Abstract
It is widely maintained that sport and physical activities contribute to the development of young people's well-being. Others argue that sports’ contribution to good living is so strong that it is even thought to be a human right. Typically, however, the value of physical activity and sport to our well-being is conceptualized and researched within a subjectivist framework. We reject this framework on three grounds: (1) its impermanence; (2) its hedonistic shallowness; and (3) its epistemological inadequacy. In contrast, we argue that the value of sports and physical activities ought to be situated in fundamental arguments about the necessary conditions for human flourishing. According to this objectivist view, there are certain constituents of a good life without which human flourishing becomes impossible. We argue that sports and physical activities offer distinctive ways to help realize these objective constituents. It follows that, to the extent to which certain sections of society are deprived of opportunities to engage in sport and physical activity, or are offered diminished provision thereof, they thereby suffer a deficit in well-being.
Notes
1. See for example, Parfit (Citation1984) who classifies theories of well-being in terms of objective, hedonistic and desire theories.
2. For an illustration of which in the contexts of sport and physical education, see McNamee (Citation1992).
3. See http://www.thefa.com/Leagues/Respect.aspx. The program is a Football Association initiative aiming to address unacceptable behavior both on and off the pitch in light of substantial numbers of referees quitting, and young players dropping out.
4. See for example http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/football/article2971538.ece ‘Sir Trevor Brooking facing some tough calls to kick some sense into our game’ and http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/trevor-brooking-youngsters-are-just-not-skilful-enough-445713.html Trevor Brooking: ‘Youngsters are just not skilful enough’.
5. As Austin (2007) observes keeping score may help foster ‘athletic and moral excellence’ (2007, p. 144). Our observation here is that to focus upon result to the exclusion of such excellences has little long-term benefit for the sport itself, or indeed for the young player.
6. For full definition, see Nordenfelt (2007, p. 54) and his earlier book On the Nature of Health (Citation1987).
7. Nussbaum fleshes out her account in subsequent writings (see for example Nussbaum, Citation2001, Citation2003, Citation2006a, Citation2006b).
8. Though this is not the place for specific philosophical objections see, for example, Pogge (Citation2002).
9. Nussbaum (2006a) still considers her single list of central capabilities to be important to those with severe mental impairments (see pp. 186–195). She cites the danger of an alternative list providing an excuse for policy not delivering on matters central to human flourishing.