A philosophy of the theory of “acts of citizenship” woven into the fabric of a political anthropology of citizenship

ABSTRACT

The significance of Engin F. Isin’s theory of ‘acts of citizenship’ lies not only in its popularity amongst social scientists but, principally, in its engagement with a political anthropology of citizenship. In a collaborative spirit and committed to a political anthropology of citizenship, we critically engage with Isin’s theory, demonstrating how it builds on various normative difficulties that should be acknowledged by anyone using it as methodology, especially for those engaged in anthropologizing the field of citizenship studies. Our examination begins by showing how the theory draws from theoretical works belonging to the causalist school of the philosophy of action, which allows us to untangle the tacit didascaly through which Isin values the introduction of the concept of ‘act’ into our language(s) of citizenship. By tackling its underlying normative bias, we make clear the fundamental element of Isin’s argument: the refusal to reduce citizenship to mere unpurposive processes. Yet, it is unclear, we argue, how citizenship can effectively be captured through purposive processes by investigating ‘acts of citizenship’. Finally, we demonstrate how anthropology allows us to critically address the reductionism at play in the normative distinction between ‘active’ and ‘activist’ citizenship, constituting the very core of Isin’s theory.

KEYWORDS:

• Acts of citizenship
• citizenship
• political anthropology
• anthropology of citizenship
• philosophy of action

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. E.g., Balibar (2001, 2011, 2012, 2015), Bénéï (2005), Carrel et Neveu (2014), Dorlin (2007, 2009), Van Gunsteren (1998), Karmis and O'Toole 2018; Larcher (2014), Lister ([1997] 2003, 2007), Mouffe (1992a, 1992b, 1993), Neveu (1993, 1997, 2005, 2009, 2015), Phillips (1991, 1993, 1998), Rancière (2000), Skinner (1993, 2003, 2012), Somers (1994, 2008) Tully (1995, 1999, 2002, 2008a, 2008b, 2014), Werbner (1998), Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999), Young (1989, 1990, 2000).

2. According to Ayse Caglar, ‘[t]he common ground of anthropological approaches to citizenship is their emphasis on ‘‘politics from below’’ and on the venues of participation and rights beyond the official forms and state-endorsed rights’ (2015, 639).

3. Here, we must understand ‘comparison’ in its anthropological sense (Dumont 1983).

4. The theory has had a great impact in terms of reception. It has been widely used and discussed (e.g., Andrijasevic 2013, Aradau, Huismans, and Squire 2011; Barbero 2012; Balibar 2015; Bloch 2022; Çağlar 2015, 2016; Carrel and Neveu 2014; Castaneda 2013; Creese 2019; Darling 2017; Ennaji et al. 2021; Ferdoush 2019; Fortier 2016; Goldstein 2017; Horner 2015; Isin and Nielsen 2008; Isin and Nyers 2014; Jakimow 2022; Ki 2019; Kuntsman 2017; Larkins 2014; Lewicki 2017; Lewicki and O’toole 2017; López-Sala 2018; Mešić and Wikström 2021; Müller 2016, 2022; Neveu 2014; Ní Mhurchú 2015; Odasso 2021; Pontradndolfo 2018; Rhodes-Kubiak 2015; Saeidi 2010; Saward 2013; Sollid and Olsen 2019; Song 2022; Vermeersch 2014; Wasserman 2015).

5. The words ‘deed(s)’ and ‘act(s)’ are used by Isin without any distinction.

6. Isin’s conceptualization of an ‘act’ derives from the assemblage of a variety of philosophers’ work, including that of Hannah Arendt (1958), Mikhail Bakhtin (1993), Emmanuel Levinas (1978), Robert Ware (1973) and Adolf Reinach (1983).

7. It is worth mentioning that, as evident in the interview with Benson in this special issue (2023), this distinction is still relevant to Isin.

8. Ware puts to work ordinary language philosophy (or what Isin calls ‘common use’) in order to determine what belongs to ‘good’ or ‘deviant’ usages of ‘act’ and ‘action’ (Ware 1973, 403; also see: Isin 2008, 21, 2009, 378) – in a manner reminiscent of John L. Austin’s ordinary language philosophy (Austin [1962] 1964). We are not convinced by this approach (see Anscombe [1965] 1981). Neither are we convinced when Ware (1973, 409) argues that there is a difference between ‘acts’ and ‘actions’ on the basis that an ‘act of kindness’ does not imply ‘physical changes’. Are sentiments, emotions or affects (involved in kindness) and their physical characteristics (shivers, smiling, etc.) attached to another kind of world?

9. It is not surprising to see that Ware (1973, 415–416) cites Davidson (1963, 1969), a well-known representative of the causalist school.

10. For Peter Winch ([1958] 1990], xii), ‘[i]t follows that causal notions do apply to human behaviour. But it would be a great mistake to think that, in saying this, we are saying anything substantial about the form of explanation and understanding of his behaviour that is in question’.

11. Not all causalists distinguish ‘acts’ from ‘actions’. Yet, they tend to understand human actions/acts in a causalist fashion. When referring to an intentional doing, the ‘intention’ will be understood as an ‘internal’ or ‘mental’ cause (see Descombes [1995] 2001).

12. Ware follows Davidson’s (1963, 1969) as he considers that intentions are also causes: ‘[w]e do things, (unintentionally or intentionally) as long as we have a determining causal role’ (Ware 1973, 405–406).

13. For Ware (1973, 406), ‘[t]here is an act only when it makes sense to speak of the agent performing it at least partly because of the agent’s reasons’. Again, Isin is loyal to Ware’s conception of an ‘act’.

14. Isin will then turn to Reinach’s work (Reinach 1983). Using his language, Isin underlines the radicality of the opposition between ‘acts’ and ‘actions’, attributing a ‘virtual/ontological existence’ to the former (Isin 2008, 24-25, 2009, 379). Yet, this should not keep us from noting that this intervention is in direct continuity with Ware’s position in which ‘acts’ do not imply physical change in the world. Ware’s significant influence on Isin could easily be minimized by Reinach’s apparition.

15. An intentionalist like Geach ([1954] 2001 uses the expression ‘mental acts’, but the word ‘act’ takes on a different signification than the one given by Isin or Ware.

16. We do not have the space to expand on the arguments that the intentionalist school have provided to show how the causalist posture is untenable. See, for example, Anscombe ([1957] 2000, [1982] 2005), Descombes (1995, [1995] 2001), Winch ([1958] 1990), and Von Wright (1971).

17. We are following von Wright and Descombes’ way of distinguishing two broad conceptions: the causalist and the intentionalist (Descombes 1995, [1995] 2001; von Wright 1971).

18. We must admit that: 1) the same word can be used in two different ways, thus referring to two different concepts, and 2) that two different words can be used in the very same way, thus referring to the same concept. See, for example, Gunnel (2014, 46–147) or Wittgenstein ([1953] 2009, § 61–65) on the distinction between a ‘word’ and a ‘concept’, the latter being a specific usage of the former.

19. Andrijasevic (2013) also thinks of Isin’s theory as methodology.

20. These dolls, from three to five feet tall with movable limbs, are used in a traditional form of puppet theatre in Japan known as Bunraku. They are usually handled by three visible puppeteers, normally dressed in black and standing in between the set and the dolls to which they give life.

21. It seems Isin’s consequentialism comes from the way Ware (1973) and Reinach (1983) define ‘acts’ and seems to be Isin’s answer to the ‘counter effects’ problem (Isin 2009, 380–381), reminiscent of Donald Davidson’s way of handling the issue of the ‘double effect’ (see Anscombe [1982] 2005).

22. Ware’s influence is still at work here, as Ware (1973, 403–407) himself postulates that ‘[a]cts … can be done because of a decision … [or that] [t]hey require … the possibility of decisions being efficacious’.

23. It is as if the content of the decision is unworthy as its value rests only in its ‘causal role’.

24. Isin’s causalism recalls Davidson’s ‘ontology of events’ (Davidson 1980).

25. Let’s take, for example, the well-known incestuous scene in Sophocles’ Oedipus. If we were to deny the ‘intentional’ element of Oedipus’ doing (sleeping with a queen not known to him as his own mother), we would say he made love to his mother, thus performing an ‘act of incest’. We would be justified, from a consequentialist perspective, to say that he is an incestuous character for being one of the many causes that led to such an incestuous event. Yet, if we were to consider the ‘intentional’ element, we would not conclude that Oedipus is incestuous in the sense that he acted in an incestuous manner.

26. If, as Isin suggests, ‘[c]itizenship is enacted through struggles for rights’ (2009, 383), then we should be able to describe these struggles. But without making room for the actor’s (individual or collective) intentionality in our investigations, how can such a description be possible?

27. Mariot (2010) also does this, but with very different conclusions.

28. We lack the space to provide details, but to put it shortly, citoyenneté in France’s French will never be used to refer to such issues as obtaining a passport or being naturalized. Such dimensions will be described as pertaining to the realm of nationality (nationalité) rules. Of course things are much more messy from a practical point of view since only nationals are endowed with (most) citizenship rights, especially voting rights. The point here is that if citoyenneté also has a strong ‘statutory’ taste (calling as in a Pavlovian move the immediate mention of ‘rights and obligations’), it does not refer exactly to the same representations as does the English term citizenship. See Neveu (2005).

29. Isin will later be interested in putting into relation ‘acts’ and ‘descriptions’ (2012, chap. 4 and 5). We lack space to discuss this relation; especially when Isin, inspired by Ian Hacking’s work on the matter, says that ‘acts are descriptions’ (126). Such an ontological statement (acts are descriptions), which draws from a grammatical one (the sense of an ‘act’ can only be given by providing a certain description of it), would need to be thoroughly discussed before we could admit that it provides a solution to the normative problems raised here.