The Political Dynamics of Secession and Institutional Accommodation

Abstract

Although not at the core of the history of ideas, federalism has a distinguished pedigree in political theory. This paper does not turn directly to federalism, however, and to the question of whether its institutional arrangements can be fine-tuned so as to reconcile territorial integrity and cultural heterogeneity. I propose instead a focus on the political dynamics of secession. This focus reveals the sensitivity of institutional accommodation to degrees of heterogeneity, showing that stable accommodation may depend on imposition rather than self-limiting behaviour or mutual enforcement.

Keywords:

• Secession
• federalism
• political equilibrium
• political accommodation
• institutional design

Notes

See, for example, Bucheit (1978), Young (1976: 460–504), Sisson and Rose (1990).

My understanding of secession is conventional. Secession refers to “the formal withdrawal of a constituent unit from an established, internationally recognized state and the creation of a new sovereign state” (Bartkus, 1999: 9). This definition may well restrict the extension of the concept, depending on how we interpret the qualifier: “established”. A significant degree of political rationalization is presupposed. In some situations, basically disintegration of state institutions, the question might not be whether a particular set of institutions does or does not prevent secession but whether an institutional arrangement (a) works as a peace settlement after conflict and (b) is sufficient to induce agreement to form a new state which incorporates both parties within shared political institutions. Failure to agree to form a new state under (b) is not secession strictly speaking, according to the definition above, since a state has not been established from which to secede.

Jenne (2009) discusses the weaknesses of the literature on ethnic security dilemmas in her paper on partition in this Special Issue. She argues that the application of the ethnic security dilemma to the analysis of these situations sanctions partition and partition institutionalizes ethnic tensions. In effect, I separate the problem of the security dilemma from the problem of accommodation and enforcement.

A situation which is secession-proof is invulnerable to the threat of secession. See, for example, Haimanko et al. (2007, 2005); LeBreton and Weber (2003). For some discussion of this literature see Meadwell (2008).

Olier Mordrel to John Legonna, 11 November 1968. John Legonna Papers. National Library of Wales.

Michael Collins, Dail Éireann, 19 December 1921.

The metaphor of the stepping stone was first introduced into the debates in the Dail by Eoin O'Duffy on 17 December 1921.

Count O'Byrne, Dail Éireann, 7 January 1922.

For a fuller discussion of unresolved issues in Scottish politics following the devolution settlement of 1998, see the contribution of Stephen Tierney (2009) to this Special Issue.

This was a plan, first mooted in 2000–01 and presented to the Basque Parliament in 2003 by the President of the Basque government, which proposed an arrangement providing much more autonomy to the Basque Country without full sovereignty (and permitting referendums). It finessed the differences between moderate and radical Basque nationalists but without solving the problem of violence.

The partisan logic of decentralization is discussed more fully in the contribution to this Special Issue by Jason Sorens (2009).

The notion of the social and political imaginary here draws loosely on the work of Taylor (2004) and Anderson (1991) to suggest that the imagined range of institutional possibilities is enlarged when independence is given tacit legitimacy.

Walter's argument is an application of the chain store paradox, first described in the economics literature. This literature addresses how a monopolist deters the entry of competitors by sacrificing short-term profits for greater long-run profits (Kreps, 1990: 43).

The essential point is the relevance of time. The literature on precedent-setting and reputation assumes a series of potential challengers over time. But this is not to say that time is not relevant in the dyadic relationship between a state agent and a secessionist group. This relationship is iterated. Hence, the importance of the enforceability of institutional accommodation over time.

This point bears on the literature on the consequences of ‘constitutionalizing’ a right to secede. For different perspectives on this issue, see Sunstein (2001: 95–114) and Wellman (2005).

See, for example, Filippov et al. (2004), de Figueiredo et al. (2007).

For discussion of the difficulties of institutional design in ethnofederations, see the contribution by Philip Roeder (2009).

The literature on plurinational democracies is explicitly ‘post-sovereign’. There is some discussion of this literature in the contribution by Tierney (2009) to this Special Issue.

There is an excellent discussion of this kind of argument and of the contribution it makes to liberal theories of federalism in Levy (2007).

Political foresight might suggest that state agents begin to prepare for the possibility of secession in such cases. Yet, to publicly announce the preparation of plans for territorial division, to be implemented should it come to that eventuality, might make more likely that very eventuality. Such are the dark arts of politics.