Solace for the Frustrations of Silent Citizenship: the Case of Epicureanism

Abstract

Insofar as no democratic society can fully realize norms of free and equal citizenship, citizens in such regimes are likely to experience some degree of discontent with their political lives. This raises a second purpose for democratic theory beyond the usual focus on improving democratic institutions: the psychological issue of how ordinary citizens might find solace in the face of disappointment. Democratic theory is capable of providing solace because egalitarian commitments – equality, free speech, solidarity, and self-sufficiency – have a double potential: they not only ground efforts to democratize institutions, but when sublimated in apolitical form also have the capacity to generate a transcendence of the political form itself. In this essay, I pursue both ideas – the need for solace and egalitarianism's ability to provide it – through analysis of the way Epicureanism may have functioned for the ordinary, plebeian citizens in late Republican Rome.

Keywords::

• Epicureanism
• democracy
• solace
• egalitarianism
• plebeian
• Rome
• extrapoliticism
• silent citizenship

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this essay were presented at Columbia University's Political Theory Workshop and at a conference, ‘Spectating and Acting,’ at the University of Edinburgh. I am grateful to the participants at these venues – especially Bjorn Wee Gomes and Mathias Thaler – for their thoughtful suggestions about how to improve the piece. Thanks are also due to Nicole Hammons and Ting Lau for their excellent research assistance. Finally, I am indebted to the American Council of Learned Societies, which, in awarding me a Charles A. Ryskamp Fellowship for 2013–2014, helped to support the writing of this work.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

^1. To clarify, I do not think that all plebeians necessarily experienced their relatively silent form of citizenship as a psychological strain, only that some, if not many, can be surmised to have felt this way given their relative subordination vis-à-vis aristocratic elites.

^2. Although my own extrapolitical reading of Epicureanism is distinct, in recognizing the political–philosophical dimension of Epicureanism, I follow Nichols (1976) and Colman (2012). Moreover, it should be emphasized that, in recovering the extrapolitical significance of Epicureanism, I do not mean to deny that it might also have functioned in an antipolitical fashion, leading some to withdraw once and for all from politics to the maximum extent that such withdrawal might be possible.

^3. On the latter, see Epicurus (1994, 35 [PD, 31–33]).

^4. Nichols, who delineates and defends an Epicurean political philosophy, still recognizes that the pervasive view historically has been that “the Epicurean teaching seems to be altogether hostile to politics as such and to urge men to avoid public life” (1976, 14).

^5. For makaria—i.e. bliss, blessedness, and happiness—and its variant forms, see Epicurus (1994, 30–31 [M, 128, 134], 34 [PD, 27], 37 [VS, 17]).

^6. See also, Epicurus (2010, Fragment 485, translated in Epicurus 1994, 103): “For a man is unhappy either because of fear or because of unlimited and groundless desire; and by reining these in he can produce for himself the reasoning [which leads to] blessedness.”

^7. Insofar as tranquility might be understood as a kind of democratic value, something I elaborate below, then its defense over and against active or excessive political involvement may be seen as having a justification beyond the purely selfish concern with one's own pleasure.

^8. Here I follow the translation from Lucretius (1957).

^9. It is possible, of course, for rare individuals while living to have a clear sense of their future fame. See, e.g. Horace (1997, II.20; III.30).

^10. If Epicureanism is understood as preaching antipolitical withdrawal from politics—a reading I am trying to show in this article is not the only way to make sense of the Epicurean tradition—then, it cannot of course be of civic use to ordinary citizens who, as such, are defined by their enduring commitment to make use of their civic potential, however, inferior relative to that of the powerful, the very wealthy, and the prominent.

^11. In addition, recall, too, that it is just this feature of extrapoliticism—its temporary withdrawal from politics in the name of political ideas—that differentiates it from other sorts of apoliticism.

^12. Note as well the idea of a “pacified mind [pacata mens]” (Lucretius 1997, V.1203), which conveys a similar idea, also on the basis of a political metaphor.

^13. See, e.g. Brown (2009, 182): “Epicurus’ conception of friendship is much more demanding than the traditional ideal of ‘civic friendship’.”

^14. See, e.g. Epicurus (1994, 34 [PD 28]: “The same understanding produces confidence about there being nothing terrible which is eternal or [even] long-lasting and has also realized that security among even these limited [bad things] is most easily achieved through friendship.”

^15. Such an idea is perhaps further suggested in Epicurus’ claim: “Friendship dances around the world announcing to all of us that we must wake up to blessedness” (1994, 38 [VS, 52]).

^16. See, e.g. Epicurus (1994, 40 [VS 71]: “One should bring this question to bear on all one's desires: what will happen to me if what is sought by desire is achieved, and what will happen if it is not?” Also, see Horace (1929b, I.1.111–113).

^17. On the association of eleutheria with the negative status of not being a slave, see Hansen (2010). Similarly, with Lucretius (1977, V.1132–35), it is argued that rule does not normally benefit the ruler, because the ruler sacrifices independence: those involved in politics are wise “from the mouth of others” (alieno ex ore), because they must wage their pursuits based on other people's ideas. Also, see Nichols (1976, 142).

^18. Lucretius (1977, V.1430–35): “Therefore the human race always toils idly and in vain and consumes its lifetime in empty cares [curis inanibus]. No wonder, for it has not learned what the limit of possession is nor at all how far true pleasure can increase. And that [ignorance] little by little has carried life out onto the deep [sea] and stirred up from the bottom great waves of war.” Also, see ibid., V.1423–24; Nichols (1976, 172).

^19. See Cicero (1918, II.6): “What duty, what reputation, what glory will be of such value that the man who has once convinced himself that pain is the highest evil will be willing to seek to secure them at the cost of bodily pain? And further what shame, what degradation will a man not submit to in order to avoid pain, if he has once decided it to be the highest evil?”

^20. That Cicero worries about Epicureans’ irresponsible involvement in politics—and not just their irresponsible withdrawal—is a further reminder that we miss out on the full meaning of Epicureanism if it is reduced to an apolitical or antipolitical standpoint.

^21. Arendt, for instance, associates Epicureanism with “world alienation” and a “deep mistrust of the world” Arendt, (1958, 310; also see 112–13).

^22. [“neglegens, ne qua populus laboret, parce privatus nimium cavere et dona praesentis cape laetus horae, linque severa.”]