The Paradox of Ethnic Partition: Lessons from de facto Partition in Bosnia and Kosovo

Abstract

This article argues that ethnic partition, rather than resolving ethnic security dilemmas endemic to ethnic civil wars, has the paradoxical effect of reproducing wartime ethnic cleavages in the post-war period. This is because segregating combatant groups into militarily defensible self-governing territories tends to undermine the central government, ensures successive electoral victories of ultra-nationalists, and puts state resources in the hands of ethnic militia leaders who have incentives to perpetuate the conflict. This argument is illustrated in the cases of post-war Bosnia and Kosovo, which show that the unwillingness of the international community to implement the integrationist elements of the peace arrangements has amplified the challenge of rebuilding peaceful state societies today.

Keywords:

• Partition
• Balkans
• Bosnia
• Kosovo
• conflict
• intervention
• peacebuilding

Acknowledgement

The author gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation, which provided the funding to conduct research for this article. Thanks also go to Larry Anderson, Jan Erk, one anonymous reviewer as well as Charles Philpott, Rhodri Williams, Florian Bieber, Matteo Fumagalli and Anil Duman, who offered useful feedback on earlier drafts.

Notes

Nationalist conflict is defined here as struggles between two or more ethnic communities over control of state territory, institutions or other resources—such conflicts may be violent or non-violent. Nationalist conflict is most easily identified in its violent forms, but varies in intensity from more moderate conflicts involving discrimination against or persecution of ethnic minorities; to collective rebellion or secessionism; to the most extreme forms such as genocide or full-blown civil war. Ethnic or sectarian war is thus a subset of the larger category of nationalist conflict.

Segregationist solutions consist of dividing the warring groups into distinct territories and giving them separate state status or extensive autonomy at the substate level. Population transfers may be used in either case to homogenize the ethnoterritorial units. In contrast, integrationist solutions do not create or recognize ethnoterritorial autonomy at any level of government.

For arguments in favour of partition as a solution to ethnic war, see Kaufmann (1996, 1998, 2007). See also Johnson (2008), Chapman and Roeder (2007), Downes (2004, 2006), Mearsheimer and Van Evera (1995) and Mearsheimer (1993).

Laitin (2004) corroborated Sambanis' findings using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. More recently, Chapman and Roeder (2007) re-ran Sambanis' statistical analysis using his own data after dropping all non-ethnic conflicts from the dataset. Although germane to the debate over ethnic partition, these scholars deal more narrowly with whether partition is the best means of preventing the re-emergence of violent conflict in the wake of civil war. In contrast, the present article assesses the value of partition for resolving nationalist conflict—both violent and non-violent—and rebuilding state societies in two cases where it has been most assiduously applied.

For these and other critiques of partition theory, see Horowitz (1985), Kumar (1997a, 1997b), Schaeffer (1990), Etzioni (1992–93), Gottlieb (1994), Carment and Rowlands (2004) and Fearon (2004).

For more on the consociational approach to conflict resolution, see Lijphart (1990). See also Horowitz (1985) and McGarry and O'Leary (1993).

According to the 1991 census, the Bosnian Republic was 17% Croat, 31% Serb and 43% Muslim.

The US-led implementation force (IFOR) became SFOR (Stabilization Force) in 1996, which was finally replaced by a European force (EUFOR) of 7000 in 2004.

Author interview, Halisa Skopljak, Legal Assistant, Human Rights Dept., OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Hercegovina, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 29 May 2006.

Author interview, Massimo Moratti, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 31 May 2006.

UNHCR Representation in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Statistics Package, 30 June 2008, available at http://www.unhcr.ba/updatejune08/SP_06_2008.pdf (accessed 7 November 2008).

Interview, Halisa Skopljak, 29 May 2006.

Interview, Vesna Vignjević, UNHCR Protection Assistant, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 31 May 2006.

Entity and local authorities even succeeded in restricting the freedom of movement for ethnic minorities to move about the protectorate.

Author interview, director of local NGO, Priština, Kosovo, 18 September 2006.

Author interview, ICG analyst, Priština, Kosovo, 21 September 2006.

http://www.kosovo.undp.org/publications/publications.asp, as cited in ICG Report (2006).

Author interview, Kristin Griffith, MercyCorps Mission Director, Priština, Kosovo, 19 September 2006. Experts on ethnic reintegration stress that property restitution is critical to sustainable minority return.

I am grateful to Florian Bieber for this observation.

Author interview, EU diplomat, Brussels, Belgium, 6 December 2007.