interview #14). According to Bressanelli et al. (2021, p. 20), this contrasted starkly with the TCA negotiations insofar as it is ‘difficult to identify the key priorities of the EP with regard to the negotiations on the future EU–UK relationship […] This is in part due to the fact that the last two resolutions are very broad and cover the whole range of the Commission’s mandate’. I agree that the TCA resolutions are much broader and lengthier than those concerning the WA. One of the interviewees attributed the wider scope of the resolutions to the fact that the EP had already secured its core priorities in the Withdrawal Agreement (Interview #12). At the same time, however, this is not necessarily indicative of a lack of focus as such. Indeed, it becomes clear from the resolutions, statements (European Parliament 2020b, 2020i; refer online Appendix I), as well as the interviews (especially Interview #13) and themes of the public hearings, that there were two primary topics that the EP identified as key conditions for its consent to the whole of the TCA. The first top priority was the issue of the level-playing field, in the sense of ‘guarantees for equal rules on, among other things, social, environmental, tax, state aid, consumer protection and climate matters’ (European Parliament 2020b; refer online Appendix I). It was this topic that was usually mentioned first or otherwise highlighted by the EP, with other priorities (such as citizens’ rights, mobility of persons, data protection, financial services etc.) usually subsumed under the ‘Other priorities’ heading. The second issue of utmost significance to the EP was the situation on the island of Ireland, with the violation of the Northern Ireland Protocol being the key reason for the EP’s postponements of the TCA ratification. In the words of one interviewee, the assembly was ‘very uncompromising’ in this respect (Interview #13).

A central difference in the WA and TCA negotiations was the fact that the TCA talks were characterised by issue-linking across arenas, too. Crucially, the EP linked its consent to the provisional application of the TCA to the demand for a constructive role in supervising its implementation. Indeed, the EP was well aware that by accepting the provisional application before it had pronounced on the TCA, it had already made an important concession. Having only ‘grudgingly’ accepted that there was no time left to thoroughly scrutinise the deal (Von der Burchard, 2021; similarly also Interview #11), the EP stressed repeatedly that its scrutiny of the TCA had to go beyond mere ratification and insisted on thorough access to information and a clear role in the implementation and future monitoring of the agreement, using inter alia the argument of democratic accountability. Its sustained pressure prompted the Commission to issue a very important statement in April 2022 that granted the EP specific powers in supervising future EU-UK relations that go beyond usual authority over trade deals (Von der Burchard, 2021). Interpreted as ‘EP’s victory’ (Interview #12; similarly also Interview #13), this is essential, as ad hoc concessions ‘may create an incrementalist process, which results in the EP using the new prerogatives to propose an expansive interpretation of the rules to further extend its powers’ (Closa Montero et al., 2021, p. 164).

Strategy of alliance-building

Alliance-building was another strategy successfully exploited by the EP during negotiations of the two treaties – both in the sense of building alliances with other EU institutions as well as with member states. Regarding the former, the EP relied on close cooperation and constant communication with multiple formal decision-makers, especially the European Commission, to influence the process and terms of Brexit. When compared to previous iterations of international negotiations conducted by the EU, the trialogue cooperation during the Brexit negotiations was of a better quality (Interview #1; Interview #3). Both the European Commission and the Council felt obligated to consider the EP’s requests (Interview #7; also Barnier, 2021; De Rynck, 2023), being conscious of the precedent set by the EP’s previous contestation of the ACTA and SWIFT treaties – which was, to an extent, believed to be a consequence of poor communication (Hart, 2020).

That being said, this strategy seems to have worked better during the WA negotiations when a close alliance was forged between the EP, and Guy Verhofstadt specifically, and the European Commission, with the Commission being generally viewed in the EP as ‘quite receptive’. By contrast, during the TCA negotiations cooperation with the European Commission was less strategic, especially due to the more inclusive nature of the EP’s participation, which gave a larger role to the committees (Bressanelli et al., 2021, p. 24). What both sets of negotiations had in common, though, was strong endorsement by the EP of the European Commission as the Union’s chief negotiator, negotiating on behalf of the EU27 (European Parliament, 2017b, 2020a, 2020d, 2020k; refer online Appendix I).

Another crucial strategy for the EP was alliance-building with individual member states. During both negotiations (but arguably more intensely during the TCA talks), the legislature forged a particularly strong alliance with Ireland. In all of its Brexit-related resolutions, the EP expressed its concerns over the consequences of Brexit for Ireland and underlined the importance of preserving the Good Friday Agreement and making sure that there was no hard Irish border. Evidence of this strategy includes, for instance, Verhofstadt’s fact-finding mission to Belfast, addresses to the Oireachtas, and a meeting with the Irish Taoiseach, coupled with various proclamations in support of Ireland such as: ‘The interests of Ireland are part and parcel of the interests of the EU27. The Irish position is the European position. The European position is the Irish position [… .] We will never allow Ireland to suffer from the British decision to leave the EU’ (Verhofstadt, 2017). The collaborative alliance between the EP and Ireland as an aggrieved party manifested itself also during the TCA talks, with the Northern Ireland Protocol implementation proving to be the key reason for the EP withholding its approval of the treaty (European Parliament 2020c; refer online Appendix I).

Strategy of mobilising the public

Consistent for both negotiations was the deliberate publicising of the negotiation process by the EP. Throughout the entire negotiating process, the EP worked closely with the media and actively encouraged public attention (Interview #2; similarly also Interview #4). The EP used every opportunity to ‘parlamentarize’ the negotiations in the sense of selling (and thereby legitimising) its key role in Brexit, promoting itself, and increasing its public visibility (cf. Lord, 2018). Complementarily, the EP was very active in emphasising transparency of the whole negotiation process, trying to open it up to wider scrutiny and participation, which reflects its long-term emphasis on disclosure (Fasone, 2022; Hart, 2020). Consistent with this strategy was the EP’s heavy reliance on resolutions, which are ‘one of the most public ‘soft law’ tools available to Parliament’ (Hart, 2020, p. 329).

By way of comparison, the EP’s engagement with the public was more intense during the WA talks, which is ascribable to the inability to meet face-to-face during the Covid pandemic and the related impoverishment of the EP’s communication channels (Interview #13). It was thus especially during the WA talks that the assembly was able to fulfil its function as ‘a window to the public’ (cf. Eckes, 2015), having self-positioned as a public venue for the discussion on Brexit, holding various debates, Q&A sessions, and hearings which were destined to help in the information-gathering process. Importantly, this tendency to map the interests of as many parties involved in the negotiations as possible reflected the EP’s long-term commitment to evidence-based policy-making (Anglmayer & Scherrer, 2020, p. 406).

Concluding remarks

The article has provided a comprehensive account of the nature of the bargaining strategies used by the EP during the Brexit process. With Brexit serving as an illustrative example of the assembly’s gradual post-Lisbon empowerment as a legislative actor (cf. Fromage & Markakis, 2022; Larsén, 2017; Richardson, 2012; Schoeller & Héritier, 2019; Shackleton, 2017), the inquiry has expanded our empirical knowledge of the assembly’s Brexit-related engagement. It has also demonstrated the utility of analysing the EP’s performance through the lens of bargaining-based rational institutionalism as well as the usefulness of Meissner and Schoeller’s (2019) typology. By way of a conclusion, I would like to offer three key findings.

Firstly, despite negotiating under different conditions, patterns of the EP’s bargaining behaviour have demonstrated significant continuity and commonality across the two sets of negotiations, as well as across the 8th (2014–2019) and 9th (since 2019) EP legislative terms. As was shown, despite the relatively limited role provided for it in the Treaties and the various unfavourable conditions, the EP systematically and energetically pushed for maximalist inclusion in the Brexit negotiations. Prominently, as one of the interviews put it, the lessons from the WA negotiations fed into the subsequent TCA negotiations (cf. Fasone, 2022). During the WA and TCA negotiations, the EP behaved as a rational, strategic and pragmatic actor, seeking to influence the conduct and substance of Brexit negotiations as well as its own empowerment and legitimisation by availing of the resources at its disposal. Fully aware of its political and normative power, the EP proactively tried to leverage its influence over the WA and TCA negotiations and increase its influence. Viewed in its entirety, it was through the effective use of a variety of strategies – based on informal governance tools which drew heavily on its veto power – that the EP sought to improve its bargaining position.

Secondly, the analysis and the illustrative empirical evidence also revealed that the EP’s bargaining strategies differed for the two sets of negotiations. As shown in Table 2, the EP used the same repertoire of bargaining tools, but in different ways and with a different focus. A key variation in the negotiation approach is to be found in the fact that while during the WA talks, the EP engaged in a somewhat balanced way in confrontational bargaining (conditioning approval of the deal on the incorporation of its priorities; threatened use of the veto) and friendly, integrative, cooperative problem-solving (inter-institutional alliances; reputation as the most conciliatory of all EU institutions), during the TCA negotiations the confrontational value-claiming bargaining mode (obstruction of the ratification process; timing control; a harder-line approach towards the UK) was more prominent. This shift highlights the increased assertiveness and self-confidence of the EP as a negotiating actor. At the same time, however, the Covid-19 restrictions caused a significant divergence in the EP’s ability to fully apply the bargaining strategies at its disposal.

Table 2. Bargaining strategies employed by the EP during the WA and TCA negotiations: A comparative summary.

Bargaining strategy of		WA negotiations	TCA negotiations
obstructing		applied partially (threats to apply it)	applied fully
moving first		applied fully	applied partially
issue linking	within an arena	applied fully	applied fully
	across arenas	not applied	applied fully
alliance building	with other EU institutions	applied fully	applied fully (but less intensively)
	with individual member states	applied fully	applied fully (but less intensively)
mobilising the public		applied fully	applied partially

Thirdly, the article showed that the EP, as a key collective veto player and an essential legitimating actor, demonstrated political savvy, as it flexibly adapted bargaining strategies to the given situation, aware of the fact that the various strategies were most effective when used in conjunction. As intimated above, weaker performance in pursuing one strategy was compensated by stronger performance in implementing another, leading in sum to the legislature’s relatively self-confident Brexit engagement. Despite some failed ambitions and a dire-looking situation towards the end of 2020, the EP managed to emerge as a tactical actor, acting as ‘a maximiser of its own powers’ (Closa Montero et al., 2021, p. 164). This enabled the EP to become a de facto negotiator, extract concessions, and win governance gains that facilitated its closer involvement in the TCA implementation.

The inquiry has broader resonance beyond the Brexit case, as it highlights the potential for the EP to assert its influence and forcefully pursue its own interests in negotiations, even in situations where its role is limited by the Treaties or other unfavourable conditions. It also underscores the importance of strategic behaviour and effective use of resources for the self-empowerment and (self-)legitimisation of the EP (cf. Fromage & Markakis, 2022; Larsén, 2017; Richardson, 2012). Last but not least, corroborating earlier research (Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2018; Ripoll Servent, 2014; Schoeller & Héritier, 2019), it emphasises the significance of informal governance as an effective means for the EP to achieve its goals and enhance its self-empowerment.

Let me finish the study with outlining a potential future research direction. Bargaining leverage does not, of course, automatically equal influence over negotiation outcomes. Indeed, the European Parliament did not always achieve what it strove for. As one interview made clear, ‘The trade agreement is not perfect. For example, as a Parliament, we wanted better dispute resolution there, but we did not succeed’ (Interview #17). Further research is therefore required to investigate the consequences of the parliamentary input and its performance effectiveness. Yet, this will be especially difficult to evaluate in the case of Brexit, as it is especially in instances of significant policy convergence between the EP and other EU institutions that it is not ‘always clear when Parliament has an impact’ (Hart, 2020, p. 349).

List of interviewees

1. Member of the European Parliament (S&D), 11 January 2018

2. Member of the European Parliament (GUE/NGL), 11 January 2018

3. Member of the European Parliament (ALDE), 19 February 2018

4. Member of the European Parliament (EFDD), 20 February 2018

5. Member of the European Parliament (ECR), 10 April 2018

6. Member of the European Parliament (ALDE), 26 April 2018

7. Member of the European Parliament (EPP), 26 April 2018

8. Member of the European Parliament (EPP), 13 March 2019

9. Member of the European Parliament (S&D), 15 March 2019

10. Member of the European Parliament (GREENS/EFA), 6 June 2022

11. Member of the European Parliament (GREENS/EFA), 6 June 2022

12. Member of the European Parliament (S&D), 14 June 2022

13. Member of the European Parliament (EPP), 28 June 2022

14. Member of the European Parliament (Renew Europe), 18 July 2022

15. Member of the European Parliament (ID), 20 July 2022

16. Member of the European Parliament (GUE/NGL), 21 July 2022

17. Member of the European Parliament (Renew Europe), 21 July 2022

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the editors of The Journal of Legislative Studies and the three anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

Writing of this article was supported by the Czech Science Agency [project GA23-05958S].

Notes on contributors

Monika Brusenbauch Meislová

Monika Brusenbauch Meislová is an associate professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic and a visiting professor at Aston University in Birmingham, United Kingdom. She is also one of the coordinators of the UACES research network ‘The Limits of EUrope’. Her research work covers issues of British European policy, Brexit, Czech foreign policy and political discourse. Her most recent research has been published in various journals, including Journal of Common Market Studies, Parliamentary Affairs, British Politics, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Europe-Asia Studies or Political Quarterly.

Notes

1 Formally, the negotiations opened in June 2017 but the reflections within the European Parliament on the future negotiations started as soon as the referendum results were announced.

2 To protect the anonymity of interviewees, only political group affiliations are disclosed.