https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8064-9699
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ABSTRACT
In 1999 regional self-government was established in Poland and, subsequently, politics began to operate in a new multilevel setting. The question raised in this article is, how did Polish parties adapt to functioning in a multilevel system focusing on coalition politics? The analysis of documents – regional assemblies’ resolutions were used to track regional coalition formation in the period 1998–2018 – was supplemented by data gathered from the author’s interviews with regional politicians. The tendency to avoid cross-cutting coalitions was evident from the first two elections when regional politics was rather autonomous. Vertically and horizontally congruent coalitions gradually became standard when advantageous conditions occurred after 2006. The particular features of the party system leading to the avoidance of cross-cutting coalitions were the role of socio-political cleavage, that is a ‘post-communist divide’ and, later, rising polarization within a bipolar party system. Cross-cutting coalitions were occasionally acceptable but never those requiring cooperation between a majority party forming the government and the main opposition party at the central level. Recent studies indicate the rise of divergent coalitions in Europe, but in Polish regions, the contrary tendency has been observed.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The authority of Polish regions is typical for Central European countries; minimally higher than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel Citation2010). The time frame for the creation of regions and the transfer of power from central government to newly established regional self-government is similar (Pink Citation2017; Rybář and Spáč Citation2017).
2 According to Albala (Citation2018), the first generation was based on game theories, with Riker’s (Citation1962) research being its cornerstone. The second group of theories increased the complexity of the models. These theories maintained an interest in the office-seeking approach as the main motivation for forming coalitions, but supplemented it with factors important in ‘real’ politics. Ideological proximity was recognised and account was taken not only of the number but also the quality of positions in coalitions. The next generation is characterised by Albala as having ‘the multivariate and anti-static objective’. The central issue of these theories is an emphasis on the incorporation of institutional characteristics in the investigation of coalition building. Among others, these theories take into consideration such factors as socio-political cleavages, consensus or polarization of the party system. In contrast to the previous generations, the third wave does not treat a party as a unitary actor. Instead, it applies a dual intra- and inter-partisan approach. Finally, a timing dimension was introduced.
3 Countries were selected to enable the incorporation of strong and weak regions according to two criteria: the degree of self-rule and the regions’ opportunity to influence national politics (four possible options).
4 According to the interviews she conducted, congruence was advantageous for the centre (enactment of legislation at the federal level). For regional governing parties, this was not always the case. Regional politicians argued that whether congruence was favourable or not depended on public support for the federal government’s parties. Incongruence could enable a regional party to distinguish itself better from federal-level party units and their preferences, e.g. from their decision to form a grand coalition.
5 His calculations show that a fully congruent coalition has a 35% chance of formation if federal government parties hold a majority in the Land. Linhart (Citation2018) recognizes the minimal winning criterion as an important factor facilitating building a fully congruent coalition because this status increases the chance of their formation even further, to 55%.
6 For the calculations, the statistical program POWERIND, prepared by Tadeusza Sozański (http://www.cyf-kr.edu.pl/~ussozans/voting.htm) was used.
7 To preserve the anonymity of respondents, regions’ names, terms of office and the parties respondents represented, are not mentioned.
8 The side-effect was that party-switching, even by one person, sometimes determined the fate of the coalition.
9 In 2014, the rate of invalid votes rose to an unprecedented 17.5%, probably due to the opaque design of the ballot ‘paper’, which was several pages long (Alberski Citation2017; Gendźwiłł Citation2015).
10 This calculation is based on Migalski’s (Citation2006) proposed measure of the fluidity of the Polish party system.
11 Polarization intensified after the Smoleńsk air disaster in 2010 in which the twin brother of PiS leader, president Kaczyński, was killed. The PiS began to adopt a confrontational rhetoric and embraced a populist anti-establishment formula (Gdula Citation2018; Sadura and Sierakowski Citation2023; Szczerbiak Citation2017). Thus, the relationship between the two main parties cannot be seen as typical for the democratic system of political competition.
12 The 2018 election brought PiS hegemony to six regions (the PO held a majority in one assembly). Nevertheless, multilevel systems extended to 16 regions, and the predominance of the PiS is questioned not only in relation to election results that are critical to it, but also to its coalition potential.
13 The SLD did not associate with other parties and, disadvantaged by the new rules, did very poorly.
14 Gazeta.pl (Citation2010).
15 TVN24 (Citation2014).
16 In contrast, interviewee 45 indicated that the AWS-UW coalition in the other region ‘was obvious’ as politicians of both parties knew each other well. (By mentioning the surnames of those active in anti-communist opposition activities, he suggests that they had the experience of nearly two decade-long cooperation.) This argument was even articulated in 2006 by interviewees in a limited number of regions (see details in further parts of the article).
17 In this term there was no one main opposition party. Thus, a coalition with either the PO or PiS and the main government party (SLD) would be classified as a grand coalition.
18 In one region, the post-communist divide was breached as the coalition formula was extended and included the post-Solidarity party: UW. It should be treated as an exception of the marginal party trying to increase its potential position starting from the SLD electoral list in 2002.
19 Arguments about the advantages of being in a coalition with central government parties was also popular among heads representing the SLD in the 2nd term.
20 PO-PSL cooperation in the regions was also seen as part of a wider strategy first practised in the regions and then repeated at central level as a coalition formula in 2007. Later, due to its success, it was also introduced to territorial (regional) units of central administration (urzędy wojewódzkie). In some of the above-mentioned interviews, reference was also made to strategic nationwide coalition agreements that are: the blocking of the list in 2006 or the PO-PSL agreement on regional cooperation signed by the national leader in 2010 (and in 2014). In this perspective, the accent was on this two-party cooperation in which adding the SLD to the coalition did not have any effect.
21 This agreement, in general, confirmed the situation preceding the 2010 election. There were only two noticeable changes. One region was taken over from the PiS. In a second region, the PO-PSL coalition party replaced the one-party rule of the PO. (The PO regional leader was in favour of ruling without the PSL. This was a consequence of the PSL regional leader’s 2006 decision to enter electoral blocs with the PiS and its junior parties.) (Majcherkiewicz Citation2021).
22 In 2010, the PO could rule alone in two regions and in 2014 the PO and PSL could each form a single-party government in one region.
23 The interviewees represented the PO and PSL. (Apart from one region, the PiS was in opposition). Research by Wasilewski, Kotnarowski and Betkiewicz (Citation2019) on regional councillors indicates the self-isolation and siege mentality of the PiS, accompanied by ostracism by other groupings.
24 The exception to this concept was a party switch of one councillor in 2018.