Shades of solidarity: Comparing Scottish and Flemish responses to Catalonia

ABSTRACT

On 1 October 2017, Catalans went to the polls to vote on independence. Catalan independentists called for international, particularly European, support. EU leaders remained wary, but representatives of Europe’s sub-state nationalist parties flocked to Barcelona to express their solidarity. In this article, we show that the Scottish National Party’s support was both less cohesive and less intense than the more assertive expression of solidarity from the Flemish Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. We consider party interactions in the European context through the lens of transnational solidarity. We find that solidarity is refracted through intra-party dynamics, domestic policy debates, and the historical trajectories of parties in the European context. Existing international relationships provide arenas for interaction, but ultimately domestic opportunities conditioned parties’ responses to the Catalan referendum. This meaningful, albeit contingent, solidarity between sub-state nationalists is worthy of exploration in the context of ongoing Catalan and Scottish independence processes.

KEYWORDS:

• Nationalism
• secession
• transnational activism
• solidarity
• Catalonia

On 1 October 2017, the international media lens was focused on the unfolding Catalan independence referendum. Deemed illegal by the Spanish constitutional courts and disrupted by the Spanish police, the vote nonetheless went ahead. In the days leading up to the vote, official and unofficial observers from across Europe’s autonomist nations and regions joined Catalan activists in Barcelona. In this article, we seek to move beyond the internal complexities of the ongoing Catalan process to consider external reactions to the 2017 vote.

In the months leading up to the vote, Catalan politicians travelled around Europe to garner support from the EU, member states, and other sub-state nationalist parties. Leaders of the Catalan movement looked to powerful sub-state nationalist parties in Flanders and Scotland to amplify their demands. Former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont aimed much of his post-referendum dialogue abroad, ‘emphasizing the need for dialogue and calls for mediation’ (Cetrà, Casanas-Adam, and Tàrrega 2018, 130). In this article, we ask how these pleas were received by counterparts elsewhere?

We evaluate whether and how two of Europe’s most powerful sub-state nationalist parties, the Flemish Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and the Scottish National Party (SNP), responded to this call. Before evaluating sub-state nationalist mobilization around the Catalan referendum, we recall the rise and fall of the shared political project - the ‘Europe of the Regions.’ We consider that this political ideal of a united sub-state nationalist and regionalist¹ approach to the EU was underpinned by a sense of transnational solidarity. We then conceptualize the notion of transnational solidarity and its wider position within the European Union.

This framework enables us to consider how both the N-VA and the SNP displayed solidarity during the Catalan referendum. First, a united understanding of the ‘problem’ is identified. Both parties frame the Catalan referendum as illustrating the right to self-determination, a crisis of Spanish democracy, and the failure of the European Union to intervene. However, the N-VA’s expression of solidarity was stronger, evident in the party’s salience and messaging on the referendum. In contrast, the SNP was more cautious, speaking less often and in a less direct manner. Its response also displayed less cohesion. In the second part of the article, we explore these differences between the SNP and N-VA. We consider how different reactions to the Catalan referendum stem from the parties’ variant internal party dynamics, domestic policy debates, and historical trajectories in transnational networks.

By using the concept of transnational solidarity, and considering how this concept plays out in the Catalan referendum, this article provides a clear case of ongoing sub-state nationalist cooperation across Europe. The ‘Europe of the Regions’ era was considered to be the peak of transnational cooperation, fading thereafter. Given the ongoing success of sub-state nationalist politics across Europe, identifying these transnationalist narratives and politics, which often take place outwith formal institutions, ensures that scholars have a full view of the dynamics at play in self-determination processes.

Inter-regional relationships in the European Union

Solidarity has underpinned nationalist and regionalist cooperation since before the Europe of the Regions era. In 1974, the Brest Charter signed between Breton, Welsh, Galician, Irish, Catalan, Basque and Sardinian movements declared ‘solidarity of collaboration among national liberation movements fighting for the right of self-determination’ (Schrijver 2006, 212; Gómez-Reino 2018, 118). Inter-regional cooperation peaked during the 1990s and early 2000s, as the ‘Europe of the Regions’ idea ascended both in the minds of regional and sub-state national actors and in the scholarly literature.

Rather than one formal institutional role for regions, this era created a ‘range of opportunities’ (Keating 2008, 633). The European Parliament (EP), Committee of the Regions, and Structural Funds provided opportunities for sub-state nationalists to work together within European institutions (Jeffery 2000; Keating 2004, 376–379). This mobilization centred on the ‘catch-phrase’ of the ‘Europe of the Regions,’ promoting regional interests in the EU (Hepburn 2008, 539; Loughlin 1996).

In the EP and Committee of the Regions, sub-state nationalist political parties sought to develop shared goals and strategies. From 1979 onwards, political parties created EP electoral coalitions. The creation of the EP party group, the European Free Alliance (EFA), fostered regular cooperation between sub-state nationalists, albeit initially in a context of ‘weak institutionalization’ (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). EFA eventually became a full-fledged European political party, giving it legal status outwith the EP. Its membership grew from six member parties to 46 (Lightfoot 2006). In addition, powerful sub-state administrations created paradiplomatic representations and transregional partnerships (Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Marks, Haesly, and Mbaye 2002; Tatham 2008; Rowe 2011). Paradiplomacy follows logically from nationalist ambitions, given its role in identity formation and promotion, political territorial mobilization, and promotion of regional interests (Lecours and Moreno 2004).

However, the grand strategy of the Europe of the Regions is largely seen to have failed (Elias 2008; Hepburn 2008). The ‘maximalist’ vision, in which the Committee of the Regions became a ‘third chamber’ did not materialize (Abels and Battke 2019; Christiansen 1996; Christiansen and Lintner 2005). Regions became less influential as EU enlargement enhanced the power of the state in the EU institutions by reducing the average level of regional authority (Tatham 2014, 39; Lynch and Dewinter 2008). While regions still seek influence in the EU, their behaviour is akin to a lobbying group rather than a veritable third level (Tatham 2015). The Committee of the Regions, for example, has greater influence when members proactively influence legislators outside the Committee rather than within it (Hönnige and Panke 2016). Furthermore, powerful sub-state regions now seek to influence European policy through domestic rather than transnational means (Tatham 2014).

Although formal structures of sub-state nationalist representation failed to gain traction, this era saw relationships forged between sub-state nationalist parties. These relationships provide the basis of the inter-regional dynamics at play in Catalonia in 2017. The Catalan referendum, subsequently, is a critical moment to reflect on inter-regional bonds. The next section further conceptualizes transnational solidarity before we turn to sub-state nationalist parties’ responses to the Catalan referendum.

Transnational solidarity in the European Union

We propose that relationships between sub-state nationalist parties are a case of transnational solidarity, made possible, to a large degree, by wider patterns of transnational solidarity in the EU (Krunke, Peterson, and Manners 2020). In this instance, the SNP and the N-VA expressed common narratives and a willingness to cooperate (two elements inherent to transnational solidarity), reflecting transnational thinking and patterns developed in the ‘Europe of the Regions’ era.

Solidarity is a pervasive but ‘nebulous’ concept which implies a readiness to act collectively and to institutionalize collective action (Stjernø 2009, 2). It can be interpersonal, occurring when subjects mutually sympathize, but moves beyond individuals (Wilde 2007). Solidarity is ‘social empathy’ which can apply to ‘relations of an individual to the members of a different group, and to the relations among groups’ (Gould 2007, 153). In transnational social movements, solidarity indicates strong shared goals, loyalty, and willingness to share risk within the group (Smith 2002, 507). Solidarity often stems from a sense of injustice in which one group supports another ‘to eliminate oppression or reduce suffering’ (Gould 2020, 23–24). The ideal of solidarity also underpinned the development of the EU. The preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and successive treaties called for solidarity as a core value (Sangiovanni 2013).

We argue that transnational solidarity is a useful concept to describe the relationships between sub-state nationalist parties, because they coalesce around their common goal of ending injustices (Marks and McAdam 1996). Due to their peripheral positions, they mostly lack access to state-led, ‘top-down’ methods of international relations. As such, sub-state nationalist parties are likely to find transnational solidarity a more useful tool of fighting injustice than state-wide parties.

In this context, we define solidarity as the willingness to act and speak collectively across transnational boundaries. This can be expressed individually, by party members and representatives, and collectively, by parties as organizations. We move beyond the ‘unitary actor assumption’ to recognize that each political party has its own internal life (Katz 2002, 87). Political party solidarity can thus be more or less cohesive depending on the extent to which the organization and individuals’ approaches align. We also recognize that solidarity is not binary. Expressions of solidarity may be more or less salient and solidarity may affect many or limited issue areas. Parties thus express solidarity with varied levels of intensity.

Our application of transnational solidarity to sub-state nationalist responses during the Catalan referendum follows from parties’ prior transnational activism in the EU. We expect solidarity to emerge due to nationalists’ shared goals, history of collective action, and ongoing institutional relationships. Our expectation is also informed by the expectations of Catalan actors themselves. In the run-up to the referendum, one independentist member of the Catalan Foreign Affairs committee noted in an interview, ‘We have an agenda with other parliaments, other parties, other governments. We are talking with Scotland, we’re talking with the Flemish people, and we’re talking with the Welsh people.’ In this article, we explore the phenomenon of transnational solidarity and the variances within parties’ expressions of solidarity with Catalonia.

Research design

The SNP and the N-VA are the two most powerful sub-state nationalist parties in Europe. Both were in government at the time of the vote. Challenges to the EU (Brexit in Scotland, migration in Flanders) have kept nationalism and the EU at the forefront of political agendas. Both parties remain members of EFA but increasingly seek links to state-wide political actors.

The parties diverge in terms of left-right position. The N-VA is ‘mainstream right’ whereas the SNP is ‘mainstream left’ (Massetti 2009, 518). Despite ideological differences, both foster European relationships (in the EP and beyond) with reference to their own self-determination claims (Gómez-Reino 2018). We posit that left-right differences will not affect parties’ responses to the Catalan referendum because the event centres self-determination rather than ideological claims.

To understand how the SNP and N-VA framed the Catalan issue, we carried out an analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. The primary data source for this analysis was SNP press releases and N-VA news items, published on the parties’ websites. These items were aimed at the press and public, rather than internal audiences (Dalmus, Hänggli, and Bernhard 2017). Each of these items (totalling more than 1500) were reviewed, and a dataset of items referring to Catalonia was compiled, totalling 52. In addition, we gathered speeches in legislatures, party and individual politician’s social media, and secondary sources to understand how the party dealt with the Catalan crisis. We focus on the period in which the Catalan process was highly salient, centring on the October 2017 period, but drawing on sources from October 2015 to March 2019 when the SNP and the N-VA engaged with the Catalan issue. The Catalan process remains ongoing.

We first sought to understand the salience of the issue within each party. We counted items in our dataset of press releases and news items over the same time period and considered quantitative and qualitative measures of salience, including where and when party leaders spoke about the Catalan issue.

Then, to distil the core arguments made by the parties and their representatives, we employed framing analysis, which allows us to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’ the ideas of actors (Benford and Snow 2000). This allows us to understand how politicians ‘intentionally and necessarily emphasize different messages and arguments in a policy debate’ (Schaffner and Sellers 2009, 1). Having found that the parties employed similar framing, we sought further nuance, looking at the language used. We were inspired by methods of discourse analysis, examining the tone and in/directness employed, noting that political actors may offer direct statements or may ‘communicate in an obscure, semantically dense, vague, oblique and rather cautious manner’ (Obeng 1997, 58). Texts which specifically name and reference key actors and events (i.e. the Spanish state, condemnations of state violence) were classed as more direct, in contrast to those which focused on broad principles (i.e. general support of a right to self-determination). Directness was one way to understand the varied intensity of party solidarity. The level of directness, we argue, is related to the strategic concerns and positioning of the parties.

The analysis of salience, framing, and directness allowed us to evaluate the substance and intensity of each party’s response to the Catalan issue.

The varied salience of solidarity

The salience of the Catalan issue differed significantly between the N-VA and the SNP, evident in both the quantitative measure of salience and qualitative assessment of additional activities undertaken by the parties. The SNP made significantly fewer statements on the Catalan referendum, delegating this to individual members. In contrast, the N-VA was more vocal collectively and individually.

For the SNP, communications about Catalonia were limited, with only two mentions of Catalonia in the over 1000 party press releases published from October 2015 to March 2019. The party did not publish any press releases on Catalonia in the days before and after the 2017 vote and the issue was only briefly mentioned in the First Minister’s 2017 conference speech, nine days after the referendum. The Scottish Government issued two statements: one in advance of the vote and one following the declaration of independence (Scottish Government 2017a, 2017b). Clara Ponsatí, an exiled Catalan minister who sought refuge in Scotland, spoke at the 2018 SNP Conference, but did so as part of a fringe event held by Young Scots for Independence, rather than as part of the official programme. Individual members have been more vocal, but in official party or government communications, the party has been remarkably quiet.

The N-VA actively drew attention to the Catalan issue, publishing more than fifty news bulletins and press releases on the subject over the same period. In addition, the parliamentary party has been more active in this domain. Four days after the referendum, the Flemish Parliament unanimously passed a resolution condemning the use of violence by the Spanish state and calling for ‘a peaceful and democratic solution to the conflict’ (Flemish Parliament 2017). The N-VA also tabled a resolution in the Belgian Parliament which called on the Government to ‘recognize the inalienable right of the Catalan people to self-determination and a sovereign state’ and to recognize Catalonia as independent (Belgian Chamber 2017). They tabled another measure of condemnation in response to the sentences of Catalan politicians. The party took calls for solidarity to its membership, running a Christmas card campaign in 2018 in which they provided cards expressing Flemish solidarity to be sent to Catalan political prisoners (N-VA 2018b).

The N-VA’s responses were more centrally organized and regular than the SNP’s, resulting in a more intense and more cohesive response. In the next section, we explore the substance of parties’ expressions of solidarity. The parties employ three similar frames, but the N-VA’s approach was more directly supportive of Catalonia than that of the SNP.

Shared transnational narratives: Framing the Catalan referendum

The SNP and the N-VA employed the same frames to support the Catalan referendum. Firstly, they defined the problem as about the right to self-determination. Secondly, the repression of the vote indicated a crisis of Spanish democracy. Third, the referendum spurred critiques of the EU. Shared framing suggests that parties continue to express transnational, European narratives about self-determination. This shared purpose emerged most visibly in the 1980s and 1990s, but our analysis affirms that underlying transnational narratives remain.

Exercising the right to self-determination

For both parties, the Catalan vote was framed as an exercise of self-determination. Their arguments were based in the language of the legal ‘right’ to self-determination and urged their home country to join calls to respect this perceived right.

In the Scottish Government’s official statement prior to the vote, then Cabinet Secretary for External Affairs Fiona Hyslop noted: ‘All peoples have the right to self-determination and to choose the form of government best suited to their needs, a principle which is enshrined in the UN Charter’ (Scottish Government 2017a). SNP representatives were careful to recognize that the Spanish Government had the right to oppose independence but should not block a vote. The First Minister said: ‘It is, of course, entirely legitimate for Spain to oppose independence for Catalonia, but it is a concern if any state seeks to deny people’s right to democratically express their will’ (Scottish Parliament, 21 September 2017a). These statements were also less direct, referencing events in Catalonia but using more general language, i.e. the right of ‘all peoples’ and ‘any state’.

After the verdict in the trial of Catalan political prisoners, Nicola Sturgeon framed the issue in democratic terms: ‘While it is not for us to take a view on the future of Catalonia, we do have a view on the upholding of democratic expression and civil rights’ (The National, 14 October 2019). The party referenced the Edinburgh Agreement, the agreement between the UK and Scottish Governments which underpinned the Scottish referendum, as an exemplar (Scottish Government 2017a). By recognizing the position of the Spanish government, it emphasized process rather than endorsing independence.

The N-VA made a very similar argument. In a statement following the vote, the party argued that borders, often the result of ‘historical happenstance’ could be changed by the ‘power of the vote’. Every population, it argued, ‘has the right to choose its own future’ (N-VA 2017b). Flemish MEP Mark Demesmaeker explained in an interview with the BBC: ‘We defend unconditionally the right to decide and the right of self-determination for those nations that want to exercise that right’ (BBC 2017b). Like the SNP, the N-VA referenced international norms, drawing on UN Charters and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which both Spain and Belgium are party (Flemish Parliament 2017).

The broad frame is the same: the Catalan people, in the view of both parties, are seeking to exercise their right to self-determination, which the parties argue is internationally recognized. However, the SNP was careful to recognize the right of the Spanish state to oppose independence, which can be read as an attempt to avoid directly endorsing the Catalan cause.

A crisis of democracy

The two parties viewed the events in Catalonia, including the suppression of the vote and use of violence by the Spanish police, as a crisis of democracy. However, they differed in the language employed. The SNP was more measured, calling for dialogue, while the N-VA described the actions of the Spanish government in unequivocal terms.

From a Scottish perspective, the Catalan issue was centred around ‘human rights and democracy’, the ‘ability of people to express their political will and their political views without fear of violence’ (Scottish Parliament 2017b). The goal was to ‘encourage a process of dialogue to find a way forward that respects democracy and the rule of law’ (Scottish Government 2017a). The party collectively spoke in broad principles rather than direct statements or condemnations. Individual MPs, however, were more direct. Drew Hendry, MP described the arrest of politicians as an effort ‘to suppress the peaceful democratic process’ (HC Debate, 26 March 2018). SNP MPs also called on the UK Government to defend democracy, with MP Joanna Cherry asking the Minister for Europe to ‘use his good offices and his positive experience to suggest a similar approach to our Spanish allies’ (HC Debate, 2 November 2017b).

Those outside of government were sharper in their critiques of the Spanish state. Former Scottish Parliament presiding officer Tricia Marwick called the response ‘state sponsored thuggery’ (The Courier, 2 October 2017). MSP Sandra White noted in an interview to The National: ‘Older people who had lived through Franco were saying “Franco lives”’ (3 October 2017). Here we identify a contrast between the party collectively, which was quiet on the issue, and the individuals within it, demonstrating low levels of cohesion.

The N-VA challenged the democratic credentials of the Spanish state more directly. The Spanish state’s actions were condemned and a ‘militant Spanish nationalism’ was described as in confrontation with a ‘popular nationalist movement.’ In a press release, it argued ‘the brutal crackdown by the police, the public support for violence by Rajoy’s supporters, the movement of the military into Catalonia and the demonstrations by Franco-fascist splinter parties are alarming signals of a state nationalism which has gone awry’ (N-VA 2017b). N-VA Member of the Flemish Parliament Peter Persyn said the treatment of Catalonia by Spain reminded him of his time working in ‘the former dictatorships of Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo’ (Steel 2017). Spain was, in the view of the N-VA behaving in a manner ‘unworthy of a European member state’ (N-VA 2018a). A joint statement by an MP, MEP, and Flemish parliamentarians condemned the actions of the Spanish state: ‘The boundaries of what is acceptable are being trampled every day by Madrid’ (N-VA 2017c).

Although the overall framing was similar, there was variation in the directness employed. The SNP embedded its arguments in broader principles, speaking of the need to respect democracy without directly challenging the Spanish state, although individual members were more direct. In contrast, the N-VA openly confronted the Spanish state. These condemnations were more cohesive than those of the SNP, because the N-VA amplified critiques made by individual politicians in centralized communications.

A crisis of Europe

The SNP and the N-VA both foresaw a role for the EU as a mediator between Spain and Catalonia and expressed their disappointment in the EU's perceived inactivity. In this frame, Flemish discourse was more explicit, with the N-VA calling into question the very credibility of EU institutions, while the SNP urged the EU to live up to its values.

Speaking following the vote, Hyslop called on the EU ‘to recognise that the expression and understanding of those rights in the current context could be best served by mediation or negotiation and by some involvement by EU institutions’ (Scottish Parliament, 3 October 2017b). Sturgeon acknowledged her disappointment in her October 2017 SNP conference address, noting the EU remained central in the party’s views but in this instance had failed to live up to its values (SNP 2017).

Individuals outside the central leadership were again more critical. Douglas Chapman MP argued: ‘If that level of violence had been carried out by state police at a football match or a pop concert, the European Union and the Commission would have made a strong statement of condemnation’ (HC Debate, 10 October 2017a). At the EFA ‘fringe’ event after the Catalan judicial verdict in 2019, the SNP Youth International Officer proclaimed: ‘The European Union’s hands are covered in blood.’ However, Alyn Smith MEP urged caution, with remarks that signalled varying approaches within the party: ‘To blame the EU for the actions of a member state is to miss the target’ (Common Space, 15 October 2019).

The N-VA was vocal on the EU’s perceived failure to take meaningful action, consistent with its increasingly critical stance towards the European Union. Flemish MEP Mark Demesmaeker called on the EU to ‘remind the Spanish Government of its responsibilities’ (N-VA 2017c). Representatives also called for the resignation of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, who spoke in support of the Spanish Government’s actions (N-VA 2017a). The party criticized Commission’s approach, saying: ‘The European Commission would rather give carte blanche for beating up citizens than admit to the legitimacy of their desires’ (N-VA 2017b).

In a Europe Day debate, N-VA members wore a yellow ribbon in solidarity with Catalan political prisoners and called for action: ‘We regret that your silence on the Catalan question shows the erosion of the credibility of the European Union’ (Flemish Parliament, 9 May 2018). In his 2019 New Year’s speech, Bart de Wever made a renewed appeal for action, saying: ‘Nobody asks you to support Catalan autonomy, but please support the fundamental values of Europe’ (de Wever 2019).

The N-VA more explicitly supports Catalan sub-state nationalists while the SNP has leaned on the language of mediation. Nonetheless, both parties expressed solidarity through attacks on a collective opponent (the undemocratic state and unresponsive EU). The following section explores possible causes for the variation in the intensity of parties’ responses.

Exploring varied responses

Although the SNP and the N-VA both displayed solidarity, we have established that their responses differed in cohesion and intensity. In our analysis, we do not seek to identify causal relationships but explore the three elements which help us understand the positions taken by the two parties: the internal life of the party, domestic political context, and their history of transnational political involvement.

Internal party dynamics

The SNP’s approach to the Catalan referendum was characterized by a lack of cohesion while the N-VA spoke with a clear, cohesive voice. We argue that the SNP’s varying responses to the Catalan referendum stemmed, in part, from intra-party dynamics surrounding the approach to the independence process. Internal disagreement subsequently reduced the intensity of the solidarity expressed. Meanwhile, the lack of salience of the independence issue for N-VA voters allowed the party to take a more unified stance in expressing solidarity.

As a collective, the SNP approached the Catalan process with caution. Sturgeon justified her caution with reference to principle: ‘I didn't ever really take kindly to people trying to interfere with whether Scotland should become independent, and it is not for me to say whether Catalonia should be independent’ (BBC 2017a).

SNP members and individuals have been more active, allowing government ministers to maintain a lower profile. Senior advisers suggested privately that this was intentional, allowing the leadership to be less vocal. Members took part in grassroots organizations including SNP Friends of Catalonia, the Assemblea Nacional Catalana and the Catalan Defence Committee. In the Scottish Parliament, Sandra White MSP, Ivan McKee MSP, and Christina McKelvie MSP took the lead. In the UK Parliament, Joanna Cherry MP and Douglas Chapman MP were the SNP’s official referendum observers and have been some of the most vocal advocates for Catalonia. In some instances, individuals called on the SNP as a party of government to do more. SNP Youth Vice Convener Rory Steel told a journalist: ‘The Scottish Government’s statement was welcome, but I don’t think it went far enough to condemn the actions of Madrid which are unacceptable’ (McQuade 2017).

In contrast to the SNP, the N-VA reached a clearer consensus. In our examination of the party’s press releases and news items, comments are relatively evenly distributed between the party president, ministers and MPs at the federal, Flemish, and European level. Frequent references to the Catalan issue are made in the party’s Nieuw-Vlaams Magazine, with calls on the membership to participate in demonstrations and in campaigns. There is no evidence of division within the party over the Catalan issue.

In the SNP, there was a clear bottom-up pressure from activists for party leaders to be more vocal about the Catalan referendum. However, leadership displayed reluctance to engage, instead allowing members as individuals to take more critical stances. The Scottish expression of solidarity thus lacked cohesion. As a result, the collective intensity of the party’s expressed solidarity was limited, as some activists noted. This is in marked contrast with that of the N-VA, which demonstrated collective agreement throughout the party and delivered a cohesive message.

Domestic debates on self-government and Europe

Sub-state nationalist parties are bound by their common search for self-determination, albeit in different forms. While they share a common cause, they are engaged in their own domestic debates on these issues, and their expressions of solidarity are refracted through the specificities of these positions. For the SNP, members’ demands for a second independence referendum amidst the uncertainties of Brexit encouraged caution. In contrast, the N-VA used the Catalan issue to shore up its own nationalist credentials at a time where it had set aside self-government demands to enter into federal coalition.

The Catalan referendum coincided with sensitive debates within the SNP on the possibility of a second independence referendum, which intensified after the UK’s vote to leave the EU (McHarg and Mitchell 2017). However, an October 2017 poll showed support for Scottish independence was only at 39%. In September 2017, 52% of respondents to a Panelbase poll felt there should not be another referendum in the near term. Considering this, SNP leadership sought to mediate calls for another referendum from membership with the position of the electorate. Having resolved its debates over fundamentalism and gradualism in the 1980s, leadership was loathe to reopen these divides (Mitchell 1990). To avoid doing so, SNP representatives carefully distinguished between the Catalan crisis, framed as a crisis of democracy, and the issue of Scottish independence. Douglas Chapman MP explained in an interview: ‘Everyone should be worried, regardless of their views on independence’ (Carrell and Brooks 2017).

The unilateral declaration of independence by the Catalan government following the vote put more pressure on the SNP, which seeks a second referendum that would enjoy the legitimacy of the 2014 vote. The BBC reported: ‘Privately, party bosses crossed their fingers that there was no declaration of independence from Catalonia during the conference; you could almost hear the chants of “UDI” welling up in the hall already’ (Sim 2017). Given the party’s long-standing commitment to a negotiated referendum, SNP leadership are likely to view the Catalan process as a cautionary tale, not an exemplar.

The Catalan debate is also viewed through the lens of domestic issues in Flanders. Calls for radical state reform formed the basis of the party’s 2014 campaign, but this commitment was set aside in the process of federal coalition formation to pursue socioeconomic reforms (N-VA 2014). The party’s support for Catalonia can be read as a means of supporting self-government in principle whilst not pursuing it at home. This is what Bart Maddens, an academic with strong ties to the Flemish nationalist movement, describes as a form of ‘separatism by proxy’ (BBC 2017b).

The Catalan issue was also employed against its partners in the federal governing coalition, allowing the party to stress its commitment to self-government. MEP Mark Demesmaeker noted these partners ‘appear blind to the Spanish crackdown on Catalan citizens … What line must be crossed for hypocrisy and double standards to be done away with?’ (N-VA 2017d). When asked whether the N-VA might withdraw from the coalition, N-VA Deputy Prime Minister Jan Jambon described it as a ‘difficult question,’ arguing ‘we cannot risk losing our credibility’ by ignoring the issue for the sake of the coalition (Cerulus 2016).

The strong statements made by the N-VA were made possible by the timeframe of its self-government goals. The party has no plans to pursue Flemish independence in the short to medium term (N-VA 2014). As a result, it can be vocal on the Catalan issue, even to the detriment of the Flemish relationship with Spain, which suspended the credentials of the Flemish representative in Madrid. There were no signs this negatively affected their support from voters. Indeed, it might bolster the party in the face of a rising threat from the Vlaams Belang, which also calls for Flemish independence.

The N-VA has little to lose by vocally supporting Catalonia, its support allows the party to display independentism from a distance and to stress nationalist credentials while in federal coalition. In Scotland, however, the Catalan issue interacts with fraught debates within the SNP on the timing of a second referendum and future EU membership. Both factors encourage caution among SNP elites.

Relationships with transnational networks

Solidarity emerges from social empathy and cooperation (Gould 2007). Given its relational nature, we expect parties to replicate previous patterns of solidarity. While both parties have sought and fostered transnational ties, the N-VA has historically been more invested in sub-state nationalist networks than the SNP. We differentiate between party-to-party relationships, developed particularly within the European Free Alliance (EFA),² and paradiplomatic activities, carried out by the Flemish and Scottish governments (Tatham 2018, 280).

The SNP has historically maintained its distance from other sub-state nationalist parties. Initially, it joined the European Democratic Alliance European Parliament group, choosing to align itself with larger, electorally successful parties over EFA, whose members were more marginal (Lynch 1995, 90–91). In an interview, the former director of EFA noted the SNP was active to a ‘lesser extent’ in EFA, partly due to the UK’s comparatively late entry to the European Union. The SNP has instead focused on paradiplomacy, building on the Scottish representatives present in Brussels since the 1990s (Rowe 2011, 178–180). In addition, they have invested in relationships outside of Europe, in a ‘One Scotland’ approach which seeks to promote Scotland as an international brand.

The Scottish and Catalan Governments have paradiplomatic relations, but the relationship has been characterized by periods of neglect. Sturgeon and Catalan President Carles Puigdemont never met. Catalan President Quim Torra visited Scotland in 2018 but did so at the request of the Catalans. Before 2018, the last official meeting between the two governments was Alex Salmond’s 2008 visit to Barcelona (Catalan News 2018).

In contrast, the N-VA has been proactive in engaging with other sub-state nationalist parties through paradiplomacy, transnational networks, and direct contacts. The N-VA’s predecessor the Volksunie played an integral role in the establishment and leadership of EFA (Gómez-Reino 2018, 119). While the N-VA exists as a distinct party, with a different ideological position, it retained many of the relationships held by the Volksunie and remained well-integrated in these transnational networks (Beyens et al. 2017).

The N-VA left the EFA EP group in 2014 to join the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), although it remains a member of the extra-Parliamentary operations of EFA. The move from the EP group should be understood as an indication of its more Euro-critical and right-wing position rather than a rejection of nationalist solidarity. The N-VA’s entry into government, also in 2014, was characterized by a focus on economic rather than constitutional policy (Leruth 2014). The N-VA must deal with its ideological ‘double soul,’ balancing conservatism and sub-state nationalism (Gómez-Reino 2018). The N-VA’s continued membership of the EFA as a European political party and strong support for the Catalan cause allows the party to stress its nationalist credentials.

This is most evident in the ways N-VA elites continue to display close relationships with Catalan politicians, both as individuals and as a party. The N-VA welcomed Carles Puigdemont to Belgium, with Bart de Wever saying: ‘I will never turn my back on friends, not when they are in trouble’ (AP News 2017). Flemish parliamentarian Lorin Parys hosted Puigdemont and his allies for dinner and publicized this. Individual representatives of the N-VA were also in attendance at the Catalan referendum vote, subsequent elections, and trials and shared these experiences on social media (BBC 2017b).

When in government, the N-VA participates in the paradiplomatic institutions set up by the Flemish Government. However, they do so in coalition, limiting their direct control. Flanders has strong paradiplomatic institutions which developed from ‘international cultural activities’ in the 1990s to its current ‘vertically integrated’ structure (Criekemans 2010). These were not controlled predominantly by Flemish nationalist politicians given the need for coalition governments.

From 2014 onwards, the N-VA had greater control of the Flemish Government’s paradiplomatic activity. Flemish Prime Minister Geert Bourgeois was the first foreign leader to visit Catalan PM Torra in Barcelona after his election in 2018 and did so in an official capacity. Minister for Asylum Francken also used his position in the Belgian government to hint at an offer of asylum to Puigdemont. Since departing from coalition in December 2019, they have continued to support the Catalan cause. In February 2019, an N-VA MEP organized a conference with Torra and Puigdemont, at the European Parliament, ultimately cancelled over security concerns. In March 2019, the Belgian Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on the political situation in Catalonia and hosted representatives of the Catalan Parliament at the behest of N-VA MPs.

Both parties sought to expand their networks beyond the sub-state nationalist space, reaching out to other governments and political parties. However, the SNP has sought to distance itself from other sub-state nationalist parties. They have had and relied more heavily on access to the paradiplomatic tools available to it as a party of government. These paradiplomatic tools allow the SNP to engage with other state or powerful sub-state administrations and to act, informally, in the manner of an EU member state. The N-VA’s more vocal defence of Catalan nationalists is consistent with their historical integration into the sub-state nationalist party network in Europe.

Conclusion

The SNP and the N-VA’s responses to the Catalan referendum highlight the complexity of solidarity between political parties in Europe. Although the idealized vision of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ failed to materialize, there remains a ‘trans-nationalist’ community based on shared goals and ‘social empathy.’ In response to the 2017 vote, the SNP and the N-VA expressed support for the Catalan cause. Solidarity was expressed collectively and by highly engaged individuals. By comparing the two parties, we have shown that the intensity and cohesion of this solidarity differed. Transnational solidarity was refracted through intra-party dynamics, domestic policy debates, and the historical trajectories of their movements in a European context. These factors contributed to divergent levels of the solidarity expressed by the N-VA and SNP.

Our analysis of transnational links demonstrates how events in one independentist movement may trigger strong and sustained shows of solidarity across Europe. Importantly, this dynamic is not contained to the Catalan case. Sub-state nationalist parties remain networked in less visible ways: party leaders speak at one another’s conferences, youth parties hold joint events, and individual representatives forge connections both in the halls of legislatures and through informal channels (Sijstermans 2019). In September 2014, the eyes of the world were trained on Edinburgh and the Scottish independence referendum. In addition to Scottish activists, the referendum saw Welsh, Catalan, Corsican, Basque, and Frisian politicians on the streets of Edinburgh. While formal spaces for cooperation in the EU failed to gain long-lasting traction, the undercurrent of solidarity between sub-state nationalist parties can be mobilized in times of heightened importance.

Expressions of solidarity with Catalonia persist. Although the overall salience has decreased, critical events, including judicial decisions, have triggered responses. With the politicians’ sentencing in 2019, Nicola Sturgeon tweeted that it was a ‘dreadful outcome’ and asked in her 2019 SNP conference speech that members join her in ‘sending them our support and our solidarity.’ Flanders’ new Minister-President Jan Jambon visited Catalonia in December 2019 and called on the EU to act as a mediator in the conflict. He also called for further institutionalization of solidarity, noting: ‘It might be useful to create a network of Minister-Presidents of regions that have the same status, like Flanders, Wallonia, Bavaria, the Basque country or even Scotland. It should only include regions that want independence’ (Brussels Times, 1 December 2019). Such proposed informal networks between regions and nations show how sub-state nationalists may bypass the structures of the EU, which do not adequately represent the interests of powerful sub-state nationalist parties and their nations.

Since it became clear that a Europe of the Regions would not materialize, relationships between sub-state nationalists in Europe have been under-examined. However, the phenomenon of transnational solidarity is one worthy of further attention, particularly given the ongoing Catalan process and the prospect of another independence referendum in Scotland.

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the helpful feedback of two anonymous referees and the editors of Regional and Federal Studies. We would also like to thank the members of the Territorial Politics Research Group at the University of Edinburgh and Dr. Daniel Cetrà for their feedback on this article at different stages.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 We use the term ‘sub-state nationalist and regionalist’ to indicate the wider group of parties including those advocating for full independence and those seeking further sub-state autonomy. When discussing the three parties at the centre of this article, we will use ‘nationalist’ as these parties all advocate full independence of their sub-state region.

2 EFA works ‘for self-determination, for A Europe of the Peoples, for Peace and Linguistic justice, for a sustainable planet, for more gender equality and social justice’ (‘Who We Are,’ e-f-a.org).