Governmental Politics in Consensus Democracies

Abstract

This contribution to the special issue on “The Boundedness of American FPA Theory” examines the scope of the Governmental Politics Model (GPM). Proponents of the GPM, which has been predominantly used in the context of the US system, claim that it is also applicable beyond the majoritarian democracies of North America. Taking up this claim, this article conducts a systematic analysis of the interconnection between consensus democracies and the emergence of governmental politics. It argues that certain features of consensus democracies—that is, the formation of coalition governments and the relative weakness of the head of government—are particularly conducive for the emergence of competing policy preferences between members of government and the ensuing bargaining processes among them, which in turn represent the very core of the GPM. This theoretical argument is illustrated by the decision of the German government to deploy armed forces to the European Union-led anti-piracy operation “Atalanta” off the coast of Somalia.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the Author

Klaus Brummer is Chair of International Relations at the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstdt, Germany. He was president of the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association (ISA) in 2015–2016. He currently serves as associate editor of the journal Foreign Policy Analysis. He has published in peer-reviewed journals such as Foreign Policy Analysis, Journal of European Public Policy, British Journal of Politics and International Relations and International Politics, and is co-editor with Valerie Hudson of Foreign Policy Analysis beyond North America (Lynne Rienner, 2015).

Notes

1. While Allison originally termed his model III “bureaucratic politics”, in both editions of Essence of Decision model III is referred to as “governmental politics”. For an overview, see Christopher Jones, “Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models”, in Robert A. Denemark (ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia (2010), available: <http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781444336597_chunk_g97814443365974_ss1-2> (accessed 11 January 2011).

2. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Harper Collins, 1971); Morton H. Halperin (with Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter), Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1974).

3. More recent publications include: Steve A. Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy: US Decision-Making and the Persian Gulf War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Qingmin Zhang, “The Bureaucratic Politics of US Arms Sales to Taiwan”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006), pp. 231–265; Matthew Fuhrmann and Bryan R. Early, “Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2008), pp. 21–44; Kevin Marsh, “Obama’s Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2014), pp. 265–288.

4. Kim Richard Nossal, “Allison through the (Ottawa) Looking Glass: Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy in a Parliamentary System”, Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1979), pp. 610–626.

5. See, for instance, Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); Karen Dawisha, “Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East: The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf War”, International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1 (1981), pp. 43–59.

6. Yaacov Vertzberger, “Bureaucratic-Organizational Politics and Information Processing in a Developing State”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1984), pp. 69–95.

7. Klaus Brummer, “The Bureaucratic Politics of Security Institution Reform”, German Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2009), pp. 501–518; Brummer, Die Innenpolitik der Außenpolitik: Die Große Koalition, Governmental Politics und Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013); Maria Elisabeth Rotter, Faktor Bürokratie: Der Einfluss bürokratischer Politik auf deutsche und amerikanische Demokratieförderung in Polen und der Ukraine (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011); William Wallace, “Old States and New Circumstances: The International Predicament of Britain, France and Germany”, in William Wallace and W.E. Paterson (eds.), Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe: A Comparative Approach (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978), pp. 31–55.

8. Garry Goertz and James Mahoney, “Scope in Case-Study Research”, in David Byrne and Charles C. Ragin (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Case-Based Methods (London: Sage, 2009), pp. 307–317.

9. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications”, World Politics, Vol. 24, Supplement (1972), p. 43.

10. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (2nd ed.) (New Haven, CN and London: Yale University Press, 2012).

11. Michael J. Brenner, “Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Policy”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1976), p. 332.

12. Lawrence Freedman, “Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Mode”, International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1976), p. 436.

13. According to Lijphart, the Canadian system is even more majoritarian than the US system. Lijphart, op. cit., pp. 305–306.

14. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.) (New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1999), p. 307.

15. Ibid., p. 298.

16. Klaus Brummer, “The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany’s Participation in EUFOR RD Congo”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2013), pp. 1–20.

17. Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 307.

18. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations (4th ed.) (New York: Free Press, 1997), p. 278.

19. Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis. Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), p. 78.

20. B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration (6th ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 214.

21. Ibid., p. 232.

22. Thomas Saalfeld, “Government and Politics”, in Richard Sakwa and Anne Stevens (eds.), Contemporary Europe (2nd ed.) (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 95–96.

23. Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 255.

24. Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp (with Arnold Kanter), Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (2nd ed.) (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), p. 40.

25. Peters, op. cit., p. 210.

26. Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 256.

27. Ibid., p. 300.

28. Halperin and Clapp, op. cit., pp. 111–112.

29. Ibid., p. 118.

30. Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 300.

31. Ibid., p. 255.

32. Ibid., p. 294.

33. Allison and Halperin, op. cit., pp. 70–71.

34. Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 306.

35. Ibid., p. 295.

36. Juliet Kaarbo, Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Choices (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2012), p. 7; see also Joe D. Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

37. Brian Rathbun, Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 15.

38. Similarly, Ozkececi-Taner hypothesised that a party’s commitment to a coalition might decrease the importance of ideas, or party ideology more generally, on coalition foreign policy making, which would also decrease the emergence of bureaucratic conflict. However, she could establish only limited empirical support for this hypothesis. Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, “The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in Coalition Foreign Policy Making: Turkey as an Example, 1991–2002”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2005), pp. 249–278.

39. Kaare Strøm and Benjamin Nyblade, “Coalition Theory and Government Formation”, in Charles Boix and Susan S. Stokes (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 783.

40. However, as one reviewer pointed out, this might ultimately be an empirical question rather than a conceptual one. Indeed, research on the role of foreign policy making in coalition governments has highlighted the at times quite significant influence of junior coalition parties in the crafting of coalition foreign policy, including the German case, which, in turn, has occasionally led to intra-governmental conflict. See, for instance, Juliet Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1996), pp. 501–530; Kai Oppermann and Klaus Brummer, “Patterns of Junior Partner Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2014), pp. 555–571.

41. Wolfgang C. Müller, “Governments and Bureaucracies”, in Daniele Caramani (ed.), Comparative Politics (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 154.

42. Christoph Egle and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, “Die Große Koalition—eine ‘Koalition der neuen Möglichkeiten’?”, in Christoph Egle and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (eds.), Die zweite Große Koalition: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2005–2009 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), p. 11. The other grand coalition government to date was between 1966 and 1969 under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU).

43. Lijphart, op. cit., p. 107.

44. Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 72.

45. Arnulf Baring, Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1969); Karlheinz Niclauß, Kanzlerdemokratie: Regierungsführung von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004).

46. Reinhard Bergmann, “Art. 64”, in Dieter Hömig (ed.), Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (8th ed.) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), p. 394.

47. Peters, op. cit., p. 204.

48. Saalfeld, op. cit., p. 94.

49. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 397.

50. Lijphart, op. cit., p. 107.

51. Germany’s contribution to Atalanta is also discussed, for instance, by Uhl as well as Paulus and Comnick, albeit without any explicit theoretical framework. Andreas Uhl, “Gemeinsam gegen die Piraten”, Internationale Politik, Vol. 64, No. 6 (2009), pp. 56–62; Andreas Paulus and Micha Comnick, “Rolle von Bundesmarine und Bundespolizei”, in Stefan Mair (ed.), Piraterie und maritime Sicherheit: Fallstudien zu Afrika, Südostasien und Lateinamerika sowie Beiträge zu politischen, militärischen, rechtlichen und ökonomischen Aspekten (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010), pp. 79–90.

52. The “absence” of Chancellor Merkel from the decision-making process was striking, all the more since the process dragged on for weeks. Even a high-ranking bureaucrat in the chancellery was unable to explain the reasons for her behaviour (Interview, Federal Chancellery, 4 March 2011). In any case, due to Merkel’s passivity, the following discussion focuses on the foreign minister and the defence minister.

53. International Maritime Organization, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report—2008, Document MSC.4/Circ. 133, 19 March 2009, p. 1.

54. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1838 (2008). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5987th Meeting, on 7 October 2008, Document S/RES/1838 (2008), 7 October 2008, preamble.

55. Official Journal of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union Military Operation to Contribute to the Deterrence, Prevention and Repression of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery off the Somali Coast, Document L 301/33–37, 12 November 2008.

56. Ibid., art. 2d.

57. Die Welt, “Bundesmarine soll künftig Piraten jagen dürfen”, 5 June 2008; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Soll man die Piratenschiffe entern oder im Meer versenken?”, 30 June 2008.

58. Details on the policy preferences of Schäuble and Zypries can be found in Brummer, Innenpolitik der Außenpolitik, op. cit., pp. 214–215.

59. This was how the State Secretary of the Ministry for the Interior, Hans Bernhard Beus, described the position of the government. Deutscher Bundestag, Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 21. Juli 2008 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 16/10047, 25 July 2008, p. 5.

60. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 7/8: July/August 2008, p. 46.

61. Ibid., p. 47.

62. Berliner Zeitung, “Soldaten gegen Piraten”, 5 June 2008.

63. Die Welt, “Bundeswehr investiert in Blankenese”, 27 August 2008.

64. Interview, Defence Ministry, 13 April 2011.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. A NATO-led operation would have been conducted within the framework of the “Standing NATO Maritime Group” (SNMG) to which Germany regularly—and without having to receive a prior mandate from the Bundestag—contributes vessels. In fact, since October 2008, NATO has conducted three successive operations (“Allied Provider”, “Allied Protector” and “Ocean Shield”) off the Somali coast using the SNMG. However, Germany has not contributed to those operations.

68. Associated Press, “Jung fordert, ‘klare Rechtsgrundlage’ für Bekämpfung von Piraterie”, 9 July 2008.

69. Interview, Defence Ministry, 11 July 2011.

70. Interview, Foreign Ministry, 7 April 2011.

71. Bulletin der Bundesregierung, Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Document 116-1, 4 November 2008.

72. Auswärtiges Amt, “Zusammenarbeit EU-NATO”, available: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Europa/Aussenpolitik/ESVP/ZusammenarbeitEUNATO.html> (accessed 22 July 2010).

73. Interview, Foreign Ministry, 6 April 2011.

74. Interview, Foreign Ministry, 7 April 2011.

75. Interview, Foreign Ministry, 6 April 2011.

76. Interview, Foreign Ministry, 7 April 2011. Similar remarks were made by another high-ranking political appointee in the foreign ministry (Interview, Foreign Ministry, 18 July 2011). Moreover, representatives from the chancellery (Interview, Federal Chancellery, 4 March 2011) and the defence ministry (Interview, Defence Ministry, 11 July 2011) also referred to disagreements within the government.

77. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “EU-Mission soll vor Somalia Piraterie bekämpfen”, 11 November 2008.

78. Associated Press, “EU bringt Einsatz gegen Piraten am Horn von Afrika auf den Weg”, 10 November 2008.

79. Ibid.

80. Financial Times Deutschland, “Bürokraten gegen Piraten”, 11 November 2008.

81. Hamburger Abendblatt, “Deutsche sollen Piraten verhaften”, 21 November 2008.

82. Agence France Presse, “Kabinett will im Dezember über Anti-Piraten-Einsatz entscheiden”, 21 November 2008.

83. Ibid.

84. The letter has not been published. It has been extensively quoted, however, in a newspaper article. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Deutsche Marine soll primär verhüten”, 6 December 2008.

85. Interview, Foreign Ministry, 7 April 2011.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Interview, Defence Ministry, 11 July 2011.

89. Interview, Defence Ministry, 13 April 2011.

90. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Deutsche Marine”, op. cit.

91. Interview, Defence Ministry, 11 July 2011.

92. Agence France Presse, “Jung: Deutsche Soldaten können Piratenschiffe aufbringen”, 7 December 2008.

93. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “EU-Mission”, op. cit.

94. Financial Times Deutschland, “Bürokraten”, op. cit.

95. This remark was made by the former head of the policy planning staff of the defence ministry, Ulrich Weisser. Weisser: “Peinliches Gerangel” um Anti-Piraten-Einsatz, 19 November 2008.

96. Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 16/11337, 10 December 2008.

97. Ibid., no. 3e.

98. Der Spiegel, “Schiffe versenken”, No. 51, 15 December 2008.

99. Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Winfried Nachtwei et al. und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Drucksache 16/1138, 17 December 2008, pp. 11, 18.

100. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht. 197. Sitzung. Berlin, Freitag, den 19. Dezember 2008, Plenarprotokoll 16/197, 19 December 2008, p. 21357.

101. Associated Press, “Jung rechnet mit Kampfsituationen beim Einsatz gegen Piraten”, 22 December 2008.

102. Ibid.

103. Indeed, over the years there have been multiple multilateral military missions conducted by the EU, NATO and particularly the UN to which Germany has not contributed military personnel despite a mandate from the UNSC.

104. See Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001).

105. Provided that CDU and CSU are counted as one party.

106. Brummer, “The Reluctant Peacekeeper”, op. cit.

107. Kaarbo, Coalition Politics, op. cit.