Abstract
A fashionable view in comparative psychology states that primates possess self-awareness because they exhibit mirror self-recognition (MSR), which in turn makes it possible to infer mental states in others (“theory-of-mind”; ToM). In cognitive neuroscience, an increasingly popular position holds that the right hemisphere represents the centre of self-awareness because MSR and ToM tasks presumably increase activity in that hemisphere. These two claims are critically assessed here as follows: (1) MSR should not be equated with full-blown self-awareness, as it most probably only requires kinaesthetic self-knowledge and does not involve access to one's mental events; (2) ToM and self-awareness are fairly independent and should also not be taken as equivalent notions; (3) MSR and ToM tasks engage medial and left brain areas; (4) other self-awareness tasks besides MSR and ToM tasks (e.g., self-description, autobiography) mostly recruit medial and left brain areas; (5) and recent neuropsychological evidence implies that inner speech (produced by the left hemisphere) plays a significant role in self-referential activity. The main conclusions reached based on this analysis are that (a) organisms that display MSR most probably do not possess introspective self-awareness, and (b) self-related processes most likely engage a distributed network of brain regions situated in both hemispheres.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on a talk presented at the conference The Minds of Animals held in Toronto (Ontario) on 12–13 August 2008. I would like to thank Petra Kamstra and Cass Foursha-Stevenson for their helpful editorial comments on previous versions of this manuscript.
Notes
1This view is based on Gallup's and Keenan's extensive research on self-recognition and self-awareness; in Gallup's case it spans over more than 40 years. Providing the reader with an exhaustive list of their published work is unrealistic. The reader can find below a list of their most important articles and book chapters.
Gordon G. Gallup Jr. and his team: Gallup, Citation1968, Citation1970, Citation1975, Citation1977, Citation1979, Citation1982, Citation1985, Citation1997; Gallup et al., 2002; Platek et al., Citation2003, 2004b; Stuss et al., 2001; Suarez & Gallup, Citation1981.
Julian Paul Keenan and his team: Barnacz et al., Citation2004; Guise et al., Citation2007; Keenan et al., Citation1999, Citation2000, Citation2001a, Citation2001b, 2003, 2005; Keenan & Gorman, Citation2007; Platek et al., Citation2004a; Rosa et al., 2008; Seger et al., Citation2004; Uddin et al., Citation2007.
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