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Abstract
This article considers responses to the Mass Observation Project’s Gulf Crisis sub-directive. It argues firstly that observers’ responses show how a potential war within Iraq in 1990/1991 was framed by fear of global conflagration and suggests that these fears were rooted in memories of the later cold war. Secondly it argues that the Gulf War was interpreted as a rapid and successful conflict, which dispelled pre-war fears of global conflagration/nuclear war, and demonstrated that the UK could be involved in large-scale modern military conflicts without risking escalation and global catastrophe.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the Trustees of the Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex, and the archive staff for their permission to use the material I have, and the help and advice they have given me when collecting it. I would also like to thank the reviewers of the original manuscript, Camilla Schofield and my supervisor, Helen Parr for all their suggestions, comments and advice.
Notes
1. For figures, see: CNN Library, “Gulf War Fast Facts”; Ciment, Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, 982; Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict; William T. Allison, The Gulf War.
2. Ministry of Defence, “1990/1991 Gulf Conflict.”
3. See, Royal Air Force, “British Forces Involved in Operation Granby”; Royal Air Force, “Timeline of Operation Granby”; Ministry of Defence, “UK Armed Forces Operational deaths post World War II.”
4. Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict; Walsh, “The Legacy of the Gulf War”; Cronin, Global Rules.
5. Brands and Palkki, “Saddam, Israel and the Bomb”; Cigar, “Did Iraq Expect a Nuclear Desert Storm.”
6. William T. Allison, The Gulf War.
7. The Gulf War exposed the rapid development of American military capabilities achieved in the years since the war in Vietnam. The close alignment of communications technology, integrated ‘full spectrum’ combat and highly professionalised personnel formed the basis of a military strategy that has underscored US-led military interventions in the 1990s and since. See: Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict; Cronin, Global Rules; William T. Allison, The Gulf War.
8. Press, “The Myth of Air.”
9. I take a perspective on the nation that is not material. National identity—the relationship between individuals and the wider national community—is a protean, constructed, subjective and imagined construct. See Anderson, Imagined Communities.
10. Smith, “Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World,” 129.
11. National identity is a particularly strong group tie because of the emotional and physical sacrifices demanded on its behalf in wartime. See: Marvin and Ingle, Blood Sacrifice; Malesevic, The Sociology of War and Violence. Similarly, this process of sacrifice for the national cause contributes to the construction of national identities distinct and separate from ‘others’. See: Lebow, Kansteiner and Fogu, The Politics of Memory; Finney, Remembering the Road to World War Two; Hutchinson, ‘War and the Sacralisation of Nations’.
12. During the long eighteenth century military opposition to absolutist, Catholic competitors in Europe, and alien colonial peoples abroad, helped to ‘forge’ dominant ideas of British identity rooted in Protestantism, conservative parliamentary tradition, martial prowess and a civilising imperial mission. Conscription and the experiences of returning soldiers, the construction of war memorials and the publication of war-related news and propaganda communicated these prevailing ideas of British identity to an audience much wider than the elites who constructed the British state. See Colley, Britons.
13. The First World War reordered the national map of Europe and, in Britain, remains a benchmark for devastating experience in total war. It’s shifting reception throughout the twentieth century formed part of a narration of Britain’s contemporary experiences in a subsequent total war, decolonisation and the cold war. See, for example: Winter, Sites of Memory; Winter, Remembering War; Winter and Sivan, War and Remembrance; Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory; Todman, The Great War; Reynolds, The Long Shadow.
The Second World War continues to be a crucible of contemporary British identity and mythologised as a period of particular vindication encompassing the stalwart and heroic resistance to Nazi aggression, largely eclipsing Britain’s formerly imperial identity. See Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia. Britain’s experience in the Second World War informs cultural, social and political debate domestically and is a central part of Britain’s mythic identity in the present. See, for example: Calder, The Myth of the Blitz; Shaw ‘Past wars and present conflicts’; Noakes, War and the British; Noakes, ‘A broken silence?’; Smith, Britain and 1940 ; Finney, ‘On Memory, Identity and War’; Finney, ‘Introduction’; Finney, Remembering the Road to World War Two; Connelly, We Can Take It!; Tombs, The English and their History; Rose, Which People’s War; Summerfield, ‘Dunkirk and the Popular Memory of Britain at War; Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War’.
14. Barkawi, “Small Wars,” 128.
15. The connections between memory, war, violence and identity are the subject of a voluminous literature spanning multiple disciplines. See, for example: Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics; Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory; Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory; Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies”; Olick, “Collective Memory”; Bell, “Introduction: Violence and Memory”; Booth, “Kashmir Road”. For a consideration of specific terms including collective, popular and social memory, see: Popular Memory Group, “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method”; Noakes and Pattinson, “Introduction: ‘Keep calm and carry on’”; Finney, “Introductio.”
16. Popular memories do not exist without the lived experiences and memories of individuals, yet individual memories and experiences are simultaneously fashioned into acceptable public narratives, often centred on national experience. For more detailed consideration of the dynamics at work in popular and social memory related to wartime experiences, see: Thomson, ANZAC Memories; Noakes, War and the British; Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, The Politics of War Commemorations.
17. Popular memories are the product of an active process of remembrance which is itself affected by the contemporary context. Memories of the past are thus informed by the needs of the present; popular memories must retain an explanatory power if they are to survive, particularly as lived experience dwindles over time. Thus, the ways in which past events are remembered publicly alters as ideas and narratives are omitted from public remembrance and others emerge. This relationship between the needs of the present and memories of the past is a central feature of all memory studies, but for discussion related specifically to Britain’s experience in war, see: Dan Todman, The Great War; Finney, Remembering the Road to World War Two; Noakes, War and the British; Calder, The Myth of the Blitz; Connelly, We Can Take It!; Smith, Britain and 1940; Shaw, “Past Wars and Present Conflicts”; Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”; Eley, “Finding the People’s War.”
18. The term ‘myth’ has a particular meaning throughout the social sciences, often linked to the work of Roland Barthes. See, Barthes, Mythologies. I am interested here not in a mythology of the Gulf War, but instead on how memory affected individual interpretations of the Gulf conflict and vice versa, as reflected by Mass Observers, thus I use the term to refer only to works—largely concerning the Second World War—in which the term is deployed. For considered examinations of Britain’s Second World War myths, see: Connelly, We Can Take It!; Smith, Britain and 1940.
19. For detailed consideration of the concept of ordinariness in relation to political history see Hinton, “Politics is Ordinary.”
20. BBC News, “Memorial for Britons Killed”; Farr, “Why the first Gulf War.”
21. Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia.
22. See: Connelly, We Can Take It!; Noakes, War and the British; Shaw, “Past Wars and Present Conflicts.”
23. For an overview of the project and its remit see the MOP’s website, available at: http://www.massobs.org.uk/about/mass-observation-project
24. Madge and Harrisson, Britain by Mass Observation.
25. Since 1981, over 4000 individuals have contributed as observers to the Project. As observers drop out and end their contributions they are gradually replaced by new volunteers.
26. This is stated on the MOP’s website also: http://www.massobs.org.uk/about/mass-observation-project
27. Langhamer, “The Meanings of Home in Postwar Britain.”
28. Adams and Raisborough, “Making a Difference.”
29. Sutcliffe-Braithewaite, “Discourse of ‘class’ in Britain.”
30. Mills, “Using the Personal to Critique the Popular.”
31. Casey et al., “Mass Observation as Method.”
32. Kramer, “The Observers and the Observed.”
33. Shaw, “Transference and Countertransference”. For a detailed discussion of the methodological issues pertaining to the use of Mass Observation data, see; Pollen, “Research Methodology in Mass Observation.”
34. Sheridan, “Writing to the Archive,” 18.
35. Observers were asked simply to document their ‘thoughts and feelings’ about the Gulf War within the 1990 directive. They were asked to keep a diary if possible, though most did not. I further post-script asked for their ‘thoughts and feelings’ after the cessation of the fighting. The directive issued can be found here: http://cdn.collectionsbase.org.uk/gb181/Autumn-Winter%201990%20Directive.pdf
36. MOP Directive sheets are available online at the massobs.org website. The Gulf sub-directive can be found here: http://www.massobs.org.uk/images/Directives/Autumn-Winter1990.pdf
37. This is in fact the highest response rate for any of the conflict-related sub-directives produced by the MOP to date.
38. Hinton, “Politics is Ordinary.”
39. Sheridan, Street and Bloome, Writing Ourselves.
40. Robinson et al., “Telling Stories about Post-war Britain.”
41. Noakes, War and the British.
42. Colley, “Is Britain a Force for Good?”
43. See the edited collection: Bennett and Paletz, Taken By Storm.
44. Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place; Ebo, “War as Popular Culture”; Robinson, “The CNN Effect Reconsidered”; Walsh, “The Legacy of the Gulf War.”
45. Rallings et al., “British Public Opinion During the Gulf War.”
46. Dixon, “Britain’s Vietnam Syndrome?”
47. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public.”
48. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War; Eichenberg, “Gender Differences in Public Attitudes”; Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends”; Gelpi et al.,“Success Matters”; Reifler et al., “Prudence, Principle and Minimal Heuristics.”
49. Baker and O’Neal, “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?”; Fordham, “Another Look”; Bronski and Way, “Does John Bull Rally ‘Round the Union Jack?”
50. Lai and Reiter, “Rally ‘Round the Union Jack?”
51. Hill, “Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy.”
52. Towle, Going to War.
53. Hill, “Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy.”
54. Drury et al., ““Pretty Prudent” or Rhetorically Responsive?”
55. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War.
56. Ibid.
57. Drury et al., ““Pretty Prudent” or Rhetorically Responsive?”; Colley, “Is Britain a Force for Good?”
58. Colley, “Is Britain a Force for Good?”
59. Shaw, “Past Wars and Present Conflicts”; Noakes, War and the British.
60. Shaw, Civil Society and Media, 12.
61. This represents approximately 10% of the responses submitted to the directive in total. This number remains small enough to allow a detailed consideration of individual accounts, yet large enough to provide a ‘saturated’ account of MOP responses and account for anomalies. For the use of a similar method related to a similar subject matter, see; Colley, “Is Britain a Force for Good?”
62. Some observers interpreted a request to keep track of events in the Gulf as a request form them simply to document what was occurring. The result in these cases is simply description, without personal opinion, comment or perspective. I have omitted observers who simply described what they read or saw in the news, though I have included observers who discussed news and media reports alongside their own thoughts and opinions.
63. This concept is present throughout public opinion research, see: Hill, “Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy.”
64. It is difficult to surmise conclusions related to those observers who did not respond to the Gulf directive as there may be a wide variety of reasons their absence. They may simply have not cared enough about a potential conflict to write about it, they may not have taken the threat of one seriously, or they were unable to take the time and effort required to respond to the directive in the first place. Crucially, because we have no written record from these observers, we cannot know why they did not contribute. Thus, it would be unwise to draw any findings and they are simply omitted from this analysis. It must be acknowledged that this leaves an ‘attentive/concerned’ sample.
65. Shaw, Civil Society and Media.
66. See, Noakes, War and the British.
67. See, for example: Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War.
68. See, Noakes, War and the British.
69. Hennessy, The Secret State.
70. Hilton et al., “New Times Revisited.”
71. Laware, “Circling the Missiles.”
72. Stafford, “The Politics of Nuclear Civil Defence”; Preston, “The Strange Death of UK.”
73. See, for example; Beardslee, “Children’s and Adolescents’”; Mayton, “Spontaneous Concern About Nuclear”; Messing and Solomon, “Perceptions of Nuclear War”; Shachter, “Growing Up Under the Mushroom Cloud”; Sommers et al., “Children in Fear of Nuclear War”; Hamilton et al., “Nuclear War as a Source of Adolescent Worry”; Mayton, “Measurement of Nuclear War Attitudes.”
74. Kierulff, “Belief in ‘Armageddon Theology’.”
75. Russet et al., “Did Americans’ Expectations of Nuclear.”
76. Cronin, Global Rules.
77. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War; Shaw, “Past Wars and Present Conflicts”; Noakes, War and the British.
78. Poikolainen et al., “Increasing Fear of Nuclear War.”
79. MO A2464.
80. MO C1043.
81. MO D826.
82. MO D2092.
83. MO A2464.
84. MO C1786.
85. MO D2205.
86. MO D1697.
87. Bennett and Paletz, Taken By Storm; Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War; Walsh, The Gulf War did not happen.
88. MO D2438.
89. MO A1223.
90. Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict; William T. Allison, The Gulf War.
91. MO C1786.
92. MO A1530.
93. Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict; William T. Allison, The Gulf War.
94. MO D1527.
95. MO C1786.
96. MO A1473.
97. Beardslee, “Children’s and Adolescents’”; Sommers et al., “Children 'in Fear of Nuclear War.”
98. MO C1786.
99. MO A883.
100. MO A883.
101. MO D826.
102. MO D826.
103. MO A2212.
104. MO A1473.
105. MO A1292.
106. MO A883.