Party Dissolutions and Democratic Consolidation: The Turkish Case

Abstract

Political party competition constitutes an important component of democratic consolidation. In this respect, party dissolutions are generally regarded as impeding consolidation of democracies. This study addresses the relationship between party dissolutions and democratic consolidation, and offers an analysis of recent dissolutions of religiously and ethnically oriented political parties in Turkey. Drawing on Geoffrey Pridham's distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ democratic consolidation, the study concludes that the dissolutions of religiously oriented parties have contributed to the former while the dissolutions of ethnically oriented political parties have not. Meanwhile, the possible dissolution of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), representing 46.6 per cent of the population, would constitute a challenge to ‘positive’ democratic consolidation.

Keywords:

• Party Dissolution
• Democratic Consolidation
• Ethnically Oriented Parties: Religiously Oriented Parties
• Turkey

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the anonymous referees and to the editors of the journal for their comments on previous versions of the article. Aylin Güney gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the Turkish Academy of Sciences (GEBİP) programme for the research for this article.

Notes

 [1] A caliph is a spiritual leader of the Muslim community. After the first four caliphs following the death of Prophet Muhammad, there was a struggle within the Muslim community over the use of the title of Caliph. Although Selim I assumed the title of Caliph following the Ottomans’ conquest of Egypt, the Ottoman sultans did not use the title until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. However, following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Caliphate was abolished in 1924 as part of a radical secularization process.

 [2] < http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPKAP.htm>.

 [3] Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution refers to the secular character of the Turkish Republic by stipulating that ‘the Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law’. The definition of secularism is provided in Article 10, which states, ‘All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.’

 [4] The NSC during that period was composed of the president, the prime minister, the chief of the General Staff, the ministers of justice, national defence, interior and foreign affairs and the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and the gendarmerie. This body sets national security policy and coordinates all activities related to mobilization and defence.

 [5] For an elaboration of the period from the establishment of the coalition government of Refah and the TPP to the 27 February 1997 National Security Council meeting, see Heper and Güney (2000).

 [6] The Chief Prosecutor asks the Turkish Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party based on the evidence produced by scrutinizing its programme and activities. After written and oral defence of the party, the Constitutional Court decides by three-fifths majority whether the party will be dissolved or not on the basis of the Turkish Constitution and Political Parties Law. In other words, seven of eleven members of the Court have to vote for a party's dissolution.

 [7] < http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K1998/K1998-01.htm>.

 [8] According to the present dress code in Turkey, women wearing headscarves are not allowed in state institutions and universities.

 [9] The holy month when the Muslims fast.

[10] In 1925, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, there has been a law regarding the Dress Code in which religious attire can be used only by people serving religious duties.

[11] < http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K1998/K1998-01.htm>.

[12] Refah Partisi Programmeı, Ankara, 1983.

[13] < http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K1998/K1998-01.htm>.

[14] < http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action = html&key = 34650&portal = hbkm&source = external&table = 285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49>.

[15] This article was amended on 4 October 2001 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in order to meet the criteria for Turkey's EU membership.

[16] < http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K2001/K2001-02.htm>.

[17] http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K2001/K2001-02.htm

[18] http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K2001/K2001-02.htm

[19] http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K2001/K2001-02.htm

[20] Hürriyet, 28 August 2001, < http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2001/08/28/21385.asp>.

[21] Turkish Daily News, 12 January 2004.

[22] Turkish Daily News, 8 November 2002.

[23] For a detailed analysis of a historical evaluation of how the Turkish state perceives the Kurdish issue, see Yeğen (1999).

[24] < http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K1993/K1993-01.htm>.

[25] http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK/K1993/K1993-01.htm

[26] Sabah, 17 February 1994.

[27] Sabah, 17 February 1994

[28] For a more detailed analysis of HADEP, see Güney (2002).

[29] Milliyet, 3 September 2001, < http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2001/09/03/siyaset/asiy.html>, interview by Derya Sazak.

[30] Milliyet, 21 September 1998, < http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/09/21/index.html>, Ruşen Çakır.

[31] Milliyet, 21 September 1998, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/09/21/index.html, Ruşen Çakır

[32] Reuters, 18 November 1998.

[33] Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 19 July 2003, on < http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/>.

[34] Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 19 July 2003, on http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/

[35] Hürriyet, 28 August 2001.

[36] < http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action = html&key = 34130&portal = hbkm&source = external&table = 285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49>.