On the Right to Linguistic Survival

Abstract

In recent years, political theorists have begun to grapple with the important normative questions that arise in relation to claims for language rights. This paper will seek to contribute to this ongoing debate by focusing in detail on the issue of linguistic survival. It will consider to what extent the members of a minority language community can demand that they have a right to see their language survive into the future. This question will be considered from two distinct perspectives. First, from an individualist perspective: can the members, as individuals, demand that they have a right to see the language survive? Secondly, from a group perspective: can the members, as a collective, demand that they have a right to see the language survive? In both instances it will be demonstrated that the concept of survival raises a number of substantial normative and ontological problems; ones that mean that a right to such a good would be extremely difficult to justify. Given this, it is concluded that those linguistic activists who have tended to base their rights claims on the concept of survival need to reflect critically on their arguments and develop a new conceptual vocabulary.

Keywords:

• Language
• rights
• survival
• individual
• group

Notes

For examples of such claims in relation to the Welsh language, see Welsh Language Society (2005) and Brooks (2009). For discussions of linguistic survival in the Canadian context, see Brett (1991: 347), Green (1987: 639) and Taylor (1994: 40).

This observation by Kymlicka was based on comments that were originally made by Brian Weinstein (1983).

See, for example, Carens (2000), May (2001) and Patten (2001; 2003a; 2003b; 2009); see also the various contributions to Kymlicka and Patten (2003).

For a comprehensive review of the normative literature on language policy and language rights, see Patten and Kymlicka (2003).

On the issue of what constitutes a language and, more importantly, what distinguishes a language from a dialect, the paper will proceed on the basis of an acknowledgement of the increasingly accepted view that a consideration of purely linguistic factors is not sufficient; a mixture of social, cultural, political, and historical factors also needs to be considered (see Chambers and Trudgill, 1980).

It should be noted that it is the enjoyment of the good or opportunity that is of importance, according to Réaume (1988: 8), and not the more fundamental process of its production. She explains that the need for co-operation with regards to production does not necessarily lead to a similar situation with regards to enjoyment. She refers, for example, to the case of clean air. This is an important good that can be produced only if a group of people collaborate with each other and refrain from emitting pollution. However, an individual can take advantage of and enjoy clean air on his or her own and, given this, Réaume insists that it is possible to hold an individual right to clean air.

Peter Jones is a scholar who has written extensively on the issue of group rights (see Jones 1999a; 1999b; 2008; 2009) and his ideas proved particularly influential in this section of the paper.

A number of other scholars have also adopted the corporate conception as a basis for their deliberations regarding the merits of group rights. See, for example, McDonald (1991), Addis (1992) and Narveson (1991).

It should be noted that the particular territorial context within which the language community found itself would not have any bearing on this conclusion. The problems identified as ones that arise in relation to claims regarding the right to linguistic survival (whether in its individualistic, corporate or collective forms) would be as relevant regardless of whether the language community happened to be one that was territorially concentrated or territorially dispersed. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pressing me to make this point.