Abstract
This conclusion links the various contributions in light of the introductory framework. In line with our framework, scepticism towards the EU has increased since 2004 across most of the EU regions (old and new) and state-centric approaches (regional influence mediated through the central executives) have become the dominant strategy for regional mobilization. Unmediated access through direct regional representation in Brussels remains an important side-strategy though, especially for sub-state nations and regions with the highest level of regional authority, as theoretically expected. Regional authority—more so than the difference between competitive versus cooperative multi-level designs—is an important predictor against centralization pressures resulting from European integration. Overall, changes in the ‘New Europe’ have intensified but not transformed the dominant patterns of regional mobilization, while system-level and regional variables mediate impacts of Europeanization.
Notes
1 For an in-depth analysis of how the Basque country, another resource-strong region with a distinct identity, simultaneously pursues various formal and informal mobilization strategies. see Bienefeld (Citation2009).
2 In line with this finding, earlier studies (Pitschel et al., Citation2008, 611) indicate that regional governments in Poland and Hungary have been relatively passive up to now and that existing mobilization potential has not been fully exploited.
3 At the same time, it should be emphasized that, while Europeanization may have a centralizing effect on the multi-level order of the state, it is by no means the only trigger affecting centre-state relations in a multi-level state. In fact, in the UK the deepening of devolved arrangements (through the extension of self-rule, especially for Wales and Northern Ireland) has continued apace. Similarly, Belgium undoubtedly will become the most decentralized state in the EU following the implementation of the most recently agreed constitutional reforms in 2014), while Germany contemplates a reform of its fiscal federal framework that may empower the fiscal autonomy of the Länder. The drivers of these regional authority transfers in these countries are primarily endogenous, resulting from domestic party competition, socio-economic differences between the regions, or jurisprudence (as in the case of the proposed reform of the German fiscal federal relations) and cannot be linked to direct Europeanization pressure as such (on this point see, for instance, Deforche, Citation2012).
4 The actors participating in the network with which these interest groups engage are political actors (parties, ministerial cabinets, MPs, Members of regional parliaments) and administrative actors (ministries, especially foreign affairs, Permanent representations with the EU etc.).