Global Citizenship and Empire

Abstract

Global citizenship is a concept that has been both propounded and critiqued on a number of grounds in recent scholarship, but little attention has been paid to what it might mean in an age of empire. Beginning with an analysis of American empire, the author argues that there has been an important shift in the meaning of imperial rule from what was initially a “realpolitik” version of empire in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to what has become a more “liberal” form of imperial power since late 2003. Whereas the former sought national security in a seemingly anarchical and hostile world, the latter has sought to spread a particular kind of globalized citizenship to the world, particularly in the Middle East. The author argues that the ideological grounding for such an imperial “civilizing mission” needs to be challenged through an alternative theorization of global citizenship. Thus, the second half of the article suggests a new theory of global citizenship rooted in two basic principles: social rights (in order to address the least well off) and shared fate (in order to draw the links between the north/south and east/west). Taken together, they provide a starting point for an alternative theory of global citizenship that speaks not simply against empire but to it.

Acknowledgements

The author wants to thank the organizers, Michael Byers and Mark Zacher, and the Trudeau Foundation, for inviting her to present an earlier draft of this paper to the Meanings of Global Citizenship conference, held at the Liu Institute for Global Issues in September 2005; and for the feedback and suggestions received from a number of the participants, including Jim Tully, Charles Jones, Daniel Weinstock, Radhika Desai, Will Kymlicka, Jane Jenson and Jon Beasley-Murray.

Notes

¹ In recent years, several leading academics have argued for a version of “global citizenship” through such terms as cosmopolitan (Nussbaum, 1996; Beitz, 1999a) or transnational citizenship (Habermas, 2001; Benhabib, 2004) as well as global citizenship (Dower, 2000).

² Thus, Michael Igantieff (2003) describes September 11 as a “moment of reckoning” that ushered in an “empire lite” in which America seeks to defend its own interests globally but over which it is in “deep denial”; Martin Walker talks about a virtual but “deeply reluctant” empire serving its interest rather than the common good that is more powerful than any previous empire (2002, p. 15); Niall Fergusson speaks of an “empire in denial” (2003a, 2003b) and Chalmers Johnson (2004) refers to a nation bent towards “world domination”.

³ The global military reach of American power is enormous and extends, through a network of bases throughout the entire world. “The US Army Special Operations Command was deployed in sixty-five countries” (Kaplan, 2003, p. 66); “[America] is the only nation that polices the world through five global military commands; maintains more than a million men and women at arms on four continents” (Ignatieff, 2003). For Martin Walker, comparisons between nineteenth century British empire and the current American empire in terms of military supremacy would leave the former far behind. “19th century Britain commanded nothing remotely akin to the current American military supremacy” (2002, p. 13). Chalmers Johnson writes of the 725 American military bases that exist outside of the United States: “Our militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities” (Johnson, 2004, p. 5).

⁴ As LaTorre points out, Richard Tuck (2001, p. 20) observes of the Roman empire: “It was this willingness to attach any potential danger which Rome sees itself as destined to be mistress of the entire orbis terrarum”. Ignatieff concludes: “Empire's interest has a right to trump the sovereignty of a state”.

⁵ Neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer comments on the UN: “The United Nations is guarantor of nothing. Except in a formal sense, it can hardly be said to exist” (1990, p. 25). Tony Judt comments on the cynicism amongst neo-conservatives and the current White House about the UN: “Neoconservatives have long since dismissed the UN as an irrelevance … The Bush administration has deliberately nominated as its next ambassador to the UN a man who holds the institution in contempt” (Judt, 2005).

⁶ http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050318-2282.html US, Department of Defense News Transcript, Special Defense Department Briefing on the New National Defense Strategy, 18 March 2005 with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Vice Director, Strategy Plans and Policy, Rear Adm. William Sullivan. It is clear that different parts of the administration are more likely to defend empire in different terms (the Pentagon taking up the realpolitik defense, the State Department taking up the liberal defense) and the fact that the Pentagon and the Defense Staff continue to view their role in realpolitik terms only speaks to the contradictions within the exercise of imperial rule. It is also true that the final arbitrator in these disputes, the President is more clearly on the side of Condoleeza Rice and the State Department in the last two years in his defense of democracy as the cornerstone of the war in Iraq and American foreign policy more broadly.

⁷ A week earlier, key journalists including Andrew Neil of BBC News were quoting White House sources on its content: “The bottom line is that the team has found no weapons of mass destruction”. “No WMD in Iraq, source claims”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2hi/uk_news/politics/3135932.stm. It is worth nothing that Bush's initial response (on the day following the report being tabled) was to stick to a realpolitk justification of the invasion, using it to reiterate that America invaded Iraq because of the potential threat to regional stability and national security: “[The report says] Saddam Hussein was a threat, a serious danger … the administration will deal with gathering dangers where we find them … I'll make tough decisions based upon what I think is right, given the intelligence that I know, in order to do my job, which is to secure this country” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031003-2.html, “Remarks by the President after a meeting with former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik”, 3 October 2003.

⁸ http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm. To put this decision in perspective, it is worth revisiting the 3 June 1997 founding document of the PNAC (signatories included Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz) that recommended American foreign policy in the twenty-first century model itself on the “Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity” in order to “shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests”. By referring to both “principles” and “moral clarity” the PNAC is laying the conceptual groundwork for a liberal as opposed to realpolitik empire. And one specific model they have in mind is America's foreign policy in Central America under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and more directly Elliot Abrams (also a signatory to the PNAC document). Francis Fukuyama, in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), also uses Reagan's foreign policy in the Americas as an example of the shift from a standard “realist” defense of stability in that region throughout the Cold War Era to Reagan's morally robust defense of “democracy”. Francis Fukuyama, “Do we really know how to promote democracy?” Speech given at the National Endowment for Democracy, 24 May 2005, http://www.ned.org/. The links between Central America, circa 1980 and the Middle East circa 2005, as Noam Chomsky (2003) has shown in some detail, are profound (both in philosophy and personnel). It is worth noting, in this regard, that President Bush appointed Elliot Abrams to direct his new “global democracy campaign” within the National Security Council in February 2005. Elliot Abrams, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-10.html, was appointed 2 February 2005 as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy.

⁹ Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 November 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-3.html.

¹⁰ Both Michael Ignatieff and Francis Fukuyama point to this tradeoff between stability and democracy as a key test of realism vs liberalism in America's approach to global affairs. Ignatieff argues that American power has on balance worked in defense of the former (stability); Fukuyama suggests there are important periods, including the present one, in which the latter is dominant. He remains skeptical, however, as to whether it will be sustained if democracy challenges, for example, the stability of the Saudi Arabian Royal family.

¹¹ http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-3.html. In June 2005 during a tour of the Middle East, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice reinforced this shift in American foreign policy: “Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.” “Rice calls for Mid-East Democracy”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4109902.stm, 20 June 2005, BBC News, UK Edition.

¹² “The people of Great Britain also might see some familiar traits in Americans. We're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists who often speak in terms of right and wrong … the United States and Great Britain share a mission in the world beyond the balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom brings. Together our nations are standing and sacrificing for this high goal in a distant land at this very hour.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html.

¹³ In September 2004 at the UN General Assembly Bush called on the UN to establish a democracy fund that would “help countries lay the foundations of democracy … Money from the fund would also help set up voter precincts and polling places, and support the work of election monitors.” George W. Bush, Address to the UN General Assembly, Tuesday, 21 September 2004, http://www.un.int/usa/04print_165.htm. In his Inaugural Address in January 2005 Bush picks up the same themes: “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” Consider, for a moment, this last phrase in light of the call to protect both “principles” and “interests” in American foreign policy in the original New American Century founding document. Bush also makes the case that America is the model for his theory of democratic global citizenship. “Americans, of all people, should never be surprised by the power of our ideals. Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul” (emphasis added), http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/.

¹⁴ I want to thank the anonymous reviewer of this article for pointing out the difference between “globalized” citizenship and “global” citizenship. I have used it here to make the case that Bush's liberal empire is really about globalizing a particular version of American citizenship.

¹⁵ http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo = 05-0113. The idea of “delivery” in the title “Delivering the Benefits of Democracy” is an interesting one (as opposed to the more traditional “spreading”) and suggests a kind of “just in time delivery” mechanism of business management practices. Democracy is a “deliverable” it would seem and as such a product in the global marketplace of ideas. Product placement of course is key and this is part of what Bush is doing.

¹⁶ “In the new Americas of the 21st century, democracy is now the rule, rather than the exception. Think of the dramatic changes we have seen in our lifetime. In 1974, the last time the OAS General Assembly met in the United States, fewer than half its members had democratically elected governments. Today, all 34 countries participating in this General Assembly have democratic, constitutional governments. Only one country in this hemisphere sits outside this society of democratic nations—and one day the tide of freedom will reach Cuba's shores, as well.” http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang = E&sLink = http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/home_eng/press.asp.

¹⁷ President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East, “Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy”, 6 November 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.

¹⁸ http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo = E-114/05.

¹⁹ Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, according to Gephardt, only 5% of the world's people having the right to freely choose their leader at the beginning of that century to 58% having the right by its end. Sociologist William I. Robinson provides some important insights into the meaning of “democracy” in American foreign policy suggesting that rather than calling it democracy promotion in American foreign policy, it would be better to understand it as “polyarchy”, a term he borrows from Robert Dahl but modifies in significant ways. Polyarchy Robinson argues is “ a system in which a small group actually rules on behalf of ‘transnational’ capital and mass participation in decision-making is limited to choosing among competing elites in tightly controlled electoral processes” (Robinson, 2004, p. 442).

²⁰ Richard Gephardt, “Spreading freedom: a mission for the American people”, National Endowment for Democracy, 22 March 2005, www.ned.org.

²¹ Aristotle, Politics (1980, 1279b: 20-1280a6, 1290a and b).

²² A Ten Year Strategy for Increasing Capital Flows to Africa, Commission on Capital Flows to Africa, The Corporate Council on Africa, June 2003, http://www.africacncl.org.

²³ In challenging the idea that democracy can be reduced to free elections, it is not to say that on this account transparent elections are unimportant. As events in the Ukraine demonstrate, elections can lead to political gains in many circumstances. To the extent elections are constructed as not simply a domestic concern but one with global dimensions is enormously powerful force as the presence of international monitors can be pivotal in keeping the state accountable to its electorate. The key is that elections cannot be imposed from outside (Iraq is the obvious example) but must emerge from within the country itself.

²⁴ In 2002–2004, the BC Citizens Assembly was created to consider alternative electoral system and make a recommendation that would be put to the general public through a referendum question. http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public.

²⁵ For a list of the MDGs see Sachs (2005, pp. 211–213).

²⁶ The World Bank page can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/incidence.htm. Also see Elbadawi (1991), Humphreys (2003), Collier & Hoeffler (1998). Collier and Hoeffler conclude “Africa's rising trend of conflict is due to its atypically poor economic performance” (p. 2). See also Fearon & Laitin (2003).

²⁷ Rice (2003, p. 2). See also the State Failure Task Force Reports, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/. From 1994 until 2000, the State Failure Task Force, funded by the CIA, analyzed the reasons for state failure in three phases.

²⁸ “Poverty breeds insecurity”, Millenium Project, 15 January 2005, Yale Globe Online. See < http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/>.

²⁹ I am very grateful to Doug Saunders of the Globe and Mail, both for insights into this question, through his column and subsequent emails, and sharing reports he had used in his own research.

³⁰ Max Farrar, “Leeds footsoldiers and London bombs”, Open Democracy.net, Online Magazine of Global Politics, 22 July 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/leeds_2696.jsp#.

³¹ As Jeffrey Sachs, in his book The End of Poverty, points out, between 1820 and 1998, the United States living standard increased 25 fold (the average income, in 1990 dollars, increases from $1200 to $30,000) while Africa's income increased only threefold ($400 per capita to roughly $1300).

³² Terror Free Tomorrow Poll of Indonesia, www.terrorfreetomorrow.org. See also related news article, “Muslim opinion of US improves” by Jennifer Harper, The Washington Times, 5 March 2005.

³³ Tony Blair attributes some of the blame for these violent attacks by “British born” citizens on the failure to “integrate” ethnic minorities into the dominant culture during a period when multicultural policies were implemented and rejects any notion that the war in Iraq could be a contributing factor. When asked at an August 2005 press conference if there should be an “end to multiculturalism” Tony Blair responded: “[We will] establish a commission that specifically addresses the question of integration … I think that when people are isolated in their own communities … that worries me. It worries me because I think there's a separateness there that might be unhealthy, and I just think we need to look at that and look at it in an honest way and learn from the experience of other countries as well.” http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp.

³⁴ “Spy agencies say Iraq war hurting U.S. terror fight”, Karen deYoung, Washington Postk, 24 September 2006, p. A01.

³⁵ If we consult opinion polls over the last year in America, we will find that the single most important problem (and the one in which Americans tend to trust Bush and the Republicans over Democratic challengers) is the question of preventing another terrorist attack on American soil and the war in Iraq. At the end of July 2005, the single most important issue was the “war in Iraq” at 19%, the economy at 15% and terrorism at 12%; the fourth most important issue was a whole range of issues all tied at 3%. CBS News Poll, 29 July–2 August 2005, N = 1222 adults nationwide, http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm.