‘Mandela’s out so apartheid has finished’: the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and South Africa’s transition to majority rule, 1990-1994

ABSTRACT

Based on original archival research and oral history interviews, this article examines how the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) adapted to the evolving circumstances during South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy between 1990 and 1994. It argues that the successful framing and impact of the Free Nelson Mandela Campaign (FNMC) of the 1980s, inadvertently created a series of challenges for the AAM in the years after Mandela’s release from prison in February 1990, as many in Britain came to associate this moment with the end of apartheid. The pervasive sense that apartheid was over, coupled with the complexity, uncertainty and violence of South Africa’s political transition, created a difficult campaigning environment for the AAM, who found it hard to maintain the momentum generated through the FNMC. Despite encountering numerous (trans)national and local challenges which inhibited its impact after 1990, this article concludes that the AAM’s persistent campaigning presence allowed it to capitalise following renewed British interest in South Africa following the announcement in June 1993 of a date for the first non-racial democratic election. This enabled the AAM to make a tangible contribution, primarily through fundraising, to the African National Congress’ successful election victory in May 1994.

KEYWORDS:

• Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM)
• anti-apartheid struggle
• social movement
• Nelson Mandela
• South Africa

The British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) is often regarded as one of the most influential transnational social movements of the twentieth century. As Hilary Sapire notes, the AAM was ‘the largest and most sustained international solidarity movement ever mounted in the United Kingdom’.¹ Even within an international context, the AAM is considered one of the most important components in the transnational solidarity network of anti-apartheid organisations which emerged during the second half of the twentieth century.² The enduring images and memories that symbolise the impact of the AAM are rooted within an array of innovative campaigns against multinationals such as Barclays Bank and Shell, the cultural and sporting isolation of the white-minority regime, and the widespread consumer boycott of South African goods which was supported by almost a third of the British population by the mid-1980s.³ Moreover, the Free Nelson Mandela Campaign (FNMC) was critical in entrenching the anti-apartheid cause into the mainstream of British public consciousness and in popular culture. This was epitomised by the Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute Concert at Wembley Stadium on 11 June 1988 which was attended by around 100,000 people and attracted a global audience of over 600 million.⁴ The contemporary perceptions of the AAM are indelibly shaped by the context of this era and accentuated by subsequent developments in South Africa, including the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the release of Mandela in February 1990, and the first democratic elections in April 1994.

The AAM had worked tirelessly over three decades to support South Africa’s liberation movements, while keeping the issue of apartheid in the public eye, and simultaneously challenging deep-seated vested interests situated within Cold War politics and western economic concerns, as well as general attitudes towards race. However, the release of Mandela in February 1990, and the onset of formal negotiations which began South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy between 1990 and 1994, created a set of interlocking crises that profoundly affected the AAM. Less than seven months after Mandela’s release, a report to the AAM’s Annual General Meeting stated that the movement ‘faces the most challenging period in its history’.⁵ The core question addressed in this article is how the AAM responded to the increasingly complex and fast-moving political environment after 1990. It argues that the broad-based FNMC of the 1980s, and its unprecedented success in mainstreaming the anti-apartheid message, inadvertently created numerous challenges for the AAM. This was because the wider British public associated the unbanning of the ANC and Mandela’s release with the end of apartheid. The widespread sense that the job was done, combined with the uncertainty and violence that plagued South Africa’s transition, made the AAM’s clear single-issue campaigns of the past far more difficult. It also left activists unsure about how they could shape future events. The article examines the various global, national, and local developments which affected the AAM’s capacity to campaign effectively between 1990 and 1994, and the multifaceted impact they had on the movement. It demonstrates that while the AAM struggled to replicate the momentum of the late-1980s following Mandela’s release, its perseverance, in spite of the many challenges it faced, enabled the movement to capitalise on renewed public interest in South Africa following the announcement of an election date, and play an active and prominent role in the build-up to the ANC’s victory in 1994.

The article begins by outlining the central aspects of the FNMC during the 1980s and explores its impact on the AAM as an organisation and the wider British public. This is followed by a discussion of the ramifications of Mandela’s release for the AAM and how this moment was interpreted by those within the movement as the beginning of a new phase in the struggle, whereas many outside associated it with the end of apartheid. The article then considers in-depth the period from Nelson Mandela’s release in February 1990 through to the announcement of an election date in June 1993. It highlights the numerous challenges the AAM faced as it sought to maintain the momentum of the 1980s, through a series of domestically focussed campaigns designed in response to the complex and evolving political context within South Africa. This section also explores the uneasy balance the AAM sought to strike between the need to stress to the British public that apartheid was not over and that the international solidarity movement’s role remained important, while not appearing blind to the changes that were occurring, and the requirement to rethink the organisation’s role in anticipation of a post-apartheid future. The article concludes by examining how the announcement of an election date in the summer of 1993 gave the AAM renewed momentum and clarity of purpose as it proceeded to play a prominent role in Britain’s contribution to the ANC’s successful election campaign.

Winding down or final push?

The burgeoning historiography on the AAM has grappled with the theoretical dilemmas of how to situate the movement and its activities, as well as its heterogeneity.⁶ There is a body of work that posits the AAM as part of the globalisation of politics after the Second World War, exploring how certain individuals connected disparate groups together, the international networks that emerged, and the underlying importance of transnational solidarity. Håkan Thörn examined the AAM’s role in the emergence of a global civil society, arguing that it played a crucial part in creating a ‘transnational political culture that was a part of a wider, complex and multi-layered process of political globalisation during the postwar era’.⁷ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink identified the AAM as being part of a ‘transnational advocacy network’ which through the use, control, and deployment of information aimed to ‘persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments … [but also] transform the terms and nature of the debate’.⁸ The AAM was extremely adept at developing and sustaining itself across borders, tying activists together around the powerful notion of solidarity. Throughout the AAM’s history, its international advocacy and public campaigning activity in Britain was premised on, and influenced by, its networks with anti-apartheid activists, and developments within South Africa. As a consequence, the unbanning of the ANC, the complexity of South Africa’s negotiations, and President F.W. de Klerk’s efforts to reintegrate the white-minority state within the international community amid the rapidly changing post-Cold War environment, all contributed to the AAM’s emergent problems in the 1990s, over which it had very little control.

The AAM was also firmly entrenched in a local and national British setting, affected by the policies of the Conservative government, the fluctuating media attention given to South Africa, the unstable interest from the general public, and the commitment and motivations of its supporters and activists. As Simon Stevens points out, the global element does not tell us why individuals were drawn into the anti-apartheid struggle nor fully answers the question of why they focussed on South Africa. Stevens concluded that, ‘Anti-apartheid activism in Britain … must be understood as simultaneously both a transnational and a national phenomenon’.⁹ Christopher Fevre’s work exploring Scottish anti-apartheid activism similarly argued that the development of the movement in Scotland was shaped by a particular national political and cultural context.¹⁰ Building upon the existing scholarship, this article pays close attention to the local, national, and global dynamics which influenced the AAM’s development during the early-1990s.

Historical writing on the AAM has explored the multifaceted components of the movement’s activities, including its origins and humanitarian traditions, individual campaigns, regional activism, organisational structures, race, and the broader challenges the movement faced.¹¹ However, little attention has been paid to the final stages of the AAM’s existence during the period that maps onto South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy. Roger Fieldhouse’s detailed empirical study of the AAM’s long history does contain a chapter pertaining to the years 1990 to 1994. That said, his characterisation of this episode in the AAM’s history as one of ‘Winding Down’ lacks nuance given that for much of this period, as will be argued throughout this article, the organisation attempted to maintain and increase its activity. Fieldhouse’s chapter begins by discussing the AAM leadership’s search for a new strategy following Mandela’s release, but it is primarily focussed upon the movement’s external relationships with the British Government, the ANC, as well as international institutions such as the European Community (EC), Commonwealth and the United Nations.¹² Christabel Gurney’s essay, ‘In the Heart of the Beast’, also includes a brief discussion of what she more accurately entitled ‘The Final Push’ between 1990 and 1994. Within this, Gurney addresses some of the challenges of the transition period and outlines a number of the campaigns formed in response, describing these years as, ‘among the most difficult in the AAM’s 35-year history’.¹³ While Gurney’s work has been important in establishing a narrative framework for understanding the AAM and its activities in this era, it represents a relatively succinct analysis of the period. This is largely due to the nature of Gurney’s project in which she embarked upon the challenging task of distilling the AAM’s entire history into a single book chapter.

This article builds upon the insights provided by Fieldhouse and Gurney, by adopting an analytical lens that not only focuses on the activities of the central, inner workings of the AAM, but also incorporates the perspectives of activists from every-level of the movement. To establish a more holistic sense of the AAM during this period, the article draws from anti-apartheid documentation such as political reports, minutes, the AAM’s newspaper Anti-Apartheid News, as well as oral testimony in order to uncover the nuances, contradictions and challenges of the early-1990s. As a starting point, the fifty-six interviews with former anti-apartheid activists, which are available through the British AAM’s online archive, Forward to Freedom, were analysed.¹⁴ A further twenty interviews were conducted via Zoom with former activists encompassing a wide array of experiences, roles and geographic locales, from those in decision-making positions within the AAM’s Executive and National Committee’s to members of regional and local structures, as well as professional groups, including Lawyers Against Apartheid. Most of the interviewees were British-born, however a small number were exiled South Africans who had embarked upon anti-apartheid activism in Britain. Activists’ recollections concerning the multifaceted role played by the AAM were largely positive, especially around the FNMC, but when considering the specificities of the transition period, there was broad acknowledgement that this was an enormously challenging time. These interviews provide an original insight into the mechanisms of the AAM, how the challenges of the 1990s were experienced on the ground, and the ways in which the movement attempted to adapt.

The British campaign to free Nelson Mandela

By the late-1980s the AAM had reached its zenith. The AAM’s steady growth from the 1970s reflected the resurgence of internal resistance to apartheid after the Soweto Uprising (1976), and extensive news coverage of state repression during the mid-1980s State of Emergency which enhanced the British public’s awareness of the situation in South Africa.¹⁵ Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s independence and the onset of majority rule in April 1980, meant that the AAM was able to channel its energies into fighting apartheid in South Africa and Namibia. Amidst this backdrop, the AAM launched a plethora of campaigns centred around economic and military sanctions, the consumer boycott of South African goods and disinvestment by multinational corporations such as Barclays Bank and Shell, as well as the ongoing cultural, academic and sports boycotts. The deployment of these dynamic campaigns, and the multifaceted experiences amassed through them by activists, both at a national and local level, were vital precursors to the growth of the AAM’s authority, and support base. Former AAM activist Maise Carter remarked, that the accomplishments in the late-1980s, ‘didn’t just magic itself out of nowhere, it all came as a result of what ordinary people like me were doing’.¹⁶ Without the sustained and often unrewarded efforts of AAM activists, its most high-profile and ambitious initiative of the 1980s, the FNMC, would not have been as effective.

The worldwide campaign to focus on Mandela was a carefully considered move that stemmed from ANC President Oliver Tambo and the ANC-in-exile during the 1970s. This new strategy was designed to draw attention to the anti-apartheid cause by personalising the struggle for freedom using Mandela as its central figure. The focus on Mandela was further motivated by the ANC-in-exile’s concerns that alternative anti-apartheid groups in South Africa such as Black Consciousness, and its martyred leader Steve Biko, would divert international attention away from the movement.¹⁷ Mandela reflected in his auto-biography that the decision was not entirely popular among other prisoners on Robben Island because it was regarded as ‘a betrayal of the collectivity of the organisation’.¹⁸ Despite these concerns, Deborah Posel asserted that ANC leaders recognised ‘that elevating Mandela as the iconic metonym of the anti-apartheid struggle, legitimately standing in for the ANC as a whole’, could enhance his leadership credentials.¹⁹ Personalising the struggle for global audiences also contributed to a greater awareness of the injustices of apartheid, while broadening the appeal and political demands of the ANC.²⁰ In South Africa, the campaign for his release was effectively initiated in 1980 by Percy Qoboza, editor of the Sunday Post (Johannesburg), who launched a Free Mandela Campaign, which gained considerable public backing.²¹

It should be acknowledged that international audiences had been aware of Mandela since the mid-1960s due to his stand at the Rivonia Trial. The trial attracted considerable public attention in Britain, through media coverage, vigils, and demonstrations that placed apartheid under the spotlight.²² However, the imprisonment of the Rivonia Trialists, coupled with the subsequent difficulties faced by the liberation movements, led to a decline in public interest. The British campaign to secure Mandela’s release was reignited in 1978 when at a joint meeting between the AAM, ANC, and SATIS (Southern Africa: The Imprisoned Society), the liberation movement approved a proposal to celebrate Mandela’s 60^th birthday.²³ Although this article is focussed on the AAM, it must be stressed that the organisation was working within the context of a much larger movement aiming to secure Mandela’s release from prison and the demise of apartheid. This encompassed a variety of groups such as SATIS, the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), progressive local authorities, sections of the media, as well as churches and trade unions. A central feature of the FNMC as it emerged in Britain was the renaming of buildings and streets after Nelson Mandela and the bestowing of awards in his honour, often led by city councils such as Sheffield. An early breakthrough in the campaign came in 1981, when Glasgow’s local authority awarded Mandela the Freedom of the City. Eight other cities and council areas subsequently followed this example during the 1980s.²⁴ The decision to honour Mandela with the freedom of nine UK cities and council areas attracted significant media attention—not all of it positive—but did raise considerable awareness about his plight and that of black South Africans more broadly.²⁵ By the beginning of the 1990s, the AAM estimated that over 300 honours had been bestowed upon Mandela in Britain by local councils, universities, and trade unions.²⁶ These actions to recognise Mandela were a key aspect of the broad anti-apartheid campaign in Britain, and were vital in altering public perceptions. The extent to which Mandela had become engrained within British culture, was evidenced by the 1980s BBC sitcom Only Fools and Horses which was set in a housing block named Nelson Mandela House.

A notable feature of the FNMC was its engagement with popular music. In 1984, The Special AKA released Free Nelson Mandela, which reached number nine in the UK singles chart. Building upon this momentum, Artists Against Apartheid, a group formed in 1985 by Jerry Dammers and Dali Tambo to reinforce the cultural boycott of South Africa and to utilise popular culture as a weapon against apartheid, organised the ‘Freedom Festival’ on Clapham Common in 1986, which attracted 250,000 people.²⁷ This free music festival was, however, a financial disaster for the AAM which left the organisation with a deficit of £40,000.²⁸ Nevertheless, the scale and impact of this event in generating public interest in apartheid and Nelson Mandela provided the inspiration for the AAM’s most ambitious initiative of the 1980s, the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign. The aim was to build international pressure to secure the release of Mandela in time for his 70th birthday in 1988. A key aspect was the Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute concert held at Wembley Stadium on 11 June, which attracted an unprecedented level of interest in the AAM and the struggle against apartheid. Although the campaign did not secure Mandela’s release from prison in 1988, the AAM described it as the, ‘most effective campaign ever initiated by the Anti-Apartheid Movement’.²⁹

The success of the FNMC had a tremendous impact upon the AAM as an organisation. Former AAM activist Christabel Gurney asserted that the campaign and concert reaffirmed the AAM’s position as the principle organisation leading the fight against apartheid from Britain.³⁰ Crucially, the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign raised much needed funds for an organisation which had been in financial crisis for much of its existence. The AAM for example, raised £390,000 after tax directly from the concert in 1988.³¹ There was also a considerable increase in the AAM’s membership; between 1 June and 30 September 10,500 new individual members were recruited which more than doubled the AAM’s membership to 18,000 by the end of 1988. According to the AAM’s ‘Report to the AGM’ in 1989, this was, ‘overwhelmingly the result … of the Nelson Mandela Freedom at 70 campaign’.³² New local groups were established across Britain to accommodate the growth in membership, peaking at 187 in 1988, which enabled the AAM to have a truly nationwide structure for the first time.³³ The campaign also had a significant influence on young people and the AAM reported an uptake in the membership of student groups as a direct consequence of the Mandela campaign.³⁴ This aligns with the recollections of former AAM activists who pinpointed how the Mandela campaign’s use of popular culture was instrumental in increasing young people’s engagement with the AAM.³⁵

Activists repeatedly referred to the local, national and crucially, global reach of the Wembley concert.³⁶ Through the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign, the AAM impinged on the public consciousness in a way that it had never before; as former AAM activist Margaret Ling recalled, the AAM became the ‘campaign of the moment’.³⁷ The ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign enhanced the way that Nelson Mandela was perceived in Britain, and AAM opinion polling in the late-1980s suggested that an estimated 92% of people knew who Mandela was and 70% believed he should be released from prison.³⁸ The personalisation of anti-apartheid activism during the 1980s had enabled the British public to identify with Mandela and this undermined previously negative portrayals of him. According to the former leader of Camden Council, and longstanding AAM supporter Tony Dykes, after the concert in 1988, it increasingly became socially unacceptable to brand Mandela or the ANC as terrorists, at least in the public sphere.³⁹ By the end of the 1980s, even Margaret Thatcher, who had been one of Mandela’s and the ANC’s most vocal critics, believed that his release was central to any peaceful resolution in South Africa. The FNMC had therefore enhanced the international legitimacy of Mandela, and the ANC, as the representatives of the majority of South Africans.⁴⁰

Is apartheid now over? The impact of Nelson Mandela’s release on the AAM

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy was a complex, violent, and non-linear process that saw the instigation of formal negotiations between the National Party (NP) Government and opposition movements unfold against the backdrop of significant social disorder fomented by the apartheid state, and wide-ranging international pressures.⁴¹ On 2 February 1990, President F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and other proscribed liberation movements, and the release of political prisoners, triggering four years of protracted talks to end the system of apartheid. The release of Nelson Mandela from prison nine days later was met by jubilant celebrations by anti-apartheid activists across Britain and around the world.⁴² These celebrations were given added impetus by South West Africa People’s Organisation prior victory in Namibia’s first democratic elections in 1989, which paved the way to its formal independence from apartheid South Africa a few months later; this fulfilled another of the AAM’s core objectives.⁴³ Numerous activities were organised in early-1990 under the auspices of the British Nelson Mandela Reception Committee (NMRC), including a rally outside the South African Embassy in London to coincide with de Klerk’s speech on 2 February. A second concert entitled, ‘Nelson Mandela: An International Tribute for a Free South Africa’, was also held at Wembley Stadium in April 1990. Reflecting on the impact of the NMRC in Britain, the AAM stated in its 1990 ‘Report to the AGM’ that the celebrations had, ‘provided a framework to give new momentum to the campaigns to free all political prisoners … and to the struggle to end apartheid’.⁴⁴ This observation encapsulated the AAM’s steadfast belief that the celebrations surrounding Mandela’s release did not signal the end of apartheid, but the beginning of a new phase in the struggle.

The AAM’s conviction that the release of one high-profile prisoner did not equate to the end of apartheid was articulated in multiple public statements released from February 1990. Immediately after Mandela’s release, the AAM produced a declaration signed by prominent politicians and public figures, as well as organisations, including trade unions and church groups. In addition to celebrating his freedom, the declaration affirmed that ‘pressures must be sustained until apartheid has been ended’ and the signatories pledged ‘to intensify efforts to isolate apartheid’. The declaration also expressed grave concern that the pillars of apartheid remained in place, and the movement’s recognition that these inhibited the realisation of a ‘united, non-racial, non-sexist, and democratic South Africa’.⁴⁵ The AAM reiterated its official position after the second Wembley concert, stating categorically, that the movement would not stop its efforts until all aspects of apartheid were destroyed.⁴⁶ It is clear from the AAM’s public statements that they did not perceive the release of Mandela as the final victory, nor the fulfilment of their objectives, instead, the AAM emphasised the importance of continued activism to ensure the complete transformation of South Africa.

The political environment that confronted the AAM after February 1990 was different from anything it had experienced before, and it was largely unprepared for the eventuality. Fieldhouse observed that the AAM had been ‘caught on the hop’ by the decision of the apartheid regime to initiate reforms.⁴⁷ The scenario mirrored the position of the ANC, which was left in turmoil and faced the, ‘most difficult time in the history of the South African liberation movement’.⁴⁸ In spite of the AAM’s clear and consistent message that the struggle continued, Mandela’s release had a significant impact on the British public’s perceptions of apartheid. Testimonies from activists consistently reiterated the draw Mandela had, with their recollections emphasising just how vital he was to the AAM’s work, especially at the grassroots level.⁴⁹ This is not to discount the boycotts or sanctions campaigns for their effectiveness, but rather, for the general public, it was Mandela that had drawn them into the anti-apartheid cause, and his release was why they had started to abandon it. The AAM had anticipated how Mandela’s freedom might impact their activities and were eager to ‘avoid a situation in which a substantial body of public opinion is deluded into believing the release of a few prisoners … automatically means an end to apartheid’, but were unable to prevent such a situation from emerging.⁵⁰ According to former Welsh-based activist Hanef Bhamjee, ‘the euphoria of the Mandela concerts filtered down to the general public, and effectively people were saying we don’t need an anti-apartheid movement anymore. It is now over’.⁵¹

‘The task ahead doesn’t … get easier’: the transnational challenges of transition (1990-1993)

The AAM’s biggest task was how to effectively counteract the prevailing narrative that Mandela’s release equated to the end of apartheid. Activists time and again referred to the difficulties of counterposing the ‘end of apartheid’ perceptions which had become increasingly ingrained within the public psyche. The consequences of the enormously successful framing of the FNMC and a ‘personality’ based-strategy meant, as Mark Guthrie, a founding member of Lawyers Against Apartheid, recalled, ‘it was harder, because he [Mandela] was out and that had been the focus of a campaign. And so it was almost like, what now?’⁵² In addition, the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation organisations had a tangible impact upon the role of the AAM. As the activist David Hillman recalled:

there was a clear sense that our status had changed … And therefore, our role was relegated in some way. And that we had to adjust to those shifting sands … Up until that moment, the UK Anti-Apartheid Movement was the largest broadcaster of the demands of the ANC. And now the ANC could make those demands in the open, legally in South Africa. How did that adjust what we were doing?⁵³

This resulted in a period of adjustment in which the AAM sought to address what its new role would be vis-a-vis the ANC, and how it could support the transition process. An additional consequence of the ANC’s unbanning was that many exiles began to return to South Africa; by the end of 1991, approximately 7,000 had already left Britain.⁵⁴ This development created two core problems for the AAM. The first was that the return of South Africans further fuelled the public impression that apartheid was all but over, and the second, was that the exiled community had been an important cog in the transnational networks that connected activists in Britain to developments on the ground in South Africa. At a stage when the AAM was reconsidering its future role, the declining presence of South African exiles was another challenge to overcome.

The AAM set-out a multi-pronged transnational strategy, premised on maintaining the pressure against the allies of apartheid, namely the British government, through the continuation of sanctions, while simultaneously seeking to forestall the international ‘charm’ offensive launched by de Klerk and the NP.⁵⁵ The core objectives were to try and level the political playing field to establish the framework for peaceful negotiations, which in turn would ensure the smooth transition to a non-racial and democratic South Africa. There was a continued focus on international activities and the AAM lobbied the British government, the UN, the Commonwealth, as well as the EC to maintain pressure on the NP during the negotiations and to help facilitate the conditions in which a ‘new’ South Africa could emerge.⁵⁶ The AAM’s actions, in co-ordination with other anti-apartheid movements, had an effect at a European level, although the approach of the British government, even after John Major’s election in 1992, meant the movement struggled to meaningfully alter official policy on sanctions during the transition.⁵⁷

Aside from lobbying at an international level, the AAM launched a series of domestically focussed campaigns, which sought to ensure that boycotts were maintained, mobilisation and fundraising activities at a local and national level continued, while providing avenues to channel the energy of activists. The AAM’s activists were suspicious of de Klerk’s motivations, the support offered to the NP by the Thatcher and Major governments, as well as recognising the ANC’s internal weaknesses.⁵⁸ Simultaneously, the AAM was prescient that the changing mood in Britain, and a failure to reshape its actions would be deeply problematic for the movement. The ‘Report to the AGM’ in 1990 explicitly warned that, ‘there exists a real danger that outside South Africa there may be a demobilization of popular anti-apartheid forces’, and that this scenario must be prevented at all costs.⁵⁹ However, from the summer of 1990, internal discussions became increasingly concerned by the movement’s declining membership base and the impact this had on the ability to campaign. Successive National Committee meetings in 1991 identified that the AAM’s immediate priority was to ‘halt the decline in membership renewals’, with the urgent need ‘to reverse this trend’.⁶⁰ But the situation did not improve, with an acknowledgement later in the year, that ‘some support for the Anti-Apartheid Movement is seeping away, and international pressure against the South African government is undermined’.⁶¹ The ‘Political Report’ of the AAM in 1992 asserted in no uncertain terms that:

… the challenges facing the AAM are immense. We must ensure that we have the human and financial resources for this critical stage. This means we must continue to address how best to fundraise, win and maintain membership, and ensure the maximum participation in our work of local and regional structures, our national and local affiliates, as well as our individual members. We must also reach out to new sections of the population who can be won to support our efforts.⁶²

This document is a clear indication of the AAM’s intention not to ‘wind down’, but maintain, if not increase the organisation’s level of support and activism. Yet, the situation was such that midway through the transition period, the AAM’s activities were hampered by the reduction in activist numbers and its inability to recruit new members. David Kenvyn, former chair of the London Committee of the AAM (1982–1988), admitted that after the release of Mandela, the AAM struggled to, ‘keep people on track … And being honest, we didn’t. Membership did fall off’.⁶³ There were genuine concerns that after 1990, once people began to move away from the AAM, it would be difficult to, ‘totally influence things or get thousands of people back on the street’ if negotiations in South Africa did not progress as was hoped.⁶⁴

The AAM’s declining membership contributed to one of its toughest financial periods up to the beginning of 1993. The onset of negotiations came as a shock to the AAM, which by the late-1980s, following the success of the FNMC, had been in a period of rapid expansion, including newly created roles in the central office, and more ambitious campaign initiatives. In 1984 for example, the AAM’s annual income had been just over £100,000, whereas this had increased to £775,000 by 1990.⁶⁵ Despite this, the situation at the start of the transition had enormous consequences on the AAM’s ability to generate income. The AAM had never been a particularly wealthy organisation, and activists described it as having lived ‘hand to mouth’ or surviving on a ‘shoestring’ for much of its history.⁶⁶ During the transition, the AAM endured an almost catastrophic financial position characterised by a sizeable income deficit, falling membership dues, and large debts totalling over £300,000 in September 1991.⁶⁷ The AAM also faced a challenging fundraising environment caused by the pervasiveness of the ‘end of apartheid’ narrative and the recession of the early-1990s, when unemployment peaked at 10.7% between December 1992 and February 1993.⁶⁸ The perilous state of the British economy meant that eliciting donations became ever more difficult for the AAM.

Amidst a background of decreasing membership and potential financial collapse, the AAM continued to campaign for a non-racial and democratic South Africa. Many of its strategic calculations were premised on the success of the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign which consequently influenced the movement’s ambitions. The ‘South Africa: Freedom Now!’ (SAFN) campaign was the first major undertaking by the AAM during the transition. It provided an overarching framework for activism at a local and national level, and had four key demands from which to hook these activities: Stop apartheid repression; Boycott apartheid/sanctions now; Solidarity with the ANC; and support for a united, non-racial, democratic South Africa.⁶⁹ At the outset of SAFN in January 1990, the AAM stated that it was confident the campaign ‘would capture the imagination of the people of Britain, as the Nelson Mandela campaign did so well in 1988ʹ.⁷⁰ Mike Terry, the AAM’s Executive Secretary, made a similar statement in October 1991; ‘the energy and enthusiasm of thousands of people found expression in the campaign for Mandela’s release. We now have to recapture the public’s imagination with the vision of a democratic South Africa’.⁷¹ The extent to which the AAM evoked the successes of the late-1980s highlighted the enduring influence of this period on the movement’s thinking, and consequently, its strategies to emulate the momentum that had been generated, into the 1990s.

The rapidly evolving situation in South Africa necessitated an almost constant re-evaluation of the AAM’s activities throughout the transition, and in response, the movement became adaptable and flexible in its approach. There was an acknowledgement that many of the tactics previously deployed were unsuited to the unfolding realities in South Africa. In addition to the continuation of the boycott, the international political, economic and military sanctions, as well as the release of all political prisoners, the AAM launched a plethora of campaigns following the inception of SAFN until June 1993 and the announcement of South Africa’s election date scheduled for 27 April 1994 (See Table 1). Mirroring the SAFN, some of these campaigns provided a broad framework for national and local anti-apartheid activities. Examples included ‘Give Democracy a Chance’ (April 1991), ‘The Vote for Democracy’ (September 1991), and ‘Peace, Freedom and the Vote’ (June 1993) which broadly focussed on removing obstacles to the negotiations, supporting the ANC, and educating the British public.⁷² Other efforts had very specific purposes, such as the reactive ‘emergency campaigns’ that responded directly to events in South and Southern Africa, including the Angolan elections in 1992.

Table 1. Indicative list of campaign initiatives launched by the AAM between 1990 and 1994.

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
South AfricaFreedom Now!	Give democracy a chance	Stop the violence now!	International campaign for free and fair elections	Countdown todemocracy
Call to Freedom	Vote for democracy	Angola emergency campaign	Angola Week of Action
Emergency Campaign—Tell de Klerk: stop the violence and repression	Day of Action: Stop the train massacres	Month of Action for Peace and Democracy	Southern Africa: Making Hope A Reality
Boycott of South African Gold	Manifesto for Democracy	Emergency Campaign in Defence of the Negotiating Process	Peace, Freedom and the Vote
Boycott of South African tourism.

There were new initiatives launched within the broader drive to sustain economic sanctions such as the continued boycott of South African gold and tourism.⁷³ Pickets were organised across Britain outside major high street jewellers, such as Ratners, HR Samuel, and Argos which, at times, attracted local publicity.⁷⁴ The gold boycott was one of the AAM’s most notable campaigns of the transition period, symbolised by Ratners decision to phase out the sale of South African gold from July 1990.⁷⁵ As part of the tourism boycott, which assumed greater priority in 1990, letters were written to travel agents and tour operators asking them not to sell South African holidays and when they refused to comply, they were picketed by local groups. The World Travel Market, held annually in London, was targeted in November 1990, including a sit-down protest at the South African Airways stall.⁷⁶ Although the campaign had some impact, the AAM struggled to discourage tourists from travelling to South Africa. By the summer of 1990, the number of UK tourists to South Africa had increased by 14% within a year.⁷⁷ This increase was directly influenced by Margaret Thatcher’s decision to lift the voluntary ban on the promotion of South African tourism following the announcement of Mandela’s imminent release. Bhamjee summed up the particular difficulties of the tourism campaign; ‘you couldn’t stop tourists from going, they would go anyway’.⁷⁸

The onset of South Africa’s transition away from apartheid, and the political instability this engendered, had profound consequences for the AAM’s campaigns, and their effectiveness. One factor which complicated the AAM’s messaging was the repeal of infamous apartheid-era legislation. The most significant change occurred in June 1991 when the legal framework of apartheid was revoked, including the Population Registration Act (1950). President de Klerk immediately ‘pronounced apartheid dead’ and that ‘statutory racial discrimination had been removed honestly and completely’.⁷⁹ This legislation was the most visible representation of racial injustice and oppression in South Africa, and the repeal, alongside de Klerk’s assertions, further fuelled the British public’s perception that the struggle was effectively over. The AAM maintained that simply removing legislation, although welcomed, did not constitute the end of apartheid. For one, the NP remained in power and the edifice of white-minority rule continued. Moreover, the AAM was conscious that the effects of apartheid-era legislation would be felt for decades. Writing in Anti-Apartheid News in July-August 1991, Frances Fletcher, a member of the AAM’s Black and Ethnic Minorities Committee, which was established in 1988, argued that ‘the legacy of apartheid will live on after the last law has been relinquished’.⁸⁰ Such sentiments reflected the AAM’s evolving position and conceptualisation of what equated to genuine transformation.

Negotiating the end of apartheid was a complex and uncertain process. One leading commentator observed in 1990, that it, ‘will be one of the most protracted and intensive parlays of modern times’.⁸¹ The questions to be resolved by the main protagonists would define the ‘new’ South Africa, including the economic principles, constitutional models, federal versus a unitary state, minority rights, and the voting system. Any proposal that inhibited a non-racial democracy was unacceptable to the AAM who, following the ANC’s lead, insisted that one-person one-vote was the only acceptable outcome. The negotiations were conducted through a series of mechanisms such as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) I and II (1991–1992), and the Multi Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) in 1993. The final interim constitution in 1993, and the announcement of democratic elections scheduled for April 1994, was only reached after several breakdowns in the talks had necessitated compromise by all sides.⁸²

Articulating the growing political complexities in South Africa to the British public compromised the AAM’s previously clear and simple message of ending apartheid. Karen Talbot, a former AAM Press Officer, summarised the dilemma of the AAM’s messaging; ‘when that focus on Mandela’s release went, and then your slogans get longer, and your demands get more than three words, it’s more complicated’.⁸³ Furthermore, Guthrie recalled that the AAM’s ability to project a ‘definitive message’ was complicated by the nuances of the situation and the ‘many different voices coming out of South Africa’ that were not solely the ANC’s.⁸⁴ One example was Inkatha, a Zulu nationalist and socio-economically conservative movement, feted by western governments and favoured by Thatcher, which stood in stark contrast to the ideals and values of the ANC. Inkatha’s ideological outlook, disruptive approach to the negotiations, and increasing profile in Britain, meant there were multiple ‘voices’ vying for attention and support. Kenvyn observed that the repercussions for the AAM was that, ‘there were complicated messages that actually had to be got over. I’m not sure that we did get them over’.⁸⁵ Ultimately, the AAM no longer had a monopoly over a clear or simple narrative around which it could mobilise the British public.

The AAM’s historical role of communicating and explaining developments to the British public assumed added importance after 1990. Allison Barrett emphasised that many of the AAM’s activities subsequently focussed on incorporating an informative element, because a lot of the negotiations were fairly, ‘subtle, [… and] we had to try and let people understand what was happening’.⁸⁶ One such example, ‘The Vote for Democracy’ campaign, was launched in September 1991 to persuade the British public ‘not to relax until South Africa has a new constitutional order based on one person, one vote’.⁸⁷ By the start of the CODESA talks in December, the campaign was explicitly linked to the negotiations as the AAM sought to communicate their significance to the public. The AAM held a series of national and local events that involved the public casting of a ‘ballot for change’, which Mandela participated in during a visit to Britain in early 1992.⁸⁸ Anti-Apartheid News provided regular updates on the number of ‘yes’ votes cast during the campaign, which culminated with a week of voting between 14 and 21 March. The AAM reviewed this campaign positively, however it was reported in March/April 1992 that only 8,000 votes had been cast, which was some way off its aspirations for 100,000 votes.⁸⁹ Moreover, the AAM’s aim of physically delivering the votes to CODESA did not materialise due to the breakdown in the talks in June 1992, as well as unspecified ‘organisational and technical reasons’.⁹⁰

The slow pace of change in South Africa and the difficulties of communicating what was happening impacted on the AAM’s campaigning effectiveness. As Ling recalled, mobilisation and campaigning became ‘much tougher … than during the height of the campaigns in the 80s when we were on a high … [which] was all very exciting. It’s less exciting to be looking at following negotiations and dealing with the compromises that inevitably come up’.⁹¹ As a consequence, participation in the AAM ebbed away as the ‘excitement’ had been replaced by a technocratic process to end apartheid, which the international solidarity movement had little influence over. For a minority of grassroots activists like Paul Phillipou it appeared as though the international solidarity movement’s ‘job was done’, and it would primarily be for South Africans, and politicians, to solve the problems.⁹² This period also coincided with the outbreak of a number of conflicts, many of which precipitated international interventions, including the First Gulf War, which diverted media attention away from developments in South Africa.⁹³ The release of Mandela, and the apparent likelihood that the country would embark upon a democratic transition, also encouraged some supporters, particularly trade unionists, to shift their attention to other causes.⁹⁴ Trade unions remained critical supporters of the AAM, but the issue of apartheid slipped down their political agenda. This was symbolised at the TUC Congress in Glasgow in 1991 which, ‘for the first time in many years’, did not feature South Africa on its initial agenda.⁹⁵ Furthermore, the AAM sought to make South Africa an issue during the 1992 British general election, through local and national campaigns, including the ‘Manifesto for Democracy’ and the creation of a ‘General Election Special Kit’.⁹⁶ Despite their best efforts, South Africa did not register as an important dimension of the British election, reiterating the difficulties the AAM faced in sustaining momentum in the face of other domestic and international concerns.⁹⁷

The complexity and uncertainty surrounding the negotiations was accentuated by the escalation of political violence in South Africa.⁹⁸ The main clashes were between the ANC and Inkatha (backed by the government’s ‘Third Force’), which was crudely reported as being ‘black-on-black violence’. According to AAM activists, this narrative fed into racist stereotypes about the violent nature of black people and obscured the role of the state in fomenting the violence. It also emboldened supporters of apartheid to assert that the black majority were incapable of governing South Africa.⁹⁹ So concerned by the negative impression created by British newspaper reporting, the AAM encouraged its members to make formal complaints whenever they discovered articles which failed to analyse the true causes of the violence.¹⁰⁰ The AAM acknowledged that the portrayal of the violence had had a ‘negative impact … on anti-apartheid sentiments’.¹⁰¹ For example, the reporting of the violence in South Africa was held directly responsible for the limited impact of the ‘Call To Freedom Declaration’ launched in June 1990.¹⁰²

Activists recalled a sense of dislocation and frustration that the violence in South Africa had not stimulated the kind of response from the British public that they had hoped. As Kenvyn remarked, ‘we couldn’t really get a reaction to what was going on, in terms of 10,000 people were killed between the 11 of February 1990 and 27 of April 1994, and we really could not get people to understand the seriousness of the situation’.¹⁰³ The AAM launched emergency campaigns in October 1990 and May 1992 aimed at enhancing public awareness of the causes of the violence, to encourage the British government to take decisive action against de Klerk and support international monitoring. These did not always have the desired impact, with one campaign event held on 5 June 1992, described as having ‘limited success’.¹⁰⁴ Yet, as had occurred following the Sharpeville Massacre (1960) and, to a lesser extent Soweto (1976), news of mass tragedies in South Africa could stimulate public interest and activism in Britain.¹⁰⁵ The Boipatong Massacre on 17 June 1992, where 46 people were killed by Inkatha supporters and led to the ANC’s withdrawal from the CODESA negotiations, had a galvanising effect. The AAM remarked that it was a tragedy that it had taken the Boipatong Massacre to get South Africa back onto the international agenda.¹⁰⁶ Following the massacre, the AAM held a series of well-attended protests and vigils, and its President, Trevor Huddleston, hosted an international hearing on violence. Such activities contributed to the mounting pressure on the British government, and the UN, to agree to monitor the violence in South Africa via international observers.¹⁰⁷

The question about whether to maintain international sanctions continued to dominate British political discourse on South Africa between 1990 and 1993. From the AAM’s perspective, it was imperative that all sanctions remained in place to maintain maximum pressure on the NP during the negotiations, which was in accordance with the ANC’s official demands. The British Government had already begun to lift what limited sanctions they had imposed on South Africa as early as February 1990. Sanctions were also eased by the EC and USA in 1991 which put the ANC, and consequently the AAM, on the backfoot.¹⁰⁸ The phased easing of sanctions was deemed a ‘reward’ to the white-minority regime for entering negotiations. There were also voices within the British media who advocated for renewed foreign investment into South Africa, exemplified by a Guardian column by Hugo Young, and a Financial Times editorial, which prompted a sharp rebuttal from Anti-Apartheid News in July/August 1990. The AAM criticised those calling for the resumption of foreign investment for exaggerating the extent of political change in South Africa which they argued was not yet fundamental nor irreversible, and reiterated that sanctions must remain so that the NP was incentivised sufficiently to remain at the negotiating table.¹⁰⁹

The evolving rhetoric and actions of the ANC added further confusion surrounding the continuation of sanctions. Although the ANC supported the continuation of economic sanctions during the transition, there was serious internal debate about the efficacy of this policy from the late-1980s. This was driven by the organisation’s need to cultivate relationships with overseas investors in anticipation of assuming political power. Within the ANC hierarchy, leaders including its President Oliver Tambo, had proposed dropping sanctions at the movement’s Consultative Conference in 1990. Despite being rejected by ANC delegates, the proposal revealed the shifting positions and debates within the liberation movement.¹¹⁰ The ANC’s sanctions dilemma impacted upon the AAM’s efforts to maintain the international boycott. Even before the Consultative Conference, evidence of grassroots confusion over the ANC’s position emerged within the AAM, when its Welsh Committee requested urgent clarification on the movement’s position regarding sanctions in October 1990.¹¹¹ The AAM had stridently promoted the ANC’s official policy on sanctions, although they were forced to be increasingly reactive as circumstances changed. By the time the ANC had requested that all economic sanctions cease in September 1993, their hand had been forced by multilateral decisions, and South Africa’s financial crisis.¹¹²

The AAM reflected positively on the state of the sanctions and boycott campaign in February 1991, however, evidence soon emerged that compliance was diminishing rapidly. Reports only a few months later detailed that branches of South African banks were opening in Britain, and the involvement of British companies in the issuance of public bonds to the apartheid government.¹¹³ The AAM also criticised the Co-operative Wholesale Society’s (CWS) decision in early-1992 to restart the sale of South African products. Interestingly, CWS alleged that they had been told by the AAM’s national office that sanctions, ‘do not matter very much now’ and that they had received approval from the ANC.¹¹⁴ Though the veracity of this claim can be questioned, the CWS’ actions highlighted how the confusion over sanctions could be exploited by companies eager to resume business with South Africa. Activists also recalled how outside of the movement, participation in the economic boycott waned during the transition. Barrett and Ling both asserted that beyond the AAM’s core activists, there was less interest in campaigning around sanctions.¹¹⁵ Similarly, Bhamjee remarked that, ‘the impetus for the boycotts fizzled out’.¹¹⁶

What created the most uncertainty for the AAM and its activists, was the ANC’s easing of the cultural, academic, and sporting boycotts.¹¹⁷ The incremental lifting of cultural sanctions contributed to the erosion of the AAM’s clear and consistent message. The decisions by the ANC were clearly with one eye on the post-apartheid future and the need to project a new, multiracial perspective of South Africa abroad. This was first demonstrated in 1990 through the Sechaba cultural festival in Glasgow.¹¹⁸ After the NP repealed aspects of apartheid legislation, sporting contact with South Africa became increasingly acceptable if teams were non-racial. South Africa consequently rejoined the Olympics in 1991, and the commencement of cricket and rugby fixtures followed thereafter. During the following year, the ANC sanctioned a rugby tour of France and Britain, but when it turned out the team was all-white, the AAM publicly criticised the liberation movement’s decision. The ANC subsequently U-turned by stating this tour was no longer acceptable, yet simultaneously requested that the AAM did not disrupt the matches, which reportedly caused ‘considerable confusion in anti-apartheid circles’.¹¹⁹ As sanctions eased, they inevitably impacted upon the AAM’s other campaigns, creating numerous ‘grey areas’ that left supporters and the general public unsure of the ‘rules’.¹²⁰ Moreover, the communication of these changes from the AAM leadership was often slow in reaching regional and local groups which further accentuated activists’ uncertainty.¹²¹ It had become difficult for the AAM to communicate their position on boycotts to activists and the public as the terrain shifted. As the boycotts diminished in importance, a visible and symbolic element of the AAM’s public campaigning declined, further limiting the avenues around which the British public could be mobilised. It also reinforced the prevailing public sentiment that apartheid was effectively over.

The AAM’s perilous financial state during the early-1990s also threatened its ability to function as a viable campaigning organisation. In late-1991, Trevor Huddleston pointedly remarked that, ‘the AAM’s financial resources are woefully inadequate to discharge its political responsibilities’.¹²² The severity of the AAM’s debts forced a different attitude towards financial management within the organisation’s hierarchy, which started to forensically monitor income and expenditure to a greater degree than previously. Margaret Ling recalled that the AAM had traditionally, ‘campaign[ed] first and raise[d] the money afterwards because the campaign creates support, which creates finance’, but after Mandela’s release it could not guarantee that the money would be recuperated.¹²³ The AAM subsequently became more prudent with financial expenditure, while the need to generate income was reiterated as ‘an utmost priority for the Movement at all levels’.¹²⁴ For example, the 1992 annual ‘Freedom Run’ held at Brockwell Park, did not include live music, even though this had proven to generate greater publicity and engagement, because the previous year’s fundraiser had lost money.¹²⁵ Furthermore, it was mandated that all campaign activities had to be underwritten in advance, curtailing ambitious planning.¹²⁶

The AAM had an unsustainable level of expenditure, forcing it to reduce the number of full-time staff working in its London HQ, while they also increased the cost of membership and advertising rates in Anti-Apartheid News.¹²⁷ Another sign of austerity was the decision to combine Anti-Apartheid News editions from May 1991 to alleviate costs and workloads, while in October 1992, the National Committee even considered axing the newspaper.¹²⁸ The political and symbolic ramifications of cutting Anti-Apartheid News would have been far-reaching, and it was recognised that this would only feed the sense that the anti-apartheid struggle was over, which ultimately saved the publication. There were also discussions about selling-off ‘assets’ such as the AAM’s membership list to private companies, as well as the ‘Freedom Bus’, which had visited over 100 British towns and cities between June and October 1990 to generate local publicity for the AAM.¹²⁹ Attempts to sell the bus were ultimately thwarted by an arson attack in 1992, yet these proposed measures were a further sign of the seriousness of the organisation’s financial predicament and the methods required to rectify them.¹³⁰

The AAM’s hard work and focus on financial matters did reduce its debts by the beginning of 1993, albeit involving some painful organisational decisions. During the financial year July 1991—June 1992, overall debt was reduced by £100,000 and by the end of 1992, the AAM’s Treasurer Richard Caborn reported positively that the organisation’s finances had returned to the black for the first time in many years.¹³¹ This remained the case until the dissolution of the AAM in October 1994. The internal professionalisation of its financial management, as well as the continued support of trade unions which regularly converted sizeable loans to the AAM into grants, were deemed critical to the movement’s improved financial picture.¹³²

Fundraising became critical to debt reduction and occupied a significant proportion of the AAM’s time during the transition period. This was made harder, as previously noted, by the poor state of the British economy. Traditional fundraising activities such as sponsored events and raffles remained a mainstay for the AAM, and the pages of Anti-Apartheid News extolled supporters to focus on income generating activities. Supporters were warned that the consequences of not fulfiling targets would result in the movement being unable to effectively function or maintain its campaigns.¹³³ In response, the AAM established a specific ‘Campaign Fund’ in which supporters were invited to donate funds which would be ring fenced for campaigning; by October 1991, the Fund was reportedly bringing in just short of £100,000 per year.¹³⁴ The AAM also began telephoning its supporters directly to ask for one-off donations, the establishment of new standing orders, and increasing the value of existing ones. Despite some complaints, telephone fundraising proved successful and reportedly brought in £100,000 annually.¹³⁵ A similarly successful scheme was the ‘President’s Appeal’, which built upon Trevor Huddleston’s respected position among the AAM’s membership, to generate tens of thousands of pounds in donations.¹³⁶ Financial matters loomed large over the movement, extracting activists time and energy, and impinged upon the forms of publicity and activity the movement could pursue. As the prominent Scottish anti-apartheid activist Brian Filling recalled, ‘I sometimes think I spent more time on financial matters than I did on other things’.¹³⁷

Another critical question which occupied the AAM in this period concerned the organisation’s post-apartheid future. In 1991, following earlier consultations, the AGM passed resolutions that indicated an appetite to assist post-apartheid Southern Africa. This reflected the fact that its work had not only incorporated South Africa, but also the frontline states of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. It also demonstrated an evolving understanding within the AAM that the election of an ANC government would not immediately reverse the manifold socio-economic legacies of apartheid in Southern Africa.¹³⁸ The decision to start contemplating the future of the AAM was not unanimous though, with a debate in London on 13 July 1991 on ‘Post-Apartheid Solidarity’ revealing that many activists, ‘felt the debate was premature’ and distracted from the movement’s immediate concerns.¹³⁹ Those dissenting views did not prevent further planning and discussion within the AAM about the future. Several iterations and proposals about the shape and purpose of the new organisation developed during the transition, albeit they remained fluid at this stage.¹⁴⁰ Ultimately, the core ambitions involved keeping Southern Africa on the international agenda, assisting reconstruction and development, enabling equitable trade and investment, and continuing public education programmes.¹⁴¹ A final decision on the future of the AAM was not made until free and fair democratic elections had been held.

Amidst discussions about the future, the AAM also began to reassess its relationship to the wider anti-racism movement in Britain during the 1990s. Although the AAM was undoubtedly anti-racist, it had steadfastly focused on the single-issue of apartheid and was reluctant to engage with the wider struggle against racism in Britain. According to Elizabeth Williams, this position, coupled with the AAM’s largely white leadership and singular support for the ANC over other liberation organisations such as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), alienated Britain’s black and Asian communities.¹⁴² Conscious that it could do more to engage these sections of society, the AAM established the Black and Ethnic Minorities Committee, which encouraged the organisation to demonstrate greater solidarity with anti-racist campaigns in Britain.¹⁴³ Following the formation of the Anti-Racist Alliance (ARA), a broad-based coalition established by black Labour Party activists in November 1991, the AAM began to engage more explicitly with the struggle in Britain.¹⁴⁴ AAM representatives attended the ARA’s AGM’s and were elected to its Executive Committee, it publicised anti-racist campaigns through local anti-apartheid groups, and supported events such as a 4,000 strong demonstration in 1992 aimed at closing down the far-right British National Party’s office in Welling, southeast London.¹⁴⁵ The AAM’s stated reason behind its greater engagement with the anti-racist struggle was the particular growth of racism and fascism across Europe in the early-1990s, while it had increasingly come to recognise the ‘connection between racism everywhere and apartheid in South Africa’.¹⁴⁶ It also reflected how the AAM was actively rethinking its role during the transition period in anticipation of a new post-apartheid environment. However, the AAM’s greater engagement with anti-racism in Britain, and its deliberations over a post-apartheid solidarity organisation, was incongruous with its rhetoric that the end of apartheid was far from guaranteed. This illustrated the difficult balancing act the organisation attempted to strike between recognising that the situation in South Africa was changing, while insisting that international pressure had to be maintained to secure fundamental and irreversible change.

The period from 1990 to 1993 presented enormous challenges to the AAM due to a variety of factors stemming from home and abroad. These encompassed political violence, competing ideological voices, complex negotiations, financial difficulties, and the prevailing public sentiments about Mandela’s release and the end of apartheid narrative. The AAM contended with a difficult balancing act of maintaining a singular focus on securing the creation of a non-racial and democratic South Africa, whilst acknowledging the rapidly changing environment it was operating within, and the need to prepare for a new post-apartheid role. Crucially, the movement survived intact, and kept going through these challenges to make ‘sure it [negotiations] didn’t go backwards’, while ensuring apartheid did not completely disappear from the British agenda.¹⁴⁷ Although the AAM embarked upon a series of campaigns in the 1990s, most did not attain the heights or impact of those in the previous decade. What is telling is that most activists interviewed struggled to recall the activities of the AAM during this period; they provided the context and general sense of what the AAM sought to achieve, and the forces it confronted during the transition, but they remained unclear of what was done to support these objectives. These ‘silences’ tell us a lot about the period and the broader impact of the AAM’s campaigns, which are a reflection of the challenges that were experienced for much of the transition process. As Kenvyn explained, ‘I think it was, basically, because 1990 to ‘94 was a difficult period. And obviously, we actually all prefer thinking about the things that went well. And, you know the release of Mandela was good, the election was good. Getting there was actually a difficult process’.¹⁴⁸

A re-energised role: the countdown to democracy, 1993-1994

Despite encountering various challenges in its attempts to engage and mobilise the British population after the release of Nelson Mandela, political developments inside South Africa during the first half of 1993, sparked renewed momentum into the AAM’s work. The negotiations resumed under the auspices of the MPNP in April 1993, but were almost immediately derailed when Chris Hani, the charismatic leader of the South African Communist Party, was assassinated on 10 April by white right-wing gunmen. Rather than sparking further conflict, Hani’s murder brought the main parties together, and hardened the resolve for change. In response, the MPNP delegates in June 1993 agreed that the date for the first democratic election would be 27 April 1994.

The AAM openly acknowledged the difficulties it had experienced since 1990. In its 1993 ‘Political Report’, the movement reflected that ‘in the period since the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, it has not always been very clear what the role of the international solidarity movement should be, and in particular what should be the priorities for the Anti-Apartheid Movement’.¹⁴⁹ Further clarity about the international community’s role had been provided at the ANC’s International Solidarity Conference in Johannesburg in February 1993, which was attended by a sizeable AAM delegation—the first occasion many activists had visited South Africa.¹⁵⁰ The assassination of Hani shortly after the conference gave a periodic burst to the AAM’s activities; Brian Filling recalled that it, ‘captured the public’s imagination’.¹⁵¹ Anti-Apartheid News also reported in June 1993 that the period after Hani’s murder was, ‘the most active … for the AAM since the release of Nelson Mandela’, which included a series of memorial events that stimulated renewed engagement.¹⁵² Despite the impact Hani’s assassination had on the AAM, the fluctuations in British public interest and mobilisation were highlighted at a rally a few months later in Trafalgar Square on 20 June 1993. Although the event was viewed positively by the AAM, Anna Krufthoffer reported to the National Committee that turnout had been much lower than expected and that ‘it was no longer possible to mobilise in the same way as had been done in the past’.¹⁵³ This admission reiterated how difficult it had become to mobilise the British public, at least in terms of street demonstrations, during the transition period.

The subsequent ratification of an election date sparked a sustained change in public interest towards South Africa, which consequently re-energised the AAM. There was now a clear goal, something the AAM had not had since Mandela’s release. Its activities became centred on ensuring free and fair elections, and launching the ‘Campaign for Free and Fair Elections’ in July 1993, which outlined a ten-point manifesto for action. The manifesto stressed the importance of free political activity, impartial media coverage, as well as equitable funding between all political parties involved in the election, and programmes of voter education in South Africa.¹⁵⁴ International monitoring of the election was also a major priority for the AAM whose leadership continued to lobby the UN, Commonwealth, EC, British Government and other political parties to ensure a sufficient overseas observer presence in South Africa in the build-up to and during the election.¹⁵⁵ Reviewing the outcome of the ‘Campaign for Free and Fair Elections’, Mike Terry indicated that the ten-point manifesto, which was endorsed by Baroness Lynda Chalker on behalf of the British Government, had largely been fulfilled by the beginning of 1994.¹⁵⁶

A notable feature of the period following the announcement of an election date in June 1993 was the AAM’s outright support for the ANC. Although the ten-point manifesto broadly discussed the need to secure equality of participation for ‘organisations which were banned’, the AAM actively endorsed the ANC’s election campaign.¹⁵⁷ This decision reflected the AAM’s longstanding affinity with the ANC, stretching back to its inception in 1959, based upon a shared commitment to the ideology of non-racialism. Its campaigns, particularly the FNMC in the 1980s, had enhanced the ANC’s legitimacy abroad and helped to establish its position as the representative of the majority of South Africans. The AAM ‘were never neutral’ during the struggle, and backed by the ANC, marginalised other organisations such as Inkatha and the PAC.¹⁵⁸ There was also a firm belief within the AAM that the ANC were the only party contesting the election who could realistically deliver the transition to a non-racial, unitary, and democratic South Africa. So, although the AAM undoubtedly supported the principles of securing a democratic and fair election, its preferred vision for the future of the ‘new’ South Africa became closely tied to the victory of an ANC-led government.

The AAM’s primary focus before the first democratic elections was fundraising. Almost as soon as the election date was announced, the ANC launched its ‘Votes for Freedom’ appeal which aimed to raise £1 million in Britain for the election campaign. According to Fieldhouse, the ANC’s decision to initiate its own fundraising campaign, with minimal liaison with British anti-apartheid activists, created tensions and raised questions about whether the liberation movement now required the AAM or whether it had taken the AAM’s support for granted.¹⁵⁹ Yet, these frustrations were short-lived, and the AAM wholeheartedly endorsed the ‘Votes for Freedom’ appeal, even providing the ANC with access to its membership list for fundraising purposes.¹⁶⁰ The AAM’s most tangible contribution to the appeal was channelled through its ‘twinning’ initiative, which had first started in 1990, but assumed greater significance from mid-1993 onwards. This initiative saw the twinning of AAM and ANC regions with the aim of strengthening relationships between the organisations, enhancing the capacity of the ANC on the ground in South Africa, and providing a focal point for local activism in Britain in the build-up to the election. It was also believed that these arrangements would cement links between twinned regions and sustain contact in the post-apartheid period to address the socio-economic legacies of white-minority rule.¹⁶¹ The AAM aimed for each British region to raise £2,000 which was reportedly enough to secure a much needed PA system and twelve bicycles for ANC activists in twinned regions.¹⁶² Local group activism was stimulated by the drive to raise funds for the ANC election campaign and numerous fundraisers were held across Britain.¹⁶³ Through its twinning initiative, the AAM raised somewhere between £20,000 and £30,000 for the ANC.¹⁶⁴ The AAM also concentrated its fundraising energies on voter education initiatives, responding to ANC concerns about the lack of voting experience among its supporters. In December 1993, the AAM launched its ‘Education for Democracy in South Africa’ fund which had raised over £100,000 for voter education programmes by spring 1994.¹⁶⁵

Nelson Mandela’s enormous popularity within Britain was harnessed by the ANC and the AAM to build support for the ‘Votes for Freedom’ appeal. In October 1993, Mandela toured Britain including a high-profile event in Glasgow where nine local authorities bestowed him with ‘Freedom of the City’, and thanked the British people for their support of the anti-apartheid cause. Thousands attended a rally in George Square where Mandela reportedly took ‘Glasgow by storm’, further highlighting the continued draw he had for the British public.¹⁶⁶ The event provided another opportunity for the ANC to actively court international assistance for the upcoming election campaign; Filling described the celebrations as an inspirational and motivational moment for activists, that acted as further encouragement to provide the necessary resources to ensure an ANC victory.¹⁶⁷ Beyond Mandela’s visit to Britain, Anti-Apartheid News published an open letter he wrote in late 1993 encouraging the AAM’s supporters to register with the ‘Votes for Freedom’ campaign so that they could be contacted by the ANC for future donations. Hinting again at the pervasive nature of the ‘end of apartheid’ narrative, Mandela encouraged AAM members and supporters not to be lulled into believing that the election was a foregone conclusion. Mandela’s message was underlined in the title of his letter, ‘Can we count on you?’¹⁶⁸

As the election neared, the AAM launched its last campaign, the ‘Countdown to Democracy’, on 17 January 1994, which initiated the final stage of its mobilisation and fundraising efforts in support of free and fair elections and an ANC victory. According to Barrett, Bhamjee, and Brian Hurwitz, the growing British media attention to the build-up to the 1994 elections created an air of excitement, which the AAM harnessed.¹⁶⁹ Mock voting booths were established across the country, culminating in a ‘National Voting for Freedom Day’ on 20 April 1994. The AAM also stepped up its educational programme by producing a series of pamphlets and newsletters including an Election Briefing Series that explained key issues including an overview of the transitional legislation and the political position of Inkatha.¹⁷⁰ This was all part of a wider publicity drive about the elections, while fundraising efforts were directed to either the AAM’s regional twinning initiative or the ANC’s election fund.¹⁷¹ Many activists recalled that the AAM’s main purpose in these final stages was fundraising. These concerted efforts to generate funds encompassed traditional raffles, jumble sales, street collections and sponsored challenges, as well as cultural events such as comedy nights and tours by musicians, including Dudu Pakwana, Marah Louw, and Hugh Masekela.¹⁷² The AAM’s final actions had a demonstrable effect, helping the ANC to achieve its target of raising £1 million in Britain. In addition, AAM affiliated unions generated £300,000 for the ANC’s election fund.¹⁷³ Finally, and in order to help secure a free and fair ballot, some AAM activists were sent to South Africa as voter registration officials and election monitors, while others served as observers for overseas voting in Britain.¹⁷⁴ Overall, the AAM’s activities surrounding the election represented a significant upturn in the activism and impact of its campaigns compared to a year earlier, and showcased the positive role the international solidarity movement was able to have during the final stages of the transition.

On 27 April 1994, the first democratic elections were held, in which the ANC gained 62.65% of the national vote, resulting in Mandela becoming the president of the ‘new’ South Africa. The result led to an outpouring of joy and relief not only in South Africa, but internationally too. A marker of the AAM’s high-profile contribution to the struggle against apartheid, and the appreciation that its activists were held in by the ANC, was the invitation of Trevor Huddleston, Mike Terry, and Brian Filling to participate in Mandela’s inauguration on 10 May in Pretoria. On the same day, the AAM’s National Committee members were invited to the South African embassy in London to participate in the celebrations, which Gurney remembered, ‘felt symbolically as if we were taking over and it was just the most wonderful moment and you felt we really had won’.¹⁷⁵ Following the election, the National Committee initiated the process of disbanding the AAM and the transformation of the movement into a new solidarity organisation. The decision was approved at an ‘Extraordinary General Meeting’ on 25 June, with the new organisation, named Action for Southern Africa, launched on 29 October 1994, which continues to fight against the legacies of apartheid.¹⁷⁶ After 35-years, the AAM had achieved its core objective of contributing to the end of apartheid rule; as the activist Simon Korner concluded, ‘we were one organisation that could disband because what we wanted, which was the right of the people of South Africa, both black and white, to elect their own government in a fair way, that was achieved, and the people of South Africa could rule themselves’.¹⁷⁷

Conclusion

The birth of the ‘new’ South Africa was a moment of vindication for the AAM and its activists, who for more than three decades had been part of the transnational anti-apartheid struggle to isolate the white-minority regime. The history of the AAM was shaped by significant ebbs and flows influenced by global, national, and local developments. South Africa’s transition represented a microcosm of the AAM’s broader experience. When anti-apartheid forces inside South Africa most needed transnational support during the negotiations, it began to diminish, as governmental, organisational, and public support rapidly receded. This article has argued that the mainstreaming of anti-apartheid sentiment in 1980s Britain, particularly through the FNMC, inadvertently created the conditions for declining public interest following the ANC’s unbanning and Mandela’s release in February 1990. The prevailing public sentiment, due to the personalised framing of the latter stages of the struggle, meant that Mandela’s freedom became equated with the ‘end of apartheid’. The pervasiveness of the ‘end of apartheid’ narrative, and the interlinked problems of declining membership and a perilous financial crisis, combined with the complexity and violence of South Africa’s transition, created a hugely challenging situation at the precise moment when the AAM sought to escalate its mobilisation and activism for the ‘final push’. The power of the ‘single anti-apartheid story’ had become complicated by nuance and uncertainty within South Africa, which did little to stem the demobilisation of some of its supporters.

For the AAM it was not a question of ‘winding down’, but how best to preserve and escalate the momentum generated from decades of activism, especially when the goal of ending apartheid rule was tantalisingly close. With the end in sight, the role of the AAM became uncertain. Not only was the movement trying to convince the British public that the transition to a non-racial democratic South Africa was not inevitable, it was also seeking to resolve and prepare for its post-apartheid future. The dilemma can be seen most markedly in the AAM’s discussions over the creation of a post-apartheid solidarity organisation and through its greater engagement with the anti-racism struggle in Britain. Replicating other periods of the AAM’s history, its ability to escalate its activism was in part shaped by political, social, and economic currents over which it had very little control. As this article has outlined, there were some considerable transnational obstacles that had a significant impact upon the capacity and ability of the AAM, at both a national and local level, to sustain international support for the transition process. Despite this, the AAM withstood these multifaceted challenges, underscoring the resilience of the movement, and the perseverance of its core activists. When conditions in South Africa altered following the announcement in June 1993 of a clear timetable for democratic elections, the AAM remained in position to have a marked impact on the process of change, most notably through its significant fundraising activities for the ANC’s political campaigning and for voter education initiatives. Contemporary perceptions of the AAM have been shaped by the framing and impact of the FNMC, and the subsequent inauguration of President Nelson Mandela, which are in turn linked to wider narratives of the rainbow nation and a ‘new’ South Africa. These have established an overarching public view that the AAM had a linear path to becoming ‘the most widespread and successful non-party political organisation of the 20th Century’.¹⁷⁸ This article demonstrates that popular perceptions of the AAM are shaped by two key moments: the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, and the onset of the ‘new’ South Africa after 1994. Such a leap in chronology tells only a partial story. It is important to recognise that the four years after Mandela’s release were filled with nuance and challenges that impacted upon the movement’s capacity to support an irreversible end to white-minority rule in South Africa.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Christabel Gurney, Brian Filling, and David Kenvyn for putting us in contact with their networks, which enabled opportunities to secure interviews with former AAM activists for this project. We also want to extend our appreciation and thanks to the many activists who agreed to give up their time to be interviewed. Furthermore, we are grateful to Bob Murphy for painstakingly digitalising large amounts of his personal collection for us. We would also like to express our gratitude to the three anonymous peer-reviewers for their constructive comments which have helped to improve this article. Finally, we are enormously thankful to Prof. Ian Phimister, Dr. Rebecca Swartz, Bill Graham, and Christabel Gurney for reading and commenting upon earlier drafts of the article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Matthew Graham

Matthew Graham is a Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Dundee, and a Research Associate at the International Studies Group (University of the Free State), with a particular focus on South and Southern Africa. His recent publications include Contemporary Africa. London: Red Globe Press, 2018; and, ‘Campaigning Against Apartheid: The Rise, Fall and Legacies of the South Africa United Front 1960–1962’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, in 2018.

Christopher Fevre is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State, focusing on twentieth century British and South African history. His recent publications include ‘“Scottish Exceptionalism?” Trade Unions and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1976–1994’, Journal of Southern African Studies, in 2019; and, ‘Race and Resistance to Policing Before the “Windrush Years”: The Colonial Defence Committee and the Liverpool “Race Riots” of 1948’, Twentieth Century British History, in 2020.

Notes

1. Sapire, “Liberation Movements,” 271.

2. Thörn, “Global Civil Society,” 250.

3. AAM Archives, “Boycott South African Goods,” http://www.aamarchives.org/campaigns/boycott.html.

4. Tony Hollingsworth, “Nelson Mandela Dies: The Story behind his 70 Birthday Concert,” Daily Telegraph, 6 December 2013. https://bit.ly/2PfjnJ6.

5. Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), “Anti-Apartheid Movement Report to the 1990 Annual General Meeting.” 1 October 1990. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b0100067.

6. Although this article focusses on the British AAM, for further details on global anti-apartheid campaigns see, South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), International Solidarity, and the collection of articles in the Radical History Review: The Global Anti-Apartheid Movement, 119 (Spring, 2014).

7. Thörn, “The Meaning(s) of Solidarity,” 418. See also, Thörn, “Global Civil Society,” 249–266.

8. Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond borders, 2.

9. Stevens, “Why South Africa?” 207, 224.

10. Fevre, “Scottish Exceptionalism?” 525–542.

11. See, Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid; Gurney, “A Great Cause,” 123–44; Gurney, “Difficult Decade,” 471–87; Skinner, Foundations of Anti-Apartheid; Klein, “Political Prisoner,” 455–470; Skinner, “‘Every Bite,” 97–114; and Williams, Race in Britain.

12. Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 441–463.

13. Gurney, “Heart of the Beast,” 255–352.

14. To access the archived interviews see, https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/interviews.html.

15. Gurney, “Difficult Decade,” 471–87.

16. Maise Carter was a prominent trade unionist and member of the Merton Anti-Apartheid group in South London. Maisie Carter, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 26 October 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Carter’).

17. Klein, “Political Prisoner,” 465.

18. Mandela, Freedom, 602–603.

19. Posel, “Madiba,” 74.

20. Klein, “Political Prisoner,” 466.

21. Posel, “Madiba,” 73.

22. Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 53.

23. Klein, “Political Prisoner,” 465–468.

24. These were Dundee, Aberdeen, Midlothian, Sheffield, Islwyn, Newcastle, Hull, and Greenwich.

25. Proposals from councillors in Aberdeen to award the Freedom of the City to Nelson and Winnie Mandela whipped up a media frenzy in 1984. See, “Don”t Give Mr Mandela This Honour!” Evening Express, 5 January 1984; “No freedom for terrorist, says Tory,” Evening Express, 13 February 1984.

26. AAM, “Report to the 1990 AGM,” 13.

27. Dali Tambo is the son of the ANC’s leader in exile Oliver Tambo.

28. AAM, “Anti-Apartheid Movement Annual Report on Activities and Developments.” 1 September 1986. 37. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b0100064.

29. AAM, “Anti-Apartheid Movement Annual Report on Activities and Developments.” 1 September 1988. 13. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b0100066.

30. Christabel Gurney was the Secretary of Notting Hill Anti-Apartheid Group, member of the AAM’s National Committee, and editor of Anti-Apartheid News (1969–1980). Christabel Gurney, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 20 August 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Gurney’); and John Nelson, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 19 August 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Nelson’).

31. Klein, “The Anti-Apartheid Movement,” 257.

32. AAM, “Report to the AGM Oct 1988—Oct 1989. 1 January 1989.” 34. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1200022.

33. AAM, “Annual Report on Activities and Developments.” 1988. 33.

34. Ibid., 29.

35. Brian Hurwitz, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 18 August 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Hurwitz’); Amin Mawani, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 1 September 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Mawani’); and Hanef Bhamjee, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 4 December 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Bhamjee’).

36. Tony Dykes, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 11 November 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Dykes’); Brian Filling, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 17 September 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Filling’); and Jerry Dammers, interviewed by Jeff Howarth, transcript, 20 February 2014, https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/interviews/jerry-dammers.html.

37. Margaret Ling was an active member of the Haringey Anti-Apartheid Group, a member of the AAM’s Executive Committee, edited Anti-Apartheid News during the 1980s, and co-founded AA Enterprises, a cooperative established in 1986 trading with the frontline states and selling anti-apartheid merchandise. Ling also worked in the International Defence and Aid Fund’s Information Department from 1975 to 1984. Margaret Ling, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 6 October 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Ling’).

38. Klein, “The Anti-Apartheid Movement,” 252.

39. Interview with Dykes.

40. Klein, “The Anti-Apartheid Movement,” 260.

41. Douek, Insurgency and counterinsurgency; Waldmeir, Miracle; and Sparks, Tomorrow.

42. “Anti-apartheid activists find cause for joy,” The Times, 3 February 1990.

43. Melber and Saunders, “Namibia”s Transition to Independence,” 73–94.

44. See note 26 above.

45. Declaration on the Release of Nelson Mandela. 18 February 1990. Bob Murphy’s Personal Collection.

46. AAM Campaign Statement 28 April 1990. Bob Murphy’s Personal Collection.

47. Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 443.

48. Johnson, South Africa, 200.

49. Interview with Carter; Interview with Guthrie; Interview with Dykes; Interview with Ling; Agnus Tolmie, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 25 August 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Tolmie’); and Allison Barrett, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 28 September 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Barrett’).

50. AAM, ‘Campaigning Perspectives into the 1990 South Africa: Freedom Now.’ 1 January 1990. 4. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1100067.

51. Hanef Bhamjee was Secretary of the Welsh Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (1981–1994). Interview with Bhamjee.

52. Mark Guthrie joined the AAM in 1977 and was at different times a member of local groups in Leicester, Manchester, and London. He was also a founding member of Lawyers Against Apartheid. Interview with Guthrie.

53. David Hillman became an AAM activist in 1985 and joined the Hammersmith and Fulham AA group. He was also on the London Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Interview with David Hillman, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 24 August 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Hillman’).

54. Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 2.

55. South Africa Freedom Now, and The AAM, “Future Perspectives for the Anti-Apartheid Movement.” 29 April 1990. 4. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1100078; and Graham, “Foreign Policy in Transition,” 410.

56. AAM, “Report to the National Committee on the South African Freedom Now Campaign.” 1 January 1990. 1. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1100054; AAM, “Future perspectives,” 1990, 8–9; and on discussions between the AAM and the British Government over sanctions during the transition period see, Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 444–449.

57. See, AAM, “South Africa: Prospects for Peace and Democracy; The Political Report of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.” 1 October 1992. 9–11. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b0100068; Ferrari, “Anti-Apartheid goes to Brussels,” 255–257; and Anderson, Justke, Siegfried, Apartheid and Anti-Apartheid.

58. Interview with Ling; Interview with Gurney; Interview with Tolmie; Interview with Barrett; Interview with Filling; and Interview with Hurwitz.

59. AAM, “Report to the 1990 AGM,” 8.

60. AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 16 February 1991. 3. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300183; and AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 11 May 1991. 3. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300184.

61. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1991, 11.

62. AAM, Political Report October 1992, 16.

63. David Kenvyn was chair of the London Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (1982–1988). Interview with Kenvyn.

64. Gerard Omasta-Milsom was a member of the Bristol University Anti-Apartheid Group and fulfilled the roles of Field Officer and Campaigns Officer for the AAM from 1988. Gerard Omasta-Milsom, interviewed by Jeff Howarth, transcript, 17 September 2013. (Abbreviated as “Interview with Omasta-Milsom”). https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/interviews/gerard-omasta-milsom.html.

65. Anti-Apartheid News, November 1990, 4.

66. Interview with Filling; Karen Talbot, interview with author, Zoom recording, 29 September 2020. (Abbreviated as “Interview with Talbot”); and Interview with Kenvyn.

67. AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 14 September 1991. 4. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300185.

68. Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 12. Unemployment data found at: Office for National Statistics. “An Overview of the UK Labour Market.” Accessed 18 March 2021. https://bit.ly/392R0od.

69. AAM, “Report to the 1990 AGM,” 15.

70. AAM, “Campaign Perspectives,” January 1990, 6; Anti-Apartheid News, February 1990, 2.

71. Anti-Apartheid News, October 1991, 1.

72. AAM, “National Committee,” 6 February 1991, 4.

73. The AAM worked with the ANC, SWAPO, and End Loans to Southern Africa (ELTSA) to establish the World Gold Commission and was headed by Peter Robbins. See, World Gold Commission. The Case for a Gold Sanction in the Fight Against Apartheid (1989). Accessed 18 February 2021. https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/1980s/80s62-the-case-for-a-gold-sanction.html?highlight=WyJnb2xkIiwiZ29sZCciXQ==.

74. “Gold Picket in the Precinct,” Hammersmith and Shepherds Bush Gazette, 9 November 1990, 7; and “Jewellery chain to stop use of gold from South Africa,” The Times, 17 July 1990.

75. Anti-Apartheid News, November 1990, 12.

76. AAM, “Report to the 1990 AGM,” 20–21; and Interview with Hillman.

77. Anti-Apartheid News, July/August 1990, 4.

78. Interview with Bhamjee.

79. “De Klerk appeal to negotiate follows burial of apartheid,” The Times, 18 June 1991.

80. Anti-Apartheid News, July/August 1991, 7.

81. Young, “Frontiers of a new land,” 17.

82. See: Freidman, Journey; Guelke, Transition; Landsberg, Liberation; Reynolds, Election.

83. Karen Talbot was an AAM Press Officer from 1985. Interview with Talbot.

84. Interview with Guthrie.

85. Interview with Kenvyn.

86. Interview with Barrett.

87. Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 1.

88. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1991, 10; Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 1, 12; and Anti-Apartheid News, March/April 1992, 3.

89. Anti-Apartheid News, March/April 1992, 3; and Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 12.

90. AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 16 May 1992. 2. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300188; and AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 3 October 1992. 1. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300189.

91. Interview with Ling.

92. Paul Phillipou was a member of the Earl’s Court Anti-Apartheid Group from the mid-1980s. Paul Phillipou, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 27 August 2020. (Abbreviated as ‘Interview with Phillipou’).

93. On the British public response to the Gulf War see, Rallings “the Gulf War,” 376–388; and Jones, “Ending Cold War Fears,” 253–275.

94. AAM, “Report to the 1990 AGM.” 40; Interview with Dykes; Interview with Nelson; Interview with Philippou; Interview with Ling; Interview with Barrett; and Interview with Gurney.

95. Anti-Apartheid News, October 1991, 8.

96. AAM, General elections local group mailing, 20 March 1992. Bob Murphy’s Personal collection; AAM, Manifesto for Democracy. Bob Murphy’s Personal Collection.

97. Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 444.

98. There is a significant body of work on the violence during South Africa’s transition, see, Kynoch, Township violence; Douek, “Counterinsurgency’s impact on transitions,” 255–275; Guelke, “political violence,” 239–254; and Ellis, “South Africa’s third force,” 261–299.

99. Interview with Nelson; Interview with Dykes; and Interview with Ling.

100. Anti-Apartheid News, November 1990, 7; Marinovich and Silva, Bang-Bang Club.

101. Anti-Apartheid News, November 1990, 1.

102. AAM, “Report to the 1990 AGM,” 16; and AAM, ‘‘Call to Freedom’ declaration,” https://bit.ly/30QpW6Y.

103. See note 85 above.

104. AAM, “National Committee,” 3 October 1992, 6.

105. Interview with Omasta-Milsom.

106. Anti-Apartheid News, July/August 1992, 12.

107. Ibid., 1.

108. Graham, “Foreign Policy in Transition,” 409–411.

109. Anti-Apartheid News, July/August 1990, 2.

110. African National Congress, “African National Congress Consultative Conference: Speeches and Resolutions, 12 December 1990,” 5. https://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/cnf19901200.026.021.000.pdf; and Mandela, Freedom, 707.

111. Anti-Apartheid News, October 1990, 12.

112. AAM, “The Role of Sanctions in Promoting Democratic Change,” April 1993, Bob Murphy”s Personal Collection; and “Mandela kills off sanctions,” The Guardian, 25 September 1993.

113. AAM, “National Committee,” 16 February 1991, 7. On South African banks opening in Britain see, Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1992, 2. On bank involvement in the issuance of public bonds see, AAM, “National Committee,” 14 September 1991, 2–3.

114. AAM, “National Committee,” 16 May 1992, 4.

115. Interview with Ling; and interview with Barrett.

116. See note 78 above.

117. There was also some uncertainty in early-1993 concerning the arms embargo. For example, the AAM was unsure over the ANC’s stance on the delivery of sixty Pilatus military training aircraft to South Africa from Switzerland, in breach of the arms embargo. AAM, ‘Minutes of the AAM National Committee.’ 11 September 1993. 1. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300194.

118. Interview with Filling.

119. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1992, 8; Interview with Gurney; and AAM, “National Committee,” 27 February 1993, 2. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300191.

120. See note 114 above.

121. Anti-Apartheid News, October 1990, 12.

122. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1991, 2.

123. See note 91 above.

124. AAM, “Future perspectives,” 29 April 1990, 9.

125. AAM, “National Committee,” 3 October 1992, 4.

126. AAM, “National Committee,” 16 February 1991, 3.

127. On membership rate increases see, AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 7 July 1990. 3. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300180. On advertising rate increases see, AAM, “Report to 1990 AGM,” 40.

128. AAM, “National Committee,” 11 May 1991; and AAM, “National Committee,” 3 October 1992, 4.

129. AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 15 February 1992. 2. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300187; and Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 12.

130. Anti-Apartheid News, March/April 1992, 10.

131. AAM, “National Committee,” 3 October 1992, 3; and Anti-Apartheid News, February/March 1993, 12.

132. Anti-Apartheid News, March/April 1992, 12; Ben Jackson, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 1 October 2020. (Abbreviated as “Interview with Jackson”); Interview with Gurney; and Interview with Ling.

133. Anti-Apartheid News, March 1991, 12; Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1991, 12; Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1992, 12; and AAM, “National Committee,” 27 February 1993, 8.

134. Anti-Apartheid News, October 1991, 12.

135. Anti-Apartheid News, July-August 1991, 12; and AAM, “National Committee,” 14 September 1991, 4.

136. Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 2.

137. Brian Filling was the chair of the Scottish Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (1976–1994). He is currently the Honorary Consul for South Africa in Scotland and chair of Action for Southern Africa Scotland. Interview with Filling.

138. AAM, “National Committee,” 16 February 1991, 5; Anti-Apartheid News, July/August 1991, 5.

139. Anti-Apartheid News, September 1991, 5.

140. AAM, “Changes and Challenges: A discussion paper on the future role of the Anti-apartheid Movement,” 23 March 1992, Bob Murphy”s Personal Collection; and AAM, “Southern Africa: A Time for Hope; The Political Report of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.” 1 October 1993. 16. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b0100069.

141. AAM, “Political Report,” October 1993, 16.

142. Williams, Race in Britain, 78–165.

143. Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 345–351.

144. AAM, “National Committee,” 15 February 1992, 6; and interview with Tony Dykes.

145. Anti-Apartheid News, February/March 1993, 10; Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1992, 10; and Anti-Apartheid News, March/April 1992, 7.

146. Anti-Racist Alliance, “ARA Pamphlet,” 1992. Bob Murphy’s Personal Collection; and Anti-Apartheid News, March/April 1992, 7.

147. Anonymised activist, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 25 August 2020; and Interview with Carter.

148. See note 85 above.

149. AAM, “Political Report,” October 1993. 17.

150. On the ANC’s International Solidarity Conference see, Anti-Apartheid News, April/May 1993, 3.

151. Interview with Filling. On commemorative events held after Chris Hani’s assassination see, Anti-Apartheid News, June 1993, 10.

152. Anti-Apartheid News, June 1993, 12.

153. AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 10 July 1993. Accessed 19 April 2021. https://jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300193.

154. AAM, Manifesto for Free and Fair Elections in South Africa. Accessed 12 April 2021. https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/1990s/90s25-manifesto-for-free-and-fair-elections.html?highlight = WyJmcmVlIiwiJ2ZyZWUiLCJmcmVlJyIsImZyZWUnLCIsImZyZWUnLiIsImZhaXIiLCJtYW5pZmVzdG8iLCJmb3IiLCInZm9yIiwiZWxlY3Rpb25zIiwibWFuaWZlc3RvIGZvciIsImZvciBlbGVjdGlvbnMiXQ==.

155. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1993, 5.

156. AAM, ‘Minutes of the AAM National Committee.’ 5 February 1994. Accessed 19 April 2021. https://jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300196.

157. AAM, Manifesto for Free and Fair Elections in South Africa; and Iain Whyte, interviewed by author, Zoom recording, 12 August 2020.

158. As cited in, Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 284.

159. Ibid., 458.

160. Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1994, 12.

161. AAM, “Introducing our twin region: London—PWV,” 1992, Bob Murphy’s Personal Collection; and AAM, “National Committee,” 10 July 1993, 3.

162. AAM, “National Committee,” 10 July 1993, 3; and Anti-Apartheid News, September/October 1993, 12.

163. See, Anti-Apartheid News, September/October 1993, 12; Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1993, 10; and Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1994, 10.

164. AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 7 May 1994. 3. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300197.

165. Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1994, 3.

166. Mandela’s appearance in Glasgow generated considerable local publicity. See, “Warmth of Welcome Delights ANC Leader,” Courier & Advertiser, 11 October 1993; “Passionate cry for freedom,” The Scotsman, 11 October 1993; “A far-sighted Mandela,” Aberdeen Press and Journal, 11 October 1993; and “Glasgow Belongs to Mandela,” The Herald, 11 October 1993.

167. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1993, 3.

168. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1993, 8.

169. Brian Hurwitz joined the AAM after moving to London from South Africa in the late-1970s and was active at different times within local groups such as Barnet, Richmond, and Merton. He was also a founding member of Lawyers Against Apartheid. Interview with Hurwitz; Interview with Barrett; and Interview with Bhamjee.

170. AAM, South Africa’s first democratic and non-racial elections, Election Briefing, numbers 1–3, April 1994. Bob Murphy’s Personal Collection.

171. Anti-Apartheid News, November/December 1993, 10; Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1994, 3; and Anti-Apartheid News, Election Special 1994, 4.

172. For examples of local group fundraising see, Anti-Apartheid News, January/February 1994, 10; Interview with Nelson; Interview with Guthrie; Interview with Hurwitz; and Interview with Gurney.

173. AAM, “Minutes of the AAM National Committee.” 7 May 1994. 3. Accessed 29 March 2021. doi:10.2307/al.sff.document.aamp2b1300197; and Anti-Apartheid News, June/July 1994, 20.

174. John McFadden, interview with author, Zoom recording, 24 June 2015; AAM, “National Committee,” 7 May 1994, 3; and Anti-Apartheid News, June/July 1994, 4.

175. Christabel Gurney interviewed by Hana Sandhu, transcript, 16 October 2013, https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/interviews/christabel-gurney.html; and AAM, “National Committee,” 7 May 1994, 1–4.

176. AAM, “National Committee,” 7 May 1994, 4–7; AAM, “Sekunjalo: Now is the time! A consultative document on the future of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, May 1994.” Bob Murphy’s Personal Collection; Anti-Apartheid News, June/July 1994; and Anti-Apartheid News, September/October 1994 (The Last Issue).

177. Simon Korner was the Secretary and Chair of Hackney AA group (1986–1994). Simon Korner interviewed by Matthew Battey, transcript, 23 September 2013, https://bit.ly/3syoZwu.

178. Lord Hughes of Woodside memories, 14 February 2014. Accessed 30 March 2021. https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/memories/mem01-lord-hughes-of-woodside.html?highlight=WyJodWdoZXMiXQ==