State and Army in Algeria: The ‘Bouteflika effect’

Abstract

Abdelaziz Bouteflika has neutralised the army as the longstanding principal power broker in the Algerian political system. The former foreign minister, elected president in 1999 and re-elected in 2004, has converted his prominence in international affairs into political capital at home. After reviewing the historical role of the military in Algerian politics, the article analyses Bouteflika's career and the process by which he has consolidated the power of a civilian presidency while encouraging the professionalisation of the military institution. In parallel fashion, he reclaimed control over the FLN from his electoral rival Ali Benflis.

Notes

1. King Hassan II, who had recently succeeded to the Moroccan throne, had convinced the French government to allow his ambassador in France to serve as his personal representative to the five detainees. Bouteflika entered under the cover of the Moroccan embassy for three days of talks. See the account of this mission in Malek (1995, pp. 190–193). Malek concludes his narrative: ‘L'alliance [of Boumediene and Ben Bella] est scellée’, p. 193.

2. Zeroual won 61.3 per cent of the vote. The other candidates were Mahfoud Nahnah of the Islamist party, Movement for a Society of Peace (ex-Hamas), who won 25.3 per cent; Said Sadi of the Berberist Rally for Culture and Democracy, polled 9.3 per cent; and Noureddine Boukrouh of the Party of Algerian Renewal received 3.8 per cent.

3. The website was operated by the Algerian Movement of Free Officers (MAOL).

4. In this regard, see Malley (1996).

5. See also pp. 160–167 for Bourges's impressions of the young Bouteflika. On the coup, see also Yefsah (1990).

6. In addition to Malley (1996), see Etienne (1977), Korani (1991) and Mortimer (1977). For a broader treatment, see Mortimer (1984).

7. In Benjedid's first government, Bouteflika was given an essentially honorific ministerial position as ‘counsellor to the president’. He was also re-elected to the Political Bureau of the FLN in June 1980.

8. In August 1983, the Cour des Comptes issued a ruling to the effect that Bouteflika owed the government 58, 868, 679 Algerian dinars (approximately US $12,268,000 at the 1983 exchange rate). El Moudjahid, 9 August, 1983.

9. Bouteflika spoke of this ‘traversée du désert’ on the French television channel TF1, for example, on 10 July, 1999 and on the European channel LCI on 12 September, 1999.

10. See the speculations of former prime minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali and retired general Rachid Benyellès as recounted in Benchicou (2004, pp. 36–37).

11. Interview with Paris-Match, 9 September, 1999; interview with Financial Times as cited in Garçon (1999, p. 407).

12. The cabinet contained an inner circle of personal presidential allies in such key posts as Interior, Finance, Energy, and Economic Reform and a broad spectrum of party representatives. The prime minister was Ahmed Benbitour, an experienced bureaucrat who had managerial qualifications that appealed to the army. Bouteflika replaced Benbitour with a close political ally, Ali Benflis, eight months later. Further down the road, Benflis and Bouteflika had a falling out that led the former to challenge the latter in the 2004 election.

13. Addi argued that Bouteflika's ‘margin of manoeuvre is very narrow so long as the generals who selected him remain in office […] [if] he seeks to exercise his full constitutional prerogatives as head-of-state […] one must expect some rude jolts’. Elsewhere Addi wrote ‘the presidency is in fact the emanation of the army, occupied by soldiers dressed in civilian clothes […] an institution by which the army controls the State’. See Addi (1999a, p. 39).

14. See the analysis by Ali Bahmane in El Watan, 19 January, 2003.

15. The ten signatories were Ali Yahia Abdennour, Ahmed Benbitour, Rachid Benyellès, Ali Benflis, Cherif Belkacem, Mouloud Hamrouche, Rédha Malek, Said Sadi, Mokdad Sifi and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi.

16. Even before 11 September, 2001, Bouteflika had cultivated closer Algerian relations with NATO as illustrated by the visits of NATO representatives in September 1999 and June 2001. Subsequently in December 2001, Bouteflika visited NATO headquarters in Brussels, something that no previous Algerian head-of-state had done. Algeria joined NATO's ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ framework in March 2000.

17. The final official results as announced by the Constitutional Council were: Bouteflika 84.99 per cent; Benflis 6.42 per cent; Abdallah Djaballah 5.02 per cent; Sadi 1.94 per cent; Louisa Hanoune 1 per cent; and Ali Fawzi Rebaïne 0.63 per cent. For a thoughtful analysis of the election, see Parks (2005). See also Beaugé (2004) who wrote ‘one would have to be very naïve, or of very bad faith, to argue that there was no fraud in the 8 April presidential election’ while nonetheless granting that Bouteflika did get the most votes.

18. Presidents Boumediene and Benjedid had both served officially as minister of defence in certain governments. Toward the end of his tenure, Benjedid named chief-of-staff Nezzar as minister of defence; in 1993 the HCE named Zeroual to this post prior to his becoming president. All of course were military officers. Bouteflika was Algeria's first civilian minister of defence.

19. As Ali Bahmane observed: ‘The important changes […] in the structures and command of the ANP drastically revise the former military hierarchy […] [which is turning] toward much less political but more technical roles. It required new leadership to effect this shift […] The transformation of the ANP is destined to continue via the emergence of new younger officers characterized essentially by their […] professionalism.’ El Watan, 7 August, 2004. See also his editorial of 10 August, 2004 in El Watan.

20. See his remarks at the March 2003 congress as reported in Jeune Afrique/L'Intelligent, 2003, p. 47.

21. Bouteflika's policy was reminiscent of that of Charles de Gaulle in the early 1960s when he developed a French nuclear strike capability (‘force de frappe’) to restore morale to the dispirited army that he had withdrawn from Algeria. Bouteflika, who met with de Gaulle on a few occasions in his capacity as Algerian foreign minister, has expressed his admiration for the French leader.

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Notes on contributors

Robert Mortimer

Robert Mortimer is Professor of Political Science at Haverford College in Haverford, Pennsylvania. His books include The Third World Coalition in International Politics (Westview Press, 1984) and Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (3rd edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), and he is the author of numerous articles on Algerian politics and diplomacy.