Technology and Politics: Have the ICTs Turned into a Domain for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey?

Abstract

The implications of technology have been widely acknowledged in international relations. Studies ranging from the causes of war and military effectiveness to terrorism and nuclear proliferation have explored how technology shapes international politics. However, the implications of technology in domestic politics have not been scrutinised much. This paper helps fill this vacuum through an analysis of Turkey’s civil–military relations. Although civilian control over the Turkish military has improved in the past decade, this process has not been smooth. With a focus on the recent court cases involving the military, the 2007 e-memorandum and the transfer of electronic military intelligence apparatus to the civilian authority, this paper demonstrates how technology has become an important domain for civil–military relations in Turkey.

KEYWORDS:

• Civil–military relations
• technology and politics
• Turkey
• e-memorandum
• Ergenekon
• Sledgehammer (Balyoz)

Acknowledgments

We presented earlier versions of this article at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago and at a faculty seminar at Işık University in April 2015. We would like to thank the audiences for their contribution. We would also like to thank the Editors of South European Society and Politics and the anonymous reviewers for their very constructive comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. This debate between the techno-optimists and techno-pessimists is evident in the concepts they use such as liberation and freedom, on the one hand, and control, oppression, suppression, on the other. See Deibert and Rohozinski (2010), Diamond (2010), Golkar (2011) and Thierer (2010).

2. For analyses of the role of social media during the popular movements in the Middle East and elsewhere see Castells (2013), Howard and Hussain (2011), Lynch (2011) and Genç (2013).

3. In the June 2015 national elections AKP, while remaining the first party, did not have a parliamentary majority and its parliamentary seats dropped from 327 to 258. However, after the November 2015 snap elections, the party’s majority jumped back to 317 seats.

4. http://balyozdavasivegercekler.com (literally ‘the Sledgehammer case and the truth’).

5. The Gülen (aka Hizmet) movement is ‘a cluster of religious, educational, and social organisations’ led by Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish preacher based in the US. (http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-gulen-movement). It is often argued that the Sledgehammer trial (and Ergenekon) was instigated by followers of the Gülen movement, which was in an ‘alliance of convenience’ with the AKP. This alliance came to an end when ‘Gülen sympathisers in the police and judiciary targeted Erdoğan by attempting to arrest close associates of the AKP leadership on charges of corruption’ (Jenkins 2014).

6. TİB was been criticised following its decision to ban Twitter and YouTube. The bans were removed after the Constitutional Court ruled unanimously that the bans were unconstitutional. Also, an MİT bureaucrat was appointed as the TİB’s new chief in December 2013, shortly after the above-mentioned corruption allegations. The plan for closing TİB later dropped from the political agenda.

7. The oversight of the MİT is possible only through its own internal mechanisms, and the investigation of an MİT member requires the Prime Minister’s permission (cited in Yetkin 2012a).