Women's Empowerment: Power to Act or Power over Other Women? Lessons from Indian Microfinance

Abstract

In the microfinance industry, “empowerment” is often described as a means to facilitate female emancipation from male domination. This paper draws on women's testimonies to highlight the fundamental importance of women's relationships with one another in this process. Women continuously negotiate a position between their kinship groups and neighbours, in a context where dependence on men is considered natural. Micro-credit uses are shaped by, and embody, relationships between women, including power relationships. We recommend revising current understandings of female agency to take into account the complex relationship between agency and power and challenge the conventional polarity of power as domination (power over) and power as agency (power to). In many cases, even where there is solidarity between women, women having agency require or imply domination over other women.

Notes

This paper has been supported by funding from the French National Agency for Research (ANR) within the RUME project (www.rume-rural-microfinance.org). This paper was initially presented in the conference Microfinance's Contribution to Development Studies: What Interdisciplinary Approaches Add to Microfinance Understanding? CERMi/UniversitéLibre de Bruxelles/Oxford University, Bruxels, January 2010. Comments from participants in the Conference and subsequently from Susan Johnson and Ariane Szafarz are gratefully acknowledged. We also sincerely thank the four editors of the special issue and two anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments.

¹ We used a random sample stratified by proximity to the city and caste.

² In this paper, we point out differences between Dalits and Hindu caste women (or non Dalits), though it would also be necessary to explore differences within non-Dalits.

³ Of the 170 women questioned, none are divorced and one lives separately.

⁴ In our sample, Dalit women work more frequently than the others (57% as opposed to 40%). Wives' contributions to household income are higher among Dalits than non-Dalits, in both absolute and relative terms. On average, women's annual income is 10 153 INR for Dalits as opposed to 8335 INR for caste Hindu women. Women's income amounts to 17.8% of household total income for Dalits (out of a total income of 35 741 INR) as opposed to 9.6% for non-Dalits (out of a total income of 41 563 INR). Some female breadwinners were found among low Dalits, but not among non-Dalits. We note, however, that women's contributions to household expenses are much higher than their contributions to household income, as their income is usually devoted to the household's well-being, while men often spend part of their income on personal expenses and helping their own kin.

⁵ For an analysis of diversity in gender regimes on class and caste lines in Tamil Nadu and the relative freedom of Dalit women, see for instance Heyer (2013), Kapadia (1996), Krishna (2005) and Ravindran (1999).

⁶ Foreigners are white people, but also Indians coming from the city (as one of us).

⁷ Although the relative freedom of Dalit women is often highlighted, Dalits are not free from patriarchy (Rao, 2003 quoted by Ciotti, 2009). It is clear, however, that in other places in rural Tamil Nadu, Dalit women enjoy much more freedom than the context studied here (see for instance Heyer, 2013).

⁸ As observed by Mencher (1988) in the 1980s in other parts of Tamil Nadu.

⁹ However, and as suggested by NailaKabeer (1999), the importance of kin support is probably less prevalent in South India than in the North, where women's income is usually lower because of stronger patriarchal norms.

¹⁰ Six per cent of the women declare having legal property titles for land, and 5.5% for housing.

¹¹ In our sample, kin support averages 11 264 INR annually, the equivalent of 30% household annual receipts. On average, 56% of this support comes from the wife's kin, but this ranges from 0% to 100%. In more than half of households, the wife's kin contributes less than 23% of the kin's support, and in one-third of cases, they contribute less than 17%.

¹² The survey aimed at quantifying the “main purpose” of the micro-credit. However, money is fungible and micro-loans are usually used for a variety of purposes. What is clear, however, is that a great majority of micro-credit uses do not generate direct income.

¹³ While our narrow sample of course cannot be used to press claims of generality, these observations raise fundamental questions that go far beyond the scope of this paper as regards the inability of microfinance to promote self-employment. For similar observations on micro-credit and self-employment in rural Tamil Nadu, see Kalpana (2008). It is worthwhile noting that an evaluation of credit programmes for the rural poor in India, in particular the IRDP, led to similar conclusions. See for instance Dreze (1990). For similar results on the limited use of micro-credit for income generating activities, see Collins et al. (2009).

¹⁴ Of course improved access to finance is not without costs. In some cases, it is likely that micro-credit increases women's financial fragility (Olsen & Morgan, 2010; Guérin et al., under review).

¹⁵ For a review, see Pattenden (2011).

¹⁶ For a review, see Razavi (2009).

¹⁷ This conception of power is in the continuation of Max Weber or Michel Foucault, who considers power primarily as a relationship and as a confrontation between two adversaries.

¹⁸ This conception of power can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes or Hannah Arendt.

¹⁹ Our observations echo to NailaKabeer's framework on empowerment (Kabeer, 1999).

²⁰ See for instance Fernando (2006), Johnson (2005), Johnson & Rogaly (1997), Mayoux (1999), Servet (2006) for India, see Garikipati (2008), Rao (2008).

²¹ See for instance Agarwal (1994) for women's property rights, or Kabeer (2010) for women's right to work and for social protection.