Agenda-Setting in Greenpeace and Amnesty: The Limits of Centralisation in International NGOs

Abstract

While international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) have been heavily studied for their role in transnational advocacy, most research has ignored their internal organisation and the relationships between international and grassroots offices. Intuition suggests that INGOs should face structural imperatives to balance maintaining global brands while simultaneously mobilising disparate publics in local contexts. However, this intuition has not yet been systematically studied. We address this with a paired comparison of Amnesty International and Greenpeace. Using case studies and an original dataset of website attributes, we show that campaigns promoted by international offices and their national counterparts reflect a balance between local diversity and global unity, revealing organisational structures that combine centralised agenda-setting with decentralised agenda implementation. Our research identifies a “measurement gap” with implications for understanding INGO accountability and effectiveness, and indicates that a more complete research programme on INGOs must include attention to internal organisation and structural diversity.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Nicholas Weller for comments, and Daisy Qin for gathering the campaign data from Amnesty and Greenpeace websites.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

About the Authors

Emily Matthews Luxon is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan-Dearborn. Her research focuses on policymaking processes and advocacy around environmental and rural issues. Her current projects include investigating the effects of policymaking transparency on advocacy groups, and the advocacy behaviours of transnational environmental organisations in national policymaking.

Wendy H. Wong is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Trudeau Center for Peace, Conflict, and Justice, Munk School of Global Affairs, at the University of Toronto. She has published on the work of NGOs, terrorist groups and other non-state actors engaged in global politics. Her latest book, co-authored with Sarah S. Stroup, The Authority Trap, will be published by Cornell University Press in 2017.

Notes

1. See Norbert Gotz, “Reframing NGOs: The Identity of an International Relations Non-Starter”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 231–258.

2. See James Crowley and Morgana Ryan, Building a Better International NGO: Greater than the Sum of Its Parts (Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2013).

3. Sarah S. Stroup, Borders Among Activists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

4. See, for example, the Canadian government’s recent efforts to regulate the advocacy activities of charitable organisations, available: <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/05/11/conservative_budget_bill_cracks_down_on_charitable_organizations.html> (accessed 5 March 2015).

5. For example, Tavishi Bhasin and Amanda Murdie, “Aiding and Abetting: Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 54, No. 6 (2010), pp. 1–29; Amanda Murdie and David R. Davis, “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2012), pp. 1–16.

6. For example, Marc Lindenberg and Coralie Bryant, Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development NGOs (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 2001); Stephen Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Sarah S. Stroup and Wendy H. Wong, “Come Together? Different Pathways to International NGO Centralization”, International Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2013), pp. 163–184. Though some organisational structures may evolve organically, there are often decision points when leaders of international organisations make conscious choices about internal structure. Greenpeace’s choice to form “Greenpeace International” in 1979 was controversial. See Paul Brown, Greenpeace (New York: New Discovery Books, 1994); Rex Weyler, Greenpeace: How a Group of Journalists, Ecologists, and Visionaries Changed the World (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Books, 2004). In Amnesty International, rules governing who could do research resulted in intense internal debates. See Hopgood, op. cit.

7. Both INGOs solicit members and mobilise individual supporters through direct mail, advertising and other means. In contrast, strategies to mobilise policymakers or corporate leaders can be considered “elite” techniques.

8. See Donatella Della Porta and Lorenzo Mosca, “Searching the Net”, Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2009), pp. 771–792.; Peter Van Aelst and Stefaan Walgrave, “New Media, New Movements? The Role of the Internet in Shaping the ‘Anti-Globalization’ Movement”, Information, Communication, & Society, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2002), pp. 465–493.

9. For example, Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest, “The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: National and Global Influences on Transnational Association”, Social Forces, Vol. 84, No. 2 (2005), pp. 621–652.

10. In contrast, for example, with Princen and Finger who suggest that transnational behaviour and positioning between global and local contexts for environmental INGOs is a function of environmental advocacy itself. See Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (New York: Routledge, 1994).

11. Wong, op. cit.

12. See Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), Restructuring World Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); R. Charli Carpenter, “Studying Issue (Non)-Adoption in Transnational Advocacy Networks”, International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 3 (2007), pp. 643–667; R. Charli Carpenter, “Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms”, International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 1 (2011), pp. 69–102; R. Charli Carpenter, ‘Lost Causes’: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Joshua W. Busby, Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Noha Shawki, “Organizational Structure and Strength and Transnational Campaign Outcomes: A Comparison of Two Transnational Advocacy Networks”, Global Networks, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2011), pp. 97–117.

13. Jessica Green, Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

14. Alexander Cooley and James Ron, “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action”, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5–39.

15. Stroup, op. cit.; Sarah S. Stroup and Amanda Murdie, “There’s No Place Like Home: Explaining International NGO Advocacy”, Review of International Organizations, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2012), pp. 425–448.

16. Amanda Murdie, “The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2014), pp. 1–27; Murdie and Davis, “Shaming and Blaming”, op. cit.

17. Bhasin and Murdie, op. cit.; Sam R. Bell, Tavishi Bhasin, K. Chad Clay, and Amanda Murdie, “Taking the Fight to Them: Neighborhood Human Rights Organizations and Domestic Protest”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2012), pp. 853–875.

18. Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); James Ron, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986–2000”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), pp. 557–588; Hopgood, op. cit.; David A. Lake and Wendy H. Wong, “The Politics of Networks: Interests, Power, and Human Rights Norms”, in Miles Kahler (ed.), Networked Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 127–150; James Meernik, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell, and Angela Nichols, “The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2012), pp. 233–256; Cullen S. Hendrix and Wendy H. Wong, “When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2003), pp. 651–672; Daniel W. Hill, Will H. Moore, and Bumba Mukherjee, “Information Politics Versus Organizational Incentives: When Are Amnesty International’s ‘Naming and Shaming’ Reports Biased?”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 2 (2013), pp. 219–232. For examples of pieces that evaluate how Amnesty views global campaigns, see Clark, op. cit., Wong, op. cit., and Hendrix and Wong, op. cit.

19. Amanda Murdie and Alexander Hicks, “Can International NGOs Boost Services: The Case of Health”, International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2013), pp. 541–574.

20. Carpenter, ‘Lost Causes’, op. cit.

21. Jennifer Hadden, Networks in Contention: The Divisive Politics of Climate Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

22. Jan Aart Scholte, “Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2004), pp. 211–233.

23. For an exception, see Jens Steffek and Maria Paola Ferretti, “Accountability or ‘Good Decisions’? The Competing Goals of Civil Society Participation in International Governance”, Global Society, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2009), pp. 37–57. Even so, their focus is on participation by civil society in international organisations, not how INGOs or civil society groups might differ in their internal governance.

24. Carpenter, “Studying Issue (Non)-Adoption”, op. cit.

25. Shawki, op. cit.

26. Amanda Murdie and David R. Davis, “Looking in the Mirror: Comparing INGO Networks across Issue Areas”, The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2012), pp. 177–202.

27. Carpenter, “Vetting the Advocacy Agenda”, op. cit.; Carpenter, ‘Lost Causes’, op. cit.

28. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations”, International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2009), pp. 559–592.

29. Fred Gale, “Constructing Global Civil Society Actors: An Anatomy of the Environmental Coalition Contesting the Tropical Timber Trade Regime”, Global Society, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1998), pp. 343–361; Helen Yanacopulos, “Patterns of Governance: The Rise of Transnational Coalitions of NGOs”, Global Society, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2005), pp. 247–266.

30. Julie Gilson, “Learning to Learn and Building Communities of Practice: Non-governmental Organisations and Examples from Mine Action in Southeast Asia”, Global Society, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2009), pp. 269–293.

31. For non-INGO examples, see Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Daniel H. Nexon, “What’s This, Then? ‘Romanes Eunt Domus’?”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9 (2008), pp. 300–308; Daniel H. Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

32. Wong, op. cit.

33. Morton E. Winston, “Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights NGOs: Amnesty International”, in Claude E. Welch (ed.), NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), pp. 25–54.

34. Hopgood, op. cit.; Hendrix and Wong, op. cit.

35. Lindenberg and Bryant, op. cit.

36. Stroup and Wong, “Come Together?”, op. cit.

37. Jennifer Rubenstein, “The Misuse of Power, not Bad Representation: Why It is Beside the Point that No One Elected Oxfam”, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2014), pp. 204–230. For examples of tensions when INGOs claim to be advocates for local populations and NGOs, see Åse Berit Grødeland, “They Have Achieved a Lot Because We Have Paid Them to Do a Lot: NGOs and the International Community in the West Balkans”, Global Society, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2010), pp. 173–201; Kristina Hahn and Anna Holzscheiter, “The Ambivalence of Advocacy: Representation and Contestation in Global NGO Advocacy for Child Workers and Sex Workers”, Global Society, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2013), pp. 497–520.

38. Jennifer Rubenstein, “Accountability in an Unequal World”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2007), pp. 616–632.

39. Abigail Andrews, “Downward Accountability in Unequal Alliances: Explaining NGO Responses to Zapatista Demands”, World Development, Vol. 54 (2014), pp. 99–113.

40. See Wong, op. cit.

41. Although non-membership INGOs and membership INGOs do not differ substantially in the way they work or in their levels of legitimacy, membership serves as an asset when addressing the public and media. See Peter Kotzian and Jens Steffek, “Do Members Make a Difference? A Study of Transnational Civil Society Organizations”, European Political Science Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2013), pp. 55–81.

42. This is a fairly common concern with INGOs that drives the decision to centralise and create international offices. See Lindenberg and Bryant, op. cit.; Stroup and Wong, “Come Together?”, op. cit.

43. Julie Hemment, “The Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, International Aid, and NGOs in Russia”, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 (2004), pp. 215–241; Peggy Levitt and Sally Engle Merry, “Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States”, Global Networks, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2009), pp. 441–461.

44. Kotzian and Steffek, op. cit.

45. Carol Chetkovich and Frances Kunrether, From the Ground Up: Grassroots Organizations Making Social Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

46. Todd Gitlin, “Occupy’s Predicament: The Moment and the Prospects for the Movement”, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64, No. 1 (2013), pp. 3–25.

47. Wong, op. cit.

48. Ibid.

49. Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

50. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2002).

51. Carrie M. Duncan and Megan A. Schoor, “Talking across Boundaries: A Case Study of Distributed Governance”, Voluntas, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2015), pp. 731–755.

52. Sarah S. Stroup and Wendy H. Wong, “Types of Authority and Organizational Practice of INGOs”, Working Paper (Toronto: University of Toronto, and Middlebury, Middlebury College, 2014).

53. Available: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are> (accessed 3 March 2014).

54. “6. Ultimate authority for the conduct of the affairs of AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL is vested in the International Council.” For more: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol20/001/2013/en/> (accessed 30 January 2017).

55. Wong, op. cit.

56. Clark, op. cit.; Wong, op. cit.

57. Author interview with Amnesty former staff, 8 June 2009.

58. Hopgood, op. cit.

59. “Amnesty International Staff Battle Management over Restructuring”, The Guardian, 2 December 2012, available: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/02/amnesty-international-staff-management-restructuring> (accessed 3 March 2014). Also: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are> (accessed 3 March 2014).

60. Available: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are> (accessed 3 March 2014).

61. Author interview with Amnesty staff, 17 July 2009.

62. Clark, op. cit.; Tom Buchanan, “‘The Truth Will Set You Free’: The Making of Amnesty International”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2002), pp. 575–597; Wong, op. cit.

63. Kert Davies, “Greenpeace”, in Thomas P. Lyon (ed.), Good Cop/Bad Cop: Environmental NGOs and Their Strategies toward Business (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Press, 2010), pp. 195–207; Sally Eden, “Greenpeace”, New Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2004), pp. 595–610.

64. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq/> (accessed 28 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/getinvolved/> (accessed 12 August 2013).

65. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq/> (accessed 28 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/our-core-values/> (accessed 8 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/governance-structure/> (accessed 12 August 2013).

66. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/> (accessed 12 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/governance-structure/> (accessed 12 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq/> (accessed 28 August 2013).

67. Vanessa Timmer, “Agility and Resilience: The Adaptive Capacity of Friends of the Earth International and Greenpeace”, PhD dissertation, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2007, p. 75.

68. Author interview with Greenpeace staff, 25 September 2008.

69. Author interview with Greenpeace staff, 29 November 2007.

70. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/> (accessed 12 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/governance-structure/> (accessed 12 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/legal-structure/> (accessed 12 August 2013); <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq/> (accessed 28 August 2013).

71. Davies, op. cit.; Greenpeace International 2012 Annual Report, p. 6, available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/reports/> (accessed 20 December 2016).

72. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/governance-structure/> (accessed 12 August 2013).

73. Pierre Auger and Jean-Luc Ferrante, Greenpeace: Controverses autor d'une ONG qui dérange (Sète, France: Éditions La Plage, 2004); Timmer, op. cit. p. 73.

74. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/governance-structure/> (accessed 12 August 2013). The core goals, values and major long-term strategic plans are decided at the Annual General Meeting (AGM).

75. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/> (accessed 12 August 2013).

76. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/legal-structure/> (accessed 12 August 2013).

77. Available: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/> (accessed 12 August 2013).

78. Greenpeace International 2012 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 6.

79. Davies, op. cit.

80. Della Porta and Mosca, op. cit.; Melissa K. Merry, “Interest Group Activism on the Web: The Case of Environmental Organizations”, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, Vol. 8 (2011), pp. 110–128.

81. László Bruszt, Balázs Vedres, and David Stark, “Shaping the Web of Civic Participation: Civil Society Websites in Eastern Europe”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2005), pp. 149–163; Lasse Berntzen, Marius Rohde-Johanssen, and James Godbolt, “Understanding Internet Use in Grassroots Campaigns: Internet and Social Movement Theory”, in Saqib Saeed (ed.), User-Centric Technology Design for Nonprofit and Civic Engagements (Switzerland: Springer, 2014), pp. 15–24.

82. Yannis Theocharis, “The Contribution of Websites and Blogs to the Students’ Protest Communication Tactics during the 2010 UK University Occupations”, Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 16, No. 9 (2013), pp. 1477–1513.

83. Andrew Chadwick, “Digital Network Repertoires and Organizational Hybridity”, Political Communication, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2007), pp. 283–301.

84. Kevin Gillan, “The UK Anti-War Movement Online”, Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2009), pp. 25–43.

85. Van Aelst and Walgrave, op. cit.

86. See Helen Yanacopulos, International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

87. See Appendix. Data collection took place during summer 2013.

88. We limited this study to English- and French-language NRO websites. These are the two dominant languages in Amnesty and Greenpeace. With a census of sites in these languages, we capture a geographically broad sample of developed and developing countries.

89. See Appendix.

90. See Appendix for a full listing of campaigns.

91. For example, several Amnesty NRO sites list “Torture” as campaigns; however, since the current Amnesty Secretariat site does not itself list “Torture”, these are coded as independent of the international office, even though “Torture” is hardly a radical departure from Amnesty’s historical focus.

92. As discussed in the next section, many of these “independent” campaigns are “common” with other NROs (two for Togo, two for Senegal, and one for Ireland), and are therefore less independent from the broader organisation than it might appear.

93. For this measure, we tabulated whether a given international campaign was taken up by an NRO or not. This measure does not correspond with an NRO’s campaign totals, as it excludes counts of multiple campaigns matching one international campaign or independent campaigns unaligned with international campaigns.

94. For example, lack of capacity, resources or interest.

95. L. David Brown, Creating Credibility: Legitimacy and Accountability for Transnational Civil Society (Sterling, VA: Kumarian, 2008).

96. Edward Weisband and Alnoor Ebrahim, “Introduction: Forging Global Accountabilities”, in Alnoor Ebrahim and Edward Weisband (eds.), Global Accountabilities: Participation, Pluralism, and Public Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1–4.

97. Alnoor Ebrahim, “Accountability Myopia: Losing Sight of Organizational Learning”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2005), pp. 56–67.

98. Such as NCCS or Charity Commission for England and Wales data.

99. Such as the European Transparency Register or Yearbook of International Organizations.