Gendered property and labour relations in agriculture: implications for social change in Turkey

ABSTRACT

By investigating the implications of gendered property and labour relations in agriculture for socio-economic transformation, this article extends development theories and contributes to feminist analysis of unpaid family labour. Drawing on the case of Turkey, it demonstrates that gendered patterns of agriculture limit women’s mobility, access to education, and paid employment in non-agricultural sectors. Using the qualitative and quantitative methods, the paper finds that patriarchal property and labour relations prevent the movement of labour from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors, constrain labour supply, and increase subsistence earnings thereby putting upward pressure on urban wages.

KEYWORDS:

• Global south
• labour markets
• wages
• internal migration
• agriculture
• gender
• property rights
• structural change
• patriarchy
• Turkey

1. Introduction

International policy frameworks reinforce an agenda that separates rural women’s interests from those of urban women. While rural policies tackle gendered dimensions of agricultural property, access to financial assets, and pathways out of rural poverty; urban policies focus on care provision, education, and employment. This separation is an important policy concern because it establishes two isolated policy domains: rural and urban. Drawing on the case of Turkey, and using qualitative and quantitative analyses, this paper investigates the extent to which gendered property and labour relations in agriculture are significant in hampering female education, migration, and paid employment, thereby showing that social policy needs to develop a holistic approach.

The Lewisian and Marxist accounts of development and feminist theories on social reproduction appear to share the same underlying assumption that the dynamics of capitalist transformation are the key determinants of social change. Drawing on the dual sector model – originally theorised by Arthur Lewis – development economists investigate the intersectional linkages between the capitalist and agrarian subsistence sectors, but neglect the ways gendered patterns of agriculture hinder the movement of labour from agriculture to capitalist sectors (Fields, 2004; Gollin, 2014; Temple, 2005). In their investigation of agrarian change, Marxist theories also disregard the powers of dispossession and labour exploitation different to capitalism (Bernstein, 2012; Brenner, 2001; Byres, 2009; Oya, 2013). Classical as well as Marxist political economists, therefore, fail to consider the role gender plays in shaping agrarian change and capitalist development.

While invaluable in examining the role of women’s unpaid/domestic labour in being necessary for the reproduction of labour power and acting as a prerequisite for capital accumulation, feminist theories on social reproduction assume that transition to capitalism brings the detachment of small-producers from the means of production, including agricultural land (Bhattacharya, 2017; Federici, 2014/1998; Giménez, 2018; Vogel, 2014/1983). Moreover, gender-based division of labour in household production and women’s oppression are subordinated to the dynamics of capitalist transformation thereby precluding consideration of patriarchal forces of dispossession and labour exploitation.

A detailed account of the gender gaps in asset ownership is provided by feminist research on gendered landownership in the Global South. Those scholars emphasise the needs of capital and the implications for ethnicity-based oppression (Mitra & Rao, 2019; Rao, 2005), or investigate the role of landowning male peasants in limiting women’s access to landownership (Agarwal, 2016; Deere, 2001; Deere, Alvarado, & Twyman, 2012; Doss, Kovarik, Peterman, Quisumbing, & Van-den-bold, 2015). While the former approach does not explain why capitalist development results in different gendered outcomes in different geographies or why male peasants with the dominant ethnic background sustain the same gendered patterns of agriculture, the latter approach tends to overlook the connections between rural and urban gender regimes.

This paper rejects the assumption that the dynamics of capitalist transformation are the only determinant of social change. Engaging with theories on multiple regimes of inequalities (Folbre, 2020; Galerant & Kergoat, 2014; Walby, 2020), I draw a conceptual distinction between the capitalist and patriarchal systems of exploitation and identify a mutually shaping relationship between these powers of dispossession and labour exploitation.¹ Critically engaging with the assumption that the peasant family is comprised of harmonious interests and preferences of its members, I differentiate the category of patriarchal peasant who can sustain a strong gender-based division of labour and exploit women’s unpaid labour in agriculture. Examining the ways in which patriarchal property and labour relations shape socio-economic transformation, I argue that agrarian change in Turkey points to an integration of patriarchal relations of production and capitalist relations of exchange. Under such conditions, the patriarchal peasantry in their position as household heads and small landowners exchange the agrarian surplus produced by women’s unpaid labour, thereby forcing women to produce for the market. Household production is therefore not limited to non-market goods and services as others assume, and production is not separated from social reproduction for all women, particularly those living in the Global South. My analysis, further, allows for an investigation of the extent to which patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture effectively shape proletarianization thereby elaborating connections between women’s exclusion from landownership and paid employment in non-agricultural sectors.

The selected case of Turkey enables an assessment of the ways in which the gendered patterns of landownership and production relations in agriculture effectively shape socio-economic transformation. Despite being categorised as an upper-middle income country (within the OECD DAC list of ODA recipients), the pattern of small landownership in Turkey has remained mainly unchanged since the 1950s. While 8% of agricultural holdings constitute large-scale farms (20 hectares or larger), 80% of holdings are smaller than 10 hectares (TURKSTAT, 2016). Such pattern of small landownership, further, occurs along with a strong gender-based division of labour and persistent gender gaps in unpaid family work: share of women in unpaid family workers in agriculture is 76% between 2010 and 2019 (ILOSTAT, 2020).

I use qualitative and quantitative methods to: (1) assess how far women are excluded from landownership, and (2) differentiate the implications of patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture. Examination of information collected through different methods allows for corroboration of findings across data sets. Considering that inheritance is one of the most important ways for women to access landownership, I examine how far women are excluded from ownership of agricultural land by analysing the land inheritance laws and regulations (1923–2015). I also assess the extent to which patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture are significant (from the 1960s onwards). My analysis draws on two main variables: the level of economic development and gender gaps in agrarian production. In each case, comparative analysis is used to consider the case of Turkey in relation to two sets of developing countries (Group-A: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, and South Africa, and Group-B: Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Morocco, and Pakistan).

The next section elaborates on the shortcomings of existing theories (Section 2). I then introduce my conceptual framework and methodology (Sections 3 and 4) followed by data analysis (Section 5). Later, I elaborate on the determinants of gendered property and labour relations in agriculture (Section 6). Finally, I conclude by summarising the key contributions of this research, including its implications for policy (Section 7).

2. Shortcomings of existing theories

Here, I critically engage with development theories, feminist research on gendered landownership, and the social reproduction approach.

2.1. A neglected area of development: gendered patterns of agriculture

Development economists examine the co-existence of modern (capitalist) and traditional (non-capitalist) sectors in developing countries, as well as analysing the movement of labour across those sectors. Drawing on this approach, Gollin (2014) emphasises that for developing countries today it is important to identify the factors preventing the movement of labour. Rather than assuming countries with a relatively high rural population have an unlimited labour supply, these scholars highlight that labour is actually scarce and has to be bid away from other uses (Fields, 2004). Building on his analysis of elasticity in labour supply, Lewis argues that there is a possibility that ‘peasant farmers, working on their own land … will not leave the family farm to seek employment if the wage is worth less than they would be able to consume if they remained at home’ (1954, p.148–149). As the gap between capitalist wages and subsistence earnings in agriculture influences the decision to migrate, the income of the peasantry ‘sets a floor for urban wages’ in the non-agricultural sectors (Griffin, Azizur, & Ickowitz, 2002, p. 292).

In their investigation of the social property relations in agriculture, Marxist theories highlight the role of the market-mediated forces of dispossession (Brenner, 2001; Wood, 2002), global capitalism (Bernstein, 2012; Oya, 2013), the necessity of coercion arising from both the state and the market (Qi & Li, 2019), and the importance of class struggle (Bernstein, 2012; Byres, 2009; Hairong & Yiyuan, 2015). Furthermore, those scholars identify various paths of agrarian transformation (Bernstein, 2010; Byres, 2009). For example, according to their analysis, agriculture in France remained non-capitalist until the end of the 19^th century due to the political power of landowning peasants. In the American case, on the other hand, the state does not allow the landlord class to accumulate political power, thus the transition to capitalist agriculture occurs when landowning peasants are transformed into bourgeois farmers.

Both the Lewisian and Marxist accounts of capitalist development neglect the importance of gendered patterns of property and labour relations in agriculture. Development economists overlook the way patriarchal property and labour relations constitute a barrier to the movement of labour from agriculture to capitalist sectors and set a floor for urban wages. By assuming that agrarian social property relations are solely determined by the dynamics of capitalism, Marxist analyses ignore the significance of patriarchal forces of dispossession and labour exploitation. This ‘failure to address the gender dimensions of production, accumulation and politics renders any understanding of the agrarian question, at best, as highly partial and, at worst, as wrong’ (Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2010, p. 268).

2.2. Feminist approaches to gendered landownership

Research on the gendered patterns of landownership provides a detailed account of the ways in which women’s greater access to landownership increases their economic empowerment, wellbeing, intra-household bargaining power, and reduces the risk of health and poverty, as well as being a marker of status and identity and serving as a prevention against domestic violence (Agarwal, 2016; Deere et al., 2012; Deere & Doss, 2006; Doss et al., 2015; O’Laughlin, 2012; Panda & Agarwal, 2005; Rao, 2018; Yngström, 2002). As well as identifying a positive correlation between women’s access to landownership and greater gender equality, those scholars investigate diversified trajectories by questioning ‘the transforming potential’ of women’s land rights (Jackson, 2003, p. 453) and problematising ‘the relationship between stronger land rights and enhanced well-being’ (Walker, 2009, p. 468).

In their analyses of the causes of gender gaps in landownership, feminist research also develops various approaches. Assuming that the productive use of land requires mutuality and interdependence between male and female peasants, some scholars point to the needs of capital (i.e., commodification of nature) and their implications of ethnicity-based oppression as the main reasons for gendered landownership (Mitra & Rao, 2019; Rao, 2005). Critically engaging with the assumption that the family is a unit of harmonious interests and preferences, others consider the significance of gendered oppression and inequality within the peasant family. In doing so, these scholars emphasise the role of landowning male peasants in excluding women from landownership, for example, by discriminating against women in land inheritance, limiting women’s access to the resources, or utilising violence (Agarwal, 2016; Deere, 2001; Deere et al., 2012).

Nevertheless, reducing the dynamics of gendered landownership either to capitalism or masculinities shaped by capitalism and ethnicity-based oppression, the first approach summarised above fails to clarify why the commodification of nature results in various gendered outcomes in different countries, or why peasants with the dominant ethnic background experience the matching gendered patterns of agriculture. While invaluable in revealing the determinants of gendered landownership and the implications for gender inequality, the second approach tends to overlook the significance of patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture for the proletarianization process, and as such, obscures the nexus between rural and urban gender regimes. The exception is an early study of Agarwal in which she elaborates on the connections between the ‘slow, uneven, and highly gendered’ agrarian transformation in India and the gendered patterns of agriculture (2003, p. 191). She argues that women’s domestic work, lower mobility, and lesser education limit their access to paid employment leading to gender gaps in the shift of labour from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. By adopting the widely accepted assumption that the key determinant of proletarianization is the capitalist sectors’ capacity to absorb the surplus labour in agriculture, Agarwal, however, limits her assessment to the gendered barriers to such absorption. Instead, I argue that under the conditions in which women’s exclusion from landownership is associated with the predominance of small landownership, gendered property and labour relations in agriculture effectively shape proletarianization.

2.3. Limitations of the social reproduction approach

Feminist theories on social reproduction provide an historical account of the separation between the spheres of production and reproduction arguing that during the transition to capitalism ‘the activities to reproduce life (unwaged) and the activities to produce commodities (waged) grew to be strictly separated and the latter began to determine the former’ (Bhattacharya, 2017, p. 18). In this respect, Federici (2014/1998) argues that women’s reproductive labour within the home is a precondition for the capitalist exploitation of wage labour. Capitalism therefore sustained women’s reproductive labour by establishing a new sexual division of labour. This sexual division of labour, she says, excluded women from free wage labour and subordinated women to men. Drawing on this approach, Arruzza attributes ‘a determining role to class exploitation’, whereas Giménez argues that as the dominant mode of production, capitalism determines human reproduction or mode of reproduction, therefore the subordination of reproduction to production is common to all capitalist societies (Giménez, 2018; Arruzza, 2016, p. 15). In explaining the roots of women’s oppression, these scholars also investigate ‘capital’s dependence upon biological processes specific to women – pregnancy, childbirth, lactation – to secure the reproduction of the working-class’ (Ferguson & McNally, 2014, p. 29).

Analysing the ways in which household production is embedded in global value chains, other scholars, however, find that the notion of an analytical divide between production and reproduction is incorrect (Dunaway, 2014; Naz & Bögenhold, 2020; O’Laughlin, 2012; Sen, 2019). Calling for a more holistic understanding of socio-economic activity, Dunaway suggests that ‘the productive and reproductive spheres are inextricably linked and overlapping’ (2014, p. 5). Winders and Smith (2018), furthermore, claim that early debates on social reproduction are based on the experience of US, Canadian, British, and Italian women in white working class families in industrial cities. Other historical and geographical contexts, they suggest, point to different theoretical directions to the social reproduction approach. In addition, according to Winders and Smith, the wider scope recently adopted serves to shed light on the roles of neoliberalism, the state, and global governance but, at the same time, loses a focus on the patriarchal character of the household.

Delphy’s critique addresses an important methodological problem associated with the social reproduction approach (Delphy, 2016/1984). She argues that in the analysis of social reproduction, the capitalist system of production is positioned as the key determinant of social change. This positioning means the dynamics of social reproduction are subordinated to capitalist production and gendered oppression is understood as a consequence of capitalism thereby obscuring patriarchal relations of production and reproduction. Theories on social reproduction, Delphy (1992) states, remain gender blind by failing to explain why it is almost exclusively women who are responsible for social reproduction. Building on Delphy’s critique, Jackson (1999) argues that this approach tends to sustain biological essentialism by reducing the dynamics of a gendered division of labour to women’s reproductive abilities.

Overall, the social reproduction approach appears to have three major limitations which prevent a detailed account of the patriarchal powers of dispossession and labour exploitation in agriculture. The first being the assumption of a one-sided deterministic relationship in which capitalist relations of labour dictate patriarchal labour relations; the second, the expectation that the Western trajectory is the only possible trajectory for socio-economic transformation; and the third, biological essentialism.

3. Rethinking the problem

All paths of agrarian transformation are gendered, but in different ways. As Doss et al. (2015) argue, the dominance of small landownership in conjunction with women’s exclusion from landownership results in differently gendered outcomes to those associated with large-scale capitalist farms hiring wage labour. Drawing on this differentiation, I investigate the role played by patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture examining the significant gender gaps in the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural employment and looking at how landowning male peasants escape proletarianization. I also explore the way women’s unpaid family labour puts upward pressure on urban wages by increasing earnings in agriculture.

Considering the gendered patterns of agriculture, I further argue that self-exploitation of the peasantry occurs only when a landowning male peasant, in his position as a household head and small-producer, lacks the necessary means to sustain the gender-based division of labour, therefore all family members work equally on the land and have equal access to the products of their labour. Nonetheless, in the third volume of Capital, Marx emphasises the possibility of small-producers obtaining the means ‘whereby he may exploit the labour of others’ (1976/1867, p. 931). Drawing on his analysis, I argue that exploitation of women’s unpaid family labour in agriculture gives rise to a patriarchal farmer. Building on the original concept developed by Lenin (1977), I argue that the patriarchal peasant is a landowning male peasant, who can sustain a strong gender-based division of labour and appropriate the surplus produced by women’s unpaid family labour. Patriarchal relations of labour, in turn, allow for a certain level of accumulation. With this accumulation, the patriarchal peasantry might increase their capacity of sharecropping or contractual farming by investing in labour saving technologies. Considering that a farmer is a bourgeois farmer only if he hires the labour of others (full time or seasonal), I argue that as long as a farmer exploits women’s unpaid labour (on his own land or on the land of others) his status remains patriarchal rather than bourgeois.

My conceptual framework draws on theories of multiple inequality regimes which propose a mutually shaping relationship between the systems of gender, class and race inequalities (Folbre, 2020; Galerant & Kergoat, 2014; Walby, 2020). Rejecting the assumption that the dynamics of capitalist transformation are the only determinants of social change, I therefore suggest that the distinguishing characteristics of gender or class based dispossession and labour exploitation give rise to patriarchal or capitalist systems, which shape every aspect of socio-economic transformation (Kocabicak, 2022). Conceptualising a mutually shaping relationship between the patriarchal and capitalist powers of dispossession and labour exploitation, I provide a detailed analysis of a particular case in which the gendered patterns of production prevent large-scale capitalist farms and wage labour. Under such conditions, men in their roles as both household heads and as small-producers exchange the agrarian surplus produced by women’s unpaid family labour, thereby forcing women to produce for the market. The products of women’s unpaid labour are not limited to non-market goods and services but circulated based on the capitalist relations of exchange within the market. This process, in turn, effectively limits women’s mobility and access to education, and prevents female paid employment in non-agricultural sectors.

4. Methodology

I assess the extent to which women are excluded from landownership in Turkey and how this exclusion shapes socio-economic transformation by drawing on qualitative and quantitative analyses. Using different forms of evidence allows for a more robust analysis since it enables verification of sources and means that gaps in certain data sets are addressed. For example, the FAO Gender and Land Rights database provides sex-disaggregated data on ownership and control over agrarian land, but does not include Turkey; historical sex-disaggregated landownership data is not collected for any country (Doss et al., 2015). In the absence of adequate statistical data on gendered landownership, I analyse land inheritance law since these laws are crucial in shaping women’s access to agrarian land. Document analysis, including the analysis of official documents derived from the state, is accepted as a qualitative research method (Bowen, 2009). Considering that evidence comprises work which has drawn on the regulations and policy framework, as well as the land inheritance laws, such as the 1926 Turkish Civil Code and the Obligations Law, and the Turkish Civil Code of 2001, my research draws on the qualitative method. The period studied is from the early decades of the Republican period onwards (1923–2015).

Alternative to the assumption that the dynamics of capitalist transformation are the only determinants of social change, I investigate the role of patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture in shaping socio-economic transformation. My comparative analysis considers two main variables: the level of economic development and gender gaps in agricultural production. I identify the ways the Turkish trajectory of social change is different to that observed in countries which share a similar level of economic development but have differently gendered patterns of agriculture. I further compare Turkey with countries which have a similar gendered pattern of agriculture to examine the extent to which this pattern brings about convergence in the trajectories of less developed countries. In this way, the comparison of Turkey with the selected countries allows the implications of patriarchal property and labour relations to be differentiated. Countries were selected on the basis of the following criteria:

1. The level of economic development: I differentiate countries having a similar level of economic development to Turkey by calculating manufacturing, value added (% of GDP); energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita); GDP and GNI per capita (constant 2010 US$). Countries missing historical data (1960s-current) are removed out of my analysis. Considering the significance of oil revenues in diversifying the trajectories of social change (Karshenas & Moghadam, 2001), I also exclude oil rich countries from my selection.

2. The gender gaps in agricultural production: I examine agricultural holdings by size (% of total) rather than using land distribution amongst landowners. The latter measures class-based inequalities whereas the former sheds light on gender-based inequalities. Employment in agriculture and contributing family workers is examined by sex to assess the labour supply of unpaid family workers in the households of landowning farmers.

   Table

   Group A
   Countries sharing a similar level of economic development to Turkey but characterized by large-scale capitalist farms and paid labour in agriculture	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, and South Africa
   Group B
   Less developed countries characterized by the dominance of small landownership and women’s unpaid family labour in agriculture	Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Morocco, and Pakistan

The period considered (1960s- current) includes increased agrarian commercialisation and thus enables investigation of the interaction between the patriarchal relations of production in agriculture and the capitalist relations of exchange in the market. I draw on statistics from the publicly available databases of the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations, the ILO, and the Turkish statistics office. I further draw on evidence provided by the FAO’s World Census of Agriculture, and datasets and reports provided by the Ministry of Agriculture.

5. Data analysis

Drawing on qualitative and quantitative analyses, in this section I examine the extent to which women are excluded from landownership and how this exclusion shapes socio-economic transformation in Turkey.

5.1. Patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture

During the early decades of the Republican period, the state took significant steps in eliminating legal discrimination against women in education, paid employment, and property ownership. The Civil Code and the Obligations Law (1926–2002) in particular is glorified as one of the pillars of gender equality and Turkish secular modernisation. However, evidence of legal discrimination against women in land inheritance points to continuity between the Ottoman and the Republican periods.

Female peasants, in the Ottoman Empire, were initially excluded from the inheritance of land under cultivation (the miri land), but male peasants had hereditary rights on the land. During the 16^th century, women had a certain level of access to landownership but were still lawfully discriminated; in order to inherit the miri land, daughters, sisters, or mothers had to pay (tapu) tax, while men did not. This discrepancy constituted legal discrimination against women in ownership of agricultural land. Gender-based discrimination in inheritance of agrarian land continued under the Turkish civil code (1926–2002). The code regulated the inheritance of small-scale land differently to large-scale land and passed land under a certain scale directly to the son. According to the 1926 civil code, only under the following circumstances, a daughter could inherit her father’s land: if none of her brothers wanted the land, and if she or her husband were eligible to cultivate the land, supervise the agrarian holding and demanded to do so. This discriminatory article of the initial civil code was replaced with an ambiguous eligibility criterion by the new civil code in 2002. Nevertheless, until 2015, when the Ministry of Agriculture announced a point-based eligibility system, such ambiguous criteria remained in place. Despite its limitations, the 2015 system represents the most gender-equal law in land inheritance. In sum, legal discrimination against women in land inheritance has sustained women’s exclusion from agricultural land across the Ottoman and the Republican periods.

Research shows that women’s exclusion from landownership leads to a strong gender-based division of labour in agriculture, thereby sustaining the patriarchal exploitation of women’s labour. Men tend to handle commercial and bureaucratic tasks whereas women are responsible for the heaviest and most labour-intensive and repetitive tasks (Ecevit, 1993; Hoşgör-Gündüz & Smits, 2007; Karkıner, 2009; Morvaridi, 1992; Onaran-İncirlioğlu, 1999). Male peasants, further, use control over the agrarian surplus to their advantage by, for example, spending more time and money on leisure, eating more and having more nutritious food than women, and having greater luxury consumption (Kandiyoti, 1990). Agrarian technologies or changes in cultivated goods do not appear to challenge the landowning male peasants’ position as appropriators nor the female peasants’ position as direct producers (Hoşgör-Gündüz & Smits, 2007; Karkıner, 2009; Morvaridi, 1992) but instead seem to sharpen the gender-based division of labour in agriculture (Hoşgör-Gündüz, 2014).

Evidence provided in Tables 1 and 2 (below) supports the above findings: that a pattern of small landownership along with women’s exclusion from landownership leads to large gender gaps in unpaid family work. Table 1 shows that the percentage of large-scale farms (larger than 20 hectares) in total agricultural holdings in Turkey and Group B countries is much smaller than in Group A countries. Moreover, historical evidence demonstrates that the proportion of large-scale farms in Turkey, India and Pakistan has remained stable over time. As Table 2 (below) demonstrates, women’s exclusion from landownership in conjunction with the predominance of small landownership leads to gender inequality in unpaid family work in Turkey and Group B countries, whereas the dominance of large-scale farms does not have the same gendered outcomes in Group A countries.

Table 1. Agrarian structure

	Agricultural Holdings, by size (% of total, hectares)
		Year of survey	Very small scale farms (0,1–5)	Small and middle scale farms (5–20)	Large scale farms (larger than 20)
Group A countries	Argentina	1988	15	20	66	100
	Brazil	1996	37	27	35	100
	Chile	1997	43	31	25	100
	Malaysia	2009	85% of total agrarian land is cultivated by large scale agricultural holdings (larger than 40 hectares).
	South Africa	1988	2	5	93	100
	Turkey	2001	65	29	6	100
Group B countries	Bangladesh	2008	87% of agricultural holdings are smaller than 6 hectares
	Egypt	1999–2000	99	1	0	100
	India	2001	95	4	0	100
	Morocco	1996	71	25	4	100
	Pakistan	2000	86	13	2	100
	Agricultural Holdings, by size, over time (% of total, hectares)
		Year of survey	Very small scale farms (0,1–5)	Small and Middle scale farms (5–20)	Large scale farms (larger than 20)
	India	1971	89	11	1	100
		2001	95	4	0	100
	Pakistan	1971–73	68	29	3	100
		2000	86	13	2	100
	Turkey	1980	62	32	6	100
		2001	65	29	6	100
	Turkey, Agricultural Holdings, by size, over time (% of total, hectares)
	Year of survey		Very small scale farms (0.1–4.9)	Small and Middle scale farms (5–19.9)	Large scale farms (larger than 20)
	1950		62	32	6	100
	1963		69	28	4	100
	2001		65	29	6	100
	2006		64	29	6	99

Note: In 2006, 1% of agricultural holdings do not own land in Turkey.

Sources: Data is calculated from the existing databases and reports provided by the FAO and the Turkish Statistical Institute (FAO, 2013, 2001; TURKSTAT, 2011a, 2011b)

Table 2. Gender gaps within unpaid family work

		Group A countries						Group B countries
		Argent.	Brazil	Chile	Malay.	S.Africa	Turkey	Bangla.	Egypt	India	Morocco	Pakistan
Contributing family workers, by sex (% of women and men employment) (modelled ILO estimate)
1990–94	Female	2	13	5	13	2	60	59	33	35	33	62
	Male	1	6	3	3	1	20	11	9	14	18	18
1995–99	Female	2	8	4	13	1	57	58	27	34	54	61
	Male	1	4	2	3	1	16	10	9	14	18	16
2000–04	Female	2	9	4	10	1	45	62	24	41	54	49
	Male	1	5	1	2	1	8	9	8	14	24	17
2005–09	Female	1	8	3	8	1	36	59	33	37	53	61
	Male	1	4	1	3	0	5	8	9	12	18	18
2010–14	Female	1	5	5	8	1	33	45	32	31	48	60
	Male	1	2	3	2	0	5	6	6	10	13	15
2015–19	Female	1	4	4	8	1	26	34	27	48	48	55
	Male	0	1	3	2	0	4	4	5	8	13	15
Employment in agriculture, by sex (% of women and men employment) (modelled ILO estimate)
1990–94	Female	0	24	6	20	18	72	89	46	76	35	69
	Male	1	30	23	24	17	33	63	32	58	42	45
1995–99	Female	0	20	5	15	18	68	82	33	75	48	68
	Male	1	27	20	21	17	31	61	31	56	41	43
2000–04	Female	1	16	5	12	10	58	69	37	73	57	69
	Male	1	24	18	17	13	25	53	28	53	40	41
2005–09	Female	0	14	6	10	6	42	68	46	69	61	72
	Male	2	22	16	17	8	17	42	28	48	36	37
2010–14	Female	0	8	5	8	4	37	60	42	62	59	74
	Male	1	17	13	16	6	17	42	25	44	32	34
2015–19	Female	0	4	5	7	4	29	61	39	58	59	73
	Male	0	14	13	14	7	15	33	22	41	32	33

Source: Data is calculated from the database provided by the World Bank (WDI, 2020)

Moreover, evidence illustrated in Figure 1 (below) suggests that the female labour force participation rate is much lower in Turkey than in Group A countries and instead tends to reflect that found in Group B countries (1995–2009). Next, I investigate whether patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture prevent the movement of female labour from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors.

Figure 1. Female labour force participation rate (% of female population ages 15–64).

Source: Data is calculated from the database provided by the World Bank (WDI, 2020)

5.2. Gendered patterns of the proletarianization process

I identify four major ways in which the gendered patterns of agriculture prevent female paid employment in Turkey: Firstly, women, in their position as mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters, are kept in agriculture and continue to work as unpaid family workers. In contrast, younger men, who are disadvantaged in relation to their elder brother(s) concerning land inheritance, are encouraged to gain an education, migrate to urban areas, and join paid employment. However, the only way for women to migrate to urban areas is marriage (Erman, 2001; Kentel, Emre-Öğün, & Öztürk, 2017; Öztürk, Topaloğlu, Hilton, & Jongerden, 2017). As it is a precondition of marriage to rural women, husbands of immigrant brides are often single male breadwinners providing regular income either as wageworkers or self-employed (Erman, 1998). The patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture, therefore, give rise to gendered patterns of rural to urban migration and, as such, are a significant barrier to the movement of female labour from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors.

Secondly, girls’ access to education in rural areas is more restricted than that of boys (Dayıoğlu, 2005) meaning that immigrant brides who migrate to urban areas are disadvantaged in finding paid employment since they are less able to compete with their more educated male counterparts. Even when husbands’ limited incomes push women to join the labour market, rural migrant women are unlikely to find employment other than domestic or home-based work (Erman, 1998). Less educated migrant women can only access informal unskilled jobs which, in turn, destabilises any involvement in paid employment. Karkıner (2009) also suggests that rural women are aware that the likelihood of finding jobs in cities is very low so marriage is seen as the only way to migrate and leave behind the heavy workload. Immigrant brides’ limited access to education is therefore a barrier to female paid employment in non-agricultural sectors.

Thirdly, immigrant rural women continue to work as seasonal unpaid family workers in their fathers’, brothers’, or in-laws’ farms (Erman, 2001, 1998). They are not therefore completely free from patriarchal labour relations in agriculture which means attachment to formal employment in non-agricultural sectors is precarious.

Lastly, considering that one third of rural migrants migrate within the same agrarian or semi-agrarian city (Kentel et al., 2017), rural women’s exclusion from the public sphere supports male merchants in excluding women from agrarian commerce (Hoşgör-Gündüz & Smits, 2007). Such exclusion further contributes to the low level of female paid employment in those agrarian and semi-agrarian cities.

Patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture appear to play a considerable role in preventing female paid employment by limiting women’s mobility and access to education and establishing the gendered patterns of rural to urban migration. In order to assess the extent of this limitation, I draw on comparative analysis of gender gaps in education and paid employment. As Table 3 (below) shows, Turkey has waited for several decades to catch up with Group A countries with respect to gender gaps in primary and secondary education, and still has high gender gaps in tertiary education. At the same time, gender gaps in education in Turkey appear to converge towards Group B countries despite their lower level of economic development.

Table 3. Gender gaps in education

	Group A countries						Group B countries
	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Malaysia	S.Africa	Turkey	Bangladesh	Egypt	India	Morocco	Pakistan
School enrolment, primary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)
1970–74	1.0	..	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4
1975–79	1.0	..	1.0	1.0	..	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5
1980–84	1.0	..	1.0	1.0	..	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5
1985–89	1.0	..	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5
1990–94	1.0	..	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.5
1995–99	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	..	0.9	0.8	0.8	..
2000–04	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	..	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.7
2005–09	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8
2010–14	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9
2015–19	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9
School enrolment, secondary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)
1970–74	1.1	..	1.1	0.7	..	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3
1975–79	1.1	..	1.1	0.9	..	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.3
1980–84	1.1	..	1.1	1.0	..	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.4
1985–89	1.1	..	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.4
1990–94	..	..	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.5
1995–99	1.1	..	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.8	..
2000–04	1.1	1.1	1.0	..	1.1	0.7	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	..
2005–09	1.1	1.1	1.0	..	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8
2010–14	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8
2015–19	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8
School enrolment, tertiary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)
1970–74	0.8	..	0.6	..	..	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3
1975–79	1.0	..	0.7	0.6	..	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4
1980–84	1.1	..	0.8	0.8	..	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4	.	0.4
1985–89	1.1	..	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
1990–94	..	..	0.9	..	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.3
1995–99	1.6	1.2	0.9	..	..	0.6	0.5	..	0.6	0.7	..
2000–04	1.5	1.3	0.9	..	..	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8
2005–09	1.5	1.3	1.0	..	..	0.8	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.9
2010–14	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.4	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0
2015–19	1.7	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.4	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9

Notes: The Gender Parity Index (GPI) indicates the level of parity between girls and boys. A GPI of less than 1 suggests girls are more disadvantaged than boys in learning opportunities and a GPI of greater than 1 suggests the reverse.

Source: Data is calculated from the database provided by the World Bank (WDI, 2020)

Furthermore, Figure 2 (below) points to a significant gap between Turkey and Group A countries regarding the proportion of women with lower and upper secondary levels of education; there is no such a gap with respect to men’s educational attainment. This means that working class women’s access to secondary education in Turkey is more limited than it is Group A countries. The evidence illustrated in Figure 2 supports the argument that the female labour force in Turkey is divided between two poles (Çınar, 1994): women with tertiary level education and women with primary education. The former group occupies qualified jobs in non-agricultural sectors, whereas the latter group works as unpaid family workers in agriculture with restricted mobility and limited access to education and paid employment. Increases in the female labour force participation rate in Turkey are largely due to the former group of women gaining employment in non-agrarian cities.

Figure 2. Educational attainment.

Sources: Data is calculated from the database provided by the World Bank and the International Standard Classification of Education (WDI, 2020; ISCED, 2012)

Table 4 (below) provides support to the above findings that gendered property and labour relations in agriculture constitute a significant barrier to the movement of women’s labour from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. As the table shows, historically, Group A countries have had a higher share of women in waged employment in the non-agricultural sectors than Turkey. Although the majority of women’s employment in Group A has shifted towards non-agricultural sectors before or around the same time as that of men’s, in Turkey women’s employment has remained in agriculture for longer than their male counterparts, i.e. men’s employment in Turkey shifted almost 30 years before that of women. The table also shows that gender gaps in paid employment in Turkey tend to converge with the less developed Group B countries where there are large gender gaps in the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural employment.

Table 4. Gender gaps in paid employment

Share of women in waged employment in the non-agricultural sector (% of total non-agricultural employment)
			1980–84	1985–89	1990–94	1995–99	2000–04	2005–09	2010–14	2015–17
Argentina			..	..	..	..	..	..	41	42
Brazil			37	39	41	42	44	45	45	45
Chile			35	35	36	37	37	31	42	43
Malaysia			32	35	35	35	37	38	39	40
South Africa			..	..	..	..	43	44	44	44
Turkey			11	13	14	15	20	22	24	27
Bangladesh			19	25	18	23	21	15	22	20
Egypt			13	18	17	17	17	16	16	17
India			..	..	13	15	17	19	19	..
Morocco			..	..	21	..	23	21	21	..
Pakistan			..	6	8	8	8	10	10	11
Employment in agriculture, by sex (% of total female and male employment) (modelled ILO estimate)
		1957–65	1970–72	1980–82	1990–94	1995–99	2000–04	2005–09	2010–14	2015–17
Argentina	Fem.	5	4	3	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Male	22	19	15	1	1	1	2	1	1
Brazil	Fem.	30	20	14	24	20	16	14	8	5
	Male	57	51	36	30	27	24	22	17	14
Chile	Fem.	4	3	2	6	5	5	6	5	5
	Male	34	27	23	23	20	18	16	13	13
Malaysia	Fem.	76	55	39	20	15	12	10	8	7
	Male	52	44	31	24	21	17	17	16	14
S.Africa	Fem.	15	26	11	18	18	10	6	4	4
	Male	34	29	17	17	17	13	8	6	7
Turkey	Fem.	94	89	86	72	68	58	42	37	29
	Male	58	54	42	33	31	25	17	17	15
Bangla.	Fem.	92	70	59	89	82	69	68	60	62
	Male	85	77	59	63	61	53	42	42	33
Egypt	Fem.	44	..	..	46	33	37	46	42	39
	Male	58	..	..	32	31	28	28	25	22
India	Fem.	82	83	76	76	75	73	69	62	57
	Male	68	70	63	58	56	53	48	44	39
Morocco	Fem.	42	..	31	35	48	57	61	59	57
	Male	65	..	41	42	41	40	36	32	31
Pakistan	Fem.	71	..	..	69	68	69	72	74	73
	Male	59	53	52	45	43	41	37	34	33

Sources: Data is calculated from the databases provided by the World Bank and ILO (ILOSTAT, 2020; WDI, 2020). Data between the 1960s and the 1980s are calculated from the dataset provided by the ILO (1990).

In light of the evidence investigated thus far, patriarchal control over women in agriculture appears to lead to a reduction of female paid employment in the non-agricultural sectors. Women are kept in small-medium scale farms as unpaid family workers, they have limited mobility and reduced access to education. A woman can only migrate to urban areas as the wife of a male breadwinner, whereas men migrate for education and paid employment. This gendered pattern of urban to rural migration in Turkey is different to that found in other countries which share a similar level of economic development.

5.3. Geopolitics of patriarchal property and labour relations

Conventional methods of differentiating rural from urban populations do not consider agrarian and semi-agrarian cities so thereby overlook the significance of gendered property and labour relations in agriculture. The dominance of small landownership gives rise to agrarian and semi-agrarian cities, where the main economic activity is agrarian commerce (e.g., merchandise, trade, transportation, warehousing). Here I differentiate agrarian and semi-agrarian cities from non-agrarian cities by investigating share of agriculture in GDP (%), women’s access to education, and gender gaps in the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural employment across all 26 regions of Turkey. Table 5 (below) demonstrates that whilst the majority of male employment is in non-agricultural sectors in all regions, female employment is mostly in agriculture in half of those regions. While there are some regions where a shift towards female paid employment has been initiated (İstanbul-TR10, Ankara-TR51, İzmir-TR31, Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik-TR41, Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli-TR21), and women’s access to education and paid employment in these regions is higher than others, these non-agrarian regions account for only 38% of the total population (in 2018) (TURKSTAT, 2020a). This means that patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture impact 60% of the total population who live in agrarian and semi-agrarian cities where women’s mobility and access to education and paid employment is more restricted than in non-agrarian cities.

Table 5. Gendered analysis of agrarian and semi-agrarian cities, Turkey (2018)

		Share of Agriculture in				Female Labour Force
		female employment (% of total employed, 15+)	male employment (% of total employed, 15+)	Share of agriculture in GDP (%)	Rate of net migration average (‰)	illiterate (% of total, 15+)	with secondary education (% of total, 15+)	tertiary education (% of total, 15+)
Agrarian cities	Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan-TRA2	76	44	27	−16	33	7	11
	Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari-TRB2	60	28	17	−15	28	12	16
	Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane-TR90	59	30	10	−25	12	15	20
	Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya-TR83	56	34	14	−4	14	12	18
	Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop-TR82	56	39	17	−42	12	10	18
	Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır-TRC2	54	29	18	−7	30	12	20
	Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt-TRA1	54	28	16	−5	14	10	25
	Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli-TRB1	52	26	10	−13	19	12	23
	Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın-TR81	48	24	4	−8	11	12	23
	Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak-TR33	43	25	15	0	7	15	22
Semi-agrarian cities	Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir-TR71	42	23	19	−10	7	14	24
	Konya, Karaman-TR52	40	20	18	−2	7	12	22
	Balıkesir, Çanakkale-TR22	36	25	13	2	4	17	25
	Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat-TR72	36	18	10	−12	9	15	28
	Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye-TR63	34	20	8	−6	13	16	20
	Aydın, Denizli, Muğla-TR32	34	22	12	3	4	17	26
	Antalya, Isparta, Burdur-TR61	27	15	9	2	3	18	30
	Adana, Mersin-TR62	26	16	10	−2	6	22	28
	Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis-TRC1	23	13	8	−9	11	16	31
	Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova-TR42	22	12	3	5	4	19	29
Non-agrarian cities	Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt-TRC3	19	13	11	−9	19	17	25
	Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli-TR21	17	16	7	4	3	20	26
	Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik-TR41	14	10	5	5	3	21	31
	İzmir-TR31	11	7	4	5	3	19	39
	Ankara-TR51	4	4	2	10	1	20	47
	İstanbul-TR10	1	1	0	8	2	21	40

Note: The Kurdish-populated provinces are also diversified based on the patriarchal labour relations in agriculture. Further research is required to investigate the mutual interaction between the ethniticy and gender based oppression.

Source: Data is calculated from the database provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT, 2020c)

5.4. Urban wage levels and labour supply constraint

There are two approaches analysing the relationship between the dominance of small landownership and urban wage levels in Turkey: the first one suggesting that small landownership led to semi-proletarianization and access to rural income subsidised the low level of urban wages (Gürel, 2011; Köymen, 2008), whereas the second proposes that small landownership and rural income put upward pressure on urban wage levels (Keyder, 1987; Oyvat, 2016). Figure 3 (below) demonstrates that manufacturing wages in Turkey used to be higher than Brazil, Chile, and Malaysia until 2000–2004. Considering that since the 1970s, Turkey has had a lower number of strikes and lockouts in comparison to Group A countries (ILOSTAT, 2020), class struggle does not seem to be the key factor placing upward pressure on wages. Furthermore, evidence demonstrated in Table 5 (above) supports the argument that small landownership prevents overurbanization (Oyvat, 2016). I suggest that the gendered patterns of property and labour relations play a considerable role in increasing agricultural earnings, preventing overurbanisation, and thereby putting upward pressure on wage levels in the non-agricultural sectors.

Figure 3. Real wages and salaries per employee in total manufacturing (international $).

Notes: (1) For the time period between 1963 and 1990, national currency is converted into the US$ using PPP over GDP (in national currency units per US$) and 1 US dollar (US$) = 1 international dollar (I$). (2) For the time period from 1990 onwards, national currency is converted into international $ using PPP conversion factor, private consumption (LCU per international $)Source: Data is calculated from the databases provided by the UN, Penn World Table and the World Bank (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2012; INDSTAT2, 2019; WDI, 2020)

Established methods of calculating rural income, however, conceal the significance of women’s unpaid family labour by measuring productivity rather than household income. Large scale capitalist farms are more productive than the patriarchal family farms, which thus lead to higher levels of rural income per capita or agricultural value added per capita. In order to assess household earnings in agriculture, I examine the ownership of mechanical technologies, and find that since the mid-1970s, Turkey has had a higher number of tractors (in use) than Argentina, Chile, Malaysia and South Africa. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, the highest number of tractors are in Turkish agriculture in comparison to the entire Group A countries (WDI, 2020). Despite the country’s lower level of rural income per capita, small-medium scale farms in Turkey seem to achieve a certain level of accumulation, and as such, this indicates the significance of women’s unpaid family labour for household earnings in agriculture.

Relatively high levels of rural household earnings and the absence of overurbanization appear to correlate with a certain level of labour supply constraint. Table 6 (below) shows that the labour force participation rate has remained more or less at the same level in Turkey whereas it has increased considerably in Group A countries during the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural employment. Turkey’s lower labour force participation rate in comparison to Group A countries implies that the labour supply is constrained.

Table 6. Labour force participation

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Malaysia	S. Africa	Turkey
Labour force participation rate, total (% of total working age population)
1952–55	..	..	36	..	..	51
1960	38	32	32	39	36	47
1970	39	32	28	33	37	43
1980	36	36	27	39	35	43
Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate)
1990–94	60	63	55	62	54	55
1995–99	61	64	55	62	53	52
2000–04	62	66	55	61	53	48
2005–09	62	67	57	61	54	46
2010–14	60	65	62	62	53	49
2015–19	60	64	62	64	55	51

Sources: Data between the 1950s and the 1980s are calculated from the database provided by the ILO (1990) and the rest from the World Bank (WDI, 2020)

Drawing on the above analysis, women’s exclusion from landownership in conjunction with the dominance of small landownership appears to have: (1) limited women’s mobility, access to education, and paid employment, (2) constrained labour supply by supporting landowning male peasants to escape proletarianization, and by developing significant gender gaps within the proletarianization process, and (3) placed upward pressure on capitalist wages by increasing earnings in agriculture. The comparison of Turkey with Group A and B countries shows that the Turkish trajectory of social change diverges away from the more gender equal path characteristic of the middle-income countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, and South Africa) which share the same level of economic development to Turkey but have differently gendered patterns of agriculture. Instead, the Turkish trajectory seems to converge towards the more gender unequal path found in the low-income countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, India, and Pakistan) which have similarly gendered patterns of agriculture to Turkey. My analysis, therefore, suggests that the trajectory witnessed in Turkey cannot be fully explained by the dynamics of capitalist transformation; rather, patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture need to be considered as key determinants of socio-economic transformation.

6. Determinants of patriarchal agriculture in Turkey

Research on the dynamics of agrarian change in Turkey focuses on the role of capitalist development in initiating a rapid de-ruralisation (Keyder &Yenal, 2011), establishing semi-proletarianization in rural areas (Kentel et al., 2017; Öztürk et al., 2017), increasing the prevalence of wage labour through contract farming (Gürel, Küçük, & Taş, 2019), or introducing the process of de-agrarianization – led by the Turkish state and the transnational agribusiness companies (Aydın, 2010). Since the 2000s, the peasantry has increasingly faced the market-mediated forces of dispossession. However, the gendered patterns of agriculture which are pivotal in accounting for the dynamics of agrarian change in Turkey have hitherto been neglected.

Under the conditions of patriarchal property and labour relations, the prevalence of wage labour in agriculture remains limited. The main survival strategy of small-medium scale farms under neoliberal policies is the intensification of women’s exploitation – female peasants work for longer hours and handle heavier tasks (Karkıner, 2009; Kulak, 2011). Indeed, in 2019 the share of paid workers (including seasonal workers) in the total agricultural workforce was 11%, whereas 88% of agricultural workers fell within the category of self-employed, including unpaid family workers (TURKSTAT, 2020b). This figure also shows that contract farming does not undermine patriarchal relations of labour by increasing the ratio of waged labour in agriculture. As previously argued, rather than hiring waged labour, the patriarchal peasantry controls women’s unpaid family labour on the land belonging to others.

Furthermore, although gender gaps in semi-proletarianization persist, the ratio of female to male members of rural households, whose major occupation is non-agricultural activity but having subsidiary occupation in agriculture, has increased considerably over time (TURKSTAT, 2001, 2006). The evidence suggests that semi-proletarianization is strongly linked to the limited proletarianization of women in rural areas. Whilst men are ‘free’ to migrate to non-agrarian cities and gain paid employment, patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture keep women’s permanent residence on the farm. Women’s restricted mobility limits their access to wage production to ateliers or factories close to the village (Suzuki-Him &Hoşgör-Gündüz, 2019). Semi-proletarianization is, therefore, developed alongside patriarchal labour relations in agriculture.

I propose that the political power of patriarchal peasantry is significant in shaping agrarian transformation by sustaining gendered property and labour relations. Research shows that peasant revolts, protests, and petitions during the Ottoman Empire and early Republican period, as well as electoral pressure through the ballot box in later periods comprise the key mechanisms for peasants to bargain with the state (Kocabicak, 2020). Contemporary policies also shed light on the extent of the peasantry’s bargaining power. Although the Turkish state has eliminated most of its agrarian incentives, it does not simply follow neoliberal policies; rather, the state has retained subsidies and quotas for some foreign crops, announced a certain level of protection against neoliberal seed systems, as well as introducing land consolidation projects which support farmers to increase their productivity and competitiveness (Köse, 2012; Nizam &Yenal, 2020; OECD, 2016, 2017). Whilst the political power of patriarchal peasantry has shaped the patriarchal character of the state, the Turkish state has itself utilized gender-based exclusionary strategies to gain the patriarchal peasants’ support for the regime (Kocabicak, 2020). This strategy has, in turn, maintained gendered property and labour relations in agriculture.

Furthermore, female peasants’ active struggle against their dispossession of rural property and the patriarchal exploitation of labour needs to be considered as an effective factor shaping agrarian transformation. Female peasants demonstrate a high level of organisational strength and resistance in various contexts (Acara, 2018; Kocabicak, 2018), and as such, indicate that not only male peasants, but also female peasants have some capacity to negotiate with the state and destabilize gendered patterns of agriculture.

In sum, the future of agriculture in Turkey does not depend only upon capitalist forces of dispossession; rather, the political power of patriarchal peasantry, the patriarchal character of the Turkish state, and women’s struggle are also significant.

7. Concluding notes

This article demonstrates the significance of patriarchal property and labour relations in agriculture for socio-economic transformation by drawing on the case of Turkey. The legal dispossession of women of agricultural land (1926–2015) in conjunction with the dominance of small landownership led to a gender-based division of labour and patriarchal labour exploitation in agriculture. These conditions have given rise to significant gender gaps in the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural employment by limiting women’s mobility, access to education, and paid employment in non-agricultural sectors. Patriarchal property and labour relations have not only produced a considerable gender gap within the proletarianization process, but also supported landowning male peasants in escaping proletarianization which, in turn, constrained the labour supply. Women’s unpaid family labour within small-medium scale farms has, furthermore, put upward pressure on capitalist wages by increasing subsistence earnings in agriculture.

The neglect of patriarchal property and labour relations weakens the capacity of classical as well as Marxist political economists to identify the role of rural gender regimes in shaping trajectories of capitalist development. While development economists fail to analyse the ways in which the gendered patterns of property and labour relations in agriculture constitute a barrier to the movement of labour from agriculture to capitalist sectors, Marxist theories dismiss the significance of patriarchal dispossession and labour exploitation for agrarian social property relations. Immediate producers can defend their ownership of means of production either by mobilising collectively against the capitalist forces of dispossession or by utilising patriarchal forces of dispossession and exploitation against other producers. The former path makes them into revolutionaries, but the latter into patriarchs and, as such, there are different implications for state-formation, capital accumulation, civil society, and the cultural and religious conditions (Kocabicak, 2022, forthcoming).

In a context where agriculture in Turkey is highly commercialized and integrated into the local and global food chains, I argue that the Turkish trajectory neither refers to a delay in capitalist transition (the French path), nor represents a bourgeois peasant-led transition (the American path). Instead, I propose that agrarian transition in Turkey points to an integration of patriarchal relations of production and capitalist relations of exchange. Thus far, the political power of landowning male peasants has sustained this integration. The future does not only depend on the capitalist forces of dispossession but also upon the patriarchal forces of dispossession and the struggle between male and female peasants.

My investigation, furthermore, extends research on the gender gaps in asset ownership by differentiating gendered outcomes of the patriarchal peasantry and revealing the connections between women’s exclusion from landownership and paid employment in non-agricultural sectors. It also provides support for the argument that the separation of production from social reproduction is not the case for all women. Household production is not limited to care work or other forms of non-market goods and services. The political power of a patriarchal peasantry maintains the integration of patriarchal relations of production with capitalist relations of exchange; men as household heads and small-producers exchange the agrarian surplus produced by women’s unpaid labour, thereby forcing women to produce for the market. This paper thus concludes that the dynamics of patriarchal dispossession and labour exploitation cannot be ignored or subordinated to the dynamics of capitalism. The cost of disregarding the distinguishing features of patriarchal relations of labour is insupportable, particularly for social policy.

International policy frameworks separate rural women’s interests from those of urban women, thereby establishing two isolated policy domains: rural and urban. The argument proposed here suggests the necessity of a holistic policy approach, addressing gender inequality throughout the continuum between rural and urban areas. In this respect, the gendered patterns of rural to urban migration have a particular importance. As the ILO argues, ‘while one should not assume that all women want to work, it is safe to say that women want to be given the same freedom as men to choose work if they want to; and if they choose to work, they should have the same chance of finding decent jobs as men’ (ILO, 2008, p.2). Social policy frameworks should, therefore, put forward an exit package for women who want to quit agriculture and have paid employment in non-agricultural sectors. Previously, state-led women-only boarding schools in Turkey played a considerable role in increasing rural women’s access to secondary education and paid employment. With a swift U-turn away from neoliberal policies, the re-establishment of these measures should be a priority. Such an exit package would certainly increase female labour force participation but, at the same time, would likely create a battlefield between various actors rather than simply producing a win-win scenario. For example, the loss of women’s unpaid labour is an important problem for small-medium scale farms. Direct payments could compensate this loss in subsistence farming, but Turkey has a significant proportion of accumulation-oriented family farms that are integrated into local and international agro-food systems. Whilst the political power of the patriarchal peasantry constitutes a barrier, the feminist movement does have the capacity to align the separate agendas of rural and urban women and to thereby promote an exit package. It is this capacity that needs to be both recognised and realised for the achievement of greater gender equality in Turkey; the framework developed here aims to move us forward in this direction by enhancing understanding of the dynamics involved in socio-economic transformation.

Acknowledgement

I especially thank Valentine Moghadam, Massoud Karshenas, and other members of the ESRC funded Global Challenges Network (led from SOAS) for their support and constructive criticisms. I thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of my manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Kunal Sen, Yasemin Dildar, Eren Düzgün, Burak Gürel, Murat Öztürk, and Şemsa Özar for their feedback on the drafts of this manuscript.

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Ece Kocabicak

Ece Kocabicak is currently working as a Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Global Studies at the Open University. Her teaching and research engage with the contemporary debates in comparative sociology, feminist political economy, property, and international development. Her research expertise is on varieties of gender regimes; diversified trajectories of capitalist development; state formation; and the significance of political collective subjects for social change. Ece is currently working on her research monograph, titled “The Political Economy of Patriarchy in the Global South” (Routledge, Gender and Economics series, forthcoming)

Notes

1. Within the limitations of this paper, I do not address the ways in which the racist regime in Turkey interacts with the patriarchal and capitalist systems. A detailed discussion can be found in my research monograph (Kocabicak, 2022).