Historical apologies as acts of symbolic inclusion – and exclusion? Reflections on institutional apologies as politics of cultural citizenship

Abstract

Institutional apologies for historical injustices can be conceived as acts of symbolic inclusion directed to people whose collective experiences and memories of the past have not been recognized in the hegemonic narratives of the past. However, in this article it is argued that such apologies also have exclusionary potential as vehicles of symbolic politics of citizenship in that they may designate the apologizing community, so that it effectively excludes cultural ‘aliens’, like migrants, from the community of ‘remedial’ citizens. The article suggests a crucial point is the rhetoric shifts when one is appealing to both cultural and political solidarity, as when apologizing in the name of the state but simultaneously invoking ‘our’ nation and ‘our’ history. Thus, the increasing number of institutional historical apologies is not necessarily incompatible with the trend of reinforcing the symbolic boundaries around ‘our’ historical–cultural communities that has been visible recently, e.g. in the demands for cultural canons and citizenship tests in many Western societies.

Keywords:

• claiming citizenship
• claims making
• obligations
• migrants
• identity
• citizenship

Acknowledgements

The argument in this article was outlined in two papers, at the Conference ‘Collective memory and the uses of the past,’ (University of East Anglia, 8 July 2006) and at the European Sociological Association ESA Conference (Glasgow, 5 September 2007). I am indebted to the audience at the sessions for their comments, and in particular to Michael Cunningham for his useful remarks. I am also grateful to the referees of the Citizenship Studies for their valuable suggestions, and to Jorma Kalela, Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen, John Torpey, Jörn Rüsen and Jeffrey Olick for the encouraging response to the various versions of the papers.

Notes

1. To the Finnish leadership, the alliance with Germany was a military rather than an ideological one. The Soviet Union had attempted to conquer Finland by invasion in 1939–1940, and though the plan did not succeed Finland lost part of her territory in the peace treaty in March 1940. Political pressure from the Soviet Union on Finland continued, however. Fearing the fate of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia which were effectively occupied by the SU during summer 1940, the Finnish Government decided to stake on Germany when Berlin offered Finland co-operation and a prospect of revanche when the anticipated war against Communism would commence. Military co-operation was designed in secrecy, and when the war between Germany and the SU broke out in June 1941, Finland joined in.

2. Prime Minister Lipponen's speech at the memorial for the eight Jewish deported, 5th November 2000 (in Finnish), available from: http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/ajankohtaista/puheet/puhe/fi.jsp?oid = 102938 [Accessed 22 January 2009].

3. The apology generated also negative reactions which betrayed that the retrieval of the Jewish experience of oppression by the Polish people was seen by some as an unwelcome addendum in the narrative of Poland's history.

4. Thompson concedes a ‘nation is sometimes said to be a group defined by a culture, language or religion […] but this way of using the term is not relevant to a theory of historical obligations and entitlements’ as cultural groups cannot ‘pursue policies or make and keep promises’ (2002, p. 72). Such non-political collectives may also have been ‘disadvantaged by their history’; that situation may justify claims for compensation on grounds of equity, not for a reparation on grounds of historical obligation (2002, p. 72).