Abstract
The effect of immigration preferences on electoral outcomes in Spain is understudied. This paper hypothesises that, even in the absence of a radical right party, immigration preferences can be associated with mainstream voting when they are incorporated into established axes of political conflict. The analyses show that the electoral strength of immigration preferences is connected with the strength of the centre–periphery cleavage in Spain. More specifically, immigration preferences are a stronger determinant of the vote for parties with relatively more pro-decentralisation stances, among individuals with more coherent immigration and decentralisation attitudes, and in regions where the centre–periphery cleavage is stronger.
Notes
[1] See Queralt (Citation2012) for a more in-depth discussion of different operationalizations and competing models of issue voting.
[2] A more detailed description of the sampling procedures followed in the survey is provided in the introduction of this special issue, which also offers a short summary of the Spanish party system and highlights its regional particularities.
[3] It is important to acknowledge a risk of projection in the measures of party positions, in the sense that some voters can position parties on the basis of where they stand themselves. To the best of my knowledge, there are no expert surveys or manifesto data that cover the specific individual items on immigration and decentralisation for the whole range of parties included here, and measured at a comparable point in time. Voter perceptions of party positions, however, have proved to be an imperfect but valid strategy in past research. I agree with Van der Brug and Fennema (Citation2003) when they argue that, given that the principal interest in voter behaviour analyses is voters’ perceptions, there is no reason to employ a measure that conditions an individual's opinion about parties on the opinion of other people who are not in a position to affect this individual.
[4] www.ine.es (accessed 4 March 2012).
[5] I have conducted some robustness checks using the vote recall variable of the party voted for in the last regional election in the Basque and Catalan regions. I have constructed a dummy variable in which 1 stands for nationalist party and 0 stands for any other party (excluding non-voters and missing values). I have then predicted this variable using a logit model and the following independent variables: immigration and decentralisation preferences, gender, age, education, and subjective social class. The individual position on immigration is significantly associated with voting for a nationalist party vs. voting for a non-nationalist party. These results are not shown for space reasons, but are available upon request.