Parallels between philosophy and academic development: under-labourers, critics, or leaders?

ABSTRACT

How should we conceptualise the role of academic developers? Academic development is criticised for being (1) under-theorized, (2) overly reflexive, and (3) intellectually fragmented. This paper attempts to address these concerns by drawing parallels between these criticisms and long-standing debates in philosophy. Philosophers have debated their role in academia: whether they should be seen as under-labourers, critics, or even leaders in relation to other disciplines. They, too, have been criticised for being overly reflexive and intellectually fragmented. A recognition of parallels, and differences, between such debates and those in academic development can help provide the conceptual resources to address the three criticisms.

KEYWORDS:

• Leadership
• role
• philosophy
• scholarship

Introduction

The scholarship of academic (or educational) development is a complex and multi-layered area which, much like the complex and multi-faceted nature of the work involved, does not lend itself to easy characterisation. Recent work has invited us to embrace this complexity in a way that encourages entry into the scholarship of academic development ‘through multiple mechanisms and pathways’ (Cruz et al., 2021, p. 3). One of these is labelled the scholarship of critical academic development, which concerns itself with ontological and epistemological questions about the nature of the discipline, ‘seeking to articulate, critique, and theorize who we are as a field’ (Cruz et al., 2021, p. 7). These are questions relating to our place in Higher Education: What is academic development? How should we conceptualise the role of academic developers?

What ‘academic development’ means is not easy to explain. Leibowitz (2014, p. 359) argues that academic development is about ‘the creation of conditions supportive of teaching and learning, in the broadest sense. This would include the provision of the support, as well as the generation of conditions that are supportive’. Sutherland (2018) argues that the scope should be broader still: a holistic understanding of academic development would include the whole academic, institutional, and individual role it occupies. Because of the complexity and broad nature of academic development roles, positions, and differing institutional expectations, perhaps nothing more definitive is possible.

There is ongoing debate, despite an established history (Cruz, 2018), about whether academic development can be called a ‘field’ at all. Clegg (2012) has written on what ways Higher Education could be considered a field, and so academic development a sub-field of it, whilst Tight (2020) has explored the topic in the context of differences between fields and disciplines. Shay (2012) reaches the conclusion that more work, building up our ‘languages of description’, is needed for academic development to emerge as a ‘recognised field of practice’.

In a recent editorial, Zou and Felten (2019) focus on the themes of being and becoming an academic developer; with many entering the community from being part of a specific academic ‘tribe’ (Becher & Trowler, 2001). While this diversity of roles and complex membership could be seen as a strength, it may also point to challenges for academic development being recognised as a genuine field. There are concerns that the intellectual foundations of the field need bolstering as it is ‘under-theorized, rhetorically reflexive, and even intellectually fragmented’ (Cruz et al., 2021, p. 7). The under-theorized point speaks to a perceived lack of confidence or robustness in academic development in comparison to established academic norms:

In the case of academic development, the struggle is against powerful academic disciplinary formations which uphold not only the prestige of the discipline and its research, but also the integrity of the curriculum and the freedoms of academics to practice based on their disciplinary knowledge. (Clegg, 2009, p. 410)

This relates to the claim of being overly-reflexive, as Baume and Popovic (2016, p. 2) state: ‘debate and uncertainty about the nature, indeed the legitimacy, of academic development, permeate the literature of our field’. To be clear: this is not the suggestion that scholarship within academic development is itself under-theorized. Some have argued that such work can be detrimentally over-theoretical. Salwén (2021), for example, argues that the popularly used expression ‘threshold concept’ does not stand up to scrutiny in terms of definition or applicability once considered. Exploring how learners acquire knowledge and understanding is a key task but, argues Salwén (p. 47), but introducing expressions without support ‘will only hamper this very important endeavour’.

The worry that concerns this paper is that the field of academic development (what it is, its nature or identity) is itself under-theorized, and therefore, it struggles for academic legitimacy and requires intellectual bolstering. The struggle for legitimacy is compounded by the fragmentation of academic development:

[…] in the sense that it consists of many sub-groups that have little in common with each other. Even within the sub-groups, there is no guarantee that there are mutual ways of working or shared conceptions of the work done. We often discover that we do not share a colleague’s interests and find it difficult to enter any sort of professional dialogue. (Harland & Staniforth, 2008, p. 669)

Clegg (2009, p. 409) recognises that a concern from within a field as to what it is, or what its subject matter is, is not unusual. But this concern runs deeper for Clegg. Sociologists, for example, may have debated ‘What is sociology?’ but they did not ‘struggle with the question of what is a sociologist’. The idea is that this generalises. Academics might debate what the subject matter and scope of their field is, not what it is to be part of it.

These criticisms of academic development, which come from those inside the field as well as those outside, are concerning. Mårtensson and Roxå (2021, p. 10) argue that academic development is a field expanding in scope and will become ‘more mainstream and public’ as academic developers come to occupy strategic roles within institutions. The Covid-19 pandemic and the ‘pivot’ online that resulted (Cunningham et al., 2021; Nordmann et al., 2020) have seen academic developers becoming increasingly relevant and important to institutions by leading the move to online and blended learning, and supporting staff and colleagues to make difficult transitions in their teaching. Some academic developers (Shephard et al., 2020) are in positions where they can influence the future direction of their institutions or indeed academia itself. But if the intellectual foundations of academic development are weak, and our identity unclear, are these developments potentially threatened?The aim of this paper is to draw parallels between the role of the philosopher and the role of the academic developer. In doing so, it hopes to offer some thoughts on how academic development can address the concerns of being under-theorized, overly-reflexive, and intellectually fragmented. Parallels exist between the philosopher’s relationship with structures of thought and the academic developer’s relationship with learning and teaching. Both navigate ongoing questions regarding their place, of appropriate subject matter, and of relevance to practice. If any discipline can refute an allegation of being under-theorized it is philosophy, with an ancient tradition that continues to ongoing vibrant debates. However, the other two criticisms of academic development may find resonance with questions that have vexed philosophy. First, philosophy can be both rhetorical and self-indulgent. There is a history of inward-looking reflection and ongoing questions about the nature of philosophy, its purpose, its subject matter and how it should be done. Such study is labelled ‘metaphilosophy’ (Joll, 2017). Second, the history of philosophy demonstrates clear intellectual fragmentation from the great rift between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ approaches at the end of the 19^th century (Levy, 2003). These ongoing discussions have provided a rich resource of conceptualisation and reflection on the nature of the discipline, and what a philosopher is. This claim of this paper is that we can address some of the concerns identified for academic development by drawing parallels with philosophy.

In what follows, Section 2 outlines the context in which this paper should be read, Section 3 sets out different ways philosophers have conceptualised their role. Section 4 applies and compares these to the role of the academic developer, and what this might mean in practice.

Context

It is important to recognise the context, or the position from which this paper is written. The author’s academic background is in analytic philosophy and so, in a sense, still belongs to that tribe and perspective. That can be seen in the structure of the paper: a statement or thesis is set out, and what follows should seek to either defend or refute that position. Philosophy papers are often like this. Gettier’s (1963) famous ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ paper takes the standard view of knowledge and refutes it within three pages, by demonstrating cases where an agent has a justified true belief yet lacks knowledge. Singer’s (1972) ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’ starts from the premise that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’. The implications of this are, argues Singer, that those in affluent countries ought to donate far more of their wealth to humanitarian causes than is currently the case. Singer then proceeds to defend his position from a series of potential objections. Such rigour and clarity are hallmarks of analytic philosophy.

A reader might be tempted to regard this paper as a kind of personal exploration, or an attempt to conceptualise the domain of academic development in a way that makes sense to the author, his existing ways of being and thought, and apply those to the role he is now in. The hope, however, is that this paper offers more than merely personal soothing or acceptance. While recognising this perspective and background, the intention is to offer a conceptualisation that makes sense to academic developers and resonates with their experience. It is not intended to stipulate or impose this conceptualisation on others, but rather provide something to react to, from, or against when we reflect on what academic development is, or indeed, could be.

The role of the philosopher

As under-labourer

One famous characterisation of the philosopher is as an under-labourer ‘employed […] in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge’ (Locke, 1996). The philosopher may have some limited agency to expose confusions or other ignorance, but they serve the needs of their master-builders. The task of the philosopher is to clarify ideas, principles, or definitions to enable another discipline to build its theory and practice. Duff (2009, p. 248) draws the analogy with a (possibly naïve version of) civil servant: ‘one whose accepted responsibility is to assist the government in carrying through its agenda’. Indeed, Wittgenstein (1958, §109) argued that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’ and that so-called philosophical problems are actually mere confusions caused by us and our language: ‘The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known’.

As internal critic

Despite Wittgenstein’s stated therapeutic aim for philosophy – that it should merely ‘shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (1958, §309) – what he then goes on to do appears to stand in contrast to this. As Winch (1990) demonstrates, Wittgenstein goes on to offer philosophical arguments that are substantially more than mere clarification of concepts (the claim that ‘meaning is use’, or on the impossibility of a ‘private language’ are examples). This points to an inherent tension with the under-labourer conception, namely that once the philosopher starts working with the concepts involved, they will very quickly find themselves analysing and critiquing from the inside. As Duff puts it:

[P]hilosophical analysis cannot be limited to the analysis of concepts as distinct from the practices and structures of thought within which the concepts operate; indeed, once we recognise the implications of ‘meaning is use’, we must recognise that conceptual analysis itself must be an analysis of concepts as they are used, and thus of the practices and structures of thought (the language games and forms of life) within which they are used. (Duff, 2009, pp. 248–249)

The philosopher is thus, on this view, an internal critic within a given game, playing a role of rational de- and re- construction of the normative and logical domain. It would involve the philosopher in unearthing, discovering, creating and rebuilding some of the concepts involved in areas of thought – challenging the proponents to clarify their aims, principles and values, perhaps even getting them to see matters in a new light. This internal critic role seems to fit what philosophers often describe themselves as doing – referring to themselves as ‘philosophers of’ an area of discourse such as education, language, mathematics, science and others.

As external critic

Once the philosopher starts critiquing from the inside, starts reconstructing a certain domain, they will want to explore what is on the outside, and so what this area of thought is about and what it stands in relation to. Duff (2009, p. 255) provides the example of the criminal law, as once a philosopher starts internally critiquing the law this must become an external critique too: ‘which appraises the law in the light (initially) of its proper role within a political community, and of the political and moral values appropriate to that community’. The philosopher, once involved in rational de- and re- construction, will look to see things from the outside in.

The role of external critic is both difficult to obtain and hard to maintain. Such a philosopher will have to navigate a careful balancing act. First, they will have to make their arguments accessible and understandable to those without formal philosophical training, whilst avoiding oversimplification of the complexities involved. Second, they will need to balance pure theory with practice – idealise in a way that still speaks to the way the world actually is, rather than how it could be. Very few philosophers could claim to have mastered this balancing act. There is also a danger that the philosopher in her hubris and arrogance takes things too far. Thoughts may leap to Plato (2007, p. 473c) Philosopher Kings:

Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils[.]

An external critic is a leader, but it is not this kind of leader. It is, rather, someone who critiques, probes and seeks to reform our understanding of difficult topics: ‘What is the nature of morality?’, ‘What is the scope of the criminal law?’, ‘What do we know about the world around us?’ and so on. But this critic also listens to the perspectives of others, is sensitive to their knowledge and understanding, and engages with them in a thoughtful way. This is critical and sensitive leadership.

So what?

It is not the task of this paper to pass judgement on which of these conceptualisations best describes or most accurately represents the philosopher and her role. The reality is likely to be that the philosopher occupies each of these positions (under-labourer, internal critic, external critic) depending on context, experience and confidence. The aim of this section is to get these conceptualisations into play so we can explore the parallels with the academic developer.

The role of the academic developer

As under-labourer

A case could be made for seeing the academic developer as an under-labourer for learning and teaching. Through the provision of workshops, modules, and other programmes the academic developer sets out the ground for learning and teaching across different disciplines for the academics themselves to build. Like a civil servant, the role is to serve the needs of academics, supporting individuals and communities in relation to learning and teaching. Such an academic developer may have empathy with the needs of academics to form genuine connections, and provide clarifications as required, but it is not their role (as under-labourers) to lead or change practice. Indeed, the effectiveness of this academic developer is to be realised in the behaviours, competences, and skills of those who are following them (Cartsen et al., 2010). Illustration of success would be pro-active academic staff in their approaches to learning and teaching: they take the initiative in designing sessions, they voice opinions and ideas in their discipline areas, they provide constructive challenge to the University more generally, and they gain recognition for their practices. In this way, the academic developer as under-labourer centres on empowering and enabling others.

Examples of such an approach could be said to include the plethora of excellent supporting resources, guidance, and materials for staff making the pivot to online learning in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (e.g. Sambell & Brown, 2022; University, 2022).

As internal critic

While there may some truth in the under-labourer conception of the academic developer, it is clear that the role should involve – indeed, does involve in the examples cited above – more than just serving the needs of academic staff. It also involves challenging practice, exposing confusions and mistakes, sharing best practice, and promoting change. What kind of change agents academic developers could and should be is open to debate (Land, 2001; McGrath, 2020), but the idea is that they perform a critical role in shaping and leading teaching enhancement.

One example of this might be what Ellis (2018) calls ‘reframing’. Reframing is an approach to inviting participants to view a situation from a different perspective, question assumptions, and initiate change. Ellis argues that reframing can work across different levels of academic development work – the individual, the department, the institution, and, indeed, the discipline more broadly – to ‘promote positive and inclusive ways of thinking’. A similar example, identified by Grupp and Little (2019), is that academic developers see their role as finding a position with academic staff and others from which they can ‘leverage change’. This can be different in different contexts, but it is in finding a way in, or position of security, from which to motivate others.

There is a sense from these examples of working from within, or performing rational re- and de- construction of a given domain of learning and teaching. As such, these examples suggest academic developers as internal critics, entering a given domain and offering support, guidance, and questioning. The academic developer’s role as internal critic is to learn the disciplinary language and how their particular game is played, and work to reframe or leverage change from within.

As external critic

Just as the philosopher could be frustrated by limiting herself to the role of internal critic, the academic developer might want to be more than a change agent or internal critic in learning and teaching. Cunningham and Mills (2020, p. 299) talk, metaphorically, of academic developers as ‘caged birds’, with bars around them ‘constructed by traditional approaches to academic development’. Perhaps one of those bars is limiting the scope to just an internal role within a given subject or area.

This call to be more obviously critical is growing amongst academic developers. Take, for example, recent discussions in the UK sector about the limits and scope of free speech on campus. What role could and should academic developers play?

Perhaps if as academic developers, we changed our approach from campus cheerleader, change agent, or compliant co-worker to true critical friend, we might be able to help cultivate in the university colleagues who attend our classes and workshops, a healthy scepticism, intellectual humility, and the appetite to interrogate, defend, and contest education theory, practice, and policy. (Sequeira, 2021)

This is precisely the external critic position that might appeal to the philosopher, reimagined for debates in learning and teaching. It chimes with calls for a more ‘leaderly disposition’ from academic developers (Lee & McWilliam, 2008, p. 75) to be active players in the game of Higher Education rather than pawns to be used by others. The very nature of being an external critic places the academic developer in a position where they can question unspoken agendas, provoke discussion and play ‘devil’s advocate to sharpen colleagues’ thinking’ (Green & Little, 2013).

To what extent, and in what ways, could academic developers be leaders in Higher Education? A recent study (Denney, 2020) explores one possible example: the appointment of academic developers as senior academic leaders at four research-intensive UK universities. These individuals clearly felt that their academic development background equipped them to lead their institutions:

They specified skills and experiences such as implementing change, an extensive pedagogical knowledge, and the ability to work with, and talk the language of, different disciplines as enabling them to be especially effective[.] (Denney, 2020, p. 10)

Despite these perceived benefits, the individuals still felt they needed to demonstrate academic credibility in terms of research, grants, papers and policy development in order to progress to senior leadership roles. (This suggests, of course, that academic development in and of itself lacks that credibility.) This mirrors the balancing act suggested for the philosopher: the academic developer needs to balance theory and practice, as well as enter the language of a given discipline enough to have understanding and competence while retaining a sense of objectivity ‘from the outside’ (Bolander Laksov, 2019). Whether, in this case, the leaders are genuinely ‘external’ critics is hard to determine, but it is clearly a challenge to attain.

Just as the philosopher would need to be careful not to allow hubris and arrogance to creep in, so the academic developer must not take this leadership too far or assume themselves to have a special privilege or role. As Clegg (2009) puts it: ‘No project, however well intentioned, can simply claim the moral high ground, and in the (re)making of higher education critique is an indispensable resource’. This could also speak to another distinction made by Land (2004), and recently discussed by Macfarlane (2021), in relation to what kind of leader academic developers should be: ‘managerial’ in the sense of working for, or with, senior managers to drive change, or ‘consultant’ in the sense of working for, or with, academics and their priorities.

So what?

An academic developer operates within and between different modes at different times. They are adept at shapeshifting and operating in spaces in-between spaces. Some may even take comfort from the thought of being ‘on the margins’ of debates in Higher Education (Green & Little, 2013). As with the philosopher, it is likely that an academic developer will be required to play the different roles of under-labourer, internal critic and external critic at different times and in relation to context. Being an external critic might be difficult to achieve. A recent study of academic developers (Rudenga & Gravett, 2019) found that at least half experienced so-called ‘imposter syndrome’. Many in the study described the academic development field as particularly challenging in this regard due to the lack of formal qualifications and having to appear as an expert in areas of little knowledge or training. Unfortunately, in some places academic development was seen as a ‘copout field’ with ‘poor perceptions or even poor treatment within the hierarchies of their institutions’ (Rudenga & Gravett, 2019. p. 1). No doubt there will be barriers – personal, institutional, and sectoral – that will shape how the field develops.

Conclusion

This paper began with three worries for academic development, namely that it is ‘under-theorized, rhetorically reflexive, and even intellectually fragmented’ (Cruz et al., 2021, p. 7). How far has this paper helped in answering these? First, to the ‘under-theorized’ point, the aim here has been to demonstrate the parallels between the role of the philosopher and the role of the academic developer. The conceptualisations made regarding under-labourer, internal critic, and external critic should provide some of the intellectual and conceptual groundwork to meet this concern. Second, to the ‘overly-reflexive’ point, the aim has been to show that reflexivity is not itself a problem; well-established fields like philosophy continue to question their place and role. Perhaps, then, we as academic developers should be more comfortable with this uncertainty and ongoing discussion. If recent claims are right (Cunningham et al., 2021; Mårtensson & Roxå, 2021), the time for academic development has arrived. Shephard et al. (2020) explore how the value of the academic developers might be closer aligned to traditional research metrics. But this also points towards a bringing together of teaching and research, that the future for academic developers is more holistic: ‘the development of academics as scholars, rather than as teachers or researchers’ (Shephard et al., 2020, p. 215). That level of confidence might speak to what we mean by academic developers as leaders (Denney, 2020).

The third worry of fragmentation is where the parallels between academic development and philosophy are weakest. Philosophy is fragmented in an intellectual sense; different philosophical traditions took different approaches to the development of the subject. Academic development is more fragmented. As Harland and Staniforth (2008) point out that this involves a ‘structural and operational fragmentation’ as academic developers are employed in many different roles and positions in universities, with differing responsibilities. Philosophers are academic staff in a defined department, but academic developers are sometimes academic staff, sometimes academic-related, and sometimes based in professional services. This might make the role of external critic even more difficult: when occupying the role of external critic, the academic developer, unlike the philosopher, might have to criticize their employer in ways that might be uncomfortable. So, whilst parallels exist between the role of the philosopher and the role of the academic developer, there remain relevant differences.

This paper has demonstrated parallels between the philosopher’s relationship with structures of thought and the academic developer’s relationship with learning and teaching. Both navigate ongoing questions of identity, of appropriate subject matter, and of relevance to practice. This has enabled a conceptualisation of the differing roles of the academic developer: under-labourer, internal critic and external critic. The intention is not to force this conceptualisation on anyone, but rather use it as something to react to, from, or against as a way of providing resources to meet worries about the intellectual foundations of academic development.

Difficult questions lie ahead – about the nature and role of technology in higher education, about different modes of learning, about meeting student and staff expectations for the future, to name a few. The parallels drawn here should provide some intellectual bolstering for academic development as this important work begins.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to my colleague Catriona Cunningham (no relation) for her comments and encouragement on an earlier draft. I’d also like to thank the comments of the editors and two anonymous IJAD reviewers for their thoughtful and detailed comments which has much improved this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tom Cunningham

Tom Cunningham is a Senior Lecturer in Academic Development at Glasgow Caledonian University. He is the Programme Leader for the Advance HE accredited Accelerate Programme, and a tutor on the Postgraduate Certificate in Academic Practice. He has interests in assessment and feedback, storytelling and the role of Academic Development.