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ABSTRACT
This article examines how a resurgent clash of Arab and Israeli nationalisms created tensions within New Labour as the leadership sought to reconcile claims of duplicity in its Middle East policy after 9/11 while retaining party unity and an international consensus for a war in Afghanistan. It argues that as European and international pressure to prioritise Middle East peace before pursuing a war with Iraq increased, Tony Blair’s emphasis on economic progress as a prerequisite to creating a state of Palestine was expanded to determine that Palestinian national rights also be considered on the evidence of fundamental reform and modernisation across the spectrum of political, civil and cultural life. These objectives, however, were not to be achieved following the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force, but the prevailing conditions of the Israeli occupation, provisos later inscribed in the US-led goal-driven, performance-based Road Map for Peace. This focus ran in parallel with his assumed role as a transatlantic ‘bridge’, and collectively helped to transform the multilateralist template of the Quartet into a classic trilateralist negotiating model—bilateral Arab-Israel talks, unilaterally overseen by the US—enacting the further exclusion of key European partners.
Acknowledgements
I am greatly indebted to Dr Matt Beech (University of Hull), Dr Spencer Mawby (The University of Nottingham), and Professor Andrew White (The University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China) for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also especially grateful to Baroness Elizabeth Symons, John Kampfner, Neil Kinnock, David Mencer, Per Stig Møller, and Robin Cook for their invaluable insights, and Lord Michael Levy for an extensive and illuminating background interview.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Blair, A Journey, 223.
2. Hardt and Negri, Empire, 115.
3. Rawnsley, The End of the Party, 215.
4. Prescott, “The Iraq Inquiry,” 3, lines 16–18.
5. White, “Let us reorder this world,” The Guardian.
6. Blair, Speech to the Annual Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 2 October 2001.
7. Blair stated the ‘Palestinian cause was used and often abused’ and a ‘powerful tool in the hands of extremists’, but was ‘not the cause of extremism’. Blair, A Journey, 176.
8. See note 6 above.
9. Phythian, “From Asset to Liability,” 196.
10. Duncan, “Middle East Peace,” address to the Royal United Services Institute.
11. Vickers, Labour’s Foreign Policy, 59.
12. Edmunds, “The Evolution,” 24–29.
13. Haines, The Politics of Power, 72–73.
14. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, 401–2.
15. Edmunds, “The British Labour Party,” 111.
16. See, for example, Nelson, “The First New Labour Government,” 121–144.
17. Buller, “Foreign and European Policy,” 194.
18. Hulme, The Israeli-Palestinian Road Map, 13.
19. Madrid Conference (George H. W. Bush) (1991); Oslo Accords (1993), Camp David (2000) and Taba summits (2001) (Bill Clinton).
20. “The Camp David Accords, Framework for Peace in the Middle East.”
21. See, for example, Callaghan, The Labour Party, notably, Chapters, 6 ‘Great Power Strategies’, 162–190, 7 ‘A Party Divided’, 191–243, and 8 ‘The Last Pretence’, 244–285.
22. Hollis, Britain and the Middle East, 3.
23. Daddow and Gaskarth, eds, British Foreign Policy.
24. Dyson, The Blair Identity.
25. Greene, Blair, Labour and Palestine, 4 and 6.
26. Vickers, Labour’s Foreign Policy Since 1951.
27. Little and Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s Foreign Policy, 4.
28. Tocci, “The Middle East Quartet,” 30–32. With its origins in the Madrid Conference (1991) after the First Gulf War, the Quartet was formally constituted in April 2002.
29. Hulme, The Israeli-Palestinian Road Map, 133.
30. Naughtie, The Rivals.
31. The pre-eminence of economics to escape the ‘prison of poverty’ is also located in Brown’s up-bringing and Christianity. Brown, Beyond the Crash, 199.
32. John Kampfner, interviewed by the author, London, 5 December, 2003.
33. Powell, The New Machiavelli, 281.
34. Seldon, and Lodge, Brown at 10, 116.
35. Though ‘always wary of drawing comparisons’, Mo Mowlam (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 1997–1999) reflected that while ‘each conflict has its own peculiarities and origins and unique features’ in principle the lessons are transferable. Mo Mowlam, Momentum, 303. The gap, however, between transferability and application is often subject to people realities, which can be more nuanced, as Jonathan Powell recalled: ‘We tried to apply the same dogged approach to negotiations that we pursued in Northern Ireland, (…) particularly in the Middle East’, though, he added, ‘Not that the Israelis always welcomed British offers of help.’ Powell, The New Machiavelli, 277–8.
36. Simon McDonald quoted in Seldon and Lodge, Brown at 10, 116.
37. See note 33 above.
38. King, “Israel can halt this now,” The Guardian.
39. Catherine Bertini, Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the Secretary-General (UN) reported that the Palestinian economic difficulties were ‘inextricably linked’ to the ‘ongoing conflict’. In particular, the ‘threats and violence from nearby settlers’, especially to the agricultural economic sector, along with the ‘unwillingness’ of some donors ‘to bear what they regard as the financial burden of Israeli occupation’. Funders were also concerned ‘the provision of humanitarian assistance may help ease the political pressure on Israel to reconsider its current policies. Bertini, “Mission Report,” paragraphs 50 and 102.
40. See, Cotton, “Southeast Asia after 11 September.”
41. See, Macintyre, Mandelson, 43–45.
42. Mandelson, The Third Man, 352–353.
43. Katz, “What Peter did next,” The Guardian.
44. Clarke, Against All Enemies, 285.
45. Mandelson, The Third Man, 353 and 353–354.
46. Levy, A Question of Honour, 197.
47. The six scholars invited by Blair to Downing Street included, ‘three specialists on Iraq, and three on international security issues. George Joffe, a distinguished Arabist from Cambridge University, and his two fellow Iraq experts—Charles Tripp [School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London] and Toby Dodge [University of Warwick] (…)—took it in turns to make opening statements of about five minutes each. They were not’, however, ‘asked to produce written memos.’ Steele, Defeat, 18.
48. Steele, Defeat, 172.
49. Seldon, Blair Unbound, 83. As foreign secretary, the role of Jack Straw in Israeli-Palestinian issues (as with his predecessor, Robin Cook) was abruptly curtailed after a diplomatic spat with Israel. The complaint from Tel-Aviv centred on the use of the word ‘Palestine’ in an article, largely written by a British official but published under Straw’s name and with his approval, in the Iranian press ahead of a visit to Tehran. See Straw, Last Man Standing, 433.
50. Steele, Defeat, 2008. p.164.
51. Howorth, “Foreign and Defence Policy,” 22.
52. “Britain Strong in the World,” section 5 of Ambitions for Britain. Labour’s Manifesto, 2001, 36–41; 36.
53. Dyson, The Blair Identity, 125.
54. Richard. “Sieben-Punkte-Plan. Vom Rückzug bis zum Friedensschluss,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 April 2002, cited in Lily Gardner Feldman, “A three-dimensional view,” 124.
55. ‘Iraq/Middle East—Interview given by M. Hubert Védrine’, LCI.
56. Bennet, “Peres Offers New Peace Plan,” New York Times.
57. See UNSC Resolution 1397.
58. ‘Text: Arab Peace Plan of 2002’.
59. Meng, “Sieben-Punkte-Plan,” 124.
60. Blair, “Middle East,” 22.
61. Blair, Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library in Texas.
62. Blair, “Middle East,” 23.
63. Kennedy, “Middle East,” 27.
64. Ross, “Middle East,” 38.
65. Winnick, “Middle East,” 29.
66. Winterton, “Middle East,” 36.
67. See note 65 above.
68. Anderson, “Middle East,” 30.
69. Burden, “Middle East,” 35.
70. Blair, “Middle East,” 24.
71. Cormack, “Middle East,” 34.
72. Blair, “Middle East,” 35.
73. See note 66 above.
74. Tapsell, “Middle East,” 38.
75. Hogg, “Middle East,” 31.
76. Blair, “Middle East,” 35–36.
77. Blair, “Middle East,” 23–24.
78. Trimble, “Middle East,” 33. Although differing narratives make Northern Ireland/Israeli-Palestinian analogies problematic, as had been noted, elements among the protagonists in the ‘post-September 11 “War on Terror”’ era had drawn their own political and cultural parallels: Since April 2002, Loyalists, partly in response to an increase in Palestinian ‘flag-flying’ by Republicans, displayed Israeli flags, as Protestant and Catholic communities identified their respective alliances. Hill and White, “The Flying of Israeli Flags,” 31.
79. Blair, “Middle East,” 34.
80. Communique as conveyed by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, ‘Press conference by members of the ‘Quartet’”.
81. Mencer (Director, Labour Friends of Israel, 1998–2004), interviewed by the author, House of Commons, London, 3 June 2004.
82. Symons, interviewed by the author, House of Lords, London, 19 January 2004.
83. See note 61 above.
84. Blair, “Middle East,” 38.
85. Bush, Speech, The Rose Garden.
86. Rice, No Higher Honour, 147.
87. Bush, Decision Points, 404 and 405.
88. See note 85 above.
89. Carter, Palestine Peace, 145–146.
90. Jeffery, “The road map to peace.”
91. Blair, A Journey, 386 and 388.
92. Coughlin, American Ally, 227.
93. David Manning, Memo to Blair, 14 March 2002, quoted in Seldon, Blair Unbound, 90, endnote, 608.
94. See note 85 above.
95. Bush, Decision Points, 404.
96. See note 85 above.
97. Bush, Decision Points, 405.
98. Abrams, Tested by Zion, 49 and 50–51.
99. “The Road Map,” 83. Per Stig Møller stated that the September draft was never published because it was ‘a work in progress’, and that while ‘deliberations took place in between, (…) the performance driven aspect became stronger during the December [2002] meeting.’ Per Stig Møller, email to the author, 23 July 2014.
100. “President Bush’s Road Map to a Palestinian State.”
101. “Statement of the Middle East Quartet.”
102. “Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002 Presidency Conclusions.”
103. Abrams, Tested by Zion, 54.
104. “Israeli governing coalition collapses,” BBC News.
105. McGreal, “Sharon’s deal for Palestine.” The Guardian.
106. Fontaine, Opening speech, European Council, Biarritz.
107. See note 101 above.
108. Haaretz published a list what it describes as the ‘primary themes of Israel’s remarks’, which the US promised to ‘fully and seriously address’. “Israel’s road map reservations,” Haaretz.
109. “Arafat’s PM bill snubbed,” BBC News.
110. “A Performance-Based Roadmap.”
111. See note 18 above.
112. Short, An Honourable Deception? 151.
113. “TUC General Council Statement on Israel and Palestine.”
114. Fairclough, New Labour, New Language? 116 and 151.
115. Blair, Speech to the Trades Union Congress in Blackpool, 10 September 2002.
116. Blair, Speech to the Annual Labour Party Conference, Blackpool, 1 October 2002.
117. Short, An Honourable Deception? 153.
118. See note 116 above.
119. Ibid.
120. Løj, “EU Presidency Statement.”
121. See note 116 above.
122. “Tel Aviv bombers ‘were British’,” The Guardian.
123. See, “Intifada Toll 2000–2005,” BBC News.
124. Blair, “Middle East,” 22 and 24.
125. Hulme, The Israeli-Palestinian Road Map, 125.
126. Simon McDonald, Private Secretary to Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary), quoted in Seldon, Blair Unbound, (‘private interview’, 8 March 2007), 476.
127. Cook, The Point of Departure, 145.
128. Straw, Last Man Standing, 446.
129. Cook, “Personal Statement.”
130. Blair, Speech to the Annual Labour Party Conference, Bournemouth, 30 September 2003.
131. Scott, Off Whitehall, 20.
132. Quoted in Scott, Off Whitehall, 208.
133. Neil Kinnock, interviewed by the author, European Commission Representation in the United Kingdom, Europe House, London, 30 January 2004.
134. Straw, Last Man Standing, 447.
135. Prescott, “The Iraq Inquiry,” 38–39, lines 24–25 and 1–4.
136. Straw, Last Man Standing, 446.
137. Short, An Honourable Deception? 149–150.
138. Prescott, John. “The Iraq Inquiry,” 40, lines 9–15.
139. Cook, The Point of Departure, 347.
140. Cook, “Why I had to leave the cabinet,” The Guardian.
141. Rice, No Higher Honour, 37.
142. Hulme The Israeli-Palestinian Road Map, vii.
143. Dyson, The Blair Identity, 93 and 92.
144. Neil Kinnock, interviewed by the author, 30 January 2004.
145. Bush, “Statement on the Israeli Disengagement.”
146. Reynolds, “Powell visit highlights problems.”
147. George W. Bush explained in 2003 that his Road Map approach was shaped by the experience of his father, George H. W. Bush, who had pressured Yitzhak Shamir (Prime Minister of Israel) to suspend settlement building, which ‘Bill Clinton mercilessly used against him—and took the presidency from him’. Straw added, the ‘closeness of his win against Al Gore in 2000, and the fact that the evangelical Christian movement, traditionally strong with the Republican Party, had now formed a strong foreign policy alliance with the Israeli lobby’, increased his political insecurity. Straw, Last Man Standing, 446.
148. Significantly, it was Israeli settlement expansion, specifically HarHoma (East Jerusalem), which triggered a break in the Blair-Cook partnership regarding Israeli-Palestinian issues. See Nelson, “The First New Labour Government,” 126, 128–130.
149. Williams, British Foreign Policy, 205. Williams claimed the ‘most positive impact’ from the Iraq war was the Road Map, but noted it contained ‘important silences (including Israel’s “separation wall”)’ and ‘one-sided interpretations and vocabulary (in Israel’s favour)’ that, he concluded, ‘clearly left the Israeli government in the driving seat of the process’, 204.
150. Cook, interviewed by the author, 2 November 2004.
151. “A Letter to Blair.”
152. Prescott, “The Iraq Inquiry,” 38, lines 4–8.
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Ian Nelson
Dr. Ian Nelson is Assistant Professor in Transnational History and Politics, School of International Studies, The University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China. He was awarded a PhD at Durham University (Ustinov College), School of Government and International Affairs, the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies.