ABSTRACT
Studies of federalism concerning the impact of (fiscal) decentralization on budgetary stability produced inconclusive results. Ambiguous findings lead to uncertain budgetary expectations, and consequently, the level of stringency of adopted balanced budget rules (BBRs) varies across the spectrum of different federal models. This article clarifies the link between the structure of federalism and the stringency of BBRs. It argues that rather than decentralization alone, it is the combination of decentralization and interdependence between levels of government that explains the varying stringency of BBRs across federal systems. Additionally, the strictness of fiscal prudency rules is estimated through a new, ten-point model. Three cases are selected for empirical testing, and the analysis shows that the European Union’s adoption of a rather stringent BBR is not counterintuitive, but rather expected based on its political structure.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Omar Serrano and Haizhen Mou for their suggestions on a previous version of the article, and the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/fiscal-governance-eu-member-states/numerical-fiscal-rules-eu-member-countries_en#database-on-numerical-fiscal-rules. Last accessed: 25 June, 2018.
7 https://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-eng.asp. Last accessed: 8 February, 2019.
8 https://www.fin.gc.ca/frt-trf/2017/frt-trf-17-eng.asp. Last accessed: 26 June, 2018.
9 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/resources/index_en.cfm. Last accessed: 26 June, 2018.
10 Data based on http://www.usgovernmentspending.com. Last accessed: 26 June, 2018.
11 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-02-13-269. Last accessed: 29 June, 2018.