Coming Down on the Winning Side: Britain and the South Asia Crisis, 1971

Abstract

The 1971 South Asia crisis demonstrated that Britain, despite the contemporaneous discussions which were taking place over British accession to the European Economic Community, continued to possess global interests. After a brief period of neutrality in the growing conflict between India and Pakistan, the government of Edward Heath leaned decisively towards the former. This contrasted with the American ‘tilt’ in the other direction, towards Pakistan. The resulting differences of approach between the Heath government and the Nixon White House reflected a wider pattern of division between British and American policy makers over Asia rather than any attempt by Heath to underscore his European credentials by distancing himself from the USA.

Keywords:

• Bangladesh
• Indo-Pakistan War
• Edward Heath

Notes

Simon C. Smith, Professor of International History, University of Hull; publications include: British Relations with the Malay Rulers from Decentralization to Malayan Independence, 1930–1957 (1995); British Imperialism, 1750–1970 (1998); Kuwait, 1950–1965: Britain, the al-Sabah, and Oil (1999); Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950–1971 (2004); British Documents on End of Empire Project: Malta (2006); Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath (2008).

  [1] The British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sir Cyril Pickard, trenchantly stated at the outset of the crisis: ‘It is tempting to turn aside in disgust from these people who can be brutal, arrogant and selfish, and leave them to go to perdition in their own way. But we have our own interests to consider’ (Letter from Pickard to Douglas-Home, 21 May 1971, The National Archives (TNA), FCO 37/870).

  [2] A further example of the Heath government's wish to assert Britain's extra-European role was the negotiation of the Five Power Defence Agreement with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore to maintain a small British military presence in Southeast Asia (see Benvenuti, ‘The Heath Government and British Defence Policy’, 53–73).

  [3] Christopher Hill and Christopher Lord refer to Heath's ‘need to renounce claims to a special relationship with the US’ being ‘obviously linked to Britain's bid to enter the European Community’ (Hill and Lord, ‘The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government’, 306). Alan Dobson, moreover, argues that ‘Nixon and Kissinger hoped to enjoy close relations with the Heath government. By contrast, Heath, determined to be a good European, kept his distance—both metaphorically and geographically’ (Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, 141). In a similar vein, Ritchie Ovendale contends that ‘Nixon's overtures of friendship were met with a deliberate and sustained aloofness by the Europe-obsessed Heath’ (Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, 136–7). Conversely, Alex Spelling argues that ‘one of the most significant challenges to the smooth running of the [Anglo-American] relationship was not Heath's supposed obsession with Europe, but the Nixon–Kissinger management of foreign relations’ (Spelling, ‘Lord Cromer’, 190). See also, Spelling, ‘Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations’, p. 655.

  [4] For example see, Ovendale, ‘Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China’, 139–58; Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil; Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War’, 459–76; Ruane, ‘The Origins of the Geneva Conference of 1954’, 153–72; Ruane, “Containing America”, 141–74; Warner, ‘From Geneva to Manila’, 149–67; Warner, ‘Britain and the Crisis over Dien Bien Phu’, 55–77; Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam; Ellis, ‘Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War’, 180–204.

  [5] The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at the time of the 1971 crisis, Christopher Van Hollen, subsequently argued that ‘The Nixon Kissinger geopolitical approach to South Asia was flawed both in conception and implementation. By attempting to resolve an essentially regional dispute through global geopolitics, the President and his National Security Adviser deemphasized or misinterpreted the political dynamics in the subcontinent and exaggerated the role and influence of major external powers. They unnecessarily elevated the local crisis into one of US Soviet confrontation in keeping with their thesis that the US Soviet contest must be fought out at all levels and in all regions, and that the Soviets should be held responsible for the actions of their “allies”’ (Van Hollen, ‘The Tilt Policy Revisited’, 355).

  [6] Hill and Lord, ‘The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government’, 292–4; Ashton and Louis, East of Suez and the Commonwealth, lxxxvii–lxxxviii; Srinivasan, British Commonwealth, 49–50.

  [7] Talbot, Inventing the Nation, 157.

  [8] Talbot, Pakistan, 119.

  [9] Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, 125.

 [10] Letter from Pickard to Douglas-Home, 21 May 1971, FCO 37/870.

 [11] ‘Pakistan: Economic Aspects of the Current Political Crisis’, Joint Intelligence Committee note, 5 March 1971, TNA, CAB 188/16, JIC (B) (71) (N) 34.

 [12] Van Schendel, Bangladesh, 119.

 [13] Letter from Pickard to Douglas-Home, 21 May 1971, FCO 37/870.

 [14] Telegram from Pickard to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, No. 412, 29 March 1971, TNA, PREM 15/1567. A graphic account of the killing of unarmed civilians in the early stages of the Pakistani army's crackdown is provided by Telegram from Sargeant (Dacca) to Islamabad, No. 199, 31 March 1971, FCO 37/880.

 [15] Letter from Pickard to Sir Stanley Tomlinson, 13 April 1971, FCO 37/870.

 [16] Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 815 (1971), col. 37; Telegram from Douglas-Home to Islamabad, No. 412, 5 April 1971, FCO 37/881.

 [17] Record of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mian Arshad Husain at 10 Downing Street, 27 April 1971, PREM 15/568.

 [18] The following is based on Letter from Indira Gandhi to Heath, 13 May 1971, PREM 15/568.

 [19] Letter from Ian McCluney (FCO) to P. J. S. Moon (private secretary to the Prime Minister), 25 May 1971, PREM 15/568.

 [20] Telegram from FCO to Delhi, No. 815, 26 May 1971, enclosing a message from Heath to Mrs Gandhi, PREM 15/568. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in East Pakistan, Heath had told Yahya Khan: ‘I am sure you will agree that, for the sake of all Pakistanis, there must be an end to bloodshed and the use of force as soon as possible, and a resumption of discussions’ (Telegram from FCO to Islamabad, No. 445, 7 April, enclosing a message from Heath to Yahya Khan, PREM 15/568).

 [21] The British government had already pledged £1 million to help relieve the refugee crisis in response to an appeal made by the United Nations Secretary General.

 [22] Telegram from Delhi [Garvey] to FCO, No. 1616, 28 June 1971, FCO 37/929.

 [23] F. C. D. Sargeant (Deputy High Commissioner, Dacca) reported that ‘the Army is acting in unrestrained fashion, wantonly killing and destroying and generally comporting itself like an Army of conquest… In the circumstances, any talk of a political settlement must be discarded as wilful nonsense’ (Letter from Sargeant to I. J. M. Sutherland, 14 April 1971, FCO 37/883). In a similar vein, Pickard insisted: ‘The result of the army's recent actions has undoubtedly generated a degree of hatred amongst the Bengalis for the army which will never permit the situation to return to normal’ (Telegram from Pickard to FCO, No. 619, 22 April 1971, FCO 37/884).

 [24] ‘Pakistan’, Minute by Wilford, 8 June 1971, FCO 37/887.

 [25] Telegram from FCO to UK Mission, New York, and Islamabad, No. 367, 11 June 1971, PREM 15/569.

 [26] ‘Arms sales to Pakistan’, Minute by Sutherland, 9 July 1971, FCO 37/938. See also ‘Arms sales to Pakistan’, Minute by Sutherland, 7 April 1971, FCO 37/937. As the situation deteriorated, it was decided to hold up all military supplies from Britain to Pakistan (Letter from Lord Carrington (Secretary of State for Defence) to Douglas-Home, MO 6/13, 25 November 1971, FCO 37/913).

 [27] Letter from J. A. N. Graham to A. J. C. Simcock, 21 July 1971, PREM 15/569. See also Letter from Moon to N. J. Barrington, 6 July 1971, FCO 37/929.

 [28] ‘Pakistan’, Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 27 July 1971, TNA, CAB 148/116, DOP(71)51.

 [29] Telegram from J. L. Pumphrey to FCO, No. 1735, 5 August 1971, FCO 37/871.

 [30] ‘Pakistan’, Minute by Trend to the Prime Minister, 28 July 1971, PREM 15/569.

 [31] Letter from Pumphrey to Douglas-Home, 3 August 1971, FCO 37/892. Pumphrey had earlier upbraided Director General for Western Europe in Islamabad, Mohammed Sultan, for the failure to ‘bring the Army under control and use it to exercise rather than spread fear’ (Letter from Pumphrey to Sutherland, 5 July 1971, FCO 37/930).

 [32] ‘The Pakistan Dilemma’, Minute by Byatt, 19 August 1971, FCO 37/892.

 [33] Telegram from FCO to UK Mission, New York, and New Delhi, No. 368, 11 June 1971, FCO 37/887.

 [34] Ibid.

 [35] Letter from Male to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 16 August 1971, FCO 37/819.

 [36] Letter from J. D. Hennings (Counsellor and Head of Chancery, High Commission, Delhi) to Sutherland, 26 July 1971, FCO 37/816.

 [37] India had been worsted by China in a brief border war in 1962.

 [38] Letter from Male to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 16 August 1971, FCO 37/819. Male's analysis was in keeping with that of the acting US Secretary of State, John N. Irwin II, who argued that ‘The Indian decision to depart from its formal posture of non-alliance … reflects India's perceptions of changing international power realities, notably the détente in Sino-American relations. In addition, recent US policies toward Pakistan have reinforced the Indian view that it could not count on US support for Indian interests in the area or on US assistance in the event of hostilities’ (Memorandum from Irwin to President Nixon, 9 August 1971, cited in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–76: Volume XI: South Asia Crisis, 1971 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 314). During discussions with Heath at the end of October 1971, Mrs Gandhi confirmed that after President Nixon had announced his plans to visit China ‘it had become necessary for India to strength its links with the USSR; hence the Indo-Soviet Treaty’ (Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India at Chequers, 31 October 1971, FCO 37/828).

 [39] Letter from Male to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 16 August 1971, FCO 37/819.

 [40] ‘Indo-Soviet Treaty’, Minute by Tomlinson, 23 August 1971, FCO 37/820.

 [41] ‘India/Pakistan’, Minute by Martin, 11 August 1971, FCO 37/907.

 [42] Ibid.

 [43] Letter from Male to Sutherland, 23 August 1971, FCO 37/907.

 [44] Ibid.

 [45] Letter from Pumphrey to Douglas-Home, 21 September 1971, PREM 15/569.

 [46] Letter from Moon to Patrick Grattan [FCO], 20 September 1971, FCO 37/893.

 [47] Letter from Grattan to Moon, 4 October 1971, enclosing a memorandum on East Pakistan, FCO 37/893.

 [48] ‘India and Pakistan’, Memorandum by Douglas-Home, 18 October 1971, CAB 148/117, DOP(71)66.

 [49] Wainwright, Inheritance of Empire, 144.

 [50] Singh, Limits of British Influence, 95.

 [51] Ibid., 146, 156.

 [52] Gopal, ‘India, the Crisis and the Non-aligned Nations’, 185.

 [53] Singh, Limits of British Influence, 231.

 [54] Ibid., 153–4.

 [55] Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 254.

 [56] At the end of March, Blood had reported: ‘Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak[istan] military’ (FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol. XI, p. 33, footnote 1).

 [57] Telegram from Blood to the Department of State, 6 April 1971, cited in ibid., 47.

 [58] Sinivier, Nixon, Kissinger, and US Foreign Policy Making, 149.

 [59] Ibid., 158; Kissinger, White House Years, 864, 887, 897, 904; Nixon, Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 527; Van Hollen, ‘The Tilt Policy Revisited’, 345–6.

 [60] Transcript of a telephone conversation between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 29 March 1971, cited in FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol. XI, 35.

 [61] Warner, ‘Nixon, Kissinger and the Break-Up of Pakistan’, 1100–1.

 [62] FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol. XI, 98, footnote 2. Nixon underlined ‘Don't’ no less than three times. Nixon subsequently noted that ‘If we failed to help Pakistan, then Iran or any other country within the reach of Soviet influence might begin to question the dependability of American support’ (The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 527).

 [63] Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, 155.

 [64] Kissinger, The White House Years, 854. Christopher Van Hollen subsequently challenged Kissinger's thesis, arguing that when fighting broke out in East Pakistan on 25 March, Romania provided an alternative channel of communication with Beijing (Van Hollen, ‘The Tilt Policy Revisited’, 343).

 [65] Memorandum for the record, 16 July 1971, cited in FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol. XI, 264.

 [66] Memorandum for the record of the President's meeting with the Senior Review Group on Pakistan, 11 August 1971, cited in Khan, American Papers, 659.

 [67] Letter from Elliott to Wilford, 14 December 1971, FCO 37/755.

 [68] Law member, supreme council for India, 1834–38.

 [69] Letter from Tebbit to Wilford, 10 December 1971, FCO 37/755.

 [70] Memorandum for the record, 16 July 1971, cited in FRUS, 1969-76: Vol. XI, 265.

 [71] Conversation among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President's Assistant (Haldeman), Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:51–9:00 am, cited in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976: Volume E-7: Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, document 160 (2005). Kissinger went even further than the President in his condemnation of the Indian premier, describing her as ‘That bitch, that whore’ (Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 175). In his memoirs, Kissinger characterized Nixon's encounters with Mrs Gandhi on 4 and 5 November as ‘the two most unfortunate meetings Nixon had with any foreign leader’ (Kissinger, The White House Years, 878).

 [72] The Times, 7 September 1965. Wilson subsequently recorded in his memoirs that his press statement issued on 6 September had been too tough that he had allowed himself to be unduly influenced by pro-Pakistan officials in the Commonwealth Relations Office (Wilson, The Labour Government, 133–4). In retirement, the former Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the CRO, Sir Algernon Rumbold, sought to justify the advice which had been tendered to Wilson (see letter from Rumbold to Sir Stanley Tomlinson, 12 November 1971, and ‘Indo-Pakistan War: September 1965’, Note by Rumbold, 15 October 1971, FCO 37/916).

 [73] Pakistan forces had attacked the Chhamb sector of Jammu on 1 September.

 [74] Letter from Freeman to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, No. 30, 2 October 1965, FCO 37/906.

 [75] Letter from C. C. W. Adams to J. O. Wright, 22 October 1965, TNA, PREM 13/396.

 [76] Colman, ‘Britain and the Indo-Pakistan Conflict’, 471.

 [77] Ibid., p. 466.

 [78] Letter from James to Douglas-Home, 22 January 1971, FCO 37/752.

 [79] ‘The Prime Minister's visit to India’, Minute by Byatt, 29 January 1971, FCO 37/752.

 [80] Letter from Birch to L. V. Appleyard, 18 October 1971, FCO 37/896.

 [81] Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India at Chequers, 31 October 1971, PREM 15/569.

 [82] Telegram from FCO to Washington, No. 2840, 5 November 1971, enclosing a message from Heath to Nixon, PREM 15/569.

 [83] Record of a conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mrs Gandhi, 1 November 1971, FCO 37/826.

 [84] Minutes of a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 30 November 1971, CAB 148/115, DOP (71)22nd meeting.

 [85] Minute from Heath to Trend, No. M67/71, 8 November 1971, PREM 15/570; ‘India/Pakistan’, memorandum by officials attached to note by the Secretaries (Burke Trend, P. G. D. Adams and P. J. Hudson), 24 November 1971, CAB 148/117, DOP(71)75. The figures cited were £100 million compared with £50 million.

 [86] Minutes of a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 30 November 1971, CAB 148/115, DOP (71)22nd meeting.

 [87] Van Schendel, Bangladesh, 170.

 [88] Minutes of a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 7 December 1971, CAB 148/115, DOP(71)24th meeting.

 [89] Ibid. See also Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 9 December 1971, TNA, CAB 128/49 Part 2, CM (71)62nd conclusions.

 [90] Letter from Garvey to Douglas-Home, 10 January 1972, FCO 37/1093. Pakistani forces surrendered to the Indian army on 16 December 1971.

 [91] Minutes of a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 14 December 1971, CAB 148/115, DOP(71)25th meeting.

 [92] Memorandum by Moon, 12 December 1971, PREM 15/571.

 [93] Telegram from FCO to Washington, No. 3170, 13 December 1971, PREM 15/571.

 [94] In mid-July, Nixon had decreed that the Indians would under no circumstances get a ‘dime of aid, if they mess around in East Pakistan’ (Memorandum for the record, 16 July 1971, cited in FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol. XI, 265). Once war had broken out between India and Pakistan, the President expostulated: ‘With regard to an announcement, with regard to the aid thing, I mean just cut it off. All aid to India period’ (FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol. XI, 704).

 [95] Letter from Cromer to Douglas-Home, 17 December 1971, PREM 15/571.

 [96] Ibid.

 [97] ‘Talks between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America at Bermuda 20–21 December 1971: India and Pakistan’, Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 16 December 1971, TNA, CAB 133/417, PMV(BER)(71)(17).

 [98] Heath, The Course of My Life, 486.

 [99] Ibid.

[100] Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 11 January 1972, CAB 128/49 Part 2, CM(72)1st Conclusions.

[101] Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 8 January 1972 at 6:30 p.m., PREM 15/751.

[102] Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 11 January 1972, CAB 128/49 Part 2, CM(72)1st Conclusions.

[103] Telegram from FCO to Washington, No. 82, 13 January 1972, enclosing a message from Heath to Nixon, PREM 15/751.

[104] Minute from Douglas-Home to the Prime Minister, PM/72/1, 13 January 1972, PREM 15/751. See also, Musson, ‘Britain and the recognition of Bangladesh’, 125–44.

[105] Telegram from FCO to Dacca, No. 153, 3 February 1972, PREM 15/751.

[106] Letter from Nixon to Heath, 2 February 1972, PREM 15/751.

[107] Telegram 1113 from the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, 3 February 1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976: Volume E-7: Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, document 391 (2005).

[108] Transcript of Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 4 February 1972, 10:34 p.m., ibid., document 392.

[109] Telegram HAKTO 11 from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Peking, 24 February 1972, cited in ibid., document 401.

[110] Transcript of Telephone Conversation between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon, Washington, 3 March 1972, 12 p.m., cited in ibid., document 407.

[111] Letter From President Nixon to Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman, 4 April 1972, ibid., document 418.

[112] Letter from Garvey to Douglas-Home, 10 January 1972, FCO 37/1093.

[113] ‘Talks between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States on 1 and 2 February 1973: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh’, Brief by the FCO, 16 January 1973, CAB 133/440, PMVW(73) B3.

[114] Colman, ‘Britain and the Indo-Pakistan Conflict’, 479.

[115] ‘India/Pakistan’, Minute from Godber to Secretary of State, 15 December 1971, FCO 37/913. In conversation with President Nixon, the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, opined: ‘the British had to be on the winning side … because they figured they had to get along with India in the future’ (Transcript of a telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, 5 December 1971, cited in FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol XI, 643). In response, Nixon rejoindered: ‘Well, maybe it means something to them but it doesn't mean anything to us except a $10 billion drag in foreign aid over the last 20 years’ (cited in ibid., 643–4). In direct discussions with the British, the President noted: ‘the sentiment in Congress and elsewhere that our considerable aid to India in the past 25 years—a total of some 10 billion dollars—had led only to our being kicked in the teeth’ (Memorandum of conversation, Bermuda, 21 December 1971, cited in ibid., 866).

[116] Letter from Pumphrey to Douglas-Home, 1 January 1972, FCO 37/1135.

[117] D. C. Tebbit of the British embassy in Washington remarked: ‘It is hard to explain in terms of policy as opposed to those of sentiment why the U.S. persisted in backing Pakistan despite the probability that the US client would lose’ (Letter from Tebbit to Wilford, 10 December 1971, FCO 37/755). Hanhimäki points out that ‘not only did the United States tilt openly towards a brutal and non-democratic regime (Pakistan) and against the world's most populous democracy (India), Washington actually ended up supporting the losing side … the Nixon administration did not enhance its credibility and prestige in the third world. If anything, the end result was lost prestige and a punctured moral authority. Realpolitik postulations and rationalizations did little to impress anyone outside Nixon and Kissinger's inner circle’ (Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 182). At the beginning of 1972, High Commissioner Sir Terence Garvey, conjectured reported that ‘American annoyance with Mrs. Gandhi, the suspension of aid, the affair of the Seventh Fleet and other psychological warfare operations, and finally the vendetta waged by the US Government against India in the Security Council, for which President Nixon is held personally responsible, have (by analogy with Mr Wilson's condemnation of Indian aggression in September 1965) probably blighted Indo-American relations for a period of years’ (Letter from Garvey to Douglas-Home, 10 January 1972, FCO 37/1093).

[118] Letter from Pumphrey to Douglas-Home, 1 January 1972, FCO 37/1135.

[119] Letter from Garvey to Douglas-Home, 10 January 1972, FCO 37/1093.