Autonomy, devolution and intergovernmental relations

Abstract

The concept of autonomy as self-rule is delineated by examination of intergovernmental relations within eight devolutionary situations: Belgium, Crimea (Ukraine), Ethiopia, Greenland (Denmark), Mexico, Scotland (United Kingdom), South Africa and Spain. After autonomy and devolution are profiled, the autonomy situations are comparatively examined through their intergovernmental institutional structures, fiscal arrangements and political channels. These three processes are at the core of post-devolution autonomy situations, and their sufficiency within a polity contributes to meaningful self-rule. While in most of the eight autonomy situations effective institutional and political channels exist, the fiscal ties are weaker and non-existent in some cases, leading to fiscal dependence. In those situations where one-party rule prevails, institutional and political autonomy is also weaker, attenuating autonomy through devolution.

Acknowledgement

This article is a revision of a paper prepared for a Workshop on Decentralization and Federalism, Annual Meeting of RC28, Research Committee on Comparative Federalism and Federation, International Political Science Association, Jávea (Alicante) Spain, October, 2001.

Notes

These cases comprise a part of the Parliamentary Development Project for Ukraine's ongoing research on comparative institutions and processes reporting framework to the Verkhouna Rada in Kyiv, for which the author is lead advisor on intergovernmental relations.