‘A Reputation for Parsimony to Uphold’: Harold Wilson, Richard Nixon and the Re-Valued ‘Special Relationship’ 1969–1970

Abstract

The course of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ in the 18 months after January 1969 is often overlooked, sandwiched between longer periods which seemingly brought to have seen significant strain and decline. The Labour government's decisions in 1967 to withdraw forces from the East of Suez military bases and to devalue the pound marked a watershed in the axis, and this article explores the changed dynamic under the new President, Richard Nixon. Far from marking an end to ‘special relations’, the absence of divisive issues allowed ties to flourish based on natural affinities and practical strengths, as did the positive attitudes of Nixon and National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. This set the tone for the US–UK interactions for the rest of the 1970s and encouraged the President that they could be even better under Wilson's successor, Edward Heath. A ‘fresh start’ to the special relationship, and one more recognisable to its contemporary prolongation was thus visible.

Keywords:

• Harold Wilson
• Richard Nixon
• Henry Kissinger
• ‘Special Relationship’
• US–UK Relations

Notes

Alex Spelling is a Teaching Fellow in the History Department at the University of Aberdeen.

 [1] See, for example, Miller and Patterson, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter FRUS), 1964–1968, 475–9, 516–28; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383.

 [2] Wilson, The Labour Government, 264. For more recent interpretations, see Young, ‘Britain and LBJ's War’; Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government’; and Boyle, ‘The Price of Peace’.

 [3] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 385.

 [4] Young, ‘Britain and LBJs War’ and The Labour Governments, 134–5.

 [5] Wilson, The Labour Government, 264.

 [6] See Boyle, ‘The Price of Peace’; Young, ‘Britain and LBJs War’.

 [7] See also Ellis, ‘Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War’.

 [8] UK National Archives (hereinafter UKNA) (Kew, London), records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (hereinafter FCO) 63/353, Palliser (note) to Wilson, 7 July 1967.

 [9] See Miller and Patterson, FRUS, 1964–1968, 603–8 and 608–9.

[10] Ibid., 611–4.

[11] See Renwick, Fighting With Allies, 199–200.

[12] Cited in Bartlett, The ‘Special Relationship’, 181.

[13] Colman, A Special Relationship?, 168.

[14] Ibid., 169.

[15] Ibid., 170, 174.

[16] Ibid., 176, 179.

[17] The long-term background to these decisions is reassessed in Jones, ‘A Decision Delayed’; McCourt, ‘What Was Britain's ‘East of Suez’ Role?’; Pickering, ‘Politics and “Black Tuesday”’.

[18] See Miller and Patterson, FRUS, 1964–1968, 618–24.

[19] Ibid., 624–7.

[20] See Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Special Economic Relationship, 223–4; Baylis, Anglo-American Relations Since 1939, 229.

[21] UKNA FCO 46/90, Trend (memo) to Wilson, 26 February 1968.

[22] Kissinger, The White House Years, 89–92.

[23] For a brief summary, see Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 86–8.

[24] Young, The Labour Governments, 49.

[25] See Bartlett, The ‘Special Relationship’, 122–3; Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 153.

[26] Heath criticised Labour's East of Suez withdrawals when visiting the USA in May 1969 and in January 1970 proposed a new ‘Five-Power’ (Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia) Defence Pact for the Far East. Concrete proposals were announced by the British government in October 1970 and the pact came into effect in November 1971 although the ultimate military significance was negligible, see The Times, 30 May 1969, and 5 January 1970. For Nixon's positive reaction, see UKNA records of the Prime Minister's Office (hereinafter PREM) 15/714, account of Heath–Nixon meeting, 3 October 1970; and the proposals and pact statement, see PREM 15/710, ‘Five Power Defence Pact’, 22 October 1970; and Sked and Cook, Post-War Britain, 267.

[27] Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States, 93–4; Bartlett, The ‘Special Relationship’, 127; Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 156–7.

[28] UKNA FCO 68/331, Wilson (telegram) for the President elect, 19 November 1968.

[29] UKNA PREM 13/2097, Dean memo, UK Embassy, 16 December 1968; PREM 13/2444, Palliser (telegram) to Wilson, 2 December 1968.

[30] UKNA PREM 13/3018, Dean (telegram) to FCO, 5 February 1969.

[31] UKNA FCO 32/376, study paper, 17 January 1969.

[32] UKNA FCO 63/353, ‘Foreign Affairs in the Next Two Years’, 4 February 1969.

[33] US National Archives and Records Administration II (hereinafter NARA II) (College Park, Maryland), Records of the State Department (hereinafter RG59): Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–69, Political and Defence series, Box 2574. UK Embassy (telegram), to State Department, January 1969.

[34] Cited in Dobson, Anglo-American Relations, 138.

[35] See Nixon, The Public Papers of the Presidents, remarks at Heathrow Airport, 24 February 1969.

[36] See Brandon, The Retreat of American Power, 154; Kissinger, The White House Years, 89–91.

[37] UKNA PREM 13/3007, note of Kissinger–Tomkins conversation, Washington, February 15, 1969; ‘Nixon visit to UK’, February 22, 1969; Washington (telegram) to FCO, 19 February 1969.

[38] UKNA FCO 68/71, note of conversation with Kissinger, Washington, 6 February 1969.

[39] NARA II, National Security Council (NSC) Files: President's Trip Files, Box 442; Briefing for Europe visit: The Middle East; 16 February 1969; Bruce (note) Boxes 442 and 444.

[40] Kissinger, The White House Years, 92, 328; Bruce, Diary, entry of 7 February 1969.

[41] Kissinger, The White House Years, 95–96; see also Young, ‘John Freeman, 1969–71’, 169–88.

[42] UKNA PREM 13/2444, Gore Booth (note) to Wilson, 2 December 1968; Bruce, Diaries, 22 February 1969.

[43] Bruce, Diaries, 25 February 1969; Kissinger, The White House Years, 94–6; and see Young, ‘John Freeman, 1969–71’.

[44] See Ogden, Legacy, 406, 425, 462; Fonzi, Ambassador Extraordinary, 209.

[45] UKNA FCO 41/576, record of Healey–Kissinger discussion, London, 25 February 1969.

[46] UKNA FCO 15/1031, paper on Vietnam, 17 February 1969.

[47] The Times, 18 March 1969; NARA II, NSC Files: President's Trip Files, Europe, Box 446, Kissinger (note), undated.

[48] UKNA PREM 13/2874, Freeman (telegram) to Downing Street, 18 March 1969; The Times, 17 April 1969.

[49] See Waugh and Cronje, Biafra—Britain's Shame, ch. 3.

[50] UKNA FCO 65/256, Elliott (telegram) to Tebbit, 21 January 1969; note of Katzenbach–Freeman meeting, 14 July 1969.

[51] UKNA FCO 15/1031, Wilson (letter) to Nixon, 7 August 1969; Kissinger, The White House Years, 417.

[52] Featured in The Observer, 9 February 1969, see Wilson, The Labour Government, 581.

[53] NARA II, Henry Kissinger Telephone conversation transcripts (hereinafter HAK Telcons): Chronological File, Box 1; HAK and Brandon, 31 January 1969; UKNA FCO 73/40, Graham (letter) to Annenberg, 14 May 1969.

[54] NARA II NSC Files: President's Trip Files, Box 465, Sonnenfeldt (memorandum) to Kissinger, 21 July 1969.

[55] UKNA FCO 7/1427, Freeman (telegram) to Stewart, 26 June 1969.

[56] UKNA PREM 13/3009, Downing Street (telegram) to Washington, 4 July 1969; NARA II, NSC Files: President's Trip Files, Box 465, Sonnenfeldt (note) to Kissinger, 7 July 1969.

[57] UKNA PREM 13/3009, Wilson comments in telegram from UK Embassy, Washington to FCO, 9 July 1969.

[58] Ibid., PM's account of conversation with President Nixon, Mildenhall, 3 August 1969.

[59] UKNA PREM 13/3016, Freeman (letter) to Stewart, 26 June 1969; PREM 13/3022, record of Freeman–Wilson meeting, Downing Street, 25 November 1969.

[60] UKNA FCO 59/465, Wiggin (note), 3 July 1969; FCO 7/1427, Sykes (note), 9 July 1969; Allinson (note), 11 July 1969; FCO 59/465, Waterfield (note) 8 July 1969. Nassau refers to the US–UK meeting in the Bahamas in 1962 during which President Kennedy agreed to supply the British with the Polaris nuclear weapons system, a move believed to have precipitated De Gaulle's rejection of Britain's 1961 EEC application.

[61] UKNA FCO 7/1427, Youde (telegram) to FCO, 22 September 1969; Marjoribanks (telegram) to FCO, 16 December 1969.

[62] NARA II, NSC Institutional (H) Files: NSSM, Box H-164, National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 79, File 1, US policy and UK accession to the EEC, 13 October 1969.

[63] NARA II, NSC Files: Institutional Files, NSSM, Box H-164. Study by the Department's of Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, April 22, 1970. British entry would also likely precipitate Irish, Danish and Norwegian memberships.

[64] UKNA FCO 7/1427, ‘Implications for Anglo-US relations of Britain's European policies’, 16 December 1969.

[65] UKNA PREM 13/3022, account of Freeman–Wilson meeting, Downing Street, 25 November 1969; NARA II, HAK Telcons, Box 3. HAK and Freeman, 6 January 1970.

[66] UKNA FCO 7/1779, Steering Briefs, Washington visit, 23 January 1970; FCO 7/1819, Agenda for Washington visit, 23 January 1970.

[67] NARA II, NSC Files: Presidential Correspondence, Box 763, Correspondence File. Memorandum for President, 16 January 1970; RG59: Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73, Box 2648. Laird (memorandum) to Rogers, 23 January 1970.

[68] The Times, 28 January 1970; Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents, 27–33.

[69] See Kissinger, The White House Years, 416–7; UKNA FCO 7/1823, account of meeting, the White House, 27 January 1970.

[70] UKNA FCO 7/1823, Washington (telegram) to Central Information Office, 28 January 1970; Graham (telegram) to Wiggin, 4 February 1970; NARA II, HAK Telcons, Box 4. HAK and Nixon, 27 January 1970.

[71] See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3917347.stm, published 22 July 2004.

[72] UKNA FCO 7/1823, Freeman (telegram) to Greenhill, 2 February 1970.

[73] See Young, The Labour Governments, 139–40; and Banks, ‘Britain and the Cambodian Crisis’.

[74] See Kissinger, The White House Years, 932–3; also Heath, The Course of My Life, 308; UKNA PREM 13/3173, transcript of Wilson–Nixon conversation, 19 June 1970.

[75] UKNA FCO 7/1823, account of meeting, the White House, 27 January 1970.

[76] Dobson, Anglo-American Relations, 138.

[77] Relations under Heath were actually better than previously assumed but subject to strains of an American making. See Spelling, Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations 1970–74; see also for a monograph length study with a similar take on the American side and a slightly different line on the British response, Scott, Allies Apart.