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Abstract
The internal divisions leading to the end of the Volksunie are analysed in order to acquire more insight into the internal divisions within ethno-regional parties. Based on a combination of inter- and intra-party research, five possible sources of internal divisions are revealed and tested. We find three well-defined groups of party members that take an adversarial position to each other on all five possible sources of factionalism. As long as there is an overarching loyalty, sustained by a common belief in the necessity of constitutional reforms, divisions can be overcome. Once the region has been granted more autonomy, intra-party divisions tend to step into the limelight.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Fons Borginon, Nico Moyaert, Laurens Appeltans and the Volksunie party secretariat for their approval to conduct this research project and their willingness to cooperate with it. I am also indebted to Prof. Wilfried Dewachter and Prof. Bart Maddens, both KU Leuven, for their support and critical remarks in earlier phases of this research project, and to Patrick De Keulenaer for correcting the text. Partial results of this research project were presented at the Dutch-Flemish Politicologenetmaal on 22–23 May 2002 in Noordwijkerhout (the Netherlands) and were published in the Belgian journal Res Publica, 44(1), 2002.
Notes
1. This happened to the Volksunie in 1977 after the failure of the Egmont Pact, a much criticized agreement on further state reforms which was subsequently abandoned. The extreme right wing of the party split off out of protest against the overindulgent attitude of the party in the negotiations, and founded a new party, Vlaams Blok. The voters also punished this attitude: the Volksunie suffered a heavy defeat in the subsequent parliamentary elections of 1978, losing about one-third of its former votes.
2. A good indication of this is the recent inclusion of the word Vlaams (Flemish) in the name of the Liberal Party (VLD, Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten, 1992) and the Christian Democratic Party (CD&V, Christen-democratisch en Vlaams, 2001).
3. ID21 was a movement that originally aimed at bundling the demands of the so-called white movements, set up all over the country in 1996 to protest against the child murders (the Dutroux scandal) and the incompetence of the police and the juridical system which facilitated these murders. Soon ID21 opted for a social-liberal profile though (Gatz & Stouthuysen, Citation2001).
4. The Lambermont Agreement (29 June 2001) provided for further transfer of competences to the regions and communities (particularly in agricultural policy, foreign trade policy and development aid policy), about the institutions in Brussels, and about more financial resources for the communities (for education in French-speaking Belgium, in particular). The votes of the Volksunie members of parliament were needed in the House of Representatives to obtain the required majority to approve the related bills. Therefore senior party figures like Bert Anciaux and Patrik Vankrunkelsven participated in the negotiations. The party leader at the time, Geert Bourgeois, rejected the agreement reached and refused, together with other members of parliament, to approve it despite its approval by the VU party council. Finally, the Lambermont agreement was approved with the support of the French-speaking Christian Democrats (CDH), but had by then caused a deep and bitter conflict within the Volksunie.
5. Strictly speaking, it was not a referendum, since no propositions were put before the members for their approval. It was in fact an election about which group would have the right to go on with the party and its components. Nevertheless, the Volksunie itself always spoke of a ledenreferendum (a referendum for the members). We follow the designation of the Volksunie, using the term ‘referendum’ throughout the article.
6. Talks about the course of the referendum and its consequences. Three representatives from each group were entitled to participate, as well as three ‘neutral’ members of the party secretariat.
7. To compare: after the 1999 Belgian parliamentary elections, the Volksunie-ID21 alliance counted eight members in the House of Representatives and three in the Senate.
8. The relevant questions (Cronbach alpha 0.77) are: the opinion on ‘how far should the reform of the state go’; agreement or disagreement with ‘Flanders should become independent’ and with ‘Flemish nationalism should remain be the most important issue of the VU’; the opinion on ‘using actual competences’ versus ‘trying to acquire more competences’; and the opinion on ‘Flanders should decide everything’ versus ‘Belgium should decide everything’.
9. The respondent's score on the economic left–right dimension (Cronbach alpha 0.47) was determined by averaging the scores on the agreement or disagreement with ‘The social class differences should be smaller than they are at present’ and agreement or disagreement with ‘Labourers still have to struggle for an equal position in society’. The score on moral-ethical issues (Cronbach alpha 0.73) was constructed by averaging the scores on the attitude towards the possibility of gay marriages; the attitude towards legalization of cannabis; and the opinion on ‘maintenance of traditional norms and values’ versus ‘free choice for every individual’. The position on immigrant suffrage (oppose versus support) was measured directly by a 10-point scale. The respondent's score on cooperation with other parties (Cronbach alpha 0.68) was constructed by averaging the scores on the following questions: agreement or disagreement that ‘VU should have never formed an alliance with ID21’; agreement or disagreement that ‘VU should close formal cooperation agreements with other parties’; and the opinion on whether the alliance VU-ID21 was a good idea. The respondent's position on citizen involvement was determined by the agreement or disagreement that ‘the direct election of the mayor would be beneficial for Belgian politics’.
10. In fact, Niet Splitsen was sometimes nicknamed the ‘middle group’ before the referendum, standing between the two other quarrelling groups.
11. Not everyone agreed, however. Less than a year after the referendum, when formulating the programme for the new party N-VA, Geert Bourgeois said:‘We have said from the beginning that we would continue with the positive elements of the VU-programme. We are not going to continue with other aspects and foolish ideas such as direct elections of the mayor’ (Knack, 1 May 2002) The inclusion of this demand in the party manifesto formed part of the strategy to broaden the focus of the Volksunie by taking into account policy aspects other than mere regionalist demands. Apparently, supporters of Vlaams-Nationaal were also in favour of this aspect of broadening the original programme.
12. In addition, the two Volksunie ministers of the Flemish regional government at that time, Bert Anciaux and Paul Van Grembergen, figured as prominent members of De Toekomstgroep.
13. One should be aware that the number of members of the party is not equal in each province, therefore a group that comes out as a winner in a province with a high number of members has an advantage over groups that obtain a large vote share in the provinces with a lower number of party members. Although Niet Splitsen attracted a majority of votes in Limburg, this province accounted for only less than 8% of the total membership (Noppe and Wauters, Citation2002: 457).