Multiple imaginations of the state: understanding a mobile conflict about justice and accountability from the perspective of Assyrian–Syriac communities

Abstract

This article examines how the struggle for the recognition of genocide in the twentieth century opens up a political space which, on the one hand, generates historical discourses and imaginaries about the categories of victim and perpetrator and, on the other hand, redefines relationships between the state and its minority citizens. Genocide becomes a ‘critical event’, in the sense of Veena Das, that citizens from different ethnic, social and religious backgrounds use to express their positions concerning the repressive state practices they have been victims of. This expression creates a collective space of solidarity where parties support each other by adopting similar strategies in the struggle for state accountability. At the same time, it opens up a space for negotiation among the state, minority citizens and migrant communities regarding claims to rights and justice.

Keywords:

• Assyrian–Syriac community
• 1915 massacres
• diaspora
• politics of memory
• justice

Notes

 1. This article is based on my post-doctoral research supported by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany. The research was conducted primarily in Sweden, Germany and towns and villages of Mardin, south-eastern Turkey between December 2007 and September 2008. The material is drawn from informal meetings and semi-structured interviews with Assyrian–Syriacs in the diaspora and in Turkey. All the interviews were conducted in Turkish or Turoyo (a local dialect of Aramaic) and translated by my research assistants or host family members. The name of the informants and the names of towns and villages (with the exception of the main field site, Södertalje, Sweden) have been changed for reasons of confidentiality. The paper was presented at the conference ‘Re-thinking Citizenship’, held in Halle, Germany in November 2008, and later at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of the Nationalities in New York in April 2009. Earlier drafts significantly benefited from the comments of Julia Eckert, Brian Donahoe, Christian Struempell and anonymous reviewers. I want to thank all of them.

 2. Assyrian–Syriacs are an ethnic and religious minority community in Turkey. They historically co-existed with Kurds and Armenians in various forms of protector–protégé relationships in south-eastern Turkey. From the 1960s onwards, due to their political and economic marginalisation, they started emigrating to European countries, which, in turn, led to a sharp decline in their population in the region (from about 30,000 to 2500 in the 1990s; Armbruster 2002). The community's self-designation in Aramaic is ‘Suryoyo’ or ‘Suroyo’, which is translated as ‘Syrian’ in English and ‘Süryani’ in Turkish. However, the subjects of this study, mainly diasporic communities, use two separate terms, Assyrian and Aramean/Syriac, to refer to themselves. The use of these terms signifies a split within the community brought about by the ongoing struggle over the historical roots of their identity. The term Assyrian has been used most effectively among the nationalist activists in the diaspora. This discourse is based on the historical imagination and construction of a sense of continuity with the Assyrian Empire. Syriacs, on the other hand, identify themselves with the Arameans and reject the historical connections with the Assyrian empire while defining the Aramaic language and Christianity as the most crucial components of their identity. The naming issue deserves special attention. In the sections on the history of migration and the conclusive analysis, I will use both terms, as these sections refer to the common experience as well as the position concerning the recognition of the 1915 massacres as Assyrian/Syriac genocide. For the ethnographic part of the paper, I will use the terms Assyrian and Syriac according to the way the subjects choose to define themselves.

 3. Founded in 1978, the PKK initiated a clandestine movement in support of the right of self-determination and declared war on the Turkish state in 1984, which led to a large-scale conflict for 13 years that caused more than 30,000 casualties, the evacuation of 3000 villages and thousands of displaced people. The war ended with a unilateral ceasefire on the part of the PKK with the arrest of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Yet, since 2004, there has been an acceleration of conflict with myriad acts of violence.

 4. For similar discussions on the relationship between the remembrance of violence and the constitution of identity, see Pandey (2001), McGranahan (2005), Drexler (2007) and Tugal (2007).

 5. For examples of ethnographic work on mythical and phantasmatic effects of the state, see Taussig (1992), Siegel (1998), Aretxaga (2001, 2003), Navaro-Yashin (2002), Das (2004) and Biner (2007).

 6. Das (1995) uses the term ‘critical events’ to refer to any event that redefines traditional categories or leads to new forms of actions acquired by a variety of political actors.

 7. For examples of studies constructing the Turkish thesis, see Shaw and Shaw (1977), Simsir (1986), Gürün (1988) and Halacoglu (2002). For well-known examples of the Armenian thesis, see Hovannissian (1992), Dadrian (1995) and Bloxham (2005). For recent reviews of the Turkish historical sources on the events of 1915, see Göcek (2006).

 8. For a comprehensive analysis of the recent debates of the events of 1915, see Altinay (2006).

 9. The online campaign launched by intellectuals, activists and journalists in December 2008 that invited people to acknowledge the atrocities of the 1915 Armenian massacres and to apologise to the Armenian community was crucial for initiating a serious public debate about confronting the past atrocities in Turkey. The campaign (http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com) and public and official responses to this initiative deserve special analysis. For a recent example of critical debates on the meaning of the apology campaign, see Armenian Weekly, 25 April 2009.

10. For a few significant examples of anthropological work on this issue, see Armbruster (2001) and Sato (2001). For a classic study on Seyfo, see Yonan (1999). For a recent historical work on the massacres as well as other forms of relationships between Syriac Christians and Kurds between 1915 and 1916, see Gaunt (2006). For an analysis of the involvement of notable Kurdish families and a comparison of the situation between Armenians and Syriac Christians in Diyarbakir and Mardin, see Üngör (2006, 2009). For an ethnographic analysis of the memories of the 1915 massacres in the city of Mardin, see Biner (2010).

11. MED TV, the first international Kurdish television channel, had studios in England and Belgium and broadcasted programmes in six languages with a large audience scattered through Europe. The channel's licence was revoked in 1999 after the arrest of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and it was reopened in 2000 under the name of MEDYA TV.

12. The Kurdish Parliament in Exile was established in 1995 and held its first session in The Hague. It acted as a Kurdish diplomatic representation and has established contact with numerous parties and personalities in Europe. It had 65 deputy members, four of whom were Assyrian–Chaldean representatives. Some of its core members represented the pro-Kurdish party HEP in Turkey's parliament and asked for asylum in Europe. Other members represented various Kurdish associations and constituencies, most of them close to the PKK. For more information, see http://www.aina.org/releases/parexile.htm.

13. See http://www.aina.org/releases/parexile.htm for the press release of the decision of the parliament on the recognition of the Armenian and Assyrian genocide.

14. The Mesopotamia Freedom Party – GHB – is by and large recognised as the most influential political movement in the diaspora. Other parties such as the Freedom Party of Asuristan should also be mentioned as contributing to the foundation of the political movements around the recognition of Seyfo. The latter resisted forming alliances with the Kurdish political movement, and this is where their position differed from the Mesopotamia Freedom Party. Apart from that, it is important to highlight that not all the members and founders of the GHB had connections with the earlier Assyrian political organisations. However, none of the supporters or members would identify themselves as Syriac. The overall aim of the party was not to fall into the trap of sectarianism between Assyrian and Syriac organisations, but rather to achieve the status of being a common political ground for all Assyrians and Syriacs.

15. As I mentioned above, apart from the Mesopotamia Freedom Party (GHB), other Assyrian organisations and parties were involved in hunger strikes and other forms of protests concerning the recognition of Seyfo. The role of those Assyrian organisations and parties and their perception of the Bethnahrin Freedom Party deserve attention and further analysis. Furthermore, it is important to note that the Syriac organisations and associations refrained from any involvement and/or support for these protests. The situation is different at the moment, and the comparison between the Syriac and Assyrian organisations regarding the issue of Seyfo needs further research and analysis.

16. http://www.atour.com/government/docs/20010926a.html.

17. http://www.armtown.com/news/en/pan/20080612/26312/.

18. The Assyrian, Chaldean and Syriac Association (http://www.acsatv.com) based in Sweden and the Seyfo Centre (http://www.seyfocentre.com) based in Holland are the most active organisations that work for the official recognition of Seyfo as genocide. Their high level of activity does not necessarily mean that they have massive public support. Rather, they owe their efficacy and high publicity to their international political links.