Explaining Regionalist Party Positioning in a Multi-dimensional Ideological Space: A Framework for Analysis

Abstract

This contribution proposes an analytical framework for explaining regionalist parties' ideological positioning in the multi-dimensional political space. It focuses on three ideological dimensions: centre–periphery, left–right and European integration. Positioning along the first two dimensions is explained in terms of socio-structural characteristics of the regions and the incentives posed by institutional/political environments. Then mutual influences between positioning on the three different ideological dimensions are discussed. The structural characteristics of the regions are particularly useful in locating the main regionalist party in each region to the left or right of centre and, to some extent, in explaining centre–periphery radicalism. Voting systems and the dynamics of (multi-level) party systems help us to explain political fragmentation of the regionalist movement, changes of positions through time and the adoption of moderate or radical positions in both centre–periphery and left–right dimensions. Finally, the analysis of cross-dimension positioning suggests that moderate centre–periphery stances (i.e. non-secessionist) tend to match with liberal or (especially Christian-democratic) moderate and conservative positions. It also suggests that anti-European integration positions match with left–right radicalism and, increasingly so, with centre–periphery radicalism.

Keywords:

• Regionalist parties
• ideology
• autonomy/secession
• left–right
• European integration

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Ailsa Henderson, Eve Hepburn and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier drafts.

Notes

Coakley uses the term ‘nationalism’ (or ‘nationalist’) meaning ‘minority’ or ‘stateless’ nationalism. Terminological issues will be dealt with in the next section.

Like Coakley, Erk uses the term nationalism (Erk, 2009) or substate nationalism (Erk, 2005).

This explains the wide use of the labels ‘ethno-regional’ or ‘ethno-regionalist’ parties (Newman, 1996; 1997; De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Tronconi, 2006).

The FDF can be considered as a regionalist party from 1970, when it abandoned centralism in support of federal reforms that would separate Brussels from the Flanders region, to 1995 when its survival was underpinned by a stable federation with the Flemish Liberals (Buelens and Van Dyck, 1998; see also Deschouwer, 2009). The UUP has remained affiliated with the British Conservative party until 1985. In 2008, this affiliation restarted (UUP, 2008). However, the party has been a convinced advocate of Northern Ireland's self-government throughout its history, except in the period 1979–95, when its leadership manifested a preference for Direct Rule from London (Murphy, 1990: 52–53).

It is worth pointing out that the UPN also displays some of the characteristics of reactive regional parties because of its strenuous opposition to Basque regionalism, which sees Navarra as part of the Basque homeland and, as far as separatist Basque parties are concerned, pursues the secession of the enlarged Basque Country (i.e. including Navarra) from Spain.

In the run-up to German unification, fearing a dramatic shift to the left due to the integration of ‘red’ East Germany and a loss of economic resources that would be ‘diverted’ to the new Länder, the CSU's prominent politicians even flirted with the idea of Bavaria's secession (Harvie, 1994: 67). For an extensive explanation of why the CSU should be included in comparative analyses of regionalist parties, see Hepburn (2008b).

Secessionist violence occurred in South Tyrol in the late 1950s and 1960s. However, the only regionalist party active at that time, the SVP, explicitly rejected the use of violence (Massetti, 2009a).

For the economic causes of regionalism, see Gurevitch (1979). For the economic rationality of secessionism, see Bookman (1992).

The term bourgeois to indicate economically advanced regions is borrowed from Christopher Harvie (1994).

For the last category of regionalist parties, see Ruzza (2006), De Winter et al. (2006b) and Mazzoleni (2005).

On the relationship between religion and preference for right-of-the-centre parties in Western Europe, see Knutsen (2004).

As far as the UK is concerned, this pattern emerged very evidently only in certain periods. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with leftist/home rulers vs. rightist/unionists. In more recent times, from the mid-1970s, with the Conservatives' opposition to proposals for devolution, through the 1980s, with the re-centralization policies of Conservative governments (Crouch and Marquand, 1989), to the late 1990s, when the Conservatives opposed devolution (Seawright, 2003). For the (re)alignment left/periphery vs. right/centre since the 1960s in France, see Urwin (1982: 426).

For an example of ‘irrational’ behaviour see Olivesi (1998) on the electoral underachievement of Corsican regionalism due to lack of unity and co-operation amongst different regionalist parties.

The LN in the mid-1990s can also be considered a regionalist party acting in a two-party system, if the two coalitions competing for the Italian government are seen as ‘parties’. At the 1996 general election, the LN refused to join either of the two coalitions, running de facto as a third party. Interestingly, on that occasion the LN adopted a more centrist position on the left–right divide while it radicalized its centre–periphery stance, calling for full independence for Padania (Massetti, 2009a).

The voting system for the Scottish Parliament is much more proportional than the one for Westminster. As a consequence, a multi-party system has emerged in Scotland since 1999.

The SSP, which split into two parties during the 2003–07 term, failed to get represented for the third time in 2007. For this reason they have not been included in the analysis.

The recent success of the N-VA at the regional election in 2009 shows that there is still room for a secessionist and centre-right party in Flanders. It also shows that the strategic mistake of VU in the early 1990s was two-fold: it went too much to the left and remained too moderate on the centre–periphery dimension (or radicalized its position too late).

In fact, the PNV has moved to a secessionist position, though an ambiguous one, since the early 2000s (Perez-Nievas, 2006).

From a deeper analysis of some case studies, it emerges that the political doctrine of the Catholic Church has had a moderating influence. The endorsement of the Catholic political philosophy by Saunders Lewis, Plaid Cymru's founder and leader in the 1920s, was strictly linked to the party's rejection of the ideology of ‘independence’, which remained one of its constant features until recently. Similarly, the Christian-democratic tradition within the SVP and the PNV has had moderating effects on their centre–periphery ideology (Acha-Ugarte and Perez-Nievas, 1998; Massetti, 2009a). Arguably, the moderating effect of the Catholic tradition (and of the Catholic Church) is stronger if the region belongs to a predominantly Catholic state.

For more complete discussions on the wide range of factors affecting regionalist parties' positioning on European integration, see Elias (2008b), De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002) and Lynch (1996). Hepburn (2010) adopts an even wider perspective, by looking not simply at regionalist parties but at the European positions of regional political actors more generally.

For reasons of space, the effect of the 2004–07 enlargement on Western European regionalist parties' influence within and attitudes towards European institutions is not addressed. On this, see Lynch and De Winter (2008).

Jolly's study covers the period 1984–2002, which coincides to a large extent with what I have identified as the ‘second phase’ period. Beyond the use of different data and methodology, the diverging conclusion reached by Jolly's research can be explained by the case selection. Seven out of the eleven anti-integration parties presented in Table 7 were not included in Jolly's analysis.

ERC, EA and the SNP have opposed the ratification of both the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaty (Madorran, 2005; Acha, 2006; Massetti, 2009a).

CSU MPs voted for the ratification of the treaties (Constitutional and Lisbon). However, prominent figures in the party tried to hinder the ratification process and questioned the compatibility of both treaties with the German constitution (Spiegel Online, 22 Apr 2005; Conservativehome.com, 24 Jun 2008). The PNV and CiU, especially in its major component CDC, were deeply divided on the treaties. They supported the ratification but kept a very low profile (Perez-Nievas, 2006: 53; Madorran, 2005; Aparicio-Romero, 2006). PC adopted a very ambiguous position on EU treaties and kept a very low profile on them (Massetti, 2009a).

See, for instance, SF's arguments for rejecting the EU Constitution (Sinn Fein, 2005) or dF's reaction to the Irish ‘No’ in the referendum for the Lisbon-Reform Treaty (Die Freiheitlichen, 2008).