Living posthumously: from anticipatory grief to self-mourning

ABSTRACT

We commonly think of grief as a response to, and thus something that follows from a significant loss. But not all forms of grief have this temporal structure, for we can also grieve prospectively, in advance of an actual or expected loss. So-called ‘anticipatory grief’ is most often discussed in the context of those caring for the elderly or terminally ill. In this paper, however, I consider self-directed anticipatory grief. Specifically, I argue that grieving in anticipation of one’s own terminal absence (‘self-mourning’) is an important, albeit often neglected, form of death awareness.

KEYWORDS:

• Death
• anticipatory grief
• self-mourning
• vulnerability
• mortality

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. I use the term ‘psychotherapy’ broadly to include counselling in its various guises.

2. See Solomon (2007), p. 72.

3. Whether it makes sense to talk of ‘grieving’ over the death of any and every form of animal life is debatable (see Plant, 2019, 2011). However, the depth of grief experienced at the loss of a companion animal can be just as profound as losing a fellow human being.

4. On the various ways grief can be conceptualised, see (Hall, 2014; Rothaupt & Becker, 2007; Worden, 2014).

5. I assume that not every type of loss can meaningfully be said to provoke ‘grief.’ I also assume that, notwithstanding individual and cultural differences, grief has some fairly common characteristics (see Wong, 2008, p. 213; Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 174).

6. See Solomon (2007), p. 74. When grieving the loss of a treasured object, it is not always the object itself that we grieve. For example, when grieving the loss of a wedding ring it is not usually the loss of a particular band of metal one grieves over, but rather what that band of metal symbolises; namely, one’s love for another person.

7. See Freud (2005), p. 203.

8. See Solomon (2007), p. 75; (Solomon, 2004), pp. 75, 78, 86–87, 97.

9. See May (1976), p. 512.

10. See also Solomon (2007), p. 72.

11. See Solomon (2007), p. 74.

12. See Freud (2005), pp. 203–204.

13. See Hall (2014), p. 11.

14. For a summary of psychological work on death anxiety, see Kastenbaum (2003).

15. See Brinkmann (2017), pp. 41–44; Robertson (2010), Ch. 11; Irvine (2008), pp. 65–84; Epictetus, (Epictetus (translation and notes by G. Long), 1912), p. 387.

16. See Moussaieff and McCarthy (2007).

17. See Reynolds and Botha (2006), p. 15; Kübler-Ross and Kessler (2005), p. 2. It is often said that domesticated dogs often grieve their owner’s death. But even assuming that it is their owner’s death (rather than their prolonged absence) that dogs grieve in these cases, it is safe to assume that they are not capable of grieving prospectively over their owner’s future death.

18. See Kübler-Ross and Kessler (2005), p. 4.

19. Anticipatory grief is not a wholly uncontested notion (see Reynolds & Botha, 2006, p. 16; Fulton et al., 1996; Sweeting & Gilhooly, 1990). Still, there are good prima facie reasons for accepting its reality. After all, given that we have the capacity to experience anticipatory anxiety in advance of an exam, anticipatory excitement in advance of a sexual encounter, anticipatory sadness in advance of a holiday’s ending (and so on), there is no obvious reason to think that we cannot experience anticipatory grief in advance of another’s death.

20. While anticipatory grief is likely unique to human beings, non-human animals can certainly provoke anticipatory grief. Anyone who has lived through the ageing and/or illness of a beloved animal will likely have experienced this. Indeed, simply knowing that one will likely outlive one’s companion animal(s) can be sufficient to provoke anticipatory grief. Although I will not discuss this here, it is doubtless possible to experience anticipatory grief for non-sentient life forms and non-living entities.

21. Temporal proximity is clearly a significant factor here. After all, as a 49 year old, knowing that I will be dead in one hundred years time and knowing (or even believing) that I will be dead in five years time are very different prospects.

22. That ‘my world will come to an end’ when I die is not, of course, to say that the world comes to an end at that time. There are a vast array of ordinary certainties we trust without question, thought or articulation (see Wittgenstein, 1999, §4, 101, 159, 288), and one of these, I presume, is that the continued existence of the world does not depend on my continued existence.

23. On a related point, see Freud (2005), p. 183.

24. See Stoppard, as cited in Enright (2008), p. 27. Simply because one cannot imagine oneself fully absent does not mean that such imaginings are inherently misleading (see Plant, 2016).

25. For more discussion of this term, see Plant (2016).

26. Interestingly, Kübler-Ross’s account of the stages of dying focusses on the dying themselves, not on mourning survivors (see Kübler-Ross, 1987).

27. Attig is the notable exception here, for he extends ‘the idea of self-mourning to all humans (not simply to those who are terminally ill) who reflect on their personal mortality and struggle to cope with their own finiteness’ (Attig, 1989, pp. 362, see also 368). In other words, ‘self-mourning is centrally a process of finding meaning for one’s own finite and fragile existence’ (ibid., p. 367).

28. See (Aurelius, 2006, 2:5, 3:1; Heidegger, 1999, p. 302; LeShan & LeShan, 1973, p. 7; Kierkegaard, 1968, pp. 149, 151).

29. For more detail on this, see Plant (2009).

30. See also (Wong, 2008, p. 209; Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005, p. 1; May, 1976, p. 509; Kutscher, 1973, p. 52).

31. See (May, 1976, p. 515; Earle, 1972, p. 214).

32. On a related point, see Kastenbaum (2003), p. 721.

33. See Cederström and Spicer (2018), p. 134.

34. See Attig (1989), pp. 363–64, 365, 367.

35. Psychotherapists rarely write about their own relationship to death (Bennett-Carpenter, 2014), and many struggle to work with clients who lack a long-term future (LeShan & LeShan, 1973).

36. Rogers is a case in point (Swildens, 2002, p. 122; Kirschenbaum, 1979, pp. 350–51). That said, Rogers does seem to acknowledge the challenge suicide presents for therapists who value the client’s autonomy, suggesting that ‘only as the therapist is completely willing that any outcome, any direction, may be chosen – only then does he realize the vital strength of the capacity and potentiality of the individual for constructive action’ (Rogers, 1951, pp. 48, see also p. 49). One might therefore wonder if, from a Rogerian perspective, suicide could ever qualify as an affirmative, ‘actualizing’ act, despite its destructive consequences?

37. While Yalom describes some of the philosophical arguments which have proved ‘most useful’ (Yalom, 2008, p. 77) in his therapeutic practice (including the ‘symmetry argument’ used to assuage fear of death), he seems unconcerned with the problems such arguments have. For his aim is to provide ‘comfort to the dying’ (ibid., p. 81; see also p. 82), not to ascertain the coherence and plausibility of philosophical arguments.

38. See Yalom (2008), pp. 85–86.

39. For this reason, Wong surely oversimplifies matters when claiming that death pales in significance once we learn ‘how to live authentically and vitally in spite of our own mortality’ (Wong, 2008, p. 217 my emphasis).

40. For a notable exception to this, see Attig (1989), p. 362.

41. Derrida seems to have lived in a state of perpetual self-mourning (see Plant, 2016; Peeters, 2013, pp. 419, 424, 433, 450, 522, 525, 528).

42. See also (Kübler-Ross, 1987), p. 240, 247.

43. Of course, we are not all equally vulnerable to all types of bad luck, or all equally likely to be recipients of all forms of good luck. The particular circumstances in which we live – including our psychological constitution, physical health and socio-economic situation – make specific manifestations of good or bad luck more-or-less likely, and render us more-or-less able to take advantage of good luck and/or cope with bad luck when they arise. In this crucial sense, while we are all afloat in the same chancy sea, we are not all in the same boat.

44. See also (Caputo, 1987, p. 259, 1993a, pp. 167–68).

45. See (Wortman & Silver, 1989), pp. 350–53.

46. See (Freud, 2005, pp. 204, 205, 214–15; Wortman & Silver, 1989), p. 353.

47. See also (Worden, 2014, pp. 96–97; Rothaupt & Becker, 2007, pp. 8–9).

48. In some areas of psychotherapy (see Rogers, 2004, pp. 188–89, 1965, pp. 23–27), not to mention the current discourse around wellbeing, ‘living in the moment’ is often presented as an existential ideal. But if self-mourning is an important facet of the sort of animals we are, and if self-mourning requires imaginative self-transcendence, then attaining the aforementioned ideal would presumably demand that we deny part of our humanity.

49. Thanks to Peter Baumann, Janie Keddie, Laura Bailey and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Bob Plant

Bob Plant completed his PhD in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen (1997-2001), and worked for Aberdeen Philosophy Department between 2003-2015. During this time he published widely on Wittgenstein, Levinas, Derrida and related authors and topics. At the end of 2015 Bob decided to leave academia. He currently works for a Scottish mental health charity and writes in his spare time.