Bodo ethnic self-rule and persistent violence in Assam: A failed case of multinational federalism in India

ABSTRACT

Indian federalism has been credited in the literature on comparative federalism for having successfully resolved many of its ethnic conflicts (in a country of immense ethnic diversity) since 1956 by conceding varied forms of statehood. In most cases, the resolution of ethnic conflict has entailed self-determination for ethno-nationalist groups. There are however cases when the experiment has failed and the institutional arrangements for recognition of ethnic self-determination have given birth to more conflicts and persistent violence. In this article, we argue that the Bodoland Territorial Authority (created in 2003) in Assam is a failed case of multinational federalism in India. We argue that the case of Bodoland illustrates the limits of territorial management when groups are intermixed and highlight the need for power sharing in government and/or non-territorial representation as a better method for managing ethnic conflict in such cases.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• north east
• Bodoland
• ethnic conflict
• multinational federalism

Acknowledgement

The authors wish to thank Sumit Sarma and Bhargob Jyoti Kachari as well as the Field Investigators in Assam for data collection and helping with conducting elite interviews. The authors wish to thank Katharine Adeney and Wilfried Swenden for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 We have in mind in particular the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution which was originally applicable to the hill tribes in the North East but later amended to include the Plain tribesmen in Assam (i.e. the Bodos).

2 Though little known as such in the general understanding of India’s states reorganization, there was a strong pressure at the moment of Partition from the Bengali Hindu dominated Bengal Congress unit to eke out a state for the Bengali Hindus for the sole reason of not to be governed by the Muslims. For details, see Chatterjee (1994, 2007).

3 However, the relation between Indian federalism and ethnic-self-determination remains an unexplored area for further research.

4 These terms are used interchangeably.

5 The Expert Committee on Plains Tribes of Assam (ECOPTA) paid a visit to the different districts of Assam like Guwahati, Barama, Nalbari, Kokrajhara and met the representatives of a number of political social and cultural organizations. The Committee submitted its Report in 1992. The report proposed the establishment of two Autonomous Councils north of the Brahmaputra – the West-Central Council and Eastern Council. The West-Central Council would consist of majority Bodos with some Rabhas and Sonwals. The Eastern Council will have a Mishing majority with some Sonwals. The Committee also recommended 22 subjects to be delegated to the Councils for administration (Chandra 2005, 265).

6 The issue of protection of the non-Bodos in the BTC areas came up in Rajya Sabha debate (debate dated 23 April 2003) K. Kalavenkata Rao, Question No, 3440, Protection of rights of Non-tribals in Bodoland – http://rsdebate.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/98920/1/PQ_198_23042003_U3440_p78_p79.pdf#search=April 23, 2003, Bodoland (accessed on 11/04/2018)

7 In the amendment to the 6th Schedule in 2003, it was provided that the Governor of Assam shall nominate 06 members with equal status including two women from the non-represented communities (Bakshi 2017, 365).

8 The SJA is a united forum of non-Bodo communities such as the Koch Rajbongshis, Adivasis, tea tribes, and Nepalis.

9 Most non-Bodo elites who were interviewed as part of this study have complained about ethnic discrimination in getting jobs and other facilities in the BTC. Nearly all of these elites also agreed that the decision to create a BTC with an in-built Bodo majority was a disaster. They are also apprehensive that if a Bodoland State is created it will lead to the further Balkanization of the area.

Additional information

Funding

Part of this field research was made possible by a Leverhulme Trust Network Grant on Continuity and Change in Indian Federalism [Leverhulme IN2013–043].