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ABSTRACT
Ever since the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), noncentral governments in the US have been clamouring for a bigger say in US trade policy making. Yet, constitutional and practical constraints remain for states to represent their trade policy interests. To investigate these constraints and how states try to overcome them, this contribution considers the case of the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US. I analyze how states formulated and represented their interests on the TTIP. While overall state interest representation on the TTIP was low, I find various avenues in which states mobilized, mostly in a coordinated setting including the federal government and mostly driven by progressive-leaning state legislators with a background in international trade. The analysis of state interest representation on the TTIP adds to the literature on noncentral actors in international trade policy making.
Acknowledgements
This contribution is based on my doctoral thesis, the research for which was conducted at Freie Universität Berlin and Columbia University in the City of New York and was in part supported by a stipend from the Berlin Consortium for German Studies. In addition to extending thanks to my doctoral advisers, I would like to thank Jörg Broschek and the three anonymous reviewers, who provided thoughtful and valuable suggestions and feedback. I also express my gratitude to the interviewees who shared their experiences, insights and opinions.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 The interviews were conducted between January and October 2016 as part of a research project on states in the TTIP talks, see Jaursch Citation2018, 59–81 (also for methodological points).
2 Personal interviews with state and federal executive officials and state legislators.
3 Personal interviews with state and federal executive officials and state legislators.
4 Personal interviews with state and federal executive officials and state legislators.
5 The findings were confirmed for the TTIP negotiations in personal interviews with state and federal executive officials and state legislators.
6 Personal interviews with state and federal executive officials and state legislators.
7 This finding was confirmed in personal interviews with officials from state representative offices in Belgium and Germany, March–July 2016.
8 This was confirmed in personal interviews with state legislators and state association officials.
9 Massachusetts’ trade policy commission was not active, and New Hampshire’s had been terminated.
10 Personal interviews with federal executive officials, state legislators and state association officials.
11 This finding was confirmed in personal interviews with state and federal executive officials and state legislators.
12 Personal interviews with state legislators and state association officials.
13 Personal interviews with state legislators.
14 Personal interviews with state legislators.
15 Personal interviews with state legislators.
16 Response to a question by the author at a public TTIP stakeholder forum in Brussels, July 13, 2016.