Open source, code and architecture: It is the Memes stupid

Abstract

This paper bridges a gap by offering an analysis of open source from the perspective of evolutionary theory. The need for balance in the information ecosystem, in particular the issue of a vibrant information commons, makes the focus on evolutionary theory appropriate. I conclude that the question posed at the outset, whether the open source concept can or cannot be extended to content, is best answered by employing insights from one strand of evolutionary theory: Memes.

Notes

1. E S Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, p 196, O'Reilly, Cambridge, 1999:

2. See, for example, K Nikulainen, ‘Open Source Software: Why is it Here and Will it Stick Around?’, SCRIPT-ed, Vol 1, p 1, 2004.

3. See E S Raymond, supra note 1 and J Gay (ed.), Free Software/Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M Stallman, Free Software Foundation, Boston, 2002.

4. L Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, New York, 1999.

5. See E Raymond, supra note 1, K N Cukier, Community property: open source proponents plant the seeds of a new patent landscape, ACUMEN, Vol 1, No 3, pp 54–60, 2004, Leader, Open source: beyond capitalism, The Economist,12 June, pp 16–17, 2004 and An open-source shot in the arm?, The Economist Technology Quarterly, 12 June, pp 15–17, 2004.

6. Leader, Open source: beyond capitalism, supra note 5:

7. L Arizpe (ed.), Cultural Dimensions of Global Change: An Anthropological Account, UNESCO, pp 89 and 97, 1996, cited in M Strathern, Commons & Borderlands, supra note 1, p 1. This may seem an odd commencing point at first sight, since the institutions of copyright and patents are concerned with promoting cooperation and collaboration, in order to overcome the transaction costs that accompany attempts by individuals or organizations at undertaking creative and innovative activities.

8. See E S Raymond, supra note 1 and J Gay (ed.), Free Software/Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M Stallman, Free Software Foundation, Boston, 2002.

9. R Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter 11, 1996 and M Strathern, supra note 1. A highly readable account can be found in Daniel C Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Penguin, London, 1996. Other works consulted include S Herbert (ed.), The Red Notebook of Charles Darwin, Bulletin of the British Museum (National History) Historical Series, p 7, 1980, P Barrett (ed.), The Collected Papers of Charles Darwin,Chicago, 1977 and R Aunger (ed.), Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–21, 2000.

10. C E Baker, Media, Markets and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 5, 2002, N Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and social change, a democratic approach to copyright law in cyberspace, Cardozo Arts & Ent L Journal, Vol 14, pp 215 and pp 265–295, 1996, John Tomlison, Cultural Imperialism, John Hopkins University Press, pp 19–30 and 30–64, 1991, J M Balkin, Cultural Software – A Theory of Ideology,Yale University Press, pp 42–73, 1998, M Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996 and F Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 2nd edn, Routledge, London, 1996.

11. Ronald V Bettig, Copyrighting Culture – The Political Economy of Intellectual Property, Westview Press, pp 34–42, 1996.

12. L Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, New York, 1999.

13. M Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol 1: The Network Society, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1996.

14. In suggesting this linkage I do not of course collapse the insights each discipline brings to bear on the events. That said, what I am trying to suggest is that inter-disciplinarity might make us better reflect on the assumptions that law makes in constructing the information society.

15. See also M Callon, Introduction: the embeddedness of economic markets in economics, in M Callon (ed.), The Laws of Markets, Blackwells, Oxford, pp 1–54, 1998.

16. My point here is not that the substantive rules and norms have no place, rather that such a line of inquiry is reductionist and seems overly concerned with providing solutions to the problem, which the rules first characterize.

17. The shortcomings of the ‘cyberspace fallacy’ thesis have been addressed elsewhere and will not be pursued here. See, for example, J Savirimuthu, Online contract formation: taking technological infrastructure seriously, University of Ottawa Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 1(2), pp 105–143, 2005 and Orin S Kerr, The problem of perspective in Internet law, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol 91, p 357, 2003, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract = 310020

18. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 11. See also Noah v. Shuba [1991] FSR 14 and Waterlow Publishers Ltd v. Rose [1995] FSR207. With regard to joint ownership see Lauri v. Renad [1892] 3 Ch 402. See also the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996, section 9(2)(a)(b).

19. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 16(1). See also the category of secondary infringements in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, sections 22–27.

20. See generally the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter III.

21. R Carl Moy, The history of the patent harmonization treaty: economic self-interest as an influence, John Marshall Law Review, Vol 26, p 457, 1993, A Czmus, Biotechnology protection in Japan, the European Community, and the United States, Temp International & Comp L Journal, Vol 8, p 435, 1994, K Aoki, Neocolonialism, anticommons property, and biopiracy in the (not-so-brave) new world order of international intellectual property protection, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol 6, p 11, 1998, C Stone, What to do about diversity: property rights, public goods, and the Earth's biological resources, S California L R, Vol 68, p 577, 1995, M Kremer, Pharmaceuticals in the developing world, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 16, p 67, 2002, M Heller and R Eisenberg, Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research, Science, Vol 280, p 698, 1998, J Barton, Reforming the patent system, Science, Vol 287, p 1933, 2000, L Thurow, Needed: a new system of intellectual property rights, Harvard Business Review, p 95, 1997 and S Shavell and T Van Ypersele, Rewards versus intellectual property rights, Journal of Law & Economics, Vol 44, p 525, 2001.

22. The UK Patent Office states that

for an invention is granted by government to the inventor, giving the inventor the right for a limited period to stop others from making, using or selling the invention without the permission of the inventor. When a patent is granted, the invention becomes the property of the inventor, which – like any other form of property or business asset – can be bought, sold, rented or hired. Patents are territorial rights; UK Patent will only give the holder rights within the United Kingdom and rights to stop others from importing the patented products into the United Kingdom.

Available at www.patent.gov.uk/patent/definition.htm. See also, for example, J H Reichman, Legal hybrids between the patent and copyright paradigms, Colum L R, Vol 94, p 2432, 1994 and J H Reichman and P Samuelson, Intellectual property rights in data?, V and L R, Vol 50, p 51, 1997. See also P Menell, The challenges of reforming intellectual property protection for computer software, Colum L Review, Vol 94, pp 2644 and 2651–2654, 1994, G Van Overwalle, Patent protection for plants: a comparison of American and European approaches, Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 39, p 143, 1999.

23. See also J Boyle, A politics of intellectual property: environmentalism for the net?, Duke Law Journal, Vol 47, p 87, 1997.

24. P Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Ashgate, 1996 and B Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright. Now see the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) N Netanel, Asserting copyright's democratic principles in the global arena, Vanderbilt L R, Vol 51, p 217, 1998.

25. A notable exception is J Litman, Digital Copyright, Prometheus Books, US, 2001.

26. S Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives, MIT Press, US, 2005.

27. See www.patentweb.de/lasr/patents.htm

28. S Scotchmer, supra note 26, is instructive:

First, and most important, innovators learn from their predecessors. Each step in the development of the laser used knowledge contributed by the earlier inventor and may not have been possible without it. Second, it is not easy to compensate the developers of basic technologies. Commercial value generally resides in products that are developed later. If the founders earn some profit, it is only because they can demand licensing fees from later developers. But this requires that later products infringe their patents. Basic scientific knowledge, such as the knowledge contributed by Einstein, is generally not patentable, in recognition of the fact that the benefits would be hard to appropriate… the main features of intellectual property that determine how profit is divided between successive inventors are breadth and inventive step. If a second-generation product both infringes an earlier patent and receives its own patent, then each inventor has blocking rights on the second product. They both have a claim on its value…. Computer systems are another twentieth-century technology where the cumulative nature of research has caused friction among innovators, as well as market turnover.

29. I am indebted to Marilyn Strathern for drawing my attention to this aspect of knowledge communities and its implications for the way we come to think about the concept of ownership in the workshop ‘Social Property and New Social Forms’: 2004 Social Property Seminar, University of Cambridge. I shall return to this theme later in this essay. For more orthodox treatments of the cultural dimensions of ownership see P Kuruk, Protecting folklore under modern intellectual property regimes: a reappraisal of the tensions between individual and communal rights in Africa and the United States, American Univ Law Review, Vol 48, p 769, 1999, S O Forbes, Securing the future of our past: current efforts to protect cultural property, Transnational Law, Vol 9, p 235, 1996, M Strathern, What is intellectual property after, in J Law and J Hassard, Actor Network Theory and After, Blackwell, Oxford, pp 156 and 160–174, 1999, J Sax, Is anyone minding Stonehenge? The origins of cultural property protection in England, California Law Review, Vol 78, p 1543, 1990, R Mastalir, A proposal for protecting the cultural and property aspects of cultural property under international law, Fordham International L Journal, Vol 16, p 1033, 1993 and C R McManis, Intellectual property, genetic resources and traditional knowledge protection: thinking globally, acting locally, Cardozo Journal International & Comp L, Vol 11, pp 547 and 565–580, 2003.

30. P Drahos, supra note 24, provides an accessible introduction. See also R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 178–182, 1974. See also J Hughes, The philosophy of intellectual property, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol 77, pp 287 and 296–310, 1988, W J Gordon, A property right in self-expression: equality and individualism in the natural law of intellectual property, Yale Law Journal, Vol 102, pp 1533 and 1540–1578, 1993, P Jaszi, Toward a theory of copyright: the metamophosis of ‘authorship’, Duke Law Journal, pp 455 and 485–491, 1991, J Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society, Harvard, Cambridge, MA, Chapters 4–6, 1996, J Litman, Copyright, compromise and legislative history, Cornell Law Review, Vol 72, pp 857 and 869, 1987, W Landes and R Posner, An economic analysis of copyright law, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 18, pp 325 and 325–353, 1989, E Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian mythology, Journal of Marshall Law Review, Vol 29, p 269, 1995 and R P Merges and R Nelson, On the complex economics of patent scope, Colum Law Review, Vol 90, pp 839 and 868–907, 1990.

31. See for example the responses to the Government consultation in http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/consultations/conclusions.htm and http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/comp/smets.pdf

32. See L Edwards, Code and Law: The Next Generation, R Leenes and Bert-Jaap Koops, Code and Privacy: An (Im)perfect Pair?, R Petrauskas and M Kiskis, Lessig and Implications for Intellectual Property Law, P Tsiavos, Tracing the Trajectory of a Techno-legal Ecology: Stories from the Open Source Development of the Gnutella Protocol and R Jones, Towards a Revised Model of Code and Social Regulation, all from a LEFIS workshop, Queens University, Belfast, 2004. Manuscripts with authors.

33. K Dobrzeniecki, How to Protect Human Rights in Cyberspace? Searching for the Best Model, A Saarenpää, Law as a Singular Phenomenon and P Kleve and R De Mulder, Some Code may Render Other Code Obsolete, but Only if This Other Code Allows it, all from a LEFIS workshop, supra note 32. Manuscripts with authors.

34. A Guadamuz, Lessig's Technological Determinism, from a LEFIS workshop, Queens University, Belfast, 2004. For a prior view of the relationship between technology and society see J Ellul, The Technological Society,trans by J Wilkinson, Vintage Books, New York, 1964.

35. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, supra note 4, p 6. His normative premise should be noted:

[t]his code presents the greatest threat to liberal or libertarian ideals, as well as their greatest promise. We can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear. There is no middle ground. There is no choice that does not include some kind of building. Code is never found; it is only ever made, and only ever made by us… What values will we build into the space to encourage certain forms of life?… If the code of cyberspace is owned (in a sense that I describe in this book), it can be controlled; if it is not owned, control is much more difficult. The lack of ownership, the absence of property, the inability to direct how ideas will be used – in a word, the presence of a commons – is key to limiting, or checking, certain forms of government control.

36. L Lessig, supra note 4. See also Yochai Benkler, From consumers to users: shifting the deeper structures of regulation, Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol 52, pp561 and 561–563, 2000.

37. L Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World, Random House, p 23, 2002:

The layers that I mean here are the different layers within a communications system that together make communications possible… At the bottom is a ‘physical’ layer, across which communication travels. This is the computer, or wires, that link computers on the Internet. In the middle is a ‘logical’ or ‘code’ layer – the code that makes the hardware run. Here we might include the protocols that define the Internet and the software upon which those protocols run. At the top is a ‘content’ layer – the actual stuff that gets said or transmitted across these wires. Here we include digital images, texts, on-line movies, and the like. These three layers function together to define any particular communications system. Each of these layers in principle could be controlled or could be free… we could imagine a world where the physical and code layers were controlled but the content layer was not.

38. More generally, on the limits of formalism see O Fiss, Objectivity and interpretation, Stanford Law Review, Vol 34, p 739, 1982, W Twining and D Meirs, How to do Things With Rules, 2nd edn, Butterworths, London, 1982, J Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions, Oxford University press, Oxford 1983, J M Feinman, Critical approaches to contract law, UCLA Law Review, Vol 30, p 829, 1983, D Sugarman, Towards a new history of law and material society in England, 1750–1914, in G R Rubin and D Sugarman (eds), Law, Economy and Society: Essays in the History of English Law, 1750–1914,1984, D Sugarman, Legal theory, the common law mind and the making of the textbook tradition, in W Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p 26, 1986 and B Simpson, The common law and legal theory, in W Twining, supra, p 8.

39. See, for example, the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the extension to global market economies. In addition, Universal City Studios v. Corley 273 F.3d 429 and United States v. Elcom Ltd 203 F.Supp.2d 1125 (ND Cal 2002). See the excellent article by J Cohen, The challenge of digital rights management technologies, in National Research Council, The Role of Scientific and Technical Data and Information in the Public Domain, National Academic Press, Washington, DC pp 109–116, 2003, C May, Digital rights management and breakdown of social norms, First Monday, 2003, available at www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue8_11/may/index.html

40. For example, idem, p 6. Of relevance is H Rosen (Recording Industry Association of America), Music on the Internet: Is there and Upside to Downloading?: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Congress, second session, 11 July 2000.

41. J Gay (ed.), supra note 3, p 9. Cf. D Post, What Larry doesn't get: code, law and liberty in cyberspace.

42. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, supra note 4.

43. E Hobsbawm, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957. In addition, E Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, Dover, New York, 1938 and H Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Humanities Press, New York, pp 251–260, 1954.

44. See generally M Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol 1: The Network Society, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1996.

45. Idem.

46. M Castells, The Internet Galaxy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 1, 2001.

47. See M Strathern, Knowledge on its travels: dispersal and divergence in the make-up of communities, in Commons & Borderlands, supra note 1, pp 15 and 17.

48. C Darwin, On the Origin of Species, with an introduction by E Mayr, Harvard, Cambridge, MA, pp 80–81, 1964:

How will the struggle for existence, briefly discussed in the last chapter, act in regard to variation? Can the principle of selection, which we have seen is so potent in the hands of man, apply under nature?… Can it, then, be thought improbable, seeing that variations useful to man have undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful in some way to each being in the great and complex battle of life should occur in the course of many successive generations? If such do occur, can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating their kind?

49. See L Eiseley, Darwin's Century: Evolution and the Men Who Discovered It, Doubleday Anchor Books, New York, 1958.

50. Of course Charles Darwin did not know that this process of transference was made possible through genes. See the paper by Gregor Mendel in 1865.

51. See Peter R Grant, Natural selection and Darwin's finches, Scientific American, October, pp 82–87, 1991, F Jacob, Evolution and tinkering, Science, Vol 196,pp 1161–1166, 1977.

52. See A R Templeman, Uses of evolutionary theory in the Human Genome Project, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Vol 20, pp 23–49, 1999.

53. National Academy of Sciences, Teaching about Evolution and the Nature of Science, US National Academic Press, p 19, 1998.

54. See the interesting paper by L H Caporale, Natural selection and the emergence of a mutation phenotype: an update of the evolutionary synthesis considering mechanisms that affect genome variation, Annual Review of Microbiology, Vol 57, pp 465–485, 2003.

55. See www.cgkp.org.uk/about/html

56. See E G Campbell et al., Data withholding in academic genetics: evidence from a national survey, Vol 287, No 4, pp 473–479, 2002 and J P Walsh et al., Working through the patent problem, Science, Vol 299, p14, 2003.

57. See Y Benkler, Coase's penguin, or Linux and the nature of the firm, Yale Law Journal, Vol 112, p 112, 2002–2003.

58. S Scotchmer, Cumulative Innovation in Theory and Practice, Goldman School of Public Policy Working Paper 240, University of California, Berkeley, CA, February 1999, p 1, available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/∼Scotch/ip.html

59. The tragedy of the anti-commons reverses the inferences drawn from Hardin's tragedy of the commons. Under the tragedy of the commons, the scarcity of resources will lead to an over-exploitation by individuals leading to their ultimate depletion and waste. However, contrast with the tragedy of the anti-commons, where proprietary entitlements enjoyed by individuals over scarce resources may lead to under-use of the particular resource. M Heller and R Eisenberg, Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research, Vol 280, No 5364, pp 698–701, 1998, M. Heller, The tragedy of the anticommons, Harvard Law Review, Vol 111, p 621, 1998, G Colangelo, Avoiding the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Collective Rights Organizations, Patent Pools and the Role of Antitrust, LUISS Law and Economics Laboratory Working Paper No IP-01-2004, 10 March 2004.

60. See D C Dennett, The Evolution of Culture, The Charles Simonyi Lecture, Oxford University, 17 February 1999.

61. See E Raymond, supra note 1.

62. S Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution, O'Reilly, 1999, online version at www.oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/ietf.html. See also http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-free.html

63. See Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, Texere, London, 1999.

64. Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–2, 2001:

65. This phrase is attributed to Linus Torvalds in relation to the development of Linux. It is cited in A Chander, Penguin on thin ice? Why IBM should win the fight to save Linux, Findlaw, 26 June 2003

66. M Castells, supra note 65, p 37.

67. Ibid.

68. Y Benkler, Coase's penguin, or Linux and the nature of the firm, Yale Law Journal, Vol 112, p 369.

69. Ibid, p 377

70. F Webster, Theories of the Information Society, Routledge, London, p 8, 2002.

71. I have found the insights from G S Gilbert, Evolutionary ecology of plant diseases in natural ecosystems, Annual Review of Phytopathology, Vol 40, pp 13–43, 2002 particularly influential in my thinking here.

72. ‘The person or persons who have associated work with this document (the “Dedicator” or “Certifier”) hereby either (a) certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, the work of authorship identified is in the public domain of the country from which the work is published, or (b) hereby dedicates whatever copyright the dedicators holds in the work of authorship identified below (the “Work”) to the public domain. A certifier, moreover, dedicates any copyright interest he may have in the associated work, and for these purposes, is described as a “dedicator” below.’

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73. The licence shall not restrict any party from selling or giving away the software as a component of an aggregate software distribution containing programs from several different sources. The licence shall not require a royalty or other fee for such sale.

74. Section 2.

75. Section 3. The licence must allow modifications and derived works and must allow them to be distributed under the same terms as the licence of the original software.

76. Section 4. The rationale seems to be that this would firstly encourage improvement, but also maintain some ownership amongst authors to ensure the manner in which the software is used, so that their personal integrity is not compromised.

77. The licence must not restrict anyone from making use of the program in a specific field of endeavour. For example, it may not restrict the program from being used in a business or from being used for genetic research.

78. Section 7.

79. It is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake an exhaustive analysis of all the open source licences. That said selected references will be made to particular licences in order to demonstrate the contemporaneous nature of Darwin's ideas.

80. R Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 188, 1989, reissue.

81. Ibid, pp 192–193:

I think a new kind of replicator has recently emerged on this very planet. It is staring us in the face. It is still in its infancy, still drifting clumsily about in its primeval soup, but already it is achieving evolutionary change at a rate that leaves the old gene panting far behind.

82. The new soup is the soup of human culture. We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission or a unit of imitation. ‘Mimeme’ comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like ‘gene’. I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme.

83. I draw on D Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, p 343.

84. See the point made by D Dennett, Darwins Dangerous Idea, p 345.

85. See D Raviart and L Lamy, Services around Linux, Open Source, and Free Software – Western European Market Forecast, IDC, June 2004, Doc # RI05L.

86. See R Kirzner and A Gillen, Myths and Revelations Regarding the Use of Open Source for Development, IDC, October 2003, Doc # 30336.

87. See J Wilcox, IBM to Spend $1 Billion on Linux in 2001, CNET News.com, 12 December 2000.

88. See S Shankland, Why Microsoft is Wary of Open Source, CNET News.com, 18 June 2001.

89. For example, an earlier version of a BSD licence had the following terms:

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with distribution. 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software must display the following acknowledgement: This product includes software developed by the University of California, Berkeley and its contributors. 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.

90. See M Ricciuti, Gates Wades into Open-source Debate, CNET News.com, 19 June 2001.

91. See, for example, P Krill, MS exec: open source model endangers software economy, Computerworld, 17 March 2004, visited 17 March 2004, available at www.computerworld.com.au

92. M Strathern, Commons and Borderlands,Sea Kingston, Oxon, 2004. In the preamble to her working paper Knowledge on its Travels: Dispersal and Divergence in the Make-up of Communities on p 15

What makes a ‘community’? The question becomes interesting in inter-institutional or inter-disciplinary contexts premised on the creative mix of expertise from diverse locations. Knowledge comes from, and is drawn, into different organizational structures. At the same time, the notion that knowledge travels (across locations) invites one to reconstruct communities in its wake, tracing connections after the fact. Late twentieth and early twenty-first century citizens of the knowledge economy, inspired by electronic circuitry, also see planning knowledge, communities, imagining connections – to – be.